Indonesia: 'green water navy'

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
I have no idea. It can be both, maybe the 405 changes shift with the 404, maybe they operate at the same moment around Natuna because it is part of the exercise or because the 405 and it's crew are brandnew.
The Type 209 has a long endurance, so probably the submarine support station doesnt need to be able to moor multiple submarines at once for fuel, food and water supplies.


Now something about BAKAMLA.
Here we can see the Special Response Team (SRT) Bakamla performing an exercise at Pelabuhan Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara. Are these assault rifle some variant of M4 or HK416?

Photos are from Humas BAKAMLA.
Here a video of the BAKAMLA Special Response Team.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
FB_IMG_1620045303604.jpg

From Bakamla FB page.

I do believe this is the 'dream' of Bakamla (Indonesian Coast Guard) on their Network Centric surveillance system. Perhaps they will leverage commercial satellite network, since even TNI still doesn't have their own satellite.

Off course all depends on how far the Administration willing to finance and Invest on Coast Guard. With the Navy it self ask substantial budget to overcome their aging assets and outdated system, I don't know when the Coast Guard will be sufficiently budgeted.
 

Foodsoldier

New Member
Our Finance Minister is a risk avoider and always afraid to try unorthodox financing scheme for defense procurement. That's the main reason behind our 'ngeteng' behavior so far. Remember, she has been our FM for 3 periods (almost 15 years).

Current MoD has secured several commitment for long term soft loan (as low as 1.0% interest rate for 15-25 years) from key partners (i.e. France, Japan, Korea, UAE, Qatar, etc). The total sum of the commitment could reach $150 billion, to finance all TNI wishlist in the Rapim and some additional items that will ensure we will be ready for any major arm conflict within 10-15 years from now.

Therefore, MoD has been very eager that TNI should be modernized in a big way, no more ngeteng. He asked permission from the president to execute a procurement plan for all items in the Rapim's TNI wishlist. The Nanggala tragedy also play important part in boosting sense of urgency in this matter.

However, in the latest Ratas, although the president was very enthustiastic about the plan, the Finance Minister has not yet agree with it. She's playing the card that any foreign loan will need to be accompanied by Dana Pendamping (domestic fund) around 15% (which we dont have the money). She is just too conservative and in a way becoming the main handicap in our current defense procurement.

Three key points that our Finance Minister overlook:
1. DP nol persen, meaning the lender doesn't require us to pay dow payment (i.e. Dana Pendamping).
2. Very low interest rate (1-2%) offered by our key partners. Compare it with MoF average bonds rate of 6-7% which is way too expensive for a country with a good credit rating like us.
3. Value creation from offset and ToT, that itself can repay the amount of debt, moreover if we can build a sustainable defense industry and ecosystem out of it.

So if we would like to see a big push on our defense procurement, we just need to convince SMI.


I do believe most DSRV (especially the ones that made on Western specifications) can handle most submarine hatches. India send their DSRV which can fit even their Russian made Kilo's.

View attachment 48185

Not Submarine expert, however isn't that hatch in the front section (where it also can be use as the access for torpedo), are where DSRV can access too. I believe there is another hatch in the aft that can also be used.



NGO's mostly hired guns. They will work depends on whose hired them on each project. You can just follow their contributors trails to see who's hired them on each specific project. After all, Defense is big business. Nobody cares on them anyway, except some journalists ;)

Anyway, as usual any incidents (especially major ones) related to TNI assets, will attract Politicians, NGO's or "analyst" and media to act like "pressure" parties to forward their own angle.


View attachment 48186

This one come from CNN Indonesia, shown trend of Defense Budget from Soeharto times to Present Administration. Which shown why many Politicians, NGO's and "analysts" attracted like flies to defense "Projects" whenever chances open for them. Now it's one of those chances.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
That's the main reason behind our 'ngeteng' behavior so far. Remember, she has been our FM for 3 periods (almost 15 years).
I don't believe the behavior of 'ngeteng' or small number of procurement coming from Ministry of Finance. It's more to how the budget being calculate before and the practices of small multiple projects. Before the practice of procurement budget calculate on each annual budget allocation. MinDef (and other ministries) then put multiple projects for each procurement spread on several years. This's not efficient procurement practices, as they will result on multiple contracts. Resulted on can't lock in long term pricing cost commitment from the suppliers or vendors.

In fact the Ministry of Finance and Bapenas are the ones that push for Multiyears Budget procurement process. This's the right ways to do, that being done by Commercial sectors from long time. This practice in fact will change the behavior of contracts being prepared, with long term payment schedule spreading on multiyears time line. This require details procurement planning and life time sustainment schedule. One project cover all, instead multi projects that Indonesian bureaucracy "likes" to operate before. Please free to interpret your self on whose got benefits on Multi Individual Projects spread throughout multiyears, or one umbrella Project cover multiyears schedule finance in detail schedule payment (as Ministry of Finance and Bapenas preference).

