Naval Ship & Submarine Propulsion Systems

Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
Oh it will happen or we will go to the next source (Just my opinion), We learnt enough from the Collin's class issues to know that we need to have full and independent control to do as we please with our submarines or we suffer for it.
I'm not sure it's that simple. There were three contenders - the French, Japanese and Germans.

It doesn't appear the German bid was going anywhere, probably because no one was sure they could build/design a large enough submarine. So that leaves the Japanese.

And right now the Japanese are annoyed. They weren't officially promised the deal, but in Japan things are often "agreed" before formal discussions and papers being signed. It's not done to wiggle out after the informal agreement. And Abbott gave them the "informal" agreement.

Would they walk away from a potential deal if the French thing went tits up? No. But I don't think they'd roll over on to their backs and give everything that Australia wanted.

We appear to have gone from a negative stance that Australians (with the exception of a wealthy few) are affable but lazy and not too smart, to one where we believe that we can do things as well as anyone else when given a fair chance.
It was always pretty stupid to suggest Australia "couldn't" build new submarines. The question is whether the premium to build them in Australia was worth it. There is an argument when you're in that sort of situation, long-term it's better to spend money on retraining a work force if jobs are going to go.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
And right now the Japanese are annoyed. They weren't officially promised the deal, but in Japan things are often "agreed" before formal discussions and papers being signed. It's not done to wiggle out after the informal agreement. And Abbott gave them the "informal" agreement.

Would they walk away from a potential deal if the French thing went tits up? No. But I don't think they'd roll over on to their backs and give everything that Australia wanted.
Good point. I've worked with Japanese people for the best part of 30 years and they certainly get annoyed when its seen that they have been snubbed, "saving face" - memboku - is a cultural imperative.
 

Milne Bay

Active Member
Good point. I've worked with Japanese people for the best part of 30 years and they certainly get annoyed when its seen that they have been snubbed, "saving face" - memboku - is a cultural imperative.
This may be the case, however I am not so sure that the Japanese option would be the second choice anyway. I rather fancy that if the French deal fell over we would be back talking to the Germans
MB
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
So DCNS has won the hull and propulsion system while the combat system/sensors will still be announced.

France's DCNS Wins $39 Billion Australian Submarine Contract - Bloomberg
Bloomberg catching up 12 month old news for the sake of its readership. I don't believe I *ever* heard a reference to this project that didn't include AN/BYG-1 or its derivative as a requirement, and this forum has been full of discussion WRT the trustworthiness and capability of the bidders when (not if) the combat systems and the likes of CBASS (or ITS derivative) come to be integrated


oldsig
 

phreeky

Active Member
It was always pretty stupid to suggest Australia "couldn't" build new submarines. The question is whether the premium to build them in Australia was worth it. There is an argument when you're in that sort of situation, long-term it's better to spend money on retraining a work force if jobs are going to go.
It's not just long-term skills, but the fact that a huge proportion of a dollar spent building in Aus ends up back in government hands. It's why cost blowouts of local builds worries me so little. The only cost is initial outlay as it takes time for that money to cycle around.

As such I don't see the cost of building local a 'premium' at all. Thinking otherwise is not seeing the big picture.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
This may be the case, however I am not so sure that the Japanese option would be the second choice anyway. I rather fancy that if the French deal fell over we would be back talking to the Germans
MB
I think thats unlikely. Labor and liberals seem to support the decision. Changing it purely for wants of design would be a kiss of death politically. We have already been burnt with politicians changing their minds. If this was 2007 then that might be different, but not now.

I don't think the Japanese are the second option either. I would like Australia to have more defense links to Japan, but I'm not sure a $50 billion sub deal was the ideal initial project. I quite like the platform, but I don't think it was as ambitious as particularly the French. I had thought the 5-8m plug in the Soryu was actually small, that it may have needed more diesel engines to meet some of the RAN requirements.

I don't think people seriously believe the Germans absolutely can't design a 4,000t submarine, its just that they don't have designs and systems in place for a 4,000t submarine. Long term it could be a bit of a completely orphaned platform, therefore risky + expensive. I think this may be part of the aversion for the German option.

With the French option we basically start to link our submarine program to a nuke program. We will have access to nuke sensors, and nuke capabilities, items sized for nuke boats. With 4 engines(correcting myself) transits and indiscretion rates will always be low, then we can start loading up on lithium ion, which would seem to be a huge growth potential for this design as it was designed to meet targets without lithium ion batteries. The french will continue to spend money on their SSN program and related SSBN programs into the foreseeable future.

While the french may have won, I'm not sure they fully understand what we want. There proposal had some key features which are obviously very important for Australia. I doubt DCNS will become our preferred supplier for everything, even for subs. I think we would want to incorporate a lot from Americans and perhaps the Japanese in our subs.

