Is China capable of crippling US CSF's in Chinese ses?

[Grand Danois]

Don't you think that by now China has enough assets to keep the situation chaotic for at least a few dozen hours?

A few dozen hours would not be enough IMV. The situation would also be chaotic for the invasion force and momentum need to be maintained beyond this time frame - supplies and reinforcements. Galrahn suggest 200 hrs before carriers make an offensive impact on a conflict. Unless the PRC does an out-of-the-blue, those 200 hrs will be much, much less.

I also think Taiwan is currently able to repulse an invasion on its own.

 

[DarthAmerica]

A few dozen hours would not be enough IMV. The situation would also be chaotic for the invasion force and momentum need to be maintained beyond this time frame - supplies and reinforcements. Galrahn suggest 200 hrs before carriers make an offensive impact on a conflict. Unless the PRC does an out-of-the-blue, those 200 hrs will be much, much less.

I also think Taiwan is currently able to repulse an invasion on its own.

Remember also that 200 hours doesn't start with the attack. It starts the precise second Taiwan and the USA become aware of a impending attack. To actually invade Taiwan would require a very significant amount of coordination prior to the operation that would be very unlikely to go unnoticed. In short, even with an OOTB attack it would be very difficult to achieve surprise. PRC military forces could not be constantly at the state of readiness necessary to launch an invasion of this magnitude. Just like it would take about a week for USN CSFs to start offensively influencing the battle, it would take the PRC some time to get its forces ready. Also, remember, the CSF would not be fighting in isolation. There are other assets and allies who could be much more responsive than a CSF. There could be significant responses to a PRC invasion within 24 hours or less.

In fact, any serious invasion attempt MUST first or simultaneously attack US/coalition forces. If not the responses will stop the invasion. But it's a paradox. Any such action would go too far up the escalation latter to make invading Taiwan by surprise practical.


DA

 

[Tasman]

I agree with that. I think the Chinese take a lot of efforts which make no sense if not in a let's conquer a nearby island scenario with some kind of brute force attack.

1. They still build amphibious light tanks with enhanced swimming capabilities (Type 63A) which nobody else does
2. If I'm not mistaken there are about 1000 ballistic missiles aiming at Taiwan
3. They are increasing their fleet of large and medium sized landing ships
4. They intend to purchase the Zubr-Class
5. They are increasing the number of airborne troops
6. They have a huge number of FACs and SSKs in service

I think that by common sense one can say this is obvious. Deny access to Taiwan street to any adversary, overwhelm Taiwan with a huge wave and then sit and wait and defend yourself against retaliation by means of nuclear deterrence until the world has calmed down.

They wouldn't have to sink a CSF, just keep them away long enough to take Taiwan.

As DA has suggested, the development and maintenance of this capability is a very effective political weapon that enables China to exert tremendous pressure on Taiwan to not declare independence. China doesn't want a wasted Taiwan but it will do everything possible to prevent it from following this path. I'm sure that the west understands this and to my knowledge there is little encouragement from western countries for Taiwan to take this action. As stated by others, western countries, including the USA itself, have built up important trading relationships with China in recent times and for economic reasons they would strongly resist being drawn into conflict with China.

So I believe that the battle between the USA and China over Taiwan will most likely be a war of rhetoric. I see the use of the USN, including its CSFs and nuclear submarines and the naval, air and land based assets of China being used to preserve the military balance and hence the status quo until, assisted by the passing of time a diplomatic settlement eventually resolves the crisis. From this point of view China needs to demonstrate (without actually doing it) that it can cripple US CSFs and other naval assets and the USN needs to ensure that it can't. At this stage, as I said before, I don't see evidence that it can.

Cheers

 

[DarthAmerica]

The best way to summarize the chances for a PRC OOTB invasion being successful is, "Unfathomable".



DA

 

[Rich]

We can hope the Chinese see an attack on Taiwan as "we" see it. Lets take a dive into history for a minute shall we? In 1941 there were plenty of strategists who could see no future for Japan should they strike the western powers in the Pacific, most of all an attack on America. When one looked objectively at the two Industrial bases, the two military/industrial complexes, it was certainly hard to swallow that Japan had a chance.

And unlike Hitler, who was basically ignorant of America, there were plenty of influential Japanese who had toured America and had a sense of the sleeping giant they were about to awaken. Of course what happened was the irrational/nationalistic voices held sway, with the inevitable racial superiority theories of their soldiers and sailors coming from a sake drenched version of samurai code. Even the Japanese leaders who were rooted in reality realized the best they could hope for was an eventual peace with acceptable territorial gains. But there is nothing in our history to have given the Japanese any hope we would eventually sign a peace giving them much of Asia.

