Japan, Koreas, China and Taiwan regional issues

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 4 of 4: Pelosi to visit Taiwan on 2-3 Aug 2022

10. Since the Sunflower Movement the political center has shifted to a pro-Taiwan position that does not accept that Taiwan is a part of China.
(a) This has moved the DPP into the power position, put the KMT on the margins, and the TPP trying to come up with a clear stance of its own, prior to the 2024 Presidential Election in Taiwan (where Tsai’s VP William Lai Ching-te is the front runner). In the past, Lai has referred to himself as a “pro-independence worker” for Taiwan.​
(b) Most Americans supporting Pelosi’s visit don’t even know about ‘The Gray Rhino’ in the room this time. As Tsai’s successor, VP William Lai Ching-te, is likely to want to force China’s hand & declare independence, once Tsai steps down at the next election. A gray rhino is a 2-ton animal, with a scary horn that is charging at us. It’s a metaphor for the things that go wrong that is actually avoidable.​
(c) Long run consequences for Taiwan is important. Pelosi raised China-Taiwan tensions at a time when tension is already excessive. She damaged Xi Jinping when he is ensuring his third term and is under attack for being weak on Taiwan. This forces him to take especially strong ongoing measures. She raised the baseline for future military signaling, which to show seriousness will now have to start with exercises completely surrounding Taiwan and likely blockading it.​
(d) We should take note what Bonnie Glaser wrote: “The actions that China is taking now are intended to drastically shift the status quo in BJ's favor. Think 2012 Senkakus and 2015-16 South China Sea. Many will look back on this visit and say that Taiwan paid too high a price.”​

(e) What Pelosi didn't do was to strengthen Taiwan or US support for Taiwan in any way. Trump, Pompeo and Biden already pushed that support to a point that jeopardized the 1979 understanding which is the foundation of Taiwan's enjoyment of peace, prosperity and democracy. The coming period of tension to the 2024 Presidential Election in Taiwan may be bumpy. It will be important for American and Chinese officials to remain in direct contact; and for each side to exercise discipline, so as to focus on preserving peace and stability in Taiwan Strait.​

I am not sure how valid is this observation, but it bears discussion
11. Clearly, from the pictures released, Taiwan’s annual "Han Kuang" exercise has staged PR displays that is devoid of military logic (or tactics). Given the Pelosi visit, it is expected that the exercise just prior to her visit have a stronger than usual PR focus. But no competent army would be silly enough to build a trench under a bridge span, with pretty sand bags for walls (when a wood frame to prevent collapse in heavy rains is more practical). The silly thing is having it located only about hundred metres from the beach.

12. As expected, Beijing unleashed a number of measures to punish Taiwan as a result of the trip. The scale and range of these retaliations are bigger than before but as many experts point out, they are not really new tactics. The Taiwanese themselves were rather calm about the Pelosi visit, and how this reflects how Taiwanese perspectives were often neglected regarding trip. While the Taiwanese appreciate the support and solidarity from a high-level official like Pelosi, they also have concerns about the level and extent of China’s retaliation, in this Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.

13. As others have noted, Friedman is right about how stupid a move this is. There is no rational reason for it and it harms Taiwan. It really is a comment on the extreme political dysfunction in the US and the fundamental American failure to understand China. Not sure how true but a commentator reported that Pelosi said she will only not go to Taiwan if Biden publicly discourages her and she can blame him.