But this has yet to be seen.Certainly an interesting choice.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
My two cents, with perhaps a little flippancy and trying to look at it from a holistic / political / PM&C POV.

hetoric of the Collins.
So now that we are going with the French will the steering wheel be on the left or the right?
I guess either way what ever our opinions of the success of DCNS in winning SEA1000 I hope we can be open to the chance it may prove a successful program .
Many on here I'm sure are guarded by the selction and have articulated over time their doubts as to going with the French. I guess I can hope [ hopefully not naively ] that some good minds were put together to select our future sub and that the French bid was deemed the best on merit. I would hope they knew and asked all the questions and understood the challenges that faced such a complex project. I would hope the history of other unsuccessful European projects like AIR 87 were also put in the mix.
Hopefully they have made the correct decision based on good information..
So for now its still a long road till the first boat is operational; so all I can say is fingers crossed it proves a successful project and provides the outcome both the Navy and the Commonwealth require.

Regards S
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Really didn't matter to much which submarine we chose when you think about it. In the end it comes down to how much time you devote to R&D and how well you use it (Didnt do so well with the Collins class), who has the IP rights and just as importantly how well you set up your management team. A bad management team can make a north korean midget submarine look good in comparison to what they are managing.

We have some very good world class people in Australia, We have a long lead time, Let's make use of it and get everything right from the get go. Not everything can be sorted out in R&D but you can get thing's close.

Do this right and might be a chance to replace Canada's submarines in the future for us.

For the time being I'm just viewing the French choice as a choice in the hull, With over half a decade before the first steel is even cut the internal system's could end up being closer to the Collins systems then the French systems (or any other systems from Japan, Germany, Sweden, US, UK etc).
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Really didn't matter to much which submarine we chose when you think about it.
disagree here, politely but vehemently. I can cite a long list of examples from actual experience. I agree with the sentiment - but sentiment doesn't equate to reality

in hot rodding terms "you run with what you brung"

what you bring speaks volumes

I'm crossing every jointed appendage on my body in the hope that we can make this work and restrict the political white anting and confected hysteria that so damaged Collins public perception, despite the reality of how good they actually are.

I am so sick of seeing armchair admirals on sites like The Drum where its patently apparent that 99% of the contributors wouldn't know the difference between a submarine and a gumtree
 

kaz

Member
And right now the Japanese are annoyed. They weren't officially promised the deal, but in Japan things are often "agreed" before formal discussions and papers being signed. It's not done to wiggle out after the informal agreement. And Abbott gave them the "informal" agreement.
I'm quite certain anybody would be upset being snubbed considering the build-up and promises within the baggage of the entire project; involving controversial issues such as ToT, labour, and even strategic advantage simply to name a few. Almost as if it's a wasted effort. It's good enough that they haven't threatened any legal action as of yet, and they possibly wouldn't.

It's generally agreed upon that this wouldn't affect the relationship between the two countries. Keep in mind, it took quite a while to convince the JMSDF they're not losing any advantage by exporting their technologies. They possibly wouldn't care too much at this point.
 

byronicasian

New Member
I'm quite certain anybody would be upset being snubbed considering the build-up and promises within the baggage of the entire project; involving controversial issues such as ToT, labour, and even strategic advantage simply to name a few. Almost as if it's a wasted effort. It's good enough that they haven't threatened any legal action as of yet, and they possibly wouldn't.

It's generally agreed upon that this wouldn't affect the relationship between the two countries. Keep in mind, it took quite a while to convince the JMSDF they're not losing any advantage by exporting their technologies. They possibly wouldn't care too much at this point.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't Abe or JPN MoD (one of the two) flat out told MHI to not put "profit" as the priority for this contract. Makes me wonder if MHI is truly miffed by losing out on the contract.

Obviously Abe is, considering the political capital he spent loosening the export restrictions and now with nothing to show for it.
 

hairyman

Active Member
Our parents and grandparents would be wondering why we were even considering German and Japanese design for a submarine. We fought on the same side as the French n two world wars, and guess who was the enemy both times. And who tried to give the people of Sydney a really close look at one of their submarines?
Maybe this means nothing to you younger people, but I was born in 1940, and I remember only too well the attitudes of the older people towards anythng Japanese or German.
In saying that, my wife and I drive a Peugeot and a Honda.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Our parents and grandparents would be wondering why we were even considering German and Japanese design for a submarine. We fought on the same side as the French n two world wars, and guess who was the enemy both times. And who tried to give the people of Sydney a really close look at one of their submarines?
Maybe this means nothing to you younger people, but I was born in 1940, and I remember only too well the attitudes of the older people towards anythng Japanese or German.
In saying that, my wife and I drive a Peugeot and a Honda.
history is a timeline.