The total sum of the commitment could reach $150 billion, to finance all TNI wishlist in the Rapim and some additional items that will ensure we will be ready for any major arm conflict within 10-15 years from now.
Well it's not fix commitment yet (from what I heard from Bapenas and Ministry of Finance sources). It's just offering, and Both Agencies has to calculate whether to take all the commitment at once or multiple disbursement schedule. This will related to Indonesia Foreign Currency exposure, thus will influence Sovereign Credit Rating. They will also has to calculate overall costs. The cost is not just in Interest Rate, but also in accompany fees. It's not uncommon that long term financing line can results on higher commitment fee that sometimes can charge more than Interest. After all that's where the Financiers make money. In Financial Industry there's a saying; "If it's too good to be true, then it usually aren't".

Both Agencies will not differentiate whether the foreign financing line will be for Defense Projects, Infrastructure Projects or others. They will have to calculate how big the installment payments compared to projected each years annual budget for say 7, 10 or 15 years of financing tenure. They have to calculate on reserve financing ratio room (for emergency usage, just like current COVID).

Let's say they calculate for next 10 years, they will have room for Foreign Currency installment payments 35% annually. From what I learned so far on ministry of finance practices, that percentage have to set reserve say 5-10% room for emergency foreign currency financing.

This practice will also to keep tab on how big the DSR (debt service ratio) and deficit can be hold. Currently Indonesia sovereign rating just notch above Investment Grade (BBB). Like or not the rating will determine how big the financing ratio Investors and Foreign Creditors will like to see. Right know market consensus see Indonesia with that rating should maintain 30-40% Debt Financing ratio (whether Foreign Currency or Domestic ones), with around 6% deficit in the Sovereign Book. Australia and Singapore for example with much higher sovereign rating have more room then Indonesia.

Dana Pendamping (domestic fund) around 15% (which we dont have the money). She is just too conservative and in a way becoming the main handicap in our current defense procurement.
The requirements for Dana Pendamping (domestic own fund) is too make sure that foreign currency portion on each projects are manageable. It doesn't has to be 15%. It depends on each financing term. For example the JICA financing Jakarta MRT Project, as far as I know have much smaller domestic portion financing. This because the financing term from JICA considered very soft (cheap) financing. Again how to calculate whether one financing is softer then the other, are not simply on interest cost, but all accompany fees throughout financing tenure.

So, I don't agree that the decisions on how big current MinDef can use is only determine by Ministry of Finance and Bapenas. Both only calculate what 'safe' limit can be book annually to guard Indonesia sovereign book.

If this financing scheme of 'rumours' USD 150 bio can be drawdown USD 10 bio annually without the cost from the rest commitment line (of 15 years), and not being book to Indonesia in front. Then perhaps Ministry of Finance more inclined to take. This kind of financing call soft financing (just like JICA do)

However if that credit line has to be book all in affront with accompany fees calculate right away, then it will burden the Indonesia Sovereign book at once. This kind of financing more in line with commercial line, and can't be call soft financing. Even both scheme give similar interests rate (as assumption), but the second one put Indonesia book to take overall credit burden at front. While the first one spreading the burden over the years of tenure. At this moment we don't have details of each financing scheme. Feel free to share if you already have that kind of information.

Thus the second one in turn can potentially downgrade our rating. If that happens all financing cost for other Government projects can go higher, moreover the cost of financing for Commercial sectors will be affected. This turn will hit economics engine. In short don't just see the interest rate or down payment scheme. How the credit line constructed over the years is more important.

From rumours, the Japanese line to offer (for 30FFM) similar in scheme with JICA ones. While the European ones more on Commercial Base ones. How it's true or not, well it's just rumours in the market. After all just like I said before, Defense is big business.

Even if the financing got through, there's no guarantee that there's no temptation from some people in MinDef and Political circles not try to back into temptation of using multiple projects without long term sustainment contracts. That what responsible for 'ngeteng', and not ministry of finance.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
@Foodsoldier and @Ananda, thank you both for sharing and helping me learn more about Indonesia, and the TNI AL. The financing discussion, especially Japanese financing for the 8 proposed 30FFM frigates for the TNI AL, is really interesting.

In addition, let me make 4 other points, to enhance security for Indonesia:

1. As the leading nation of ASEAN, ADMM needs Indonesian leadership to continue with efforts in Maritime Security, and Counter Terrorism. The past co-chairs of the EWG on Maritime Security and EWG on Counter Terrorism have agreed on the synergy between the two EWGs; and this needs more Indonesian support in future.

