I'd have to beg to differ on this. I'm a member of the AOC and we've had numerous conferences and sessions particularly on the issue of comms sensitivity and link security. So yes, I am aware of the price of civilian comms options and how cheap they can be. A civ GPS can be hijacked within 600m of receiver. and the gear to do it costs about $10k USD. Milspeccing that GPS does blow out the cost due to redunancy issues - that can't be avoided. It's also why no single comms solution is sound and why typical redundancy is achieved through dual comms - and now tri comms.MattChave said:Telemetry information is reasonably easily encoded using schemes which the military already posses, the only reason your argument could be valid is if the uav is downed and picked up by someone else, in which case some counter measure for this could be built in.
The uav can still be used by a government if its open source they dont have to release their work unless they want to publish it, ie if they only use it internally. therefore their upgrades/telemetry/board designs/control algorythms, whatever, can remain completely secure.
AFAIK the standard military requirement is that it cannot rely on GPS, this doesn't.
Military UAV's are expensive becuase we are led to believe that this is a hard thing to do.....its not really. The're also expensive because of their reliability requirements, personel, and their engines which cost a lot.
"the whole issue of UAV's is protection of the platform from external comms hijacking"
Even encryption schemes such as "public key encryption" transmitted using frequency agile communications such as CDMA are very secure and widely used, one thing that could be used against it i guess would be jamming the entire band but its pretty difficult to jam an aircrafts transmissions. this can be implemented easily with OTS components.... not convinced go check out GPRS modems $200.
Although it sounds simple like using a CDMA link - a CDMA link (eg) can be hijacked if you're within a specific range. Ig the UAV is not traversing a benign area - then there are any number of ways that it can be compromised. Using CDMA as an example - the Romanians , Poles and Israelis have vehicle mounted jammers on the market designed specifically to sanitise short range comms links in a battlespace area - thats to neutralise UAV's, burst comms, IED's etc...
I'm not dissing what they've done as its admirable, but to associate that capability as a panacea for the cost reduction of military UAV's is somewhat disingenuine if not an example of academic naivete.
in a netcentric battlespace thats why you have UAV's being used with Link 12 or Link 16 solutions - it's the same problem that is holding back the infusion of UCAVs and TUAVs into a combat environment.
I'd suggest reading a bit of JED or C4ISR as examples of reputable publications which don't have a commercial or technological barrow to promote. They are the 2 of the most influential publications on the market
I will be attending Unmanned Systems Asia-Pacific 2006 in Singapore and am also tagged for Unmanned Systems Europe 2006 in Berlin, Germany. I am sure that this technology will be amongst the many that are discussed every year for niche capability.
Of course a non secure type of UAV has uses for other govt work - but in a combat environment? I can assure you that no one will touch it unless they spec in approp mil redundancy - and thats a military requirement - it has nothing to do with commercial opportunism on the part of the client/vendor.
Finally - it is not difficult to jam aircraft transmissions. a $250k pod is used by most airforces to do just that.