NZDF General discussion thread

Todjaeger

Potstirrer

To assist in getting everyone back on duty there is a lot to discuss in the link above. And please actually read the darn thing before posting.
So far, I am part way through the Maritime Security reset piece by Timothy Portland and while I have not finished reading and digesting it, my thoughts so far are that I am not impressed. It seems that the author feels that the Project Protector programme was a success, and that because it would cost too much money for the RNZN to retain a combat-focused fleet and that RNZN should instead be refocused to provide a constabulary capability to contribute to regional stability. In effect (and even trying to use the USCG as a model) he seems to argue for the RNZN to become the RNZCG...
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
So far, I am part way through the Maritime Security reset piece by Timothy Portland and while I have not finished reading and digesting it, my thoughts so far are that I am not impressed. It seems that the author feels that the Project Protector programme was a success, and that because it would cost too much money for the RNZN to retain a combat-focused fleet and that RNZN should instead be refocused to provide a constabulary capability to contribute to regional stability. In effect (and even trying to use the USCG as a model) he seems to argue for the RNZN to become the RNZCG...
I reckon Dr Lance Beath has placed it in their as a soft cushy liberal counterpoint to some of the more measured contributions such as the piece by Simon Murdoch who though not listed in the brief bio was the Director of the GCSB for a while and would be more aware than Portland to the real politique of where the geo-strategic land lies. Mr Portland is obviously an MFAT hang over from the Clark era. I can just imagine him with his "partner" strumming his guitar along to his favourite Billy Bragg CD's on summer Saturday evenings in the conservatory of his Wadestown villa over a $90 bottle or two of Moy Hall Pinot Noir.
 

Shanesworld

Well-Known Member
I reckon Dr Lance Beath has placed it in their as a soft cushy liberal counterpoint to some of the more measured contributions such as the piece by Simon Murdoch who though not listed in the brief bio was the Director of the GCSB for a while and would be more aware than Portland to the real politique of where the geo-strategic land lies. Mr Portland is obviously an MFAT hang over from the Clark era. I can just imagine him with his "partner" strumming his guitar along to his favourite Billy Bragg CD's on summer Saturday evenings in the conservatory of his Wadestown villa over a $90 bottle or two of Moy Hall Pinot Noir.
I could be wrong but I believe he was RNZN (ironically). He did a stint at jfhq. I believe he is quite a bright guy. Just wrong.

I am tickled by the inclusion of images of the damen cross over and I think there was mention of absalon (which I think have also had a change of designation from command and support ships to frigate).
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
So far, I am part way through the Maritime Security reset piece by Timothy Portland and while I have not finished reading and digesting it, my thoughts so far are that I am not impressed. It seems that the author feels that the Project Protector programme was a success, and that because it would cost too much money for the RNZN to retain a combat-focused fleet and that RNZN should instead be refocused to provide a constabulary capability to contribute to regional stability. In effect (and even trying to use the USCG as a model) he seems to argue for the RNZN to become the RNZCG...
IMHO the last thing NZ needs in this increasingly unstable world is to reduce our combat ability in any shape or form, The increasingly fragile state of world peace and stability would or should dictate otherwise.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy
Issue 1, Vol., 1. January 2021

Part 2.

Welcome to Part Two of my discussion on Vol. 1 of the first issue of the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy (PJRNZN). The first part is posted here. In this part I will be looking at an opinion piece, Affordability and Value: The Defence Context by Rear Admiral John Martin with Gareth Chaplin.

Affordability and Value: The Defence Context by Rear Admiral John Martin with Gareth Chaplin - The challenge facing the Navy’s leadership.
This article is in two parts and the first part is written by Gareth Chaplin, who discusses the Treasury point of view with regard to defence acquisition and offers some advice about how to get Treasury onside. He also offers some very interesting insights. I have chosen this article as the next article for discussion because funding has a considerable part to play in acquisitions and it is how capability plans and requests are presented to both Treasury and the Cabinet that can make all the difference between success and failure. Gareth Chaplin speaks to this.

Gareth Chaplin is the Principal Economist at the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research and former Treasury Vote Manager for Defence at the New Zealand Treasury. Gareth writes about the affordability and value of New Zealand’s naval forces.

