Is China capable of crippling US CSF's in Chinese ses?

Status
Not open for further replies.

abramsteve

New Member
Fair enough. Whilst minor, theres still the question of the ROC navy though?

The idea of destroying all of Taiwans air defences in one strike seems a bit extreme. The defeat of their airforce on the ground and in the air seems reminicent of the Battle of Britain.

Beleive it or not but I actually see where your coming from, I floated a similar idea in a thread not long ago. But like Gf has said on countless ocassions, amatures talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.:rolleyes:
 

goldenpanda

New Member
In a "supply the airport" situation all the peace time flight rules are out the air. Just follow the IL76 in front you dead reckoning. Land, unstrip, take off. You get a lot more capacity if flight safety is the last thing you're worried about.

MANPADS are another problem. The first drop will likely be parachuted down from high altitude. They'll try to push out a cordon around the airport, with civilians running before them :cool:

Anyone have data exactly how many Patriots have been sold? My understanding is they're not sending them up against BM's at all--not enough of them and too expensive to race China.

Yeah it'll be dangerous as hell. I have a theory though the IL76's will be obfuscated with empty 737's--we have about 600 of those.

ROC navy? It confounds me why they're not submarine based. They are target practice for YJ83's or even MLRS.
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
In a "supply the airport" situation all the peace time flight rules are out the air. Just follow the IL76 in front you dead reckoning. Land, unstrip, take off. You get a lot more capacity if flight safety is the last thing you're worried about.
I am not talking peace time flight rules. And I reckon most transports will get shot down. How are you going to unstrip a pallet of artillery rounds and transport it to the battery? Are they firing from the runway?

MANPADS are another problem. The first drop will likely be parachuted down from high altitude. They'll try to push out a cordon around the airport, with civilians running before them :cool:
Hehe!

If they aren't taken out by medium to high altitude AA missiles or fighters. And the subsequent landing transports are still prone to MANPADS.

Anyone have data exactly how many Patriots have been sold? My understanding is they're not sending them up against BM's at all--not enough of them and too expensive to race China.
Any sophisticated air defense system. Any of these will do if they're in range of your newly acquired airport:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/air-defense.htm

or any of these:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/rocaf.htm

Yeah it'll be dangerous as hell. I have a theory though the IL76's will be obfuscated with empty 737's--we have about 600 of those.
How many flights are there between the mainland and Taiwan. And what will happen if they don't identify themselves?

ROC navy? It confounds me why they're not submarine based. They are target practice for YJ83's or even MLRS.
Surface units in the Straits: Swift, but heroic end. They lack the subs.
 

goldenpanda

New Member
I am not talking peace time flight rules. And I reckon most transports will get shot down. How are you going to unstrip a pallet of artillery rounds and transport it to the battery? Are they firing from the runway?
We use all the cute little pull karts that come ready made with the airport. Our pallets have wheels on them.

If they aren't taken out by medium to high altitude AA missiles or fighters. And the subsequent landing transports are still prone to MANPADS.
The cordon should try to push out far enough. It helps if the landing strip points into the sea. We'll try to land and take off again in the homeward direction.

Any sophisticated air defense system. Any of these will do if they're in range of your newly acquired airport:
The Avenger looks pretty hot. Looks like low to medium altitude. We'll have to make a big cordon.

How many flights are there between the mainland and Taiwan. And what will happen if they don't identify themselves?
what I mean is 737's could loiter around to confuse the missile guys. I wonder if it'd be possible to quickly add ejection seats to them. Probably not they just have to run from the door.


Yeah looks like there's no way to hide or move any high altitude missile. All the Taiwanese systems are at public locations. They are toast to BM's, especially if we concentrate on a locate area, like a really good airport.
 
Last edited:

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
The question is how is the light airborn infantry going to hold the ground against some enemy divisions? ;)

Even if they would get to the landing zone (Which is simething others explained very well) they would face shitloads of enemy combined arms units rolling into their direction.