The same could be said of Hitler. His version of erratic nationalism gave him a vision that Britain, and later Russia, would sign a peace with him giving him much of what he wanted. This gross distortion of reality stayed with him until the end when the death of FDR still gave him hope of a negotiated peace that served his interest.

You see this time and time again throughout history, for the most part, when involved nations are ran by dictators or personality cliches in an atmosphere of tolitarism.

Does such an atmosphere exist in China today? That's the question. Its a vast country whose political power rests in the hands of a comparative few. Taiwan is an emotional issue, and a very nationalistic one. To them a Taiwan operating on its own causes them loss of face, in a region where the image of "face" means everything.

I dont want to stray from the nuts and bolts of this thread, however, it must be said there is a real chance of both sides miscommunicating and underestimating each other. Remember the last time we and the Chinese dealt with Taiwan they shot a bunch of missiles over the Island and Bill Clinton sent two CVs to the region.

So I am not so reassured by any current trends or economic ties we've developed with the mainland. The lessons of history leaves me anxious over Taiwan.

 

[swerve]

Speaking from a strictly military point of view China MUST assume that any aggressive/offensive military operations will be countered by AT LEAST a naval blockade that cuts off their SLOC. Even if it's simply allied warships turning ships bound for China away and not actually sinking them. If they don't plan for that they risk being cut off and choked to death which would ultimately doom any military operation to fail.

At a minimum they need to be prepared to protect their shipping and key choke points. The PLAN is not big enough nor does it have the logistics or C4ISR capability to conduct maritime security outside of territorial waters while simultaneously supporting a massive amphibious landing in the vicinity of Taiwan. The PLAN is completely vulnerable to submarine and minewarfare warfare(both of which can be done covertly) within its territorial waters and it is vulnerable to aerial interdiction, subs and mines in international waters and this too can be done with some plausible deniability.

If this is all the foreign assistance Taiwan received it would be enough to seriously threaten the PRC operation and even hurt the PRC economy enough to outweigh the benefits of taking Taiwan. The PRC understands this so well that they haven't attempted to use force against Taiwan and their entire naval procurement scheme is based on dealing with this threat.

It seems that people completely discount this in their analysis.

DA

Agreed. They also discount Chinas continuing acquisition of US government bonds. The first shot would cost China $700 billion - and climbing. I'm sure the Chinese government bears that in mind.

IIRC, neither Japan nor Germany had much in the way of foreign assets before WW2.

 

[swerve]

Ah, shit.
Thanks for the correction.
I thought the treaty also includes at least sea and air assets on the northern half of the globe.

Air & sea assets in & over the European territories, the Mediterranean, & the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer. Nowhere else. Deliberately excluded most colonies.

 

[goldenpanda]

I don't think China is planning on keeping trade routes open at all. The most overseas asset we've built are sigint stations, rather than full bases. Most of oil goes to fuel middle class consumption. We can turn off the tap to those anytime it's not a problem. 3 million bpd of domestic production is no joke for fueling military operations and production.

A lot of people assume debts are somehow erased by war. If that would happen people will be starting a war everyday. The basis of the international system is that debt is debt. you can freeze assets for national security reasons but outright confiscation is not done. You can try but then "full faith and credit of the united states" will solicit funny sounds.

 

[Grand Danois]

Remember also that 200 hours doesn't start with the attack. It starts the precise second Taiwan and the USA become aware of a impending attack. To actually invade Taiwan would require a very significant amount of coordination prior to the operation that would be very unlikely to go unnoticed. In short, even with an OOTB attack it would be very difficult to achieve surprise. PRC military forces could not be constantly at the state of readiness necessary to launch an invasion of this magnitude. Just like it would take about a week for USN CSFs to start offensively influencing the battle, it would take the PRC some time to get its forces ready. Also, remember, the CSF would not be fighting in isolation. There are other assets and allies who could be much more responsive than a CSF. There could be significant responses to a PRC invasion within 24 hours or less.

That sums it up I guess. I don't think an Taiwan OOTB could be pulled off. The logistics behind an invasion of Taiwan have so many signatures and are so huge that it would be incredible if it could be done. On top of this is the value of US Cold War style intel assets, which would excel at such a task under peacetime conditions. Anyhow, who knows, this is what maskirovka is all about .