Chaplin starts off by stating that: “Defence funding is a hard question for Treasury, and for Government Ministers. The cost is immediate, the benefits are highly uncertain, and the normal budget rules don’t seem to apply. Build a hospital, and you can run the metrics over procedures, survival rates, quality of life, and come up with a cost-benefit calculation. If it’s positive enough, you might invest in a new hospital, over a new school, or a new piece of roading infrastructure. To do that, Treasury has built a whole industry around Better Business Cases, Benefit Assessments and Investment Frameworks. So, in that context, how much should be afforded to build the Navy? And how might you tell?” (Chaplin and Martin, 2020, P. 61)

He then goes on to state: “I would tend to define affordability to mean ‘purchasing an optimal amount of naval capability’. Very Treasury, very sound. But how on earth do you define optimal? How about, ‘what do other people spend?’” He then states that Ministers like to feel comfortable in there expenditure, so they will look at what other OECD nations spend upon defence and that is how we ended up in the 1.5 – 2.0% band. However I would argue that he is being very optimistic if he’s claiming that band because I would say that we are in the 1.0 – 1.5% band. He goes on to say that; “I think this is our default thinking, and it gets defence spending very much into the ‘grudge spend’ mindset. What is the minimum necessary we can get away with? I think we can do a bit better. How about a slightly more granular definition: ‘buying the minimum amount of capability that you can be reasonably confident will deliver most of the tasking you are likely to need over the life of the asset’.” I think that we are at this level now where that the absolute minimum is acquired and that has been the default setting since 1999, stand fast the LAV III acquisition. He lists four points that he believes have to be considered:
  • What tasking can you reasonably expect to plan for?
• Capability is a combination of platforms, systems and people. How much of each is enough and when will a refresh be necessary?​
• Time matters. Navy assets have long lives, people have to be recruited, trained and given experience, and ships have to be maintained. You have to be able to get up and go again following a deployment, so how much headroom do you need to allow for stewardship of the people, the service and the ships?​
• Life-cycle cost matters: whole-of-life operating costs are (rule of thumb) twice the cost of the platform.​
• What does “reasonably confident” mean—bleeding edge, comfortably achievable, somewhere in the middle?​
(Chaplin and Martin, 2020, P. 62)​

He makes the point that NZDF capabilities are highly specialised assets, taking time to raise, train and maintain. Therefore the challenge for the RNZN, NZDF and the MOD is to help the other ministries and wider government navigate their way through these issues. He then goes on to identify key issues which are highly important, especially dealing with Treasury. He uses the term Form Follows Function quite often, which appears to be a Treasury mantra.
Government is unwilling to face up to providing clear direction about likely use and tasking of its military capability.
Why this matters to Treasury:

Form follows function. It is easy to see what health investment, or education investment is supposed to achieve. What does investing in military capability provide? In the past, New Zealand has not been inclined to specificity about our strategic interests, or our military needs” We have lots or partial statements, nice sound bites, about all the nice things that the GOTD wants NZDF to do. Peacekeeping, HADR, NZARP Support, Pacific Reset, EEZ surveillance, Australian defence treaty obligations, FPDA, Coalition arrangements etc., but there is no distinct single government long term defence strategy or direction. Hence the result is in his words: “We end up with horrible metrics like percentage of GDP. 2% turned up years ago, it’s an incredibly poor metric, it speaks nothing of choices, or capability, or assets. It provides a rough comparator of affordability—but is there a better one?

What benefits does having a Naval capability really deliver?
Why this matters to Treasury:

There are a range of economic and social benefits that having naval capability provides. Some of the arguments are stronger than you might think, others are probably weaker. Understanding that there will be a package, and that Treasury will look at direct benefits, indirect benefits and then, maybe, wider-economic benefits (be warned, Treasury staff are trained to be deeply sceptical of benefits, and of multipliers. You should also invest some time in encouraging Treasury to think through arguments around option value.
I believe that in the last 3 or 4 years Treasury have had a person coordinating with the MOD Capability Branch, so hopefully that they will have gained and understanding of Defence capability and its uniqueness. Maybe Treasury should consider seconding some of its people to the MOD and NZDF Capability Branches in order for them to gain a greater understanding of Defence capabilities. This would be a win win for Treasury and MOD / NZDF with both obtaining learnings and understandings of each other’s needs and requirements.
Benefits of Naval Capability.jpg