WW1 we were allies with the Japanese
WW2 we were allies with the Chinese
 

hypernova

New Member
My two cents, with perhaps a little flippancy and trying to look at it from a holistic / political / PM&C POV.

RAN requirements are basically for a boat that can conduct the same missions as an SSN but without actually having nuclear power, so what better than an SSN design without nuclear power?

Steel industry is in trouble due to cheap Chinese steel being dumped globally (I suspect that part the reason that Mitsubishi was carrying on so much about their special steels is because the global glut it hurting them too). Option F not only throws the local steel industry a lifeline but will likely see the tax payer investing in much needed modernization as well as an on going, captive market. Protection for a vulnerable industry, made more vulnerable by a collection of FTAs, without being seen to actual protectionism.

A series of recent reviews have established that ASC are actually extremely capable when not constrained by inadequate funding and micromanagement by a technically naive, risk adverse (that incidentally had no real understanding of the risk) executive (i.e. successive governments and in particular some of the board members they have inflicted upon the organisation). Since the Coles review and the associated loosening of the shackles plus more appropriate and sustainable funding levels, ASC have demonstrated massively improved performance, including innovative solutions to persistent problems. Combined with the clear air gained by the removal of defmin Johnston it has been seen by Cabinet that ASC is a strategic asset worth saving and, though too late to reverse the decision to scrap the local design of the replacement submarine, we are well and truly capable of partnering with an established designer and providing what the RAN needs.

Lessons learned from not only Collins and AWD, but also MU90, Tiger, MRH90 and other projects, include that Australian industry can and has stepped up to complete major, complex work that the designer/vendor/partner has not done/completed or has screwed up. The message may have actually gotten through that instead of blaming and criticising local industry and capability for cost and schedule slips, more often than not caused by issues beyond their control, that they have consistently managed to recover the situation and provide the required capability against adversity and as such should be listened to and trusted more.

The big one is, if we actually understand the risks involved, plan and provide adequate funding, mitigation and resources, realistic budget and schedules can be achieved. Further more, as seen with the tech gf mentioned and other examples such as Australia's integration of Hellfire on Tiger, we can actually export the fruits of this work.

Not wanting to get into a political discussion, but I can see the submarine decision as a change in the substance of the government since the change in PM. We appear to have gone from a negative stance that Australians (with the exception of a wealthy few) are affable but lazy and not too smart, to one where we believe that we can do things as well as anyone else when given a fair chance. A change in that we are now looking to partner in a risky design and build instead of killing sovereign capability and buying a turnkey option from overseas.

Nothing is set in stone, a change in government or even just in PM could see a complete change of direction with canoes entering the fray again, reputations of people and organisations trashed and the usual suspects trying to offshore everything again, but for now I am going to be positive. I am going to look at the challenges of option F as being a vote of confidence in our capability to overcome them and make it work, i.e. an Australianised combat system of which BYG is just a component as has been successfully done on AWD with AEGIS. Australian innovations developed for Collins being evolved and implemented on Shortfin (something that was far less likely on Soryu+). As I am choosing to see it Soryu+ was the F100, Shortfin the Baby Burke, fingers crossed we can make it work and that, being a coalition government baby now, it can avoid the death by rhetoric of the Collins.
Excellent post. From reading this thread its clear many of the members here have extensive experience in project management at various stages in the development life cycle, including submarines. But it also seems as though the discussion is too narrowly focused upon risk in this area specifically. Option J seems to have been the preferred course of action here, and in terms of risk mitigation, at least in the design phase, because it was a boat ‘in the water’, or at least the closest to it. But design alterations is not the only area of these programs which impose risk – Mitsubishi HI, Kawasaki Shipbuilding and the JMSDF have literally zero experience in this kind of joint venture with foreign shipyards. Not to mention ToT and IP issues. IIRC ASC had awful trouble with support from kockhums with Collins which was a major issue in that program (happy to stand corrected here). In this regard Europeans are far more experienced, which reduces the overall risk profile.

But in a much wider sense these procurement decisions need to be placed in a greater context. The first is capability. According to Andrew Davies from ASPI – who apparently had some influence on the process – the Soryu simply did not meet the RAN’s endurance requirements. There were fundamental issues with the design which limited habitability for the desired crew levels, such as the differing size of Australian and Japanese submariners. We can infer from that everything from bunk to head to shower size was sub-optimal – critical in long endurance missions - and thus would have required significant redesign. As has been noted several times in this thread small changes to a design can quickly add up. Additionally, from public reports anyway, Soryu+’s transit speed was likely to be dramatically lower than the Barracuda, which imposes significant limitations at the operational level: the RAN’s primary area of operations is massive and the SSK’s engagement footprint with current weapons is reasonably small, thus being able to move large distances quickly is desirable. Even with the addition of LRASM transit speed will be a very desirable capability, especially in the ‘most’ high end scenario. Again, allowing for the immaturity of the design and the limitations of public information, it seems as though Option F provides the greatest ‘on paper’ capability for the RAN, risk aside.