14. As much as I pity Taiwan, it’s pretty impressive that China, within hours of the Pelosi visit has used every element of DIME to express displeasure:
(a) Diplomacy — Not only has China has lodged a demarche to the US White House National Security Council and the Department of State on US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, China’s MFA has coordinated responses with other countries like Pakistan, North Korea and even Lesotho.​
(b) Information — China’s MFA statement says Pelosi's visit "in any form and for any reason is an escalation of official exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan and a major political provocation." There is also an active disinformation campaign and cyber attacks.​
(c) Military — The Chinese:​
(i) say the PLA will "launch a series of targeted military operations to counter" the actions of the U.S. and the DPP authorities, 16 minutes after Pelosi landed in Taipei;​
(ii) scale of exercises are so large and in so many areas that Taiwan port authorities asked ships to find alternative routes and avoid areas of China's announced drills around the island. Commenting on the six exclusion zones, M. Taylor Fravel said: “It’s quite clear they’re going to be simulating how they might blockade Taiwan in the future." Scale and depth reflect the fact the PLA is today a much more modern, capable organisation with the capacity to project power further out; and​
(iii) flew 27 PLA military aircraft into Taiwan's ADIZ and they crossed over the median line of the Taiwan Strait. These were comprised of 16x Su-30 and 6x J-11. To put this in perspective, when Sen. Tammy Duckworth visited in May and met with President Tsai the PLA launched a 50-sortie incursion. This is a new normal, as China's gray zone tool kit gets a workout.​
The silver lining is that Beijing’s overreaction to Pelosi’s visit might result in Taiwan and other countries, like Australia, Canada, and Japan accelerating their own plans to reduce their dependence on China; and​
(d) Economics — Chinese customs suspended imports of Taiwanese citrus fruits, chilled white scallops and frozen mackerel, extending the list of banned items to more than 1,000 products as cross-Strait relations have deteriorated in recent years. Chinese mainland will halt natural sand exports to Taiwan — sand is critical for concrete, critical for the construction industry, a critical political support base for the DPP. Ditto for some of the agricultural export bans.​
15. The Korea Times says officials in Seoul are all too wary and nervous over the timing of Pelosi's visit to Korea (after coming from Taiwan). Pelosi will hold talks with South Korea's National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin-pyo.

"Amid the deepening U.S.-China rivalry, China has threatened military actions and it could invoke a U.S. response in kind, which would eventually affect South Korea, because of the South's alliance with the U.S.," director of the U.S.-China Policy Institute at Ajou University Kim Heung-kyu was cited as saying in the publication.​

16. Far too many American think tanks make theoretical assessments justifying the need for high levels of spending for military deterrence but show no awareness of the need for American political reassurance, to China, as well.

(a) Stable US-China relations are vital for regional peace and prosperity. But I have given up hope that the US and China can work out a modus vivendi, exercise self-restraint and refrain from actions that will further escalate tensions. The Pelosi visit was not just a re-run of Newt Gingrich's visit a generation earlier, which occurred during an entirely different relationship between the two countries. Pelosi’s political stunt that took a dangerous situation and made it more dangerous.​
(b) Thanks to Nancy Pelosi, the prior Team Biden, attempt at a guard-rails strategy for China is firmly thrown into the dustbin of history. She is seen as so toxic, the President of South Korea, will only take a call with her and refuses to meet her, as he is on ‘holiday,’ in Seoul. Keeping in mind that part of President Yoon's policy platform when he ran for president was to strengthen ties with the US.​
(c) Taiwanese troops on 3 Aug 2022 fired flares at 2 Chinese UAVs which penetrated Kinmen County's airspace, marking the first time PLA UAVs have appeared over the county.​
 
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Vivendi

Well-Known Member
How could China be quiet? It has long maintained that Taiwan is an integral part of China [most of the world agrees] and that the U.S. is again interfering in a Chinese internal/domestic affair. Having put itself into such a position and long maintained it; China has no choice but to be vocal.
"most of the world" don't necessarily agree that Taiwan is an integral part of China. It's true that very few countries today recognize Taiwan. However all countries also know that the cost of recognizing Taiwan as an independent country is immense (due to severe punishments from China) and is therefore not worth it. So most countries are very careful about this, to not be in trouble with China. Just look at how strongly China reacted when e.g., Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open office Analysts: Even EU Members Taking ‘Wait and See’ Approach on China-Lithuania Standoff (voanews.com)

It's like having a bully in your neighborhood that is in conflict with a smaller guy. You don't agree with the bully but you also decide to stay silent, since you don't want to get in trouble with the bully yourself. Your silence is not because you "agree" with the bully, it's just a result of your personal risk-benefit analysis.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
most of the world" don't necessarily agree that Taiwan is an integral part of China.
"Most of the world" adheres to the One China policy; that although Taiwan is a self governing state; it's still considered part of China; which is incidentally why many; although they have some form of relations with Taiwan; do not officially recognise it.

Just look at how strongly China reacted when e.g., Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open office.
I'm aware of the blowbacks which can arise when one displeases China but thank you for mentioning the Lithuanian example..

Your silence is not because you "agree" with the bully
And nobody said it was... Nor was it a point of the discussion which was centered on something else entirely...

