NZDF General discussion thread

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Well they were building a complete air force and we don't have 20 years. We can contract out LIFT to our FVEY partners until we have built up a good cadre of experienced aircrew and instructors and then bring it back home. But we are going to have to spend good money on acquiring the appropriate platform for the job and the F-35 isn't it. What we really require is a twin seater that has long legs, is quick, and can carry a goodly supply of under wing stores. It is also something that can back the RAAF F-35 up as well by being a weapons truck.
Agree with you on the aircraft type, The F 35 would be viable but I would prefer what you have said. The big problem is the building up of High quality experienced leadership in the flight leader and squadron leader roles and this takes the time. I would agree with the Air Forces appraisal in the early 2000's that to get back to the level they were at prior to the disbandment of the AFC would take at least 15 years. It is the building of the total unit competency and operational effectiveness that is so time consuming. I think you could probably achieve a unit that was reasonably useful at 8 to 10 years, but getting to the level we had before the mighty Helen stuffed things up will take longer.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Well they were building a complete air force and we don't have 20 years. We can contract out LIFT to our FVEY partners until we have built up a good cadre of experienced aircrew and instructors and then bring it back home. But we are going to have to spend good money on acquiring the appropriate platform for the job and the F-35 isn't it. What we really require is a twin seater that has long legs, is quick, and can carry a goodly supply of under wing stores. It is also something that can back the RAAF F-35 up as well by being a weapons truck.

Well if you are not interested in F35 which I find surprising then realistically there is only 3 choices. If the intent is for a multi role platform you will want something with legs and then there is the need for AAR considering the overwater distance that RNZAF will have to cover. IMHO pending what the ADF does in the future I think that either F35B/C is the only real choice for NZ long term

F15EX
F18E/F
Eurofighter Typhoon

While there are the Saab Gripen I don’t think it would be viable
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Well if you are not interested in F35 which I find surprising then realistically there is only 3 choices. If the intent is for a multi role platform you will want something with legs and then there is the need for AAR considering the overwater distance that RNZAF will have to cover. IMHO pending what the ADF does in the future I think that either F35B/C is the only real choice for NZ long term

F15EX
F18E/F
Eurofighter Typhoon

While there are the Saab Gripen I don’t think it would be viable
Why is it surprising that we mightn't be interested in the F-35? FYI it may not have the capabilities that we are after and there may be other considerations such as the WOLC to consider. In fact if I was setting the requirements, its legs are to short and I wouldn't recommend it anyway regardless. The EF Typhoon is also out of contention because of acquisition cost, risk, cost of integration of US weapons and systems, it's not designed for what we want, and WOLC. That leaves the F-15EX and the F-18F. Yes AAR is a capability that will have to be very seriously considered.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Agree the Boeing option is NZ’s best option. The SH has some advantages, commonality with the RAN and can refuel other SHs albeit not as good as having a MRTT. The F-15EX has a lot going for for it. It would be an interesting decision.
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Agree the Boeing option is NZ’s best option. The SH has some advantages, commonality with the RAN and can refuel other SHs albeit not as good as having a MRTT. The F-15EX has a lot going for for it. It would be an interesting decision.
Guessing you meant the RAAF there John ? :) I think it would be the only choice for NZ to be honest, but that does not mean that would be the one chosen if NZ went that way. I think another advantage with a SH decision would be the ability for NZ to stand the force up in a much quicker time frame, possibly even poach some Australian talent looking to extend their flying careers a little further across the ditch ?

Cheers
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Guessing you meant the RAAF there John ? :) I think it would be the only choice for NZ to be honest, but that does not mean that would be the one chosen if NZ went that way. I think another advantage with a SH decision would be the ability for NZ to stand the force up in a much quicker time frame, possibly even poach some Australian talent looking to extend their flying careers a little further across the ditch ?

Cheers
Yep, missed an “A” and the “N” should have been a “F”. Agree, poaching some talent from Australia might speed things up wrt SHs.
 