No chance for light infantry to hold the ground for long time especially not with just one open airport which is under constant attacks.

BTW, once the runway is hit by anything your light airborn will not be able to repair the runways.
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
Alright here are the assumptions:

  • The groundbased air defense is defeated in detail.

  • The air force is destroyed so much that it can't launch any fighter.

  • A sufficiently sized cordon can be made so that the runway wont be shut down by missiles or artillery (Uh, what will happen if that airport gets MLRS'd? Owie!).

  • Enough supplies and reinforcements can come through. Oh yes, including the loggies with carts.

  • Light forces can hold the airport against combined arms opposition.

If any of these are untrue, the plan ends in failure. There are probably even more failure points.

Anyway, in short order someone will say this is a ridiculous turn this thread has taken. :crazy
 

goldenpanda

New Member
Alright here are the assumptions:
nope. these are the assumptions

- giant, publicly located high altitude missiles are destroyed in a *local* area.

- the air force is handicapped so that any fighter it sends up is too busy staying alive to worry about attacking transports

- taiwanese artillery will hesitate to use area bombardment against a heavily civilian area. they'll also be pounded from the air. IL76 can do low altitude drops of some cargos over a damaged runway, like we see in africa aid missions. the infantry includes repair crews, using air dropped equipment.

- an modern airport under peacetime flight rules can handle tens of thousands of passengers each day. it should then be able to supply an airborne army of say 20,000 personnel.

- taiwanese armor will be pushing against panicking civilians. the availability of urban built up areas, along with airlifted heavy weapons, can hold their assault until a near by harbor is taken.

Anyway, in short order someone will say this is a ridiculous turn this thread has taken. :crazy
The only other high value objective I can think of is to capture a harbor directly. I don't see how that should be any easier to do. It will depend on sea-based supply much more. So your assumption must be the PRC has undertaken the task to build TWO airborne armies with NO military value against Taiwan. Isn't that even more crazy?
 

goldenpanda

New Member
I should add that there seems to be enough airborne to take other objectives at the same time, for example to support harbor capture. Taking an airport will nicely support the harbor operation. So I don't see why it shouldn't be attempted. Furthermore the mere existence of this scenario gives ROC another dimension to worry about. Now they have to defend 10 airports in addition to all their harbors.
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
nope. these are the assumptions

- giant, publicly located high altitude missiles are destroyed in a *local* area.
The Patriots are mobile, the Avengers are your real problem for this particular op. But you do assume they will be destroyed in detail! What does "*local*" mean?

- the air force is handicapped so that any fighter it sends up is too busy staying alive to worry about attacking transports
Really? Well, so you did assume this.

- taiwanese artillery will hesitate to use area bombardment against a heavily civilian area. they'll also be pounded from the air. IL76 can do low altitude drops of some cargos over a damaged runway, like we see in africa aid missions. the infantry includes repair crews, using air dropped equipment.
The PRC only has 300-400 fighters that can reach Taiwan. You are really asking a lot of them.

You consider the unloading area and runway for heavily populated - another assumption. Even artillery shells will short any and destroy transports on the runway unloading area. And resupply of 20,000 troops via airdrop?

- an modern airport under peacetime flight rules can handle tens of thousands of passengers each day. it should then be able to supply an airborne army of say 20,000 personnel.
But your transports filled with personnel is shot down en masse... That peacetime capacity doesn't exist - you only have the logistics you bring with you.

- taiwanese armor will be pushing against panicking civilians. the availability of urban built up areas, along with airlifted heavy weapons, can hold their assault until a near by harbor is taken.
Another assumption - it only buys a little time.

The only other high value objective I can think of is to capture a harbor directly. I don't see how that should be any easier to do. It will depend on sea-based supply much more. So your assumption must be the PRC has undertaken the task to build TWO airborne armies with NO military value against Taiwan. Isn't that even more crazy?
Two armies does not alter the calculation - it is the defense in the area that does the work of killing it.
 

goldenpanda

New Member
I wish you would address my points directly rather than make argumentative assertions in a different area.

