OPSSG
Can you detail what Singapore has contributed to the Timor op, and to Afghanistan since then?
1. IMO, ASEAN member participation helps provide 'legitimacy' and political support for Australian forces in regional operations. Before I talk about older operations, there are three more recent 2013 exercises using amphibious assets that are relevant to Australia and Singapore.
One, Australians and Singaporeans working together in Exercise Trident in 2013 while embarked on the RSS Resolution (see
replies #84 and #85 of the Singapore Army picture thread).
Two, in the June 2013 HADR and Military Medicine Exercise in Brunei (see
reply #3 in the ADMM Plus picture thread onwards), in which both Australia and Singapore took part, with Australia as a ADMM Plus member.
Three, in Kiwi led Exercise Southern Katipo 2013, some coalition countries (including Australia, Canada, France, US and Singapore) participated in, on this point (see
reply #90 of the Singapore Army picture thread).
2. In the 1991 Gulf War, a 30-strong SAF medical team led by the then MAJ (Dr) Tan Chi Chiu was deployed and based in the British Army Rear Hospital at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. The strategic relationship continued as Singapore gave the US permission to land aircraft en route to Kuwait and Iraq traveling from the United States and Asia during the 1991 Gulf War (Operation Desert Shield) and also in the 2003 invasion of Iraqi (Operation Iraqi Freedom). Beyond just giving landing rights, Singapore is also a burden sharing partner with the US and it is done in a manner that reinforces the relationship between US, Australia and Singapore. With regard to older operations that both Australia and Singapore have participated in support of peace support operations, I am sure you are aware that:-
(i) over 1,400 Singaporeans have operated under CTF 151 as part of the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. Singaporean boarding teams have faced off with pirates and sank their attack skiffs in Operation Blue Sapphire;
(ii) 492 Singaporeans have served in Afghanistan. For details on Operation Blue Ridge, see: [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1KnsrozJfw"]Singapore Army: Operation Blue Ridge (OBR) Documentary - Full Version - YouTube[/nomedia];
(iii) over 1,500 reservists (aka NSmen), NSFs and regulars were deployed to provide humanitarian assistance to Meulaboh, Aceh, an area with an active insurgency, in January 2005. In the case of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami:-
(a) Commander 21st Division (a 1 star) and his command staff were deployed to Banda Aceh in support humanitarian operations under Operation Flying Eagle. Within days of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, the 21st Division (Singapore Guards) landed a reinforced battalion size force, in multiple phases - with combat engineers creating beach-heads, clearing roads of debris and providing drinking water; with medical and surgical teams providing care for the injured; with a command team to plan and manage the massive logistics required to help the locals
(b) RSS Endurance was the first foreign navy ship to re-establish a life-line to Meulaboh (a coastal town in West Sumatra that was previously completely cut off after the tsunami). Singapore's contributions to Indonesia included the deployment of three Endurance Class LPDs, eight CH-47 Chinooks and four Super Pumas, six C-130s, two F-50s, a mobile air traffic control tower (see this video:
http://youtu.be/jnZVrs5Sjp4).
(c) With host nation support in Singapore, US Commands (Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific and Naval Regional Contracting Center Singapore) worked 24/7 to surge supply capacity in support of the humanitarian effort in Operation Unified Assistance.
(d) During the conduct of Operation Unified Assistance by US PACOM, two SAF officers proficiently in Bahasa Indonesia, with in-depth knowledge of Indonesian culture, psyche, and sensitivities to the presence of foreign military forces, were posted as Liaison Officers to enable the US to deliver aid to Indonesia with less fiction;
and
(iv) 998 Singaporeans from the army, navy and air force served in Iraq and the Northern Arabian Gulf from 2004 to 2008. The SAF deployments in support of Operation Blue Orchid included:-
(a)
Navy: 5x deployments of Endurance Class LPDs for the seaward defence of Iraq for 300 days
against suicide boat attacks - which included NDU boarding teams conducting routine inspection of ships and dhows for explosives and other threats to protect Iraqi's two oil terminals. The Singapore Navy also trained the Iraqi Navy and helped them extend their operating range by refueling their patrols boats at sea (see this video on SAF in Iraq: [nomedia]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpC4TTkT8Iw[/nomedia]);
(b)
Air Force: 1x C-130 deployment for 2 months carrying men, cargo and equipment and performing evasive manoeuvres for about 1/3 of their 29 missions completed in 190 hrs of flight time (in the above video, you can see the force protection team deployed with the C-130); 5x KC-135R deployments for 3 months, each, all facing the danger of short-range SAM attacks with 303 missions completed in 1,800 hrs of flight time; and
(c)
Army: 4 officers, each, serving a 6 month tour under coalition command in Iraq.