2. In sum, Japan under the Suga administration continues to reinforce its security cooperation with ASEAN. In providing capacity-building support to ADMM, Japan focuses on: (i) consolidating the regional/maritime order based on the principles of international law; (ii) promoting maritime security cooperation; and (iii) effectively addressing increasingly diverse and complex security issues.

3. At the sixth defence minister-level meeting between ASEAN and Japan in 2019, then Defence Minister Taro Kono announced an updated version of the Vientiane Vision (“Vientiane Vision 2.0”), which emphasised Tokyo’s willingness to promote “heart-to-heart”, “tailored and long-lasting”, and “equal and open” security cooperation with ASEAN. The TNI AL must work more closely with the JMSDF at a ADMM Plus ONE level, with the Japanese to fully exploit Vientiane Vision 2.0.

4. At the 10th ADMM-Plus held virtually in Dec 2020, Japan’s Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi expressed his full support for ASEAN’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which shares fundamental principles with Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Under Suga’s new government, the updated Vientiane Vision is closely associated with FOIP.
 
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Foodsoldier

New Member
We are talking about this current Defense Minister (Prabowo), which everyone know he has been doing aggresive reform on MoD procurement system to stop this ngeteng behavior for good.

His logic is actually very simple and follow that multi-years model. Each year MoD will spend around $5 billion for big ticket procurement (out of $10 billion MoD total budget), and if we stretch it into at least 15 years span, we could have $75 billion worth of purchasing power. It even could reach $90 billion If we take into account 5-10% defense budget increase per-year. MoD would like to use that purchasing power upfront to get the best deal in term of price, offset and maintenance package. However, SMI doesn't seem to have willingness to support the idea. Eventhough she shouldn't need to be worried about our capability to repay the debt.

Bappenas and MoF concern is irrelevant, since they have done a more riskier financing project before (ie. infrastructure projects). Too many infra projects which are unfeasible (economically) have been executed. If they willing to do it for infra (taking the risk), why dont they do it as well for defense?

That's why I believe that our ngeteng behavior is driven by the inability of our FM to think out of the box when it comes to defense procurement.


I don't believe the behavior of 'ngeteng' or small number of procurement coming from Ministry of Finance. It's more to how the budget being calculate before and the practices of small multiple projects. Before the practice of procurement budget calculate on each annual budget allocation. MinDef (and other ministries) then put multiple projects for each procurement spread on several years. This's not efficient procurement practices, as they will result on multiple contracts. Resulted on can't lock in long term pricing cost commitment from the suppliers or vendors.

In fact the Ministry of Finance and Bapenas are the ones that push for Multiyears Budget procurement process. This's the right ways to do, that being done by Commercial sectors from long time. This practice in fact will change the behavior of contracts being prepared, with long term payment schedule spreading on multiyears time line. This require details procurement planning and life time sustainment schedule. One project cover all, instead multi projects that Indonesian bureaucracy "likes" to operate before. Please free to interpret your self on whose got benefits on Multi Individual Projects spread throughout multiyears, or one umbrella Project cover multiyears schedule finance in detail schedule payment (as Ministry of Finance and Bapenas preference).



Well it's not fix commitment yet (from what I heard from Bapenas and Ministry of Finance sources). It's just offering, and Both Agencies has to calculate whether to take all the commitment at once or multiple disbursement schedule. This will related to Indonesia Foreign Currency exposure, thus will influence Sovereign Credit Rating. They will also has to calculate overall costs. The cost is not just in Interest Rate, but also in accompany fees. It's not uncommon that long term financing line can results on higher commitment fee that sometimes can charge more than Interest. After all that's where the Financiers make money. In Financial Industry there's a saying; "If it's too good to be true, then it usually aren't".

Both Agencies will not differentiate whether the foreign financing line will be for Defense Projects, Infrastructure Projects or others. They will have to calculate how big the installment payments compared to projected each years annual budget for say 7, 10 or 15 years of financing tenure. They have to calculate on reserve financing ratio room (for emergency usage, just like current COVID).

Let's say they calculate for next 10 years, they will have room for Foreign Currency installment payments 35% annually. From what I learned so far on ministry of finance practices, that percentage have to set reserve say 5-10% room for emergency foreign currency financing.

This practice will also to keep tab on how big the DSR (debt service ratio) and deficit can be hold. Currently Indonesia sovereign rating just notch above Investment Grade (BBB). Like or not the rating will determine how big the financing ratio Investors and Foreign Creditors will like to see. Right know market consensus see Indonesia with that rating should maintain 30-40% Debt Financing ratio (whether Foreign Currency or Domestic ones), with around 6% deficit in the Sovereign Book. Australia and Singapore for example with much higher sovereign rating have more room then Indonesia.



