Naval Ship & Submarine Propulsion Systems

Hoffy

Member
I suppose the issue on steel was the deal breaker. AFAIK, the other two emphasized their top-secret "state of the art" steels which would undoubtedly involve more complicated ToT and training.

Pity TKMS going home empty handed as none of its bids have succeeded despite an impressive commercial push. Anyhow, the ship has sailed.
Obviously a key consideration and point of differentiation was pump-jet technology which is already used in US/Russian/French & British vessels as well as the Mk48 torpedoes. Greater stealth as well as better shallow water maneuverability.
Also the defence white paper had from the very beginning sought a new , clean sheet design solution to meet the key requirements , so perhaps all the discussion about "vaporware" was not viewed as important during the evaluation process.
Weapons systems integration issues were also obviously pre-handled to the Australian Governments satisfaction.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Obviously a key consideration and point of differentiation was pump-jet technology which is already used in US/Russian/French & British vessels as well as the Mk48 torpedoes. Greater stealth as well as better shallow water maneuverability.
Only the USN and RAN use Mk48 ADCAP. (CBASS) - no one else has access as the data sets were australian developed and integrated into new chipsets - Russia France and UK don't use the Mk 48 let alone the ADCAP (CBASS)

How has the French solution got better littorals ability - even the nuke version doesn't have the tech set to get in close like the Virginias (or Astutes)

How does the French solution have better "stealth"? In fact it has less sensing ability at the array level than the current Collins iterations.

I'll just add this little tidbit. I was involved in 2 different sub classes (one french) where we added export technology developed for Collins to those platforms. ie we modified existing french and swedish subs with tech developed for Collins to improve their acoustic signatures. This from a country where politicians of both sides have laid waste to australian technology capability in their quest to score political points. We applied the same tech to low signature missile boats and demoed the same capability onto an allied partners nuke sub.

I worked specifically in submarine acoustics on french, swedish and danish subs - so I am interested as to where you believe this has been met?

Also the defence white paper had from the very beginning sought a new , clean sheet design solution to meet the key requirements , so perhaps all the discussion about "vaporware" was not viewed as important during the evaluation process.
quite a few of the blue tagged members have worked in acquisition and assessment so I'm curious as to your claims - a cleansheet design automatically ticks the risk appetite box - so you want to have a demonstrably superior platform to remove that risk matrix from the assessment.

the french have more experience than the germans? I don't think so 100 subs since WW1 as opposed to the germans 500+ and the grandfathers of modern sub design? The japanese have the highest availability and lowest maintenance recovery rate of anyone - including US nukes.

btw, final decisions are made by the NSC and then Cabinet - and as has happened in the past they can make a choice that differs from the actual assessment teans choice. It has happened before more than once

Weapons systems integration issues were also obviously pre-handled to the Australian Governments satisfaction.
Nope, they can't have, Thats a negotiation that has to be started now that a prime has been selected. and thats entirely governed by US State Dept on how and who they want to handle ITARs material. It won't be the French (and its not up to Australia to make the choice either - as we don't own the US tech sets even when we buy them - all ITARs and FMS artifacts approved for export are "owned" by the US State Dept even if it was built by Lockmart, Boeing, Raytheon, NG etc...) State Dept nominate who they approve of to assist in managing the issues around that export artifact - and the US builder can have veto over whether they approve of States selection choice. eg State Dept can say, all this work will be done by Neutron Consulting - and Lockmart who own the stateside IP might say that they disagree with the choice as they believe that Neutron is an unsafe partner - they can go back to State and suggest that the contractor should be Photon Contracting as they have an extant relationship. etc etc etc......
 
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gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
let me be clear re previous discussions on sub choices.

The decision is made, so its now up to everyone involved to ensure that we hold the development and build promises to account. tally-ho and all that.