- the patriot isn't going anywhere from the time we take the sat picture, and the BM reaches it

- local means if we're attacking taipei we don't worry about kaosiong

- we will drop above the reach of avengers (4000meters?). this initial drop will cordon against them. I have said this several times

- no we have about 700 that can reach taiwan, without refueling, without wartime rebasing.

-MLRS will catch runway AND terminal with thousands of passengers, not to mention any on the tarmac. in any event you're assuming enough artillery and armor in range of exactly the two spots we picked, harbor and airport. Taiwan is small but not zero size. They have dozens of points to defend.

- I don't know how many tons you think chinese airborne uses each day, but each IL76 carries 50 tons. The entire 6th army in stalingrad needed 300 tons per day. clearly the airport capacity is not the problem. whether they'll be shot down see my points above.

- my point about two armies is PRC has invested huge resources, not for nothing don't you think?

Hey this is becoming too addictive. It is not even my job. So see you guys later.

Panda
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
I wish you would address my points directly rather than make argumentative assertions in a different area.
I was adressing the failure points. Hence it got argumentative. Basically I can't agree with how you predict such an op will unfold. Failure points.

WW2 armies didn't need the amount of resupply your airdrop will; you need to get 20,000 soldiers plus kit flown in; under fire from Avengers and whatnot; shells are accurate enough not to hit the terminal; they are light infantry - they will have difficulty expanding from the immedate bridgehead; PRC air cover is engaged and attrited in the fight with RoCAF. They will be killed in situ.

700 fighters - ok, not that ajour on the PRC orbat.

A harbour is a more attractive target, but even more difficult to utilise.

;)
 

Galrahn

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Agreed. They also discount Chinas continuing acquisition of US government bonds. The first shot would cost China $700 billion - and climbing. I'm sure the Chinese government bears that in mind.
This is an economic political cost, the flip side to the whole "China owns the US" argument which serves as a very nice down payment to both sides for peace, not war; a point too often ignored.

Swerve you also asked a great question regarding how allies would be involved. I honestly don't know, but if the US is attacked directly in the Pacific it is a reasonable assumption that Australia would support the US militarily short of offensive operations against the mainland of China and Japan would protect US assets on Japanese territories. I think there is a better argument China would neutralize South Korea politically without firing a shot, and virtually every other nation would do nothing but offer rhetoric. In the end I don't really know and would agree I made too many assumptions, but short of the US attacking first I highly doubt all sources of assistance to the US in the Pacific would dry up.

As for tactical of USN operations and potential of massing forces.

If we follow the montra "train as you intend to fight" the US Navy is trained to fight with as many as three CVs in a single group. The rotation is 2 CVs for offensive operations in 12 hour cycles and 1 CV for Task Force protection operations over a 24 hour period, including additional fighter protection for strike aircraft. The CV not active during a 12 hour period for offensive operations would serve as a reserve for the CV operating in Task Force protection. The idea is 3 CVs could continuously provide offensive capability with at least a single CV 24 hours a day, while maintaining one of the largest air defense capabilities in the world available. Alternatively, if air superiority is achieved, the rotation could be 2 at night and 1 at day, or the reverse.

In the Pacific currently, it is assumed 3 CVs could be on station on 30 days notice fully prepared in the Task Force, with 2 more carriers to reinforce by 90 days. When the GW replaces the KH, and a 6th CV (CVN-70?) is rotated to the Pacific the plan is to have two separate 3 CV Task Forces, one by 30 days and the second by 90. 30 days and 90 days represent maximum time periods, not minimum.

There is no reason each CSG couldn't operate in pairs instead or even independently though, and probably would in a war against a nuclear power, instead of as a massed force. It would depend on events and the requirements for operations at the time.