In this case the "smaller guy"; although he's all for democracy, human rights and freedom of the press; has his own interests to watch out for; he does a lot of trade with the "bully" and desires acess to the "bully's" large market. He also has no desire for unnecessary trouble with the "bully" as it would have damaging consequences.
 
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koxinga

Well-Known Member
"most of the world" don't necessarily agree that Taiwan is an integral part of China. It's true that very few countries today recognize Taiwan. However all countries also know that the cost of recognizing Taiwan as an independent country is immense (due to severe punishments from China) and is therefore not worth it.
A statement like this is an expression of opinion and inference that most countries would secretly want to recongized Taiwan. There is no way to test this opinion. My own opinion is most nations around the world don't really have a strong opinion either way, except that the status quo should be maintained and not be unilaterally changed by China.

@Musashi_kenshin IMO, the correct counterpoint to the CCP's revisionist worldview is Taiwan. It is probably the reason why it's continued existence rankles the CCP. It shows how a Chinese "civilisation" (regardless KMT or DPP) can move on from the past and be a well adjusted, democractic and developed society that is integrated with the rest of the world without feeling that it is being ripped off by it. It is a narrative that runs counter to their vision.

XJP's China Dream? It's just next door.
 

weaponwh

Member
Previous Chinese attempts to punish Taiwan by blocking imports of certain foodstuffs haven't gone according to plan. The infamous ban on Taiwanese pineapples opened up alternative markets, especially in Japan - the result was that Taiwanese growers sold more than before the Chinese ban. It's quite possible that with the increase in food prices globally, other countries might be very happy to snap up Taiwanese produce to keep their prices down.

Also according to Nikkei Asia, some of the "suspensions" only come into force in 2027.

So I have to question as to how much of a negative impact these latest Chinese trade restrictions will have.
if i remember correctly from taiwan news, the pineapples was only got temporary boost from japan and the local, mainly due to heavy discount. but they can't have deep discount indefinitely.
 

weaponwh

Member
The problem is that the Chinese have difficulty in understanding the difference between a member of the legislature & a member of the government. Everyone has to toe the party line in China.
i would think given decades of US-china relationship, they would already understand US govern system. even a person with some political science background would know this, and ccp study US system for long time.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group

Just put this to remind that problem of Taiwan/ROC can not be put the blame only to CCP but KMT as the leader of Taiwan in most of Taiwan historical period also take big blame on that.

1971, the United States and its allies promoted a "two-China" policy in order to allow membership in the United Nations (UN) to both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC). The idea was to resolve the unreasonable arrangement by which the PRC, which in fact ruled the mainland, was not a UN member, and the ROC, which ruled only Taiwan, held "China's" membership.
The Article that I put the link into was wrote by DPP politician. Off course he wants to blame on every thing on present Taiwan legal 'mess up' to KMT. Personally I can't blame everything to KMT, but I do agree that KMT that rule Taiwan at that time mess up the chances of "two china" recognition internationally.

Like it or not, Internationally there are recognised two Korea just as before there ware two Vietnam. Eventough each Korea as each Vietnam internally also claim whole Korea and Vietnam (even only one succed for force reuinification). ROC is part of the mess that insist there is only one China.

If in 70's they are 'realistic' that they have no chances whatsoever to regain mainland, and understand Taiwan is the only teritorial area left they have, then perhaps the agenda for two China can be push in UN. As now this one China policy is the trap that ROC pur their self in to it.

PRC just push the implementation of one China policy to everyone Internationally. By legal, any country that already recognise one China, can not and should not send any offcial delegation to Taiwan. Like it or not, PRC on this matter have legal ground.

If Nancy Pelosi come as private individual, that"s another matter. Indonesia once received ROC delegation that come as part of Trade representative group. Thus legally Indonesia never received any ROC official delegation. PRC put official complaint, but they can not push much as those ROC delegation come not as offcial of a nation but part of trade delagations of a trading entity.

Those legal niceties that US by allowing Pelosi come offcially (with US official planes with official agenda) that PRC push, and again they have legal ground on that. So this talk on PRC should know how US work, or PRC behave as 'bully' does not answer why US broke legal status quo.

So eventough when Biden come after Trump, many nations hope US will behave more proper within Internationally norms (unlike Trump), however there are now big questions if US democrats in Hill or White House handle better compares to Republican Trumps.