A lingering doubt that the defence asset procurement system doesn’t work very well
Why this matters to Treasury:

In the past you could not really trust defence acquisition processes. Our recent history has seen poorly thought-out specification processes, troubled acquisitions, and significant and material under-estimation of whole-of-life operating costs. Essentially, the civilian-led procurement system seemed systemically organised to deliver poor quality solutions. From a Treasury perspective, because of the incentives, there is little experience in procuring major defence assets:
1. It’s a once in a generation activity, so normal civilian techniques to assess business cases are used;
2. There is little expertise within the services and MoD around managing highly complex military acquisitions;
3. Other civilian players don’t really have skin in the game. Will Customs or Fisheries be forced to use only defence assets?; and
4. New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel, even in acquisition roles, were in rotational postings, not specialist roles.


Since 2014 the MOD Capability Branch has undergone significant reform and in 2018 the then Minister Of Defence, Ron Mark who used to be a harsh critic of defence procurement for many years, ordered a review of defence procurement. The report came back with a favourable review and the then Minister was very pleasantly surprised, so after the review he sang their praises. Publications | Ministry of Defence Website

Part 3 will appear in the near future.

Source:
Chaplin, G. and Martin, J. (2020): Affordability and Value: The Defence Context, Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy, 1, No 1 December 2020, 60 - 69 https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/publication/Professional-Journal-of-the-Royal-New-Zealand-Navy-December-2020_online.pdf 03/02/2021
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The whole publication is an interesting read which I have not yet completed. The timing of its publication and any possibky as yet undisclosed reasons for its appearance are also thought provoking.

I suspect the value of a defence force might become easier to explain, even to the NZ Treasury, if China stays on its current trajectory. Eventually even the NZ GOTD is going to wake up to the fact that it provides what is, in the longterm, an existential threat to Western democracies.

When that is going to happen, and whether NZ will then have the time (and possibly the courage) to do something about it, and avoid becoming effectively subjugated to the will of Beijing, is another question. One thing is for sure - when it does happen they (like all the rest of us) will need all the help they can get.

This is not a time to be distancing allies - which to be fair NZ is not really doing. However they do need to be careful of (as see from this side of the Tasman) gleefully leaping into the China trade space left by the spat between Australia and China. It’s taken a while for this country to wake up to the threat, and now we have we wouldn’t take kindly to somebody, and particularly a close friend like NZ, “going behind our back”.

Mind you, there’s still a lot of people here who don’t want to admit that threat for various reasons, but the number seems to be diminishing quite quickly. Regrettably as well the whole thing is going to bring some nasty side effects including the rise of xenophobia with regard to those of Chinese descent, which is going to need close watching.
 
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MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member

The latest Line of Defence Magazine is now out.

A piece by Chris Penk MP a former Officer in the RNZN serving on Te Kaha and later the RAN serving on a Collins Class sub who is now the Opposition Defence Spokesperson is interesting as he examines the big picture.

As far as the military is concerned, meanwhile, our imperative must be to ensure that we enjoy a high degree of interoperability with allies and
prospective allies. That being so, my final observation is that all aspects of NZDF’s mandate need to be realised in this way. Our personnel must be recruited and trained in such a way that they will be able to fight alongside our allies. Our platforms and assets must be acquired and upgraded in ways that make sense in combination with those of our allies.

Our peacetime operations, including exercises, must be undertaken when, where and how our allies need them to be undertaken such that they gain comfort and understanding about our capabilities. The policies of government and opposition parties alike must be viewed through this lens. I invite readers of Line of Defence Magazine to challenge any politician who fails in their solemn duty to consider the strategic needs of the NZDF in favour of considerations that may be more urgent but are ultimately much less important.


And for comic relief former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp offers us another satirical impersonation of an irrelevant old academic and politician suffering from strategic amnesia again advocating the replacement of the Anzac Class with four DeWolf Class SOPV's.

The Canadian Navy and Coast Guard are acquiring eight Arctic capable Harry DeWolf class OPV’s of 6,600 tonnes at a unit cost of C$600
million, which is virtually the same in New Zealand dollars. These are versatile vessels with helicopters and landing craft.