But I get more than a little twitchy when I see comments which apply some kind of pixie dust to the solution selected as though its an unimpeachable and totally meritorious choice and that we should accept claims made as entirely accurate.

anyone with a background in engineering would also be raising the flag at this point as some statements are just abject nonsense from a selection and assessment perspective.

by all means lets clap and cheer that a decision has been made - but for goodness sake, lets not turn into the emperor with no clothes on and abandon logic for wishful thinking.

just for clarity - the selection of the prime is just the beginning
all the issue around tech selection and design now become part of the contract negotiation - none of the australian requirements have been confirmed - all thats been confirmed is the selection of the prime to undertake the development and build to australian requirements, cost issues, kpi's, milestone issues, training, development, sustainment, critical maint cycle issues etc....

none of the above has occurred, so any claims about whats going in these boats (outside of the mandated BYG issue) is yet to be started.

more to the point, you can't lay any steel until all this is done as there is an order in how and what you build for subs....

and then there's the subcontractor involvement, certification of sub contractors, acceptance of sub contractors, indemnity against sub contractor work (ie prime has overarching responsibility etc....)

none of the above is trivial - and steel won't be cut until the early 2020's.
 
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old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
As a member of the public, and a tax payer, I was blind sided. I was sold on option J, and I really hoped that was the choice.
I pray that the Barracuda (short finned, longfinned, foulmouth or whatever) is not a Tiger, NH90 or Styer. I have to wonder if this project might lead to a French ANZAC replacment?
Getting used to this though, hoped for a Bourke with 2 helo, s, got an F100 with one. Hoped for Apache, got Tiger. Hoped for new gen blackhawk, got NH90, s. Hoped for SPG, got s.f.a.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
So are saying untill all the t are crossed and the i dotteted it still could fall over in the negotiation stages if things don't go our way?

So would we have signed some sort of preliminary contract?
Technically and contractually - yes

It then defaults to the 2nd selection choice.

and that has also happened before

there are lots of things that have to be addressed before the lights go green

remember that steel doesn't get cut until 2024, 2025. So there is a lot of leeway if things go pear shaped
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Technically and contractually - yes

It then defaults to the 2nd selection choice.

and that has also happened before

there are lots of things that have to be addressed before the lights go green

remember that steel doesn't get cut until 2024, 2025. So there is a lot of leeway if things go pear shaped
Don't forget India choosing the Rafale as their future MRCA Fighter, supposed to have been 126 aircraft, some built in France then the rest in India. The entire program fell apart at the contract stage.
 

Punta74

Member
gf - I know you have stated prior the complexity of Sub redesign, and the fact its not as easy as it seems on paper.

Having just read up on the Barra SSN to Shortfin "Potential" re-designs, is it possible it may only required minimal changes (albeit still extremelly complex).

Seems the Nuclear module (approx 8m) is a single module. Assume that similar diesels that are on the Scorpene could be used ?


The SSN already has an Electric motor, can that stay the same ?
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
gf - I know you have stated prior the complexity of Sub redesign, and the fact its not as easy as it seems on paper.

Having just read up on the Barra SSN to Shortfin "Potential" re-designs, is it possible it may only required minimal changes (albeit still extremelly complex).

Seems the Nuclear module (approx 8m) is a single module. Assume that similar diesels that are on the Scorpene could be used ?


The SSN already has an Electric motor, can that stay the same ?
I'll give a broad reply - and my mate Volkodav will also probably do a drive by... :)

no, not that simple. The drivetrain is a singularly large critical mass - and the nuke drivetrain will have a very different mass to a diesel-electric.

and that impacts upon centre of gravity issues, buoyancy management, handling changes, counterbalancing issues to compensate for mass changes

its not just the issue that as a module it can be easily replaced - the entire sub handling and buoyancy behaviour revolves around its current mass design distribution.

all that changes in a heartbeat. its a significant issue and far from being trivial

simple things like whether we will have photonics changes the design completely.

traditional periscope design limits the workspace - the use of photonics means that you can put the combat room on the lower levels where room is less of an issue. You dramatically alter the hull integrity by having photonics. Your combat room ends up in the lower deck and the FBW means immediate changes to platform performance.

none of that detail has been established or detailed into the contract.

its like calling the winner of the melbourne cup before the horses are loaded into the truck to get to the racetrack.
 