No matter, the eggs already broken. However US now must deal with realities of Russia and China alliances actually being push closer by Washington action more as consequences. Multipolar Globalisation come faster to realities, also done due to Washington action. Personally I just chuckle with the tought on Biden administration still hope China will work with them to 'cap' Russian oil revenue or isolate Russian cooperation after this.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
Related to Taiwan, but also more to Historical Military operation. Some time ago I reread on several online sources on military "what if" scenario if Chiang Kai Shek ROC during 1949 decided to regroup their line on holding Jiangnan teritory, instead wholle China.

Jiangnan.png

For those who are not familiar with what is Jiangnan (map from online sources).

The argument are:
1. KMT strong base it self basically southern China and Jiangnan make big part of that.
2. USSR supplies make CCP possition in Northern China actually eventually will overwhelm ROC/KMT possition upnorth. By concentrating their defense in Southern area, and smaller supply lines, ROC can create southern fortress. In a way just like Southern Song done when they are being push from North.

I know in realities Chiang will not going to let this happen, and his insistence to fight for all China cost him later on. Still this is going to be intriging scenario of it is happen.

If this scenario happen, then reality of two China will happen. What make of Jiangnan now is also big part of Industrialised China. North China still have big industry bit so does South China. Then imaggine if both of them also nuclear arm.

Sorry Mods, if this is bit out of topic. However puting this just shown in the end reality of One China or ROC better to religuish hope to regain China, should come to conclusions when ROC/KMT army got little late to reorganise their defense in Southern China.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Here we go!

Day 1 of 5

Eastern Theater command confirms the start of the exercises

The chinese identified a list of locations which these military exercises will be happening in the form of navigation warnings.


According to the Ministry of National Defense, chinese missiles starting impacting in the designated target areas at 13:56 local time.

The contrails of the missiles have been widely captured on social media.


These images were identified as Pingtan island, Fujian province, directly facing Taiwan and is also one of the closest.


Which also seems to be the focal point of the exercises

 
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koxinga

Well-Known Member
Continued..

Officially released images suggested DF-15 / 16s were launched, with at least two that flew over the width of Taiwan into designated target zone on the eastern seaboard. (launch images/video were taken mostly from CCTV Military Weibo here Sina Visitor System)


Taiwanese media reported both DF-15 and DF-16s were used. (below tweet took screenshots of local media)


So far, it is not confirmed. A number of PLA bases could be taking part in these exercises

 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemns the G7 statement... and reiterate their worldview which I mention earlier. Thanks FM Wang Yi!

"Today's China is no longer the China of the 19th century. History should not repeat itself, and it will never repeat itself!"
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Perhaps the current Chinese naval exercise is training exercise for an eventual blockade of Taiwan’s sea access. A blockade would be a less risky approach versus an actual invasion and would allow testing of Western and Asian partner resolve. Also easier to change course if things go sideways.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Japan & other factors in the 4th Taiwan-Straits Crisis

1. Japan about to react — as a member of G7, they will back future JMSDF moves. The PLA has managed to make Team Biden look bad but the Japanese will move once their national interest is affected.

2. IMO, the US and China are deliberately talking past each other, in the aftermath of the Pelosi visit to Taiwan. Team Biden now thinks this is about Chinese coercion, whereas many in the CCP think this is about a drift from “one China” to "one China, one Taiwan." BOTH sides cannot backdown and this will lead to a very unstable new Cross-Straits baseline. On 5 Aug 2022, US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, & Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa released a statement, with extracts of select quotes below:
“…reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. They appreciated ASEAN’s statement about the importance of deescalating tension in the Taiwan Strait. The three sides share the region’s desire for diplomacy to avoid the risks of miscalculation.”​
“…expressed their concern about the PRC recent actions that gravely affect international peace and stability, including the use of large-scale military exercises. They condemned the PRC’s launch of ballistic missiles, five of which the Japanese government reported landed in its exclusive economic zones, raising tension and destabilizing the region. The Secretary and the Foreign Ministers urged the PRC to immediately cease the military exercises.”​

Perhaps the current Chinese naval exercise is training exercise for an eventual blockade of Taiwan’s sea access. A blockade would be a less risky approach versus an actual invasion and would allow testing of Western and Asian partner resolve. Also easier to change course if things go sideways.
3. Great, if it is really that silly of a squeeze play plan — as the counter reaction is not pleasant. IMO, a blockade of Taiwan will occur when an invasion attempt fails.