If it was decided that the principal theatre of operations for the RNZN should be the South Pacific, extending from the Antarctic to the Equator,
then capable OPVs may be more useful than frigates.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member

The latest Line of Defence Magazine is now out.

A piece by Chris Penk MP a former Officer in the RNZN serving on Te Kaha and later the RAN serving on a Collins Class sub who is now the Opposition Defence Spokesperson is interesting as he examines the big picture.

As far as the military is concerned, meanwhile, our imperative must be to ensure that we enjoy a high degree of interoperability with allies and
prospective allies. That being so, my final observation is that all aspects of NZDF’s mandate need to be realised in this way. Our personnel must be recruited and trained in such a way that they will be able to fight alongside our allies. Our platforms and assets must be acquired and upgraded in ways that make sense in combination with those of our allies.

Our peacetime operations, including exercises, must be undertaken when, where and how our allies need them to be undertaken such that they gain comfort and understanding about our capabilities. The policies of government and opposition parties alike must be viewed through this lens. I invite readers of Line of Defence Magazine to challenge any politician who fails in their solemn duty to consider the strategic needs of the NZDF in favour of considerations that may be more urgent but are ultimately much less important.


And for comic relief former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp offers us another satirical impersonation of an irrelevant old academic and politician suffering from strategic amnesia again advocating the replacement of the Anzac Class with four DeWolf Class SOPV's.

The Canadian Navy and Coast Guard are acquiring eight Arctic capable Harry DeWolf class OPV’s of 6,600 tonnes at a unit cost of C$600
million, which is virtually the same in New Zealand dollars. These are versatile vessels with helicopters and landing craft.

If it was decided that the principal theatre of operations for the RNZN should be the South Pacific, extending from the Antarctic to the Equator,
then capable OPVs may be more useful than frigates.
Sounds like Mr Penk would make an interesting Defmin if ever given the chance, brings a unique set of qualifications to the job. Sounds like your Bl***y lucky Mr Mapp is the former Defmin.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Unfortunately, to a public basically either uninterested in, or opposed to spending money on, the defence function he may however come across as a person with indside knowledge who should be listened to. Four HdWs as the total combat force of the RNZN would really impress NZ’s friends, not to mention it’s enemies - but of course it has none of those!
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro

kiwi in exile

Active Member

The latest Line of Defence Magazine is now out.

A piece by Chris Penk MP a former Officer in the RNZN serving on Te Kaha and later the RAN serving on a Collins Class sub who is now the Opposition Defence Spokesperson is interesting as he examines the big picture.

As far as the military is concerned, meanwhile, our imperative must be to ensure that we enjoy a high degree of interoperability with allies and
prospective allies. That being so, my final observation is that all aspects of NZDF’s mandate need to be realised in this way. Our personnel must be recruited and trained in such a way that they will be able to fight alongside our allies. Our platforms and assets must be acquired and upgraded in ways that make sense in combination with those of our allies.

Our peacetime operations, including exercises, must be undertaken when, where and how our allies need them to be undertaken such that they gain comfort and understanding about our capabilities. The policies of government and opposition parties alike must be viewed through this lens. I invite readers of Line of Defence Magazine to challenge any politician who fails in their solemn duty to consider the strategic needs of the NZDF in favour of considerations that may be more urgent but are ultimately much less important.
Alternative viewpoints on NZs direction in the Biden era outlined in recent issue of Masseys Nat Sec Journal:
https://nationalsecurityjournal.nz/the-biden-administration-and-new-zealands-strategic-options-asymmetric-hedging-tight-five-eyes-alignment-and-armed-neutrality/

Current policy setting seems to be 'asymmetric hedging' which works up to a point. Blancing out strategic and values based allignment with 'the west' with our trade dependence with the CCP, without fully committing to explicitly to either.
nationals Penk favours 'tight five allignment'
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Alternative viewpoints on NZs direction in the Biden era outlined in recent issue of Masseys Nat Sec Journal:
https://nationalsecurityjournal.nz/the-biden-administration-and-new-zealands-strategic-options-asymmetric-hedging-tight-five-eyes-alignment-and-armed-neutrality/

Current policy setting seems to be 'asymmetric hedging' which works up to a point. Blancing out strategic and values based allignment with 'the west' with our trade dependence with the CCP, without fully committing to explicitly to either.
nationals Penk favours 'tight five allignment'
Your link doesn't seem to be working properly. It keeps flicking me back to page 1 of this thread. Try this link

 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Thank you because you have given me another source of information, which I pillaged last night.