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Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Yep, missed an “A” and the “N” should have been a “F”. Agree, poaching some talent from Australia might speed things up wrt SHs.
A bit of poaching would be very necessary to get things going. I wonder how many F 18 ( A or F) pilots may have gone to the airlines and are now looking for a job now the airlines are not doing much? Could be a good time to get started. (Just dreaming )
 
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oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Agree the Boeing option is NZ’s best option. The SH has some advantages, commonality with the RAN and can refuel other SHs albeit not as good as having a MRTT. The F-15EX has a lot going for for it. It would be an interesting decision.
How would the SH have commonality with the RAN? RAAF perhaps, for a while.

oldsig
 

t68

Well-Known Member
How would the SH have commonality with the RAN? RAAF perhaps, for a while.

oldsig

Until when 2035ish

NZ would not make a decision on a ACF for at least 5 years and then the selection process, so I imagine the earliest a aircraft would arrive in NZ colours would be after 2030 or roughly 2032 F-15/18 lines would most likely be closed by the time NZ gets around to ordering aircraft

Maritime strike for F35 is from block 4/5 from what I can gather the Israeli Air Force is supposedly working on conformal fuel tanks for the F35. I cant see NZ going straight to 6th gen Aircraft off the bat so I can only see F35 as the only game for NZ if it wants to get back in the game.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Until when 2035ish

NZ would not make a decision on a ACF for at least 5 years and then the selection process, so I imagine the earliest a aircraft would arrive in NZ colours would be after 2030 or roughly 2032 F-15/18 lines would most likely be closed by the time NZ gets around to ordering aircraft

Maritime strike for F35 is from block 4/5 from what I can gather the Israeli Air Force is supposedly working on conformal fuel tanks for the F35. I cant see NZ going straight to 6th gen Aircraft off the bat so I can only see F35 as the only game for NZ if it wants to get back in the game.
In my view the most likely route to an AFC would be first of all a combated capable trainer like the T-FA 50 followed by a bigger strike aircraft. These could very well be second hand refurbished items and I would expect that there would be significant numbers of F 18 E-F's available ex USN having been replaced by the F35 C on the American carriers. We are pretty good at keeping older aircraft flying and viable for long periods of time with good maintenance and updates. If the RAAF go all F 35 there could be a fleet from that source. What we must keep in mind is that we must first establish a robust and viable top line capability and that until we have achieved this there is little need for top line aircraft.
Even an agreement to bring a company like "Draken International" to NZ for a limited period of time to get the ball rolling should not be discounted.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Why are talking re-establishing our ACF as it is not even on the radar? The DCP-2019 reaches out to 2030-35, no mention not even a hint...

Don't get me wrong I would love to see the return... but I can't see it in any foreseeable future...
I am aware of that but the times are a changing for the worse and that is slowly sinking into the pollies skulls.
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
Why are talking re-establishing our ACF as it is not even on the radar? The DCP-2019 reaches out to 2030-35, no mention not even a hint...

Don't get me wrong I would love to see the return... but I can't see it in any foreseeable future...
In many respects the DCP19 was a mild refresh of DCP's earlier in the 2010's decade, but for locking in an already very average "High Pathway" funding plan of the Key government as well as adding for some rhetorical flourishes of recognition that things are becoming more strategically strained and to keep an eye on the PRC.

So why are we talking about it now? Because in the NZ context someone has to start raising it and my view is that now its time has come. And on this forum board it is as good as any.

As a Mod ten years ago I would shut down such discussions, because I knew the political climate had no appetite for it and had no foreseeability for it though I and others recognised an obvious strategic unbalancing in both New Zealand's long term future, but also because some of the solutions were from armchair amateurs that were frankly ridiculous or unrealistic. My view at the time was that it was a capability set that should have never been lost. I privately felt that eventually over the medium-long term it would need to get re looked at - as real politique sensibilities on a sea of increasing instability would capsize the pacificist idealism (mixed with dollops of University Common Room moral superiority of the local political class) of the 1990's and early 2000's New Zealand.

Because things have moved so fast in the last 5 years in terms of strategic instability - in fact during 2020 there are respected commentators who believe that the unthinkable - major state on state conflict in the Indo-Pacific region could happen. That is the problem with the NZ political class - they cannot understand that just because they cannot think it - the unthinkable will not happen. Covid has shortened the strategic insecurity timeframe.