4. If China conducts a silly blockade Taiwan in a smaller circle; the JMSDF & the US Navy will keep the PLA(N) largely bottled up at Japanese controlled choke points within the 1st island chain. It will be a small circle within a bigger circle.

5. Meanwhile Indonesia will panic & ask for US Army Pacific to deploy to protect its islands in the 2nd island chain. Leakers will be caught by allied and partner air forces & submarines deployed in the 2nd island chain — deployed at the request of the host country. This will choke the Chinese economy in depth.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
A blockade would be a less risky approach versus an actual invasion and would allow testing of Western and Asian partner resolve.
The problem is a blockade also gives other countries tie to mobilise and deploy assets to the region or areas close to Taiwan. A blockade also takes time to produce results.

4. If China conducts a silly blockade Taiwan in a smaller circle; the JMSDF & the US Navy will keep the PLA(N) largely bottled up at Japanese controlled choke points within the 1st island chain. It will be a small circle within a bigger circle.
In your opinion what could China possibility do in response? Could it create some tension in the areas around Japan to keep the JMSDF busy and perhaps get North Korea to misbehave in certain ways in order to keep the Americans focused there?

5. Meanwhile Indonesia will panic & ask for US Army Pacific to deploy to protect its islands in the 2nd island chain.
It will be very concerned and worried but whether it actually panics remains to be seen and depends on what China actually does. Getting/requesting the U.S. to provide overt assistance would be a major political move for Indonesia; one it would only resort to if it had absolutely no alternative and was convinced that it was sound course of action.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Baseless speculation posted, in response to Qns — Part 1

In your opinion what could China possibility do in response?
1. Let’s take a step back. This is a PLA face saving move, no blockade unless the invasion fails and it’s a continuation of the invasion effort.

Could it create some tension in the areas around Japan to keep the JMSDF busy and perhaps get North Korea to misbehave in certain ways in order to keep the Americans focused there?
2. Below, I discuss the most dangerous course of action or what is commonly called ECA B. In this scenario, the PLA thinks in scale — all 50 locations, where US troops are located in Japan hit, in a 1st strike.
(a) Guam, Tinian Island, Hawaii, Butterworth, Australia and Singapore hit within the 1st ten waves of Dongfeng missiles, before invasion — as part of phase 1 tactics (prior to invasion).​
(b) The reasoning is this.​
  • It’s only a matter of time Australia will gear up to support the US, so a PLA first strike makes sense.
  • In the past, I was on the fence, on the PLA hitting Australian forces in phase 1— AUKUS tipped to scale from good to strike to must strike. This means Butterworth will be hit early.
  • Malaysia is a non-factor for the PLA — most of ASEAN are just chess pieces to be shuffled in PLA round 1 logistics consideration.
  • With PLA having bases in Hainan and the South China Sea, Singapore will be seen as just a divert from Butterworth, so we will be hit.
  • The PLA are so over confident, they think they can get round the Malacca Straits dilemma by firing at Malaysia/Singapore to force surrender.
  • Plus in the future, Singapore will be based in Guam, so it’s just another 2 air fields (to hurt us significantly). The warning time will be so short, Singapore could only launch a portion of her fighters. Fortunately, we have some deep bunkers to sit out the missile strikes.
3. Trouble with North Korea, a phase 2 plan — it cost also nothing for the PLA to hit Malaysia or Singapore as minor powers, to gain deterrence against real middle powers, like South Korea or Indonesia. In the recent CNAS war game, they assumed China went nuclear over an unpopulated area (over the sea).

4. China knows that it can veto any South Korean support against a reckless American admin. If Korea allows ops/US troops from its territory to join in, North Korea will be given the green light for hostilities.
  • I don’t think it is step by step, as it will cause China to be defeated in detail and NATO to rally supplies to US allies.
  • I think it would take a miracle for Singapore to be moved as a phase 2 target. The only way that happens is if we can prove to China, their strikes on our air bases will have no effect on RSAF sortie generation and we will remain neutral (as a open port to all).
  • I suspect that the PLA would punch Singapore so hard, we would be badly hurt and have exhausted our stocks of land based Aster 30 reloads. Singapore will be begging France, Italy and Isreal for missile reloads.
It will be very concerned and worried but whether it actually panics remains to be seen and depends on what China actually does. Getting/requesting the U.S. to provide overt assistance would be a major political move for Indonesia;
5. You mean after Butterworth is totally flattened, Indonesia won’t panic? China will demand neutrality from Indonesia or 5 of its air bases will be hit in phase 2.

