From some of the msm articles posted on here of late (eg over the last two pages) quoting the new DefMin he seems to be cognizant of the increase in maritime capabilities including maritime threats within our wider region and seems to be hinting that he would like to see NZ doing more.
For example in this
article "
He said that although New Zealand had made some investments already, the government needed to consider more, especially for the country's navy".
And in this
article "
The deal’s centrepiece - Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines - has attracted most attention, along with its eye-popping $400 billion price tag. But as Little notes, our trans-Tasman neighbours are far from alone in ramping up their military spending, with Japan and the Philippines among Asia-Pacific nations putting more money into defence. “Even when you look at what China is doing and their hugely significant additional spend on their military capability over the last 20 years, with a much, much larger military, and particularly maritime capability, we can't stand aside and say, 'Nothing to see here and we'll kind of just carry on what we're doing' - it is a debate we have to have as a country.”"
In the same article (as well as others) DefMin Andrew Little is reported as wanting to fast-track the review of New Zealand’s defence policy (and IIRC including the Future Force Design Principles).
Now of course what the DefMin wants (or supports) would still need to be discussed at Cabinet level (and in order to gain funding) so nothing is a given. Nor is it clear what he means in terms of investing more in for example the Navy. For example is he talking about capabilities or the basics like personnel, pay and conditions and accommodation, infrastructure, opportunities for exercising and training with overseas counterparts and so on ... or all of the above?
An obvious major initiative would be to strengthen (increase) personnel numbers across the three services (including pay and conditions and accommodation etc) as having a larger critical mass would reduce outputs and capability failures. There really does need to see a significant step change in this space otherwise what follows (eg capabilities) would still be both "token" and unsustainable when there are competing demands or pressures (deployments, attrition etc).
By way of example and in general terms, for the Army the reliance on the Reserve Forces to strengthen the Regular Forces on deployments needs reassessing as it is no longer for for purpose (imo) and hasn't been for a long time now. The current model (two RF battalions dates back to the 1950's/60's and NZ contributing force elements in SE Asia to integrate into allied structures) needs to see change because of demands and pressures for the Army to deploy now and in the future (potentially to multiple locations overseas for combat/support and supporting international training initiatives eg Iraq recently, UK currently regards Ukraine) and as well as demands and pressures on the home front (including the South Pacific) in terms of HADR, civil defence emergency response and counter terrorism etc).
Ideally then and although the emphasis needs to be on NZ's maritime sphere, the issue of the Army Regular Force numbers needs further addressing/growing compared to even what the DCP19 was advocating under previous DefMin Ron Mark (and of course this would be over time to grow numbers and experience so this is a longer term project etc). For the Reserves perhaps fortuitously the Govt is acknowledging nowadays there is the need to strengthen Reserve Forces in the regions and there appears to already have been some thinking on this (covered previously in this thread last year), as well in recent times with the February cyclones reinforcing this (again mentioned in some msm articles). Presumably the Defence Review will provide some guidance and options and perhaps this could end up being a shorter or medium term project (after all this would be a mix of new personnel and existing experienced personnel when leaving the forces etc). Again pay and conditions are important here to ensure there is sufficient interest to sustain this, especially in terms of balance when managing their civilian job prospects. It has been suggested by others previously that one initiative could be, if additional funding to sustain this is problematic due to competing funding demands across govt let alone defence, could perhaps be to institute a form of tax credit whereby personnel could claim back a portion of their tax payments either annually (could make a nice bonus to look forward to each year of service) or perhaps on a semi-regular basis to assist with cost of living demands?
For Air Force it seems to be clear that a loss of critical mass occurred with the disbanding of the air combat force back in 2001, in terms of personnel numbers as a whole, but also by way of the ACF also providing pathways for senior pilots and maintainers to move to other areas such as the airlift/air transport or maritime patrol fields (and particularly nowadays, to work for contractors as civilians back on base ensuring that important institutional knowledge and experience is retained and passed on to the younger generations coming through). So ideally the area of ACF would be addressed, as a longer term project, because of the range of benefits that would result across the spectrum as mentioned let alone for capability and whole of defence support reasons, but also politically/diplomatically it would signify to NZ's partners and allies that NZ is taking its defence obligations seriously and would surely be welcomed. As a recruitment tool it would be invaluable.
In the short (eg 2025-ish) to medium term (eg pre-2030) presumably supplementing existing capabilities would both strengthen the RNZAF's capabilities (increase critical mass to sustain deployments) and be easier to achieve due to the experience already existing (save for increasing and retaining personnel numbers over time). There are plenty of do-ables here for example enhancing the medium utility helicopter fleet (eg additional NH90's or supplementary heavy lift helicopters), which would ensure better sustainment of NZ/South Pacfiic HADR and overseas Army deployments. Certainly another two P-8 Poseidon's would ensure at least concurrent deployments (certainly another four would guarantee that and allow for additional contingencies), and politically/diplomatically it would be a win for the Govt. Additional C-130J-30's would round things off and if the future 757 replacement scope were to include both ramped and non-ramped types that would finally give the NZDF the strategic airlift capabilities it requires to match the lift and distances it needs to work with. None of this is excessive (if anything it is the absolute minimum), if we were to be taking things to the next level these numbers would rise again and to counter the threats the NZDF could also encounter would perhaps have provision for the likes of EW and/or maritime strike and/or early warning platforms or capabilities - perhaps these could be put into the longer term projects/options (post 2030)?
For Navy, although this is an area that does need strengthening (like the Air Force their combat capabilities have reduced in recent times) there does seem to be a recurring pattern of ongoing (years and years of) not having sufficient personnel/skillsets to ensure all vessels can put to sea, so this area needs addressing as a priority. So perhaps or ideally they also need larger critical mass to ensure enough vessels can be put to sea (and supported) so that there is coverage, concurrent coverage, when a critical issue develops. I think DCP19 suggested a fairly reasonable (but minimum) navy structure consisting of two sea-lift vessels, Pacific and Southern Ocean patrol vessels and auxiliaries ... but what is missing is enhancing the Combat side of things.