The problem is that for a maritime nation with both regional defence and global trade interests over significant distances it has virtually no counter maritime strategy. Having ISR capabilities is only a dimension of a counter maritime strategy and a maritime strategy involves air, space/cyber and naval domains as well as land adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway.

And into this challenging environment we find that through what is sheer strategic stupidity and frankly ignorance driven by hubris the NZDF has no capability of engaging a moving ship or aircraft from outside visual range. No flexibility and rapid response capability to move from a situation of detecting something to interdicting something and confronting it as well as no provision of a credible deterrent to nation(s) contemplating an offensive maneuver into our strategic lines of communications, let alone areas of interest in our maritime domain.

The other significant point is that with the removal of a credible air combat capability and without an attempt to rebuild it it weakens not just ourselves but our closest defence partners in the region. It is not just an issue for New Zealand but one also for Australia obviously but also Singapore.

There is this disconnect, this hypocrisy when New Zealand looks at the four cornerstone of our external relations. We recognised inter-dependence in partnership engagement in our trade, diplomacy and intelligence components, but in defence there is this selective abrogation into dependency when it comes to certain combat elements of our defence capability.

As this decade unfolds it will become more unconscionable for not just New Zealand but also other friends and partners who we will mutually rely on for New Zealand to have a partial gaping hole in naval combat capability and a huge gaping hole in air combat capability. Any future adversary with half a brain would have read Sun Tze (I'm sure it is on the reading list at all PLA academies) and realises that those gaping holes are our weaknesses to exploit and through proximity directly affect Australia.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
The comment on NZ’s political environment from the 1990s to early 2000s is in most ways applicable to Canada and our defence has suffered for it. We still have a ACF but not for much longer unless the fighter replacement starts ASAP. Financially, NZ will be much better than Canada post-COVID.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
As a Mod ten years ago I would shut down such discussions, because I knew the political climate had no appetite for it
Yep I remember being on the wrong side of such an argument some years ago. I do agree the politicians and particularly John Key were not in the slightest bit interested in the subject. A friend of mine with a significant community standing, tried to talk to him about an AFC soon after John Key became prime minister and was very quickly shut down.
 
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ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
In many respects the DCP19 was a mild refresh of DCP's earlier in the 2010's decade, but for locking in an already very average "High Pathway" funding plan of the Key government as well as adding for some rhetorical flourishes of recognition that things are becoming more strategically strained and to keep an eye on the PRC.

So why are we talking about it now? Because in the NZ context someone has to start raising it and my view is that now its time has come. And on this forum board it is as good as any.

As a Mod ten years ago I would shut down such discussions, because I knew the political climate had no appetite for it and had no foreseeability for it though I and others recognised an obvious strategic unbalancing in both New Zealand's long term future, but also because some of the solutions were from armchair amateurs that were frankly ridiculous or unrealistic. My view at the time was that it was a capability set that should have never been lost. I privately felt that eventually over the medium-long term it would need to get re looked at - as real politique sensibilities on a sea of increasing instability would capsize the pacificist idealism (mixed with dollops of University Common Room moral superiority of the local political class) of the 1990's and early 2000's New Zealand.

Because things have moved so fast in the last 5 years in terms of strategic instability - in fact during 2020 there are respected commentators who believe that the unthinkable - major state on state conflict in the Indo-Pacific region could happen. That is the problem with the NZ political class - they cannot understand that just because they cannot think it - the unthinkable will not happen. Covid has shortened the strategic insecurity timeframe.

The problem is that for a maritime nation with both regional defence and global trade interests over significant distances it has virtually no counter maritime strategy. Having ISR capabilities is only a dimension of a counter maritime strategy and a maritime strategy involves air, space/cyber and naval domains as well as land adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway.

And into this challenging environment we find that through what is sheer strategic stupidity and frankly ignorance driven by hubris the NZDF has no capability of engaging a moving ship or aircraft from outside visual range. No flexibility and rapid response capability to move from a situation of detecting something to interdicting something and confronting it as well as no provision of a credible deterrent to nation(s) contemplating an offensive maneuver into our strategic lines of communications, let alone areas of interest in our maritime domain.

