Excellent to some....
Sometime ago in my life I had a chance to work in a commercial kitchen for a short time. I wasn't desperate for work, but was helping out a friend, and really enjoyed the experience. However, one day the cook and his two apprentices, and me as the helping hand, really screwed up...wait, there is a moral to this.
About four hours after we started to ruin what was going to be a dinner for 50 people, the chef walked in. In fact we didn't even know we were screwing things up until she took one look, and then just quietly said...stop.
Then she demonstrated the difference between a chef and a cook. Within 20-30 minutes we had fixed up most of the mistakes, and although it cost some $300 extra, the dinner was served as ordered, and still at a profit.
Iraq, and to some degree Afghanistan, is just that, a really screwed up 'serving' that was made following the wrong set of directions, and aimed at a different 'client'. However no one seems to be able to step in and just say to everyone to hold what they are doing, discard the already ruined 'ingredients' and start again. Everyone seems to be defending their 'honour' and opinion, and failing to admit that there are too "many cooks spoiling the broth" and not a chef in sight.
It seems to me that the first problem is the need to realise that the US and NATO troops are "not in Kansas any more".
This is not something their manuals written for the Cold War could teach them, and even application of those parts that are applicable, like conducting a patrol, may not be serving the same purpose. Probably after all this time the actual grunts know this, but is this understood at the top? Why are all these generals coming out AFTER they leave the service to voice their disagreement with the policy they had been helping out enact?
Also they need to realise the terrain is very different. Its not the German plain, and its not even the Kuwaiti desert. Terrain always shaped strategy and tactics, but in these cases it is seemingly being disregarded because the political imperative would not be served to adopt more appropriate methods.
There needs to be a willingness to also admit that something can be learned from the mistakes made by the Soviet forces when they were in Afghanistan. and that creating a semi-sovereign Kurdistan may not be good for global inflation in economies that pay for the security efforts.
The other thing I would do is to reshape the higher command echelons. Create Staff sections for specialists that may not necessarily feature in military HQs like Environment analysis, Sociology, Cultural assessment, and Economic development. Everything being done has to be done on multilevel analysis and not only from military perspective.
If a community of Shia need to be relocated, do it.
If a pass in the North of Kurdistan needs to be secured, build a fort.
Sure relocation didn't work in Vietnam, but it may do in Iraq.
Sure the US Army Corps of Engineers have not built a fort for some time (Civil War?), but it is a perfectly valid form of military art and science if the situation called for it.
I know that Department of State (USA) has many officials in Iraq, but in my experience the likelihood of ensuring cooperation between US DoD and DoS is no better then getting a German Sheppard to play with a Siamese cat. All these officials need to be given probationary ranks, and given to understand that they are serving a greater good then their own career. The military officers on the other hand need to understand that their career has not for the most part provided them with the knowledge and experience to resolve non-military conflicts in a foreign society (why in a good kitchen the pastry chef and the soup chef never switch roles).
The British Empire never conquered Afghanistan before, but they had good results in other parts of the region, namely the North West Frontier (thats where the Taliban is training now).
NATO has other historical experience to draw on to help with the situation. The interdiction of smuggler trade routes between Italy and Switzerland, Germany and Austria in the 18th and 19th centuries may be a useful subject to revisit.
Or may be operations of Austrian border troops (Grenz) on the Hungarian border against Turkish raiding parties may teach something?
The Spanish peasants made things difficult for Napoleon in similar terrain. There are loads of books written on the subject of guerrilla warfare, but most were written for NATO 'Napoleons'. Maybe NATO troops can try playing the guerrilla role (what Australian SAS does as far as it has been reported)?
These were very low tech operations I understand
Just my two bits