Robert Ayson has written a good piece for Newsroom about our Defence Minister, stating that he has gone AWOL. Prof Ayson states that unless our DEFMIN doesn't take charge of NZ's Defence policy, it will be set for him and the NZG by outsiders.


This is an interesting paper that discusses the NZ maritime domain security in conjunction with the US. It discusses what the term maritime domain means and then attempts to define it within the context of UNCLOS, which I think it does reasonably well. It also adds the three dimensional context to the maritime domain by including the air domain.

Within this context the author introduces the concept of the Polynesian Triangle that encompass an area from Hawaii in the north, NZ in the west and Rapa Nui (Easter Island) in the east. This includes all of our Realm areas plus all of the Polynesian nations that we have relationships with including those we have responsibilities for such as Samoa (defence agreement). We also participate in the Quad agreement with Australia, France and US for EEZ monitoring, HADR, illegal unreported fishing etc., within the Triangle. She also notes our surveillance of the Antarctic region which the US doesn't do and she comments on the Antarctic Treaty itself, specifically that of the original signatories the US and Russia are the only two nations who can make any territorial claims on the continent if they choose to do so. They haven't made claims yet and none of the nations who signed later are able to make territorial claims.

The author makes the point about the tensions that exist within the RNZN between its core warfighting role and it having to conduct constabulary missions for other departments. She also makes the point that for a maritime nation, we devote very few resources to monitoring and protecting our interests in it.

Whilst there are areas of her paper that I agree on there are others that I don't. However having said that, she does offer a different and I believe spatial view of the maritime domain per se. She also offers the interesting concept of the Polynesian Triangle which I think is a good idea and one worth pursuing with the US, Australia and France, along with Australia we should be devoting surveillance resources further south as well. Definitely worth the read because it does offer a non defence theoretically context for the maritime domain that is equally as valid.

 

kiwi in exile

Active Member
Thank you because you have given me another source of information, which I pillaged last night.

Robert Ayson has written a good piece for Newsroom about our Defence Minister, stating that he has gone AWOL. Prof Ayson states that unless our DEFMIN doesn't take charge of NZ's Defence policy, it will be set for him and the NZG by outsiders.



The author makes the point about the tensions that exist within the RNZN between its core warfighting role and it having to conduct constabulary missions for other departments. She also makes the point that for a maritime nation, we devote very few resources to monitoring and protecting our interests in it.
Newsrooms great. Agree with Ayson.

The NSJ article: the tensions between warfighting and constabulary missions you/the author alludes to is similar for the discussion around the RNZAF EMAC capability. Within the RNZN, this is handled by the seperation between the OPVs and the frigates. There is no similar two tier fleet within the RNZAF (yet)- hence the p3s get tasked with civil agency work , hence the new need for EMAC. Because the RNZN has this two tier, i don't believe we need a coast guard type patrol service. But this might be the direction we go down re EMAC.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Newsrooms great. Agree with Ayson.

The NSJ article: the tensions between warfighting and constabulary missions you/the author alludes to is similar for the discussion around the RNZAF EMAC capability. Within the RNZN, this is handled by the seperation between the OPVs and the frigates. There is no similar two tier fleet within the RNZAF (yet)- hence the p3s get tasked with civil agency work , hence the new need for EMAC. Because the RNZN has this two tier, i don't believe we need a coast guard type patrol service. But this might be the direction we go down re EMAC.
It's difficult to say however if you have been following @OPSSG discussion here, where he says:
"(a) Realistically, I expect that ASEAN navies are not going to be able to afford destroyers, but investment in frigates and corvettes must be part of the future force mix. Ideally, 8 corvettes and 4 frigates is what is needed for constant presence to deter an enemy and meet the challenge of vertical escalation, within a single zone of contention."​

Now I expect that many pollies and a certain Kiwi poster will cough and splutter into their morning cuppa tea / coffee at a suggestion of 8 corvettes and 4 frigates, however I think that 6 corvettes and 3 frigates are absolutely necessary on top of the SOPV that we are supposed to be getting. Unfortunately people are blind to the threats that we face in the next 10 - 30 years. They forget the lessons of history and they ignore the attraction of the hidden resources in and around Antarctica. They also ignore the potential that lies within NZ and on the Zealandia continental seafloor of high value rare earths and other minerals. The same goes for areas within the Polynesian Triangle.

