NZDF General discussion thread
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Gracie1234
Well-Known Member
WIth Japan doubling its defence budget i believe that it will be near impossible for NZ to not allocate a min of 2% GDP towards defence spending. With the region getting more unstable and all of our friends spending significantly more than us, if we do not align with them then our seat at the table will get smaller. That is not a position any govt would accept. Case in point Russia and China just veto any increase in maritime protected areas in Antarctica, even though this was agreed in 2004. All of these 'little' things are adding up.
When we were at lower investment rates we were not outliers but with a lot of other countries(friends) who had also reduced their investment to a minimum level. With our friends hitting a floor level of 2% GDP we will be pulled up to that level.
I do not see us being able to fund an ACF force unless we invest 2.5% GPD. There are just too many other priorities as has been stated by others.
These include:
Increasing our surveillance capability and response capability, more P8s, drones and the lower level manned maritime surveillance capability
Replacing our frigates, OPVs, transport and increase in drones
Increasing the combat capability of the army across all of their capabilities
This is an interesting interview.
When we were at lower investment rates we were not outliers but with a lot of other countries(friends) who had also reduced their investment to a minimum level. With our friends hitting a floor level of 2% GDP we will be pulled up to that level.
I do not see us being able to fund an ACF force unless we invest 2.5% GPD. There are just too many other priorities as has been stated by others.
These include:
Increasing our surveillance capability and response capability, more P8s, drones and the lower level manned maritime surveillance capability
Replacing our frigates, OPVs, transport and increase in drones
Increasing the combat capability of the army across all of their capabilities
This is an interesting interview.
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Thanks for the detailed answer Ngati.
I found this to be a very interesting point. Would you start here and then work else what you can do given budget constraints.
Regards,
Massive
Nor me. It looks as if it's not been published.
IMO NZ has the opposite problem to Australia.
They simply don't spend enough to sustain the desired capability, even though the have been very smart on acquisition and operate extremely professionally.
We on the other hand have made bad procurements and acquisitions, spend huge sums of money and still cut capability.
They simply don't spend enough to sustain the desired capability, even though the have been very smart on acquisition and operate extremely professionally.
We on the other hand have made bad procurements and acquisitions, spend huge sums of money and still cut capability.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I would say instead that NZ has sometimes been very smart about acquisitions whilst other times, not so much... The C-130H MLU/SLEP programme comes to mind as an example. Instead of NZ acquiring new transport aircraft, it was decided to have upgrades and a life extension done of the RNZAF Hercs which had been in service since the late 1960's, so that another decade of service could be gotten from them instead. Aside from the programme running significantly behind and over initial expected costs, it turned out that the amount paid for upgrades to the five -H Hercs could have purchased (at the time, IIRC) four new C-130J Hercs which could easily see ~25 years of service.
That is certainly an example of trying to do something on the cheap and having it cost significantly more than expected particularly when weighed against the delivered capability.
Project Protector is another example of procurement that IMO did not really deliver either, though I have always had a strong suspicion that a significant part of what I see as issues was caused by politics imposing requirements or making decisions based upon ideological reasoning. I otherwise cannot see why a sealift vessel based off a commercial ro-ro vessel operated in the Irish Sea would have been selected with an ice-strengthened hull and named a "multi-role" vessel with the expectation that a sealift vessel would also conduct patrol operations. One has to also remember that this selection took place after it had been determined that the Charles Upham was not fit for service.
I have been quietly following this thread and the arguments for and against reintroducing an ACF.
It seems the main reason advocates for an ACF use is, for want of a better term, “invasion of the homeland”.
What is the strategic imperitive? why would China ever wish to invade NZ?
The only answer I can surmise is, if the Chinese invaded Oz to secure much needed resources and they thought that NZ provided a base for an allied counter offensive, they may consider neutralising NZ and then 16 RNZAF F 16s might be an annoyance.
But this scenario is deeply in la la land.
Therefore, let NZ use its treasure and manpower on more useful endeavours many of which have been proposed here, AEW, Frigates and Maritime surveillance (P8 and drones).
It seems the main reason advocates for an ACF use is, for want of a better term, “invasion of the homeland”.
What is the strategic imperitive? why would China ever wish to invade NZ?
The only answer I can surmise is, if the Chinese invaded Oz to secure much needed resources and they thought that NZ provided a base for an allied counter offensive, they may consider neutralising NZ and then 16 RNZAF F 16s might be an annoyance.
But this scenario is deeply in la la land.
Therefore, let NZ use its treasure and manpower on more useful endeavours many of which have been proposed here, AEW, Frigates and Maritime surveillance (P8 and drones).
i asked a stupid question in google and this is what came back
Gives it a range of 8000nm I have no idea where the info came from or for that matter if it is correct.