6. Keeping in mind that prior to phase 1, China would have bribed or tried to bribe Manila, Bangkok and others in ASEAN, to stay out. The only thing I am uncertain is how Vietnam fits into all this.

one it would only resort to if it had absolutely no alternative and was convinced that it was sound course of action.
7. It’s almost a WWIII scenario — Indonesia has to pick a side, immediately. Given the above ECA B, I think an invasion of Taiwan will not happen — not just now to 2026 but even if it is 2036. It will hurt China too much, to gain a first mover advantage.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
All this really remains to been; like the war in the Ukraine a war with China could be very different from what we're imagining or speculating.

My guess is that in the event of an all out war or a first strike; in addition to the U.S; China will focus its attention and resources on Japan, Australia and South Korea. A wait and see approach is how China will deal with the likes of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

In Malaysia's case I'd expect the Chinese Ambassador to inform the Malaysian government that if after 24 hours there are RAAF aircraft at Butterworth: a few dozen IRBMs or cruise missiles will be headed towards the base. Same with Singapore: if say USAAF aircraft are being refueled at Tengah: the base would 've flattened.

You could be right in saying that a blockade might occur in the event an invasion fails but if so and if the PLA's invasion has gone ratshit would still be in a position to even mount a blockade?
 
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recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Baseless speculation posted, in response to Qns — Part 1
  • With PLA having bases in Hainan and the South China Sea, Singapore will be seen as just a divert from Butterworth, so we will be hit.
  • The PLA are so over confident, they think they can get round the Malacca Straits dilemma by firing at Malaysia/Singapore to force surrender.
  • Plus in the future, Singapore will be based in Guam, so it’s just another 2 air fields (to hurt us significantly). The warning time will be so short, Singapore could only launch a portion of her fighters. Fortunately, we have some deep bunkers to sit out the missile strikes.
How feasible could it be for Singapore to instigate other capabilities that may either deter the CCP early strikes, or otherwise provide the means for retaliatory strikes by Singapore?

For example, land-based long range missiles may not be wise (as they could be targeted and destroyed), but what if Singapore had (conventionally powered) submarines capable of launching them?

Or would possibly joining AUKUS (and hence nuclear powered submarines) be feasible? What would political/public perceptions be of such a potential move? Or would it be resisted by neighboring countries (if so, hence why suggesting joining a "Western" project with its checks and balances, rather than something "indigenous" but co-produced with say, France as an example)?

Could Singapore acquire aircraft carrier(s), so that its strike jet forces can be moved from harms way and/or positioned to retaliate (with USN) when the time or opportunity presents itself? Plus appropriate support vessels (tankers, resupply and maintenance vessels etc. (Singapore already has decent combat Frigates and submarines for carrier protection etc).

Otherwise if Aircraft Carriers are not feasible, then AWD destroyers (with counter ballistic missile systems)?

Note: presumably funding is not indefinite, if so acknowledging that other existing capabilities may need to be scaled back to provide funding and manpower (eg less land-based fighters, but new carrier launched aircraft etc).
 
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John Fedup

The Bunker Group
All this really remains to been; like the war in the Ukraine a war with China could be very different from what we're imagining or speculating.

My guess is that in the event of an all out war or a first strike; in addition to the U.S; China will focus its attention and resources on Japan, Australia and South Korea. A wait and see approach is how China will deal with the likes of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. In Malaysia's case I'd expect the Chinese Ambassador to inform the Malaysian government that if after 24 hours there are RAAF aircraft at Butterworth: a few dozen IRBMs or cruise missiles will be headed towards the base. Same with Singapore: if say USAAF aircraft are being refueled at Tengah: the base would 've flattened.