Punta74

Member
I'll give a broad reply - and my mate Volkodav will also probably do a drive by... :)

no, not that simple. The drivetrain is a singularly large critical mass - and the nuke drivetrain will have a very different mass to a diesel-electric.

and that impacts upon centre of gravity issues, buoyancy management, handling changes, counterbalancing issues to compensate for mass changes

its not just the issue that as a module it can be easily replaced - the entire sub handling and buoyancy behaviour revolves around its current mass design distribution.

all that changes in a heartbeat. its a significant issue and far from being trivial

simple things like whether we will have photonics changes the design completely.

traditional periscope design limits the workspace - the use of photonics means that you can put the combat room on the lower levels where room is less of an issue. You dramatically alter the hull integrity by having photonics. Your combat room ends up in the lower deck and the FBW means immediate changes to platform performance.

none of that detail has been established or detailed into the contract.

its like calling the winner of the melbourne cup before the horses are loaded into the truck to get to the racetrack.
Thanks - completely out of my depth, but it's great to learn and subsequently read up more.

One last Q - Assuming we end up Scaling up the Scorpene's diesel-Electric propulsion, and use learning from this boat as well as the French SSN / SSBN. Do you know if this has a good availability record, or known issues with the drive ?
 

knightrider4

Active Member
Optimism.

There certainly is quite a bit of pessimism regarding the French selection. Its almost as if we have condemned the design when there has been no detailed design work done. Lets give DCNS a chance, there will be at least 3-5 years of detailed design work before steel gets cut. I for one wish them all the best.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Thanks - completely out of my depth, but it's great to learn and subsequently read up more.

One last Q - Assuming we end up Scaling up the Scorpene's diesel-Electric propulsion, and use learning from this boat as well as the French SSN / SSBN. Do you know if this has a good availability record, or known issues with the drive ?

as others have pointed out, the french have had problems with getting the nukes up to speed, they've have problems with co-development of scorpenes and S80's.

its been a while since I looked at meaningful data, but their availability rates were in the bottom half of the top 10 boats.

don't get me wrong, I as much as anyone else wants RAN to have the best available capability that can be acquired, and until the entire process runs it course, the assumption is that the french will carry the day.

however, I and many of the other DefProfs on this forum have been around this buoy before - and the reality of actual experience always trumps wishful thinking.

I genuinely hope it can be achieved, but I'm not going to subscribe to some automatic switching off of my brain and ignore some of the hard and real lessons and experiences I've had - especially with respect to sub programs - I'm not the only one with that philosophy - and as I and others have said, have a look at integration and delivery issues with any of the french kit that's been acquired or in service for the last 30 years - and across all the services

Its fine to be enthusiastic, but that doesn't mean that logic and common sense gets turned off.

wishing and hoping doesn't work in acquisition :)

in the third person, if you aren't realistic then you will just make the same errors even if it looks different this time around
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There certainly is quite a bit of pessimism regarding the French selection. Its almost as if we have condemned the design when there has been no detailed design work done. Lets give DCNS a chance, there will be at least 3-5 years of detailed design work before steel gets cut. I for one wish them all the best.
we (Defence staff) were told less than 2 weeks ago that steel won't be cut until 2024, 2025
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Just a query does anyone know if MESMA will be included or does the RAN still think it is not worth the effort?
the operational constraints applied to Collins are even less relevant now, so without seeing the CONOPs then a larger conventional sub will have to still meet the requirement.

AIP may well be designed into the drivetrain remapping that has to take place - whether AIP generators can fit into the same module space as the diesel electric drivetrain is unknown as basic details around what drivetrain is being offered has yet to be established.

I would question whether MESMA and the DE will fit in the same drivetrain space as the existing nuke module
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
My two cents, with perhaps a little flippancy and trying to look at it from a holistic / political / PM&C POV.

RAN requirements are basically for a boat that can conduct the same missions as an SSN but without actually having nuclear power, so what better than an SSN design without nuclear power?