Also there is one more point that should be highlighted, something I don't think anyone has fully recognized in this discussion. While the Hornet and SH has unquestionably increased the US Navy sortie rate on US large carriers, a 3 CV force represents about 200 strike sorties per day at 500kms from target that could probably only be sustained up to 150 hours maximum before declining rapidly. or roughly 1300 strike sorties sustained in a week by a combined force of 3 US carriers.

That 1300 number wouldn't include ASW, MSO, EW, ELINT, AEW, or Refuel sorties from the carrier force, and those long range strike sorties would require additional refueling sorties from Guam or other regional land facilities. Also, that 1300 number represents top end wartime maintenance attrition, not losses in combat which would reduce the number accordingly, and with strike at distances longer than 500kms the sortie rate would decrease accordingly.

A more realistic battlefield sortie rate in a contested theater would be 1000 or less for a week of operations by 3 CVNs that suffered light battlefield attrition. While US aircraft can put multiple precision aim points on target for each sortie, the numbers are probably not as high as people are assuming for a 3 CV force.
 

dioditto

New Member
I don't think so. The USN was training against N-Tipped Mach 5-6 SLCM's 40 years ago, they weren't a overwhelming threat then, and they certainly aren't a threat now.

The whole "supersonic cruise missile threat" is a bit of a new PR campaign without substance. It makes people at home feel good about technology, but it's an old old threat that's been dealt with before and can be dealt with now.

Frankly, the whole business about the lethality of supersonic cruise missiles being the new bogey is outright fabrication. The current supersonic CM's are slower than the past, and the threat respondents are more sophisticated.
Question, if USN can "deal with" Nuclear tipped SLCM 40 years ago, why do you have contradictory claim like this:

Anything's possible. Australian F-111's have scored successful (notional) Harpoon missile hits on US aircraft carriers using a combination of high speed and an extremely low level ingress, during a number of exercises off the coast of Australia
.


If it can't even dealt with F-111 (US's own design) that flies at "high speed" (I assume as fast as mach 1.8 - 2.0 .. well short of mach 4~5 you claim to be able to dealt with), what makes you think it can dealt with hypersonic missiles that US doesn't even have data of ??
 

tphuang

Super Moderator
guys, just try to keep away from the emotional and political stuff as much as you can, this is especially for you GoldenPanda. Stick with military.

a) The PRC military isn't built around being able to invade Taiwan
b) The PRC military capability is much more oriented toward deterring Taiwan from outright declaring independence with the threat of punishing strikes
hmm, if b is strong enough, I think it would be result in opposite of a.

It isn't enough to "keep the situation chaotic" - China would need air superiority, which it couldn't get in the first place with US support for Taiwan. China would also need more than a few days to secure Taiwan, even if it managed to gain control of the air.
as long as F-22/35s don't get there, China can establish air superiority.

I also think Taiwan is currently able to repulse an invasion on its own.
Taiwanese (who actually severely underestimate several indigenous PRC systems) estimated they can last a maximum of 7 days against China by themselves.

How many tanks could China Sea Lift?
depends on the tank type, but for a rough estimate
11 yuting-2 - 10 tanks each
12 yuting-1 - 10 tanks each
7 yukan - 5 tanks each
1 071 currently - who knows how many tank?
reportedly purchasing 6 Zubr class - 3 tanks each
then, there are a bunch of type 73s and 79s.

The Patriots are mobile
they will eventually have to stop, set up and turn on the radar if they want to actually shoot anything down.

The PRC only has 300-400 fighters that can reach Taiwan
5 regiments of JH-7/A, 6 regiments of J-10 (can reach through refueling). That alone is 11 x 25 = 275 fighters. I haven't even counted the flankers and the j-7/8s in the area. That is the status as of today.