That brings us to the strategic context which stretches well beyond the submarine capability and its role in the ADF. We cannot escape the fact that Japan is currently embroiled in a North Asian power struggle with the worlds emerging great power, a power who is our largest trade partner. No matter how you slice it that means a defence project of this magnitude has geostrategic consequences. Now, whether you tow the Hugh White line of Australian isolationism or not, these strategic implications at least need to be discussed. They do not exist, for better or worse, with either of the Europeans.

Additionally, and this ties in with the major theme of your post Volkodav, IMHO we need to be looking well past the 2030 commissioning of the first vessel. Australia is the – or at least one of – the fastest growing major developed nation on earth. By 2030 our population will be 30 million, by 2050 it will likely be north of 40 million and by the latter stages of this century it could be higher than the UK, France or Italy. What this means is will have the base industrial capacity to design and build our own major surface combatants and submarines entirely in house. I think that is an end most of the Australians on this forum would find desirable. But to get there we need to invest in domestic defence industry across the board, and it seems as though Option J favoured by the last government had the least Australian industry involvement, and option F has the most. Could we simply save money and have the capability on hand quicker if we just had the Japanese build the subs? Almost surely. But what kind of domestic capability would that generate? Australian innovations and design fixes in a number of foreign – European – builds such as Collins and ARH have only stimulated our capability in these spaces. Going with something as ambitious and home grown as Option F will force large-scale investment and problem solving across the industry. Will there be delays in Option F, will there be cost overruns, will the French screw us? Possibly, but Australian defence industry as a whole may be better off for it, and in 2040 we may well be able to design the replacement class in house. There is more to all of this than simply delivering a submarine in 2030.

I wouldn’t assume that the dumb politicians don’t have their head around our issues with the ARH and other European programs either. If you look at the senate JSF public hearing from the DFAT References committee (I’d post a link but I cant) fears over Australia becoming the lead developer on projects where we were supposed to leverage the development programs of other militaries – cough ARH cough – were raised by a senator with LM. So I’m sure the NSC was well aware of the risk of similar issues occurring with our partnership with DCNS. Their confidence in Option F speaks of confidence in Australian industry.
 
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gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
According to Andrew Davies from ASPI – who apparently had some influence on the process
no he didn't. and I know Andrew. he's as blind as everyone else was re the actual process and the actual determinations.

the reports have not been released and/or made available outside the assessment teams (and relevant exec - and they certainly are not blabbing as the debriefs to the losing respondents has also not occurred.)

NSC and Cabinet get a compressed brief - they don't get the entire assessment and the NSC never wants the complete assessments anyway

In addition, I'd hesitate to add that you've made some bold assumptions about the analysis that some of us have made in the open forums....
 

hypernova

New Member
no he didn't. and I know Andrew. he's as blind as everyone else was re the actual process and the actual determinations.

the reports have not been released and/or made available outside the assessment teams (and relevant exec - and they certainly are not blabbing as the debriefs to the losing respondents has also not occurred.)
IIRC he was being employed as an independent analyst. It could have been for SEA5000 I guess but I do remember reading he had some influence on the process. Cant remember when I read it but I think it was after ASPI's sub conference a couple of years ago. Again happy to stand corrected.

That is his evaluation of option J however, he's obviously claiming some level of knowledge on the Japanese proposal. I'd post a link but I cant as yet.

NSC and Cabinet get a compressed brief - they don't get the entire assessment and the NSC never wants the complete assessments anyway
Not sure what you mean here. I'm sure that's probably the case.

In addition, I'd hesitate to add that you've made some bold assumptions about the analysis that some of us have made in the open forums....
Bold assumptions? What have I assumed? AFAIK i was purely referring to the conversation in this thread. If I have misrepresented anyone I'd be happy to stand corrected. But as far as I can tell all i have referred to is the positions as they stand above.
 

kaz

Member
Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't Abe or JPN MoD (one of the two) flat out told MHI to not put "profit" as the priority for this contract. Makes me wonder if MHI is truly miffed by losing out on the contract.
Best case scenario for MHI chasing a "profit" would be the submarines being built and designed entirely in their own yards in Japan. The application for SEA1000 is simply one element of loosening the entire military industrial export business, it doesn't lean on it. The push for exports wouldn't dissolve completely simply because their efforts didn't win the SEA1000 contract.
 

Punta74

Member
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