 

[goldenpanda]

In 1950 China put 200k troops in northern korea. They were missed by your thousands of aircraft. Most likely china will show zero signs of mobilization until the BM's are underway. Your early warning will be the political tension which is not possible to conceal. China should be able to handle 3 or 4 CVG's. If USA manages to gather more China will pull its aircraft back to the interior and pick ships off from long range + use coastal missiles. The navy will sail back up the Yangtze or something.

 

[Grand Danois]

In 1950 China put 200k troops in northern korea. They were missed by your thousands of aircraft.

As opposed to a land campaign, for an invasion you need ships and long range aircraft and specialised assets. And this invasion has a huge logistical footprint compared to your example.

Most likely china will show zero signs of mobilization until the BM's are underway.

What? You're just gonna fire som BM's? No invasion?

Your early warning will be the political tension which is not possible to conceal. China should be able to handle 3 or 4 CVG's. If USA manages to gather more China will pull its aircraft back to the interior and pick ships off from long range + use coastal missiles. The navy will sail back up the Yangtze or something.

Succes! Invasion attempt foiled. No need to get close to mainland China with any carriers. No carriers lost as long as they don't pursue, but stay east of Taiwan.

 

[DarthAmerica]

Rich,

I appreciate you analysis but I think the Pearl Harbor analogy/history doesn't compare well to the PRC-Taiwan issue. The Japanese knew they had little chance for success by direct conflict with America. But they attacked for a different reason. They were motivated by national survival and trying not to lose the broader "Pacific War". For the PRC vs Taiwan, its hard to call it national survival. Sure they are annoyed by the thought of an independent Taiwan. But its hardly a life or death issue.

IMV, the PRC does see that an invasion is not likely to be successful. I think they also see that they have much more to lose than they could ever gain. If the PRC really wanted to invade, they would have to do massive expansion of their port capacity and tactical airfields within range of Taiwan. Moreover, they would have to use their civilian shipping in order to have the lift capacity to get sufficient mass on the beaches. Then they would have to be able to protect these assets from the Taiwanese, USN Carriers, Warships, Submarines, Mines and US/Coalition land based air and not necessarily in that order.

Strictly dealing with the Carrier related part, they would need to do a Massive build up of capability to directly challenge the USN Carrier(s). Remember, even if they get one, the fleet is designed to take loses and there are many carriers. I think they are tailoring their forces around being able to deter embarrassing episodes like when President Clinton sent two right through their backyard. But overtly challenging or defending against them is going to take a lot more assuming the USN doesn't make some huge mistakes.

The only reason the PRC would conceivably attack a USN carrier IMO would be during a conflict over Taiwan. But again, I don't see anything to suggest that they consider that a realistic option. There are a wide range of maritime operations that don't involve war with the US that require substantial naval power. Blue Water Naval Power. It seems much more likely that the PRC is organizing itself more for that rather than focusing on the specific threat of USN carriers. I think that China looks on powers like Japan, South Korea, Viet Nam, Singapore and Australia and wishes to organize itself to meet or exceed those forces ability to influence events in the region and not specifically to invade Taiwan.


DA

 

[DarthAmerica]

That sums it up I guess. I don't think an Taiwan OOTB could be pulled off. The logistics behind an invasion of Taiwan have so many signatures and are so huge that it would be incredible if it could be done. On top of this is the value of US Cold War style intel assets, which would excel at such a task under peacetime conditions. Anyhow, who knows, this is what maskirovka is all about .

When you do an operational analysis of the port and sea lift capacity required to support an actual invasion of Taiwan with enough troops to give 5 to 1 ratio and support. One of the biggest signatures will be the empty shelves at the local Wal-Mart or the sudden increase in price of good manufactured in China for export.


DA

 

[goldenpanda]

As opposed to a land campaign, for an invasion you need ships and long range aircraft and specialised assets. And this invasion has a huge logistical footprint compared to your example.

What? You're just gonna fire som BM's? No invasion?

Succes! Invasion attempt foiled. No need to get close to mainland China with any carriers. No carriers lost as long as they don't pursue, but stay east of Taiwan.

I said zero signs I didn't say zero preparation. I don't see how 200,000 troops has a small logistical trail at all. The airborne army can quickly follow the BM's. The sea invasion can stream in as assets become ready. Hey Chinese are used to sailing in bamboo floats with little preparation or support. The airborne army can even sustain itself on Taiwan to some extent. Really they have zero strategic depth. All their leaders will be captured or cutoff.