1618220883542.png
Source: TranspacificProject.com | An Online Resource Center on Transpacific Relations

1618220929387.png
Source: Ibid.

There is also the protein that swims within the seas within the Polynesian Triangle and south of NZ to Antarctica. That protein source is an absolute necessity for many, if not all of those island nations and the last thing they need is PRC fishing fleets coming through and sweeping the seas of anything that swims in the water column or lives upon the seafloor. Such a rapacious rapine that is occurring in other parts of the world, because of the PRC, would be devastating to the island nations. So yes we do have to be equipped to deal with that, amongst other things.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
It's difficult to say however if you have been following @OPSSG discussion here, where he says:
"(a) Realistically, I expect that ASEAN navies are not going to be able to afford destroyers, but investment in frigates and corvettes must be part of the future force mix. Ideally, 8 corvettes and 4 frigates is what is needed for constant presence to deter an enemy and meet the challenge of vertical escalation, within a single zone of contention."​

Now I expect that many pollies and a certain Kiwi poster will cough and splutter into their morning cuppa tea / coffee at a suggestion of 8 corvettes and 4 frigates, however I think that 6 corvettes and 3 frigates are absolutely necessary on top of the SOPV that we are supposed to be getting. Unfortunately people are blind to the threats that we face in the next 10 - 30 years. They forget the lessons of history and they ignore the attraction of the hidden resources in and around Antarctica. They also ignore the potential that lies within NZ and on the Zealandia continental seafloor of high value rare earths and other minerals. The same goes for areas within the Polynesian Triangle.

View attachment 48166
Source: TranspacificProject.com | An Online Resource Center on Transpacific Relations

View attachment 48167
Source: Ibid.

There is also the protein that swims within the seas within the Polynesian Triangle and south of NZ to Antarctica. That protein source is an absolute necessity for many, if not all of those island nations and the last thing they need is PRC fishing fleets coming through and sweeping the seas of anything that swims in the water column or lives upon the seafloor. Such a rapacious rapine that is occurring in other parts of the world, because of the PRC, would be devastating to the island nations. So yes we do have to be equipped to deal with that, amongst other things.
That's a seriously large bit of ocean.

While we all like to explore subjects on Google, I still like the old fashioned approach and occasionally get the globe of the world down from the top of the bookshelf.
Like the Polynesian Triangle discussed above, when viewing large areas of the world, the globe does give a certain perspective to distance over large areas.

However you view this subject, it does highlight the challenge of distance both New Zealand and Australia share in meeting the variety of contingency's in their respective maritime domains.

Regards S
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
That's a seriously large bit of ocean.

While we all like to explore subjects on Google, I still like the old fashioned approach and occasionally get the globe of the world down from the top of the bookshelf.
Like the Polynesian Triangle discussed above, when viewing large areas of the world, the globe does give a certain perspective to distance over large areas.

However you view this subject, it does highlight the challenge of distance both New Zealand and Australia share in meeting the variety of contingency's in their respective maritime domains.

Regards S
I am a geographer by trade so my tendency to like working with maps and diagrams. They are an important tool to help understand an issue.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Now I expect that many pollies and a certain Kiwi poster will cough and splutter into their morning cuppa tea / coffee at a suggestion of 8 corvettes and 4 frigates, however I think that 6 corvettes and 3 frigates are absolutely necessary on top of the SOPV that we are supposed to be getting. Unfortunately people are blind to the threats that we face in the next 10 - 30 years. They forget the lessons of history and they ignore the attraction of the hidden resources in and around Antarctica. They also ignore the potential that lies within NZ and on the Zealandia continental seafloor of high value rare earths and other minerals. The same goes for areas within the Polynesian Triangle
Na, They won't be doing any coughing or spluttering as they will simply put on their pink eye blinkers and pink shaded son glasses, totally ignoring any such idea as if it does not even exist and hope that any such foolishness that would require them to spend money on defence will simply disappear behind the nice pink screen they put in front of such a outrages idea.
 
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