Steel industry is in trouble due to cheap Chinese steel being dumped globally (I suspect that part the reason that Mitsubishi was carrying on so much about their special steels is because the global glut it hurting them too). Option F not only throws the local steel industry a lifeline but will likely see the tax payer investing in much needed modernization as well as an on going, captive market. Protection for a vulnerable industry, made more vulnerable by a collection of FTAs, without being seen to actual protectionism.

A series of recent reviews have established that ASC are actually extremely capable when not constrained by inadequate funding and micromanagement by a technically naive, risk adverse (that incidentally had no real understanding of the risk) executive (i.e. successive governments and in particular some of the board members they have inflicted upon the organisation). Since the Coles review and the associated loosening of the shackles plus more appropriate and sustainable funding levels, ASC have demonstrated massively improved performance, including innovative solutions to persistent problems. Combined with the clear air gained by the removal of defmin Johnston it has been seen by Cabinet that ASC is a strategic asset worth saving and, though too late to reverse the decision to scrap the local design of the replacement submarine, we are well and truly capable of partnering with an established designer and providing what the RAN needs.

Lessons learned from not only Collins and AWD, but also MU90, Tiger, MRH90 and other projects, include that Australian industry can and has stepped up to complete major, complex work that the designer/vendor/partner has not done/completed or has screwed up. The message may have actually gotten through that instead of blaming and criticising local industry and capability for cost and schedule slips, more often than not caused by issues beyond their control, that they have consistently managed to recover the situation and provide the required capability against adversity and as such should be listened to and trusted more.

The big one is, if we actually understand the risks involved, plan and provide adequate funding, mitigation and resources, realistic budget and schedules can be achieved. Further more, as seen with the tech gf mentioned and other examples such as Australia's integration of Hellfire on Tiger, we can actually export the fruits of this work.

Not wanting to get into a political discussion, but I can see the submarine decision as a change in the substance of the government since the change in PM. We appear to have gone from a negative stance that Australians (with the exception of a wealthy few) are affable but lazy and not too smart, to one where we believe that we can do things as well as anyone else when given a fair chance. A change in that we are now looking to partner in a risky design and build instead of killing sovereign capability and buying a turnkey option from overseas.

Nothing is set in stone, a change in government or even just in PM could see a complete change of direction with canoes entering the fray again, reputations of people and organisations trashed and the usual suspects trying to offshore everything again, but for now I am going to be positive. I am going to look at the challenges of option F as being a vote of confidence in our capability to overcome them and make it work, i.e. an Australianised combat system of which BYG is just a component as has been successfully done on AWD with AEGIS. Australian innovations developed for Collins being evolved and implemented on Shortfin (something that was far less likely on Soryu+). As I am choosing to see it Soryu+ was the F100, Shortfin the Baby Burke, fingers crossed we can make it work and that, being a coalition government baby now, it can avoid the death by rhetoric of the Collins.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
My two cents, with perhaps a little flippancy and trying to look at it from a holistic / political / PM&C POV.

RAN requirements are basically for a boat that can conduct the same missions as an SSN but without actually having nuclear power, so what better than an SSN design without nuclear power?

Steel industry is in trouble due to cheap Chinese steel being dumped globally (I suspect that part the reason that Mitsubishi was carrying on so much about their special steels is because the global glut it hurting them too). Option F not only throws the local steel industry a lifeline but will likely see the tax payer investing in much needed modernization as well as an on going, captive market. Protection for a vulnerable industry, made more vulnerable by a collection of FTAs, without being seen to actual protectionism.

A series of recent reviews have established that ASC are actually extremely capable when not constrained by inadequate funding and micromanagement by a technically naive, risk adverse (that incidentally had no real understanding of the risk) executive (i.e. successive governments and in particular some of the board members they have inflicted upon the organisation). Since the Coles review and the associated loosening of the shackles plus more appropriate and sustainable funding levels, ASC have demonstrated massively improved performance, including innovative solutions to persistent problems. Combined with the clear air gained by the removal of defmin Johnston it has been seen by Cabinet that ASC is a strategic asset worth saving and, though too late to reverse the decision to scrap the local design of the replacement submarine, we are well and truly capable of partnering with an established designer and providing what the RAN needs.