Edit cancel my last that info applies to a Heavy Cruiser from the 30's
A thought crossed my mind in regards to NZ. I am normally opposed to jack of all trades platforms, but when you are talking a really small defence force that doesn't have the manpower or huge budgets, but does have highly trained, professional personnel, then they become more practical.
NZ needs more ships in each category than they can man. It makes sense then that what they buy should be as large as can be afforded, as capable as can be afforded, and to a greater degree than usual, multi roled.
Maybe instead of OPVs NZ should look at the OPV role being undertaken by a multirole ship such as a modern APD (assault transport), with an OPV systems fitout, but designed for installation of corvette or frigate level systems if required.
Instead of frigates, invest in a multi role aviation ship with significant C3I and a frigate sensor / weapons suite. This ship could operate the MRH as well as what ever replaces the SuperSeaSprite, with accommodation for an infantry company.
NZ needs more ships in each category than they can man. It makes sense then that what they buy should be as large as can be afforded, as capable as can be afforded, and to a greater degree than usual, multi roled.
Maybe instead of OPVs NZ should look at the OPV role being undertaken by a multirole ship such as a modern APD (assault transport), with an OPV systems fitout, but designed for installation of corvette or frigate level systems if required.
Instead of frigates, invest in a multi role aviation ship with significant C3I and a frigate sensor / weapons suite. This ship could operate the MRH as well as what ever replaces the SuperSeaSprite, with accommodation for an infantry company.
Are you suggesting something along the lines of the Fassmer 120 MPV crew 60 plus 240 grunts about 6000 tonn
Takao
The Bunker Group
The one downside of reusing names.... Of course, I'm a fan of reusing names #UnlikeStupidHunters
Of course, after D+5, that Mogami would likely be the toughest beast in the region...
Why.
Yes NZ would provide a base for an allied counter offensive, it also could be used as a Base along with say the Solomon's to isolate Australia from direct help from the US. An other factor could be food or water as it is predicted that these will be in short supply in the next couple of decades.
The other factor to be considered which has already been mentioned is that NZ is a significant distance from the operational radius of any land based strike type aircraft, which means that any strike aircraft based in NZ have automatic air superiority.
The other factor to keep in mind is that to establish an AFC takes between 1 and 2 decades, but expanding one from an existing practice and knowledge base can be done a lot quicker.
Why 16 F16's? the aircraft type and number is irrelevant if a AFC is reformed the question of numbers or type will be dictated by the situation of the time and the money available.
NZ is currently very vulnerable to just about any form of aggression currently and an AFC reduces this vulnerability significantly.
Far from being of a nuisance value, an well organized AFC could dominate the region out to 800 to 1000km from NZ due to the lack of close available assets for combat strike type aircraft with in their radius or action.
China? who knows what will be wanting to dominate this area in 20 years or 50 years time. Look at WW2 Germany rose from total defeat and military inconsequence to starting a war that engulfed the world in a little over 20 years
One final thought is that one AFC sqn in NZ would have on a per aircraft basis, a significantly smaller area to cover than than the Australian RAAF strike fleet.
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Stuart M
Well-Known Member
No, the main argument is not prevention of invasion, it is the efficient prevention of coersion of policy choice through physical means.
Listing to some to some of issues raised on, I'll add my thoughts on the various issue:
Personnel Issues
These stem solely from the terms and conditions of service in the Defence Act which allow for release with 3 months notice. This period of time means that NZDF has no time to even recruit, let alone train replacements. The only two viable options are to retain the current arrangements and extend the minimum period of notice to 12 months or shift to a fixed term period of say 4 years (Infantry, Logisitics etc), 7 years (Marine Engineers, Plumbers, Avionics Tech etc.) and 10-12 years for officers (I believe the RN has a 12-year term for officers with a 1-year notice). It is interesting to note from an historical perspective that prior to the change in the terms in conditions in 1977-78 (from memory), the navy was able to maintain the necessary personnel to maintain all its ships except when there was a little munity (for valid cause) around pay issues in 1947.
Speaking of which there needs to be an across-the-board pay rise in the NZDF. I do not believe it has received an across the board rise since for a number of years (i.e., before the Labour party got into power). The higher salaries commission should be tasked with determining that.
Air Combat Force
I have never seen the Air Combat Force as a requirement to defeat an invasion. Simply put the logistics in trying to mount an invasion on NZ, make it near but not impossible to achieve. However, that does not mean that NZ is not immune from military threats to its sovereignty and a viable Air Combat Force is a critical deterrent IMHO to that. It does not necessarily have to be a 40 strong force that mixed advanced trainers and A4K, though you could argue if the purpose is to deter aircraft carriers, then such a force is justified. From a purely NZ perspective a twin engine fast jet is required (ability to recover on one engine and range been the deciding factors) focused on maritime strike, air defence and strategic strikes on say naval bases, airfields etc. (if you intend to operate overseas). The numbers depend on whether governments seen them as a contributor to international operations. If a sustained but limited overseas deployment capability is required by government then a minimum of three to four operational flights of 4-6 aircraft would be required. I would emphasize quality over quantity in this area.