In my personal opinion, 2012 is probably going to be an important point for the following reasons (5 to 6 years from now):
- the beijing olympics and Shanghai world expos would be over
- Beidou 2 would be at least partially operational by then, meaning that the satellite guided bombs like LS-6, FT-1, FT-3 and their descendants would actually have a real GPS to guide them. Beidou 2's accuracy around China should at least be good enough for SGBs and LACMs.
- the improve variant of WS-10 series will be certified, it gives enough thrust to J-10s to possibly allow it to do supersonic cruise without afterburners. This along with AESA radar, next generation AAMs should be ready. Also, if we assume annual induction rate of around 60 J-10s, that would mean about 300-350 more J-10s by this point -> replacement of all the old J-7/8s.
- the Chinese version of su-34 - J-11BS should also be ready by this point, giving pla something other than JH-7 series to conduct the long range ground attack/anti-shipping missions.
- the twin-engined "J-10" should also be ready by this point, which is suppose to be something that should allow China to counter F-35. If not that, at least do pretty well against the latest super hornets in A2A combat.
- the IL-76 contract should be almost finished by then. Giving China the 4 IL-78 tankers that it needs, plus allow it to convert more of the existing IL-76 into KJ-2000 AWACS. Possibly finally filling up the regiment (approximately 24) that it established for KJ-2000
- Y-9 project would be certified for 2-3 years by this point. Allowing for the mass induction of the Y-8 surveillence types, especially KJ-200 and the battlefield surveillence type
- the small WS series engines should be certified by this point, allowing them to be used in the new cruise missiles being developed.
- the PGMs we have seen recently like LT-2, LS-6, FT-1, FT-3 should be more prevalent with more classes by then. anti-surface missiles like KD-88/63 will be quite prevalent.
- I suppose Varyag would be sailing by this point and quite possibly also have su-33 or domestic naval J-11s flying off it.
- 15 Be-200 + 20 ka-31 deal that supposedly got signed last year, if indeed goes through, should be ready by this point. That should provide AEW for the surface fleet in general + improved ASW capability in nearby water
- should have around 5 071s - that should be enough sea lift capacity
- respectable number of 093s and 094s in service
- about 20 054 series frigate, enough to replace all of the Jianghu class
- JN would've been relocated for 3-4 years, enough to produce 6 052Ds
- 100 type 22s should be in service by this point to replace all the type 21/24
 

Tasman

Ship Watcher
Verified Defense Pro
as long as F-22/35s don't get there, China can establish air superiority.
I presume you are talking about air superiority in Taiwan airspace. Given that Taiwan's air forces would most likely be supported by USN carrier based assets operating to the East of Taiwan I would have thought this point is at least debatable.

As well as USN forces I would expect that the USAF may deploy fighters and AWACs to Taiwan if tensions developed. The 2012 date you mention might be too soon for the F35 but aircraft such as the F22, F15 and F16 would still be able, IMO, to assist Taiwan in denying air superiority to China.

Cheers
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
Adding some notes.

I did acknowledge that the 300-400 figure was not on the mark.

Found out Taiwan has 18 batteries of Hawk Phase III with 108 lnchrs and 2000 rounds. These are also mobile, but of course also have to stand still at some point. But goes to the vertical envelopment of an airport discussion.

Why I think an invasion is currently not viable - that is really a matter of naval mines and ASMs IMV. I don't think they can get safely across in an organised and sustained manner. Area weapons make beaches a killing zone. That leaves ports, where traffic can be targeted by ASMs, mined, destroyed, etc. And the vertical envelopment idea is truly hasardous.

That makes me wonder: What benchmark do the Taiwanese use when they say they can last 7 days max?

Of course increased sophistication and growing volume of deployed systems at the mainland side will shift the balance in PRC favour.

Will have a look at your list later.
 

goldenpanda

New Member
Something else that hasn't been considered is special forces. They can be delivered using submarines/inflatables/aircraft (one reason Taiwan doesn't like direct flights). They blend in nicely with the population. Airport is a high traffic area with lots of vehicles going in and out. So I would say they have some chance to destroy batteries/take hostages/cause general havoc (not sure if china is into hostages though).
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top