3. Going further back, after a UN-sponsored vote for independence in 1999, Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) was engulfed by conflict. In September 1999, Australia was desperate for an ASEAN partner to deploy into East Timor. Thanks to Dr. Mahathir's prior political stance, Malaysian troops were seen by the locals, Australia, NZ and the US as taking a pro-Indonesian or non-neutral position with regards to events in Timor-Leste (eg. The
NY Times reported that Ramos-Horta was opposed to Malaysia being given command of UN troops and that such a move would anger the East Timorese). Thailand was the first ASEAN country to volunteer, followed by Singapore and the Philippines. Thereafter, Thai and Singaporean military and ships deployed in support of the Australia and New Zealand-led international stabilization force were instrumental in maintaining ASEAN's credibility, at a difficult time — with the then
Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir casting aspersions on the lead country conducting peace-enforcement operations in East Timor. The SAF deployed to conduct UN peace-enforcement patrols at Cova Lima, in south-western Timor-Leste with a mandate under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. These combat peacekeeping deployments:-
(i) started in May 2001 with 70 Singaporean combat peacekeepers stationed at Cova Lima in Operation Blue Heron. The deployment of this enlarged platoon lasted for a period of one-and-a-half years till November 2002. The conduct of these border patrols, intelligence gathering efforts, and presence of a quick reaction force enabled the SAF to disarm militia-men and criminal elements in their assigned sector, to stop the cycle of violence;
(ii) continued in November 2002. The number of Singaporean combat peacekeepers deployed to Cova Lima was enlarged to a company sized force of a 160 troops as reports of groups terrorizing the villages between the border and Dili grew in number till early 2003. Singapore's combat peacekeeper company was supported by a RSAF helicopter detachment comprising four Huey helicopters, with a Singaporean Major General taking command of UNMISET forces of 3,300 peacekeepers from August 2002 to August 2003. The Singapore combat peacekeepers operated as part of THAIBATT with responsibility for half of the border between West Timor and Timor-Leste — AUSBATT having responsibility for the other half. The increase in numbers and the insertion of Singaporean long-range recce patrols by RSAF Huey helicopters into the jungle to track hostile elements crossing the border was instrumental in stopping the cycle of violence. 17 reservists and 10 full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) were among those who volunteered and were deployed for the combat peacekeeping mission; and
(iii) lasted till December 2012 (at a lower level), with the end of the UN mandate.
At early stage of the peacekeeping mission under INTERFET, Singapore Navy's 3 LSTs provided up to 50% of all sea-lift to support the UN peacekeeping mission via a continuous ferry service dbetween Darwin and Dili (for details see '
Strength through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation Stabilise'). Thereafter, Singapore has consistently provided troops for deployment to Timor-Leste and only ending these small deployments in December 2012.
4. There is an article from the Second Line of Defense on the Italian ship that is worth a read (
RE-THINKING THE ROLE OF THE SMALLER DECK CARRIER: THE CASE OF CAVOUR). A ship like the Cavour, operating F-35Bs, can form a centerpiece of a maritime operational force or provide overwatch and strike support for an allied coalition force, seen as a distributed force.
5. It is not a secret, in 2014, that Singapore is looking for a Joint Multi-Mission Ship (quite possibly a LHA), possibly similar in capabilities to the Italian Cavour; and in the 2020s looking at the F-35B as the RSAF's F-16C/D replacement. The cycle of planning has started for the RSAF. Recently, 5 new Singaporean pilots earned their wings in a course conducted in Italy (see
reply #37 in this RSAF picture thread). This has occurred against the backdrop of the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation between Italy and Singapore that was signed in February 2012.
6. If you look further back at military to military relations between US and Singapore, it is clear that the Americans have committed resources to help facilitate a Singapore decision on which F-35 type to acquire. A case in point, the conduct of
Exercise Commando Sling 12-1. ‘Commando Sling’ is the code name for a series of bilateral air combat exercises between the US and Singapore. Commando Sling 12-1 stands out as one of the more remarkable exercises.