While I have some sympathy for an Attack Helicopter Squadron to support 1 Brigade, I seem to recall that Afghanistan experience showed that fast jets could arrive on site sooner, remain on station longer and carry more stores. Something like the FA-50 might be more appropriate from an NZ perspective say in Australia, but operations into the Pacific lean more to a rotary attack capability (short of purchasing an aircraft carrier or F35B)
That said I do agree the first emphasis right now should be on sorting out the shortfalls in current capability. I tend to agree with most suggestions around additional helicopters, P8A with standoff weapons, improved tactical / strategic lift etc. The one area I have concerns with is the integration of large UAV into New Zealand air space and civilian traffic control systems. I don't have the necessary knowledge in this area to come to a conclusion.
Navy
I concur with the general view that 3 frigates are required, but I am open to the Type 31 as I am the Type 26 or another class, but realistically I suspect keeping it in the 5Y family might prevail. In terms of other capabilities, I would lean towards a further 9 Blue water ships (assuming the personnel issues above are addressed). I would replace Manawanui and the IPV with a single class of a multi role vessel of around 1,800 Tonnes - UAV capability only, dynamic positioning and modular diving capability. (Lt Cdr level command). I would replace Canterbury, the OPV and the proposed logistics ships with 4 Damen Cross type Vessels, however NZ would need to decide on the size of the rotary wing given the limitations on the Damen Crossover (so the Fassmer design might work). That leaves the POLAR OPV and the AOR. Any inshore capability should be a secondary consideration taking into account Whole of Government as well as potential defence usage.
My aim is to consolidate the number of classes, systems etc. operated by the navy. So a common Combat Management System for the Frigates and Damen vessels, ExLS say for the frigate and Damen for Local / Point Air Defence as examples.
Personnel Issues
These stem solely from the terms and conditions of service in the Defence Act which allow for release with 3 months notice. This period of time means that NZDF has no time to even recruit, let alone train replacements. The only two viable options are to retain the current arrangements and extend the minimum period of notice to 12 months or shift to a fixed term period of say 4 years (Infantry, Logisitics etc), 7 years (Marine Engineers, Plumbers, Avionics Tech etc.) and 10-12 years for officers (I believe the RN has a 12-year term for officers with a 1-year notice). It is interesting to note from an historical perspective that prior to the change in the terms in conditions in 1977-78 (from memory), the navy was able to maintain the necessary personnel to maintain all its ships except when there was a little munity (for valid cause) around pay issues in 1947.
Speaking of which there needs to be an across-the-board pay rise in the NZDF. I do not believe it has received an across the board rise since for a number of years (i.e., before the Labour party got into power). The higher salaries commission should be tasked with determining that.
Air Combat Force
I have never seen the Air Combat Force as a requirement to defeat an invasion. Simply put the logistics in trying to mount an invasion on NZ, make it near but not impossible to achieve. However, that does not mean that NZ is not immune from military threats to its sovereignty and a viable Air Combat Force is a critical deterrent IMHO to that. It does not necessarily have to be a 40 strong force that mixed advanced trainers and A4K, though you could argue if the purpose is to deter aircraft carriers, then such a force is justified. From a purely NZ perspective a twin engine fast jet is required (ability to recover on one engine and range been the deciding factors) focused on maritime strike, air defence and strategic strikes on say naval bases, airfields etc. (if you intend to operate overseas). The numbers depend on whether governments seen them as a contributor to international operations. If a sustained but limited overseas deployment capability is required by government then a minimum of three to four operational flights of 4-6 aircraft would be required. I would emphasize quality over quantity in this area.
While I have some sympathy for an Attack Helicopter Squadron to support 1 Brigade, I seem to recall that Afghanistan experience showed that fast jets could arrive on site sooner, remain on station longer and carry more stores. Something like the FA-50 might be more appropriate from an NZ perspective say in Australia, but operations into the Pacific lean more to a rotary attack capability (short of purchasing an aircraft carrier or F35B)
That said I do agree the first emphasis right now should be on sorting out the shortfalls in current capability. I tend to agree with most suggestions around additional helicopters, P8A with standoff weapons, improved tactical / strategic lift etc. The one area I have concerns with is the integration of large UAV into New Zealand air space and civilian traffic control systems. I don't have the necessary knowledge in this area to come to a conclusion.