You could be right in saying that a blockade might occur in the event an invasion fails but if so and if the PLA's invasion has gone ratshit would still be in a position to even mount a blockade?
That would be my question as well, after a failed invasion any PLAN assets deployed for a blockade would be prime submarine bait. A failed invasion pretty much guarantees an aggressive response by allied navies. Needless to say a failed invasion would have serious consequences for Xi.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Baseless speculation posted, in response to Qns — Part 2

How feasible could it be for Singapore to instigate other capabilities that may either deter the CCP early strikes, or otherwise provide the means for retaliatory strikes by Singapore?
8. With a 2022 defence budget of ONLY SGD16.36 billion (USD12.16 billion), nothing Singapore does alone by itself, will make a difference. To deter China from treating Butterworth as a target, via deterrence:

(a) it needs to be defended by either an Aster 30 or a PAC-3 MSE battery; and​
(b) the RAAF needs to acquire a 5th and a 6th squadron of F-35As (a 4th squadron alone will not make a difference), plus retain the Growlers in the 7th squadron. 7 squadrons is 1 fighter wing — the smallest size for a decent force structure that can take some attrition in a fight in the 2nd island chain.​

For example, land-based long range missiles may not be wise (as they could be targeted and destroyed), but what if Singapore had (conventionally powered) submarines capable of launching them?
9. Singapore is a 5 squadron Air Force (with a fighter fleet of 100), we need to grow it to 6? and get Brunei to agree for a squadron to be based there, for it to make a difference.
(a) Assuming that Malaysia one day also can contribute 20 fighters (right now, on any given day Malaysia cannot fly more than 6 + 10 fighters), combined with Singapore, we would have one fighter wing.​
(b) We also need station a squadron, closer to the South China Sea bases and be in a position to flatten them for deterrence to work.​
(c) Right now, the RSAF can’t even afford raise, train and sustain enough F-35Bs to hit the magic number of 60 (for 1 to 1 replacement of F-16Vs). When in actual fact we need to grow the fighter fleet to 120.​
(d) I suspect that to raise train and sustain 80 F-35s (while retaining the existing 40 F-15SGs), it would be unaffordable for the RSAF.​

10. We are so out numbered in the underwater domain it is not funny — we need every torpedo instead of storing SSMs. The simplest way to gain more underwater capability is to acquire 2 more Type 218SG Mark IIs, to grow the fleet to 6; and invest in UUVs.

Or would possibly joining AUKUS (and hence nuclear powered submarines) be feasible? What would political/public perceptions be of such a potential move? Or would it be resisted by neighboring countries (if so, hence why suggesting joining a "Western" project with its checks and balances, rather than something "indigenous" but co-produced with say, France as an example)?
11. Not practical and too expensive — we already have an Air Force bigger than that of Canada, like them, the Singapore Navy operates 4 submarines and our new Type 218SG submarines are more advanced than theirs for our CONOPS.

Could Singapore acquire aircraft carrier(s), so that its strike jet forces can be moved from harms way and/or positioned to retaliate (with USN) when the time or opportunity presents itself? Plus appropriate support vessels (tankers, resupply and maintenance vessels etc. (Singapore already has decent combat Frigates and submarines for carrier protection etc).
12. Can’t afford it at this time, based on our GDP. Our primary threat matrix orientation is not China. Further, with a force structure of 40 F-15SGs, 60 F-16Vs, 5 MPAs, 6 Formidable-class frigates, 2 Archer-class & 2 Invincible-class submarines, the SAF can convert the waters near the 150 Natuna islands into a bomb ally for a hostile navy (with Harpoon & Blue Spear missiles after SEAD is applied).

Otherwise if Aircraft Carriers are not feasible, then AWD destroyers (with counter ballistic missile systems)?
13. No money, no manpower and no desire to gain a tier 1 ranking, like the JMSDF or the Royal Navy. If we can a middle-tier 2 naval force, like the Canadian Navy, that will more than enough for the RSN. The key is more speed of the task group and a few more helicopters for ASW. Currently, the RSAF only operates 5 MPAs and 8 ASW helicopters — which is tiny (we need 12 to 16 actually).

Note: presumably funding is not indefinite, if so acknowledging that other existing capabilities may need to be scaled back to provide funding and manpower (eg less land-based fighters, but new carrier launched aircraft etc).
14. We have negative natural pop growth and importing so many new Singaporeans is causing lots of social problems — we can’t keep growing by replacing Singaporeans. There is a joke that the MOM is a ministry of Singaporean replacement.
 
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