Lessons learned from not only Collins and AWD, but also MU90, Tiger, MRH90 and other projects, include that Australian industry can and has stepped up to complete major, complex work that the designer/vendor/partner has not done/completed or has screwed up. The message may have actually gotten through that instead of blaming and criticising local industry and capability for cost and schedule slips, more often than not caused by issues beyond their control, that they have consistently managed to recover the situation and provide the required capability against adversity and as such should be listened to and trusted more.

The big one is, if we actually understand the risks involved, plan and provide adequate funding, mitigation and resources, realistic budget and schedules can be achieved. Further more, as seen with the tech gf mentioned and other examples such as Australia's integration of Hellfire on Tiger, we can actually export the fruits of this work.

Not wanting to get into a political discussion, but I can see the submarine decision as a change in the substance of the government since the change in PM. We appear to have gone from a negative stance that Australians (with the exception of a wealthy few) are affable but lazy and not too smart, to one where we believe that we can do things as well as anyone else when given a fair chance. A change in that we are now looking to partner in a risky design and build instead of killing sovereign capability and buying a turnkey option from overseas.

Nothing is set in stone, a change in government or even just in PM could see a complete change of direction with canoes entering the fray again, reputations of people and organisations trashed and the usual suspects trying to offshore everything again, but for now I am going to be positive. I am going to look at the challenges of option F as being a vote of confidence in our capability to overcome them and make it work, i.e. an Australianised combat system of which BYG is just a component as has been successfully done on AWD with AEGIS. Australian innovations developed for Collins being evolved and implemented on Shortfin (something that was far less likely on Soryu+). As I am choosing to see it Soryu+ was the F100, Shortfin the Baby Burke, fingers crossed we can make it work and that, being a coalition government baby now, it can avoid the death by rhetoric of the Collins.

Well said, yourself and GF are right it's all said and done, we have to get over our anti-French bias and get right behind the project from day dot. We all want what's best for the RAN and just hope that it all comes together as advertised.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
That can't have come as any surprise, unless you (the defence staff) hadn't read the White Paper. Actual delivery of boat number one isn't envisaged in the DWP until around 2030

oldsig
no, but intermal messages to staff are not always identical to external releases

its not deliberate massaging, but staff get messages with less political ra-ra attached

there was already some frustration at how the press was going off the rails and a frustration at the lack of education which then enters the public arena as fact

eventually the distorted facts become a binding truth - look at Collins and JSF
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Well said, yourself and GF are right it's all said and done, we have to get over our anti-French bias and get right behind the project from day dot. We all want what's best for the RAN and just hope that it all comes together as advertised.
Its not an anti-french bias for me at all, its a rubber to the road and toes to the fire issue based on prev experience.

I have french relatives, so they know I love the french.

Govts OTOH. lordy lordy
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
just a little thing to consider re pump jet propulsion

on a nuke where they basically have electric power like acceleration, the pump jet can be amped up with energy and get the sub into a position where they can bolt at a moments notice - and sustain that surge

a DE on pump jet just won't have the same capability, its impossible. with an e-boat like the Soryu LiPo proposal - a lot more like the surge and sprint characteristics of a nuke

that means that the DE will require massive generation and storage to meet the demands of the pump jet propulsion as well as adding in the sensor and combat suites demands. it means adding a primary drivetrain which is not likely to be in service on any large french conventional sub

its no longer an issue of trying to fit the DE drivetrain into the nuke drivebay module - it means adding in AIP and extra batteries to meet the CONOPs demands - it means adding in conventional batteries like Collins which are huge.

suddenly all your real estate advantages inherently provided by using a nuke DT are gone, suddenly all that big space available to kit out the specials, store swimmers, store the USV/UAV hybrids is under challenge

and I would have to say, that going off prev known examples like Steyr, Tiger, NH90, Bushmaster, HQJOC, MU90 where the decisions were heavily influenced by political imperative and the injection of the AIC card that the heavy hand of AIC in the assessment matrix lurks in the background - and that can invite the Service response of "make the choice and we'll make it work"
 
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