The other significant point is that with the removal of a credible air combat capability and without an attempt to rebuild it it weakens not just ourselves but our closest defence partners in the region. It is not just an issue for New Zealand but one also for Australia obviously but also Singapore.

There is this disconnect, this hypocrisy when New Zealand looks at the four cornerstone of our external relations. We recognised inter-dependence in partnership engagement in our trade, diplomacy and intelligence components, but in defence there is this selective abrogation into dependency when it comes to certain combat elements of our defence capability.

As this decade unfolds it will become more unconscionable for not just New Zealand but also other friends and partners who we will mutually rely on for New Zealand to have a partial gaping hole in naval combat capability and a huge gaping hole in air combat capability. Any future adversary with half a brain would have read Sun Tze (I'm sure it is on the reading list at all PLA academies) and realises that those gaping holes are our weaknesses to exploit and through proximity directly affect Australia.
Reactivating an ACF is a hugely expensive and long process and I believe that the NZDF would achieve better deterrence by investing in alternative capabilities.
1. Expand the frigate force, the OPVs and maritime helo numbers so that all deployed ships had helo capability.
This would enable the RNZN always partake in allied naval activity, provide escorts for the proposed LHDs and to meet its sovereignty obligations in both the Pacific and the Antarctic.
2. Expand the P8 force and give them LRSAM’s. That in itself is probably a greater deterrent than a small ACF.
3. Give the Army a meaningful Attack/ARH capability to add lethality, and;
4. Provide a further CAS capability in the form of the Beechcraft AT-6B which would be incredibly useful in the Indo Pacific especially for the counter insurgency Role and would compliment allied capability (I’ve argued for this previously).
5. Increase air mobility/transport numbers.
It may be the case that a choice between 3&4 above would be appropriate.
All of the above give the NZDF a better balanced force as I fear resources given to an ACF would leech funds away from other more needed assets.
 
Reactivating an ACF is a hugely expensive and long process and I believe that the NZDF would achieve better deterrence by investing in alternative capabilities.
1. Expand the frigate force, the OPVs and maritime helo numbers so that all deployed ships had helo capability.
This would enable the RNZN always partake in allied naval activity, provide escorts for the proposed LHDs and to meet its sovereignty obligations in both the Pacific and the Antarctic.
2. Expand the P8 force and give them LRSAM’s. That in itself is probably a greater deterrent than a small ACF.
3. Give the Army a meaningful Attack/ARH capability to add lethality, and;
4. Provide a further CAS capability in the form of the Beechcraft AT-6B which would be incredibly useful in the Indo Pacific especially for the counter insurgency Role and would compliment allied capability (I’ve argued for this previously).
5. Increase air mobility/transport numbers.
It may be the case that a choice between 3&4 above would be appropriate.
All of the above give the NZDF a better balanced force as I fear resources given to an ACF would leech funds away from other more needed assets.
I agree with these ideas. The economic reality is that NZ doesn’t have a lot of money to spend on defence. Arming the P-8’s, creating a CAS capability plus possibly jumping on the Australian Tiger ARH replacement order would give “some” air-to-ground capability.

Another idea I have floated here before would be to combine with the RAAF for one NZ squadron. Kind of like a joint NATO (but ANZAC) squadron that could be based near Auckland. Training pipeline etc all managed by the RAAF but applications to join open to citizens from both countries. Preference for that squadron could be given to NZ officers and personnel to try and build experience within NZ. Control would be managed by both countries but usage in wartime would have to be detailed by a “mutual defence” scenario. At least this way if the NZDF ever takes it back “in house” there is something to start with. Funding would come from a NZ/AUS mix. Probably 80% NZ for that squadron but it would benefit from economies of scale when combined with the RAAF training and maintenance system.

Australia would also benefit from having another squadron of strike fighters in the region (albeit with close Allies). “Stronger together” is a phrase I’d use to describe this sort of policy.
 
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