 

[DarthAmerica]

In 1950 China put 200k troops in northern korea. They were missed by your thousands of aircraft. Most likely china will show zero signs of mobilization until the BM's are underway. Your early warning will be the political tension which is not possible to conceal. China should be able to handle 3 or 4 CVG's. If USA manages to gather more China will pull its aircraft back to the interior and pick ships off from long range + use coastal missiles. The navy will sail back up the Yangtze or something.

Just to put this post in perspective. Google Earth provides vastly superior intelligence collection capabilities compared to what was available in 1950. Resources available to a modern military are many orders of magnitude greater.

Put these coordinates into Google Earth:

39.905 125.49

41.279, 129.087

Are the implications clear?




DA

 

[Grand Danois]

I said zero signs I didn't say zero preparation. I don't see how 200,000 troops has a small logistical trail at all. The airborne army can quickly follow the BM's. The sea invasion can stream in as assets become ready. Hey Chinese are used to sailing in bamboo floats with little preparation or support. The airborne army can even sustain itself on Taiwan to some extent. Really they have zero strategic depth. All their leaders will be captured or cutoff.

I wouldn't recommend feeding an airborne army into a modern IADS - even if it is degraded by BM's and CM's. They are just to easy to shoot down en route.

Long range and specialised aircraft will have to be postioned. Naval power will have to be nearby. If things are not in place, the invasion is doomed for failure before it starts.

The Warsaw Pact experimented with civilian sealift for amphibeous assault and found it would be suicide. Specialised assets for that - not fishing vessels or RO/RO's.

 

[DarthAmerica]

I said zero signs I didn't say zero preparation. I don't see how 200,000 troops has a small logistical trail at all. The airborne army can quickly follow the BM's. The sea invasion can stream in as assets become ready. Hey Chinese are used to sailing in bamboo floats with little preparation or support. The airborne army can even sustain itself on Taiwan to some extent. Really they have zero strategic depth. All their leaders will be captured or cutoff.

The BM's aren't accurate enough to destroy the Taiwanese Air Force or Navy. Further, you need thousands of bamboo floats not to mention reliable deconfliction of the sea lanes and precise enough navigation to get organized units to the beaches. Otherwise, you will simply be doing the Taiwanese a favor by drowning half your invasion force and providing the other half up for slaughter as a disorganized mob on the beach. Moreover, Its unlikely that you would get the Taiwanese leadership targets without tactical surprise. NOTHING you have suggested would allow for that.

Also, bamboo floats cant transport the heavy mechanized forces or logistics vehicles you would need to even get off of the beach.


DA

 

[goldenpanda]

Just to put this post in perspective. Google Earth provides vastly superior intelligence collection capabilities compared to what was available in 1950. Resources available to a modern military are many orders of magnitude greater.

The question is not finding where the ports are, but how to tell mobilization from lack of it. China will move at night, hide fuel tanks in apartments if we have to.

I agree with you however it will be hard to suppress all early warning. China isn't going to attack unless things get bad with Taiwan, and everyone will know when they do. Back to the concept of "maskorovko" (nice word Danois), China may very well back off for a while then attack out of the blue.

I have a question about how much CTF's are able to operate in close proximity to each other. During WWII Japan grouped as much as six carriers in a task force. Why are US CTF's just one CV, when there are plenty available?

 

[DarthAmerica]

The question is not finding where the ports are, but how to tell mobilization from lack of it. China will move at night, hide fuel tanks in apartments if we have to.

I agree with you however it will be hard to suppress all early warning. China isn't going to attack unless things get bad with Taiwan, and everyone will know when they do. Back to the concept of "maskorovko" (nice word Danois), China may very well back off for a while then attack out of the blue.

I have a question about how much CTF's are able to operate in close proximity to each other. During WWII Japan grouped as much as six carriers in a task force. Why are US CTF's just one CV, when there are plenty available?

Moving at night offers ZERO protection from modern ISR methods PERIOD. If anything it would increase the amount of communications the PRC would need for coordination of the movement and offer up additional ELINT opportunities. Also, displacing people from their apartments is going to further compromise your OPSEC and provide an additional unsecured electronic avenue of approach through cellular networks as PRC citizens try to find out which relative they have to live ect.

 

[Grand Danois]

I have a question about how much CTF's are able to operate in close proximity to each other. During WWII Japan grouped as much as six carriers in a task force. Why are US CTF's just one CV, when there are plenty available?

I think the USN do sometimes concentrate several CVN in the same operational group, but not sure. It would be too much speculation from me on what the pros and cons are. Perhaps one of the posters with knowledge on this subject could clear this up?