Decoding Indonesia’s submarine choices — Part 3
I DSME willing to provide complete path of Submarine Manufacturing Tech Transfer with 6 Submarine on two batch all within USD 2 bio +.
DSME 1400 is relatively affordable modern submarine on procurement and maintenance. Thus it's up to this administration on Political willingness to provide more procurement and maintenance budget...
I agree with
@OPSSG that for future deterrence, TNI-AL need to move from DSME 1400, even DSME already read that. Their offer on DSME 2000 design seems the way I see it, as one of the offer they try to put on continuing Industrial Tech Transfer with PAL. Off course the second batch that previously agreed was for DSME 1400. However they already talk in media that DSME 2000 is step forward from DSME 1400 for export market in SEA.
Not that DSME 2000 will be at par with proven 214 or Naval Group Riachuelo based Scorpene.
9. DSME 2000 is a paper submarine — which should not be built in Indonesia, given the country’s limited ability to provide a satisfactory indigenous solution locally. There is a huge difference between fanboy dreams and actual risk reduction efforts by national design and procurement agency efforts — where there is a lead Indonesian national agency that is able to review the design work of DSME to SUBSAFE standards, prior to approval of plans for steel cutting.
10.
If designed right, DSME 2000 can be ‘better’ than any existing submarine and on the cutting/bleeding edge of technology, including the untested Korean lithium-ion batteries and super capacitors (that store energy in terms of an electric field), that has not been deployed on their current submarines — what is the TRL level of this core technology?
If built right, it can be very capable but that is unlikely, given that it is an untested design concurrently with untested TRL 6 or 7 and below technologies that needs time to mature.
If built on time in 6 to 8 years, it can be worth while enhancement to TNI AL underwater capabilities — the Koreans get to be paid to build a design their own navy does not want, while Indonesia bears the risk.
If testing goes smoothly, it can serve as a timely and cost effective replacement for TNI AL’s existing submarine fleet.
11. There are 4 ‘ifs’ above, which means a lot of Korean developmental risk transferred to Indonesia and paid for by Indonesia, over a gestation period of 8 to 12 years to bring this capability online and the TNI AL will need very deep pockets to pay DSME to fix bleeding edge tech problems found (or to be found) with so many untested and risky Korean technologies to be packed into this capable hull — look at all the problems that needed solving in realising any new submarine design and the problems with integrating any TRL 7 and below solution to a new design and common sense will tell you it is very unlikely to be built on time and within budget. If Indonesia does not plan risk management properly, the loss of a brand new submarine is a real possibility.
12. Italy’s Near Future Submarine (NFS) design will accommodate
Italian diver delivery systems and includes as Italian weapons like the Blackshark torpedo and the new TESEO MK.2E (unofficially called EVO) anti-ship missile. More significantly, the NFS will incorporate Italian developed lithium-ion batteries in place of lead-acid. This is significant and is likely to be the first Western submarine to feature this technology. Currently only Japan fields submarines with this battery technology, although Italy and South Korea are close behind. If you look at:
(a) the Japanese, the JMSDF are testing their lithium-ion batteries on a mature Sōryū-class submarine design (at the end of a production batch — on the last 2 submarines); and
(b) the Italians, the Marina Militare are testing their lithium-ion batteries on a mature Type 212 class submarine design, that they are building as the NFS.
13. Countries with much deeper pockets like Israel, Singapore and Australia as experienced submarine drivers have decided to forgo using this sort of advanced technology despite being offered (quietly on the side), because our DSTA understands the need for testing and allowing time for each risk to be tested and matured. Such tech may be considered for insertion as a major mid-life upgrade at 12 to 18 year mark, after commissioning, for the Type 218SG. This sort of upgrade will take the submarine off-line for 2 to 3 years at least.
14. This oracle of Twitter is again writing nonsense, to lobby for his preferred supplier in a way that only idiotic fanboys support — his lobbying efforts for the more expensive French offer is likely to end in failure. There is a difference of being on the bleeding edge and being on the cutting edge in FY2022 or FY2023. I am certain Singapore, who placed the orders for the Type 218SG submarines years ago, is watching Japanese, Korean, Italian and French efforts carefully to understand how the TRL levels are being matured as part of each vendor’s efforts. The Japanese are ahead of many in terms of incremental testing on, lithium-ion batteries and super capacitors, due to the fact of their ‘hot’ submarine production line.
15. Super capacitors allow a submarine to change its speed (transient speed change) in a manner that battery power alone cannot cope. I suspect but can’t confirm that the JMSDF are well on the way to developing hybrid “super batteries” that combine the best of both — a tech that they don’t intend to sell, for at least 10 to 15 years — to avoid its theft. The PLA(N) have spies watching this area and trying to penetrate USN and JMSDF efforts in this area.