Navy
I concur with the general view that 3 frigates are required, but I am open to the Type 31 as I am the Type 26 or another class, but realistically I suspect keeping it in the 5Y family might prevail. In terms of other capabilities, I would lean towards a further 9 Blue water ships (assuming the personnel issues above are addressed). I would replace Manawanui and the IPV with a single class of a multi role vessel of around 1,800 Tonnes - UAV capability only, dynamic positioning and modular diving capability. (Lt Cdr level command). I would replace Canterbury, the OPV and the proposed logistics ships with 4 Damen Cross type Vessels, however NZ would need to decide on the size of the rotary wing given the limitations on the Damen Crossover (so the Fassmer design might work). That leaves the POLAR OPV and the AOR. Any inshore capability should be a secondary consideration taking into account Whole of Government as well as potential defence usage.
My aim is to consolidate the number of classes, systems etc. operated by the navy. So a common Combat Management System for the Frigates and Damen vessels, ExLS say for the frigate and Damen for Local / Point Air Defence as examples.
I feel there is a rational and an emotional aspect to so much of this.
For instance, I understand all the rational arguments for no having an ACF - opportunity cost, addressing very low probability events etc etc.
However, for me, the only situation where the outcome of an event is truly disastrous is when conflict impacts home.
If I was a Kiwi, I would want to have an ACF. This may be irrational, but I expect the defence force to provide a robust defence, regardless of how low the probability of the very adverse outcome.
My expectation of the ADF having effective land power backed by sufficiently large and adequately equipped reserves to generate effective mass reflects the same.
Regards,
Massive
I would disagree with you on the logistics. Due to our current lack of defence ability, most of the logistics could be achieved with current commercial ships or aircraft, as we would have no current way of stopping this from happening and any initial wouldn't have to be of any significant size, simply take control of the port of your choice, preferably with a good size airport and run from there.
ASSAIL, I'm surprised this highly unlikely scenario is your take-away from this discussion.
I'm assuming that in the short term, if NZ rediscovers its responsibilities as a nation and neighbour, then the increasing of existing scarce resources such as P-8A and FFG are a priority. In the medium term, especially with a traditional Western maritime nations perspectives, and for the same reasons as why RAAF has enhanced combat capability over the past few years, then we might quickly identify that RNZAF Air Power has a key role to play and find suitable ways to reestablish this mission over time.
To look at EW or large UAS specialist platforms may be too niche when the nation wants maximum balance and capabilities from a small force. The ACF missions are universally consistent whether they are in direct defence of NZ (least likely), contributing to a long term JTF in PNG or NW Australia (certainly possible), or part of a small Coalition operation (very likely). The ACF capabilities provide speed, firepower, and flexibility. With suitable aircraft like F-35s multiple roles can be flown ISO the physical, kinetic, requirements of the nation of NZ. These unique characteristics are what NZG has lost and why, if professionally assessed, they could be resurrected.
I'm assuming that in the short term, if NZ rediscovers its responsibilities as a nation and neighbour, then the increasing of existing scarce resources such as P-8A and FFG are a priority. In the medium term, especially with a traditional Western maritime nations perspectives, and for the same reasons as why RAAF has enhanced combat capability over the past few years, then we might quickly identify that RNZAF Air Power has a key role to play and find suitable ways to reestablish this mission over time.
To look at EW or large UAS specialist platforms may be too niche when the nation wants maximum balance and capabilities from a small force. The ACF missions are universally consistent whether they are in direct defence of NZ (least likely), contributing to a long term JTF in PNG or NW Australia (certainly possible), or part of a small Coalition operation (very likely). The ACF capabilities provide speed, firepower, and flexibility. With suitable aircraft like F-35s multiple roles can be flown ISO the physical, kinetic, requirements of the nation of NZ. These unique characteristics are what NZG has lost and why, if professionally assessed, they could be resurrected.
I can’t see any strategic benefit for NZ in allocating scarce resources to an ACF.
In all the JTF examples you quote, greater advantage would be gained (at lower cost) by the RNZAF contributing tactical airlift, surveillance and other capabilities already in service and expanded.
It’s a cost benefit proposition, what will the NZDF forgo in acquiring an ACF? The RNZN perhaps?
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
Why do they need to forgo anything? If history is any guide money goes where it's politcaly expedient or simply meets a unavoidable requirement, like disaster recovery.
Fact of the matter is that NZDF successfully ran an ACF as part of a relatively balanced force until it was no longer fiscally or ideologically expedient for two successive governments. Absent those two factor's there is no reason for it not to be restored, imo.
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
I think the question on this is one of possible vs probable; An invasion is certainly possible for the reasons you suggest, but put that in the context of a war that would invariably also involve the five eyes and associated others and then it becomes a question of logistics. Holding anything that might be initially gained becomes significantly riskier and less sustainable after the element of surprise is lost for any forces that can be sustained beyoned the hostile nations primary ara of operations becuase of interdiction of supply.
I think that any successful attacks on NZ by land units is more likely, and sustainable, from SF attacks on political and economic targets backed by harbour mining and missile strikes from surface/subsurface vessels.