The requirements for Dana Pendamping (domestic own fund) is too make sure that foreign currency portion on each projects are manageable. It doesn't has to be 15%. It depends on each financing term. For example the JICA financing Jakarta MRT Project, as far as I know have much smaller domestic portion financing. This because the financing term from JICA considered very soft (cheap) financing. Again how to calculate whether one financing is softer then the other, are not simply on interest cost, but all accompany fees throughout financing tenure.

So, I don't agree that the decisions on how big current MinDef can use is only determine by Ministry of Finance and Bapenas. Both only calculate what 'safe' limit can be book annually to guard Indonesia sovereign book.

If this financing scheme of 'rumours' USD 150 bio can be drawdown USD 10 bio annually without the cost from the rest commitment line (of 15 years), and not being book to Indonesia in front. Then perhaps Ministry of Finance more inclined to take. This kind of financing call soft financing (just like JICA do)

However if that credit line has to be book all in affront with accompany fees calculate right away, then it will burden the Indonesia Sovereign book at once. This kind of financing more in line with commercial line, and can't be call soft financing. Even both scheme give similar interests rate (as assumption), but the second one put Indonesia book to take overall credit burden at front. While the first one spreading the burden over the years of tenure. At this moment we don't have details of each financing scheme. Feel free to share if you already have that kind of information.

Thus the second one in turn can potentially downgrade our rating. If that happens all financing cost for other Government projects can go higher, moreover the cost of financing for Commercial sectors will be affected. This turn will hit economics engine. In short don't just see the interest rate or down payment scheme. How the credit line constructed over the years is more important.

From rumours, the Japanese line to offer (for 30FFM) similar in scheme with JICA ones. While the European ones more on Commercial Base ones. How it's true or not, well it's just rumours in the market. After all just like I said before, Defense is big business.

Even if the financing got through, there's no guarantee that there's no temptation from some people in MinDef and Political circles not try to back into temptation of using multiple projects without long term sustainment contracts. That what responsible for 'ngeteng', and not ministry of finance.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
That's why I believe that our ngeteng behavior is driven by the inability of our FM to think out of the
box
That's your belief, and you are entitled on that. The Minister of Finance in fact much more familiar with what financing scheme available in the market. She in fact already proven can think out of the box more often than any other minister.

Again 'ngeteng' behaviour come from MinDef behaviour. Yes, Prabowo has tried to rectified that. However, it is more related to how his MinDef try to construct the procurement contracts.

You can buy USD 3 bio frigate projects (for say 4 frigates) signed in a single contract but spread the installments financing on several years. That way you can lock-in the lower procurement costs from begining. Or you can use 4 multiple contracts for 4 frigates, in which, each of the 4 contracts is done separately, with the risk each of them can have different costs to each other, that in the end has resulted on USD 4 bio overall costs. This is that resulted on 'Ngeteng' as temptation on changing suppliers for each contracts or doing seperate "transactional" negotiations can happen.

The later ones that mostly being done on previous MinDef. I can not say right now Prabowo's MinDef will use the first more efficient way. We can only hope so. Simple way to say is whether MinDef wants to commit on single long term contract or seperate short term contracts. Finance and Bapenas with their preference on multiyears budgeting, tend for long term procurement financing scheme.

Bappenas and MoF concern is irrelevant, since they have done a more riskier financing project before (ie. infrastructure projects). Too many infra projects which are unfeasible (economically) have been executed. If they willing to do it for infra (taking the risk), why dont they do it as well for defense?
Irrelevant of what ? They are the one who control the budgets. Of-course their concern is very relevant, even more than MinDef ones. Again it depends on financing scheme. How do you means infrastructure is riskier projects ? Riskier than the defense ?

Infrastructure projects can be calculated back on economics impacts, defence can not. Off course defence financing in whole world is more riskier then financing civilian projects. Some infrastructure projects can be economically unfeasible, but all defence projects come to unfeasible economically. Even if domestic industry got involvement, the economic multiplier effect is much less than an infrastructure project.

For that (again) will depends how you are going to finance it. Some more economics feasible infrastructure projects, being finance on pure commercial base (using B to B method), this for example on most Tol Highways in Java. On this conditions Ministry of Finance and Bapenas does not involve, as it's being finance using market mechanism by SOE companies. Thus it will not leveraging government book.

While Tol Highways in other islands considered more riskier financially, which in turn some of it will be finance by Government sources. Either using APBN or Government agencies leverage scheme. For that Ministry of Finance and Bapenas will have to calculate that, as it will directly hit on the leverage ratio of Government sovereign book.

On the other hand all defense projects are leveraging government sovereign book. Thus Finance and Bapenas that will decide which financing scheme they will take it or not. It's MinDef job to find suppliers that can provide the best financing scheme that Finance as Goverment Treasury can deemed exceptable.

'Ngeteng' or not is coming from how MinDef construct the procurement projects. Is not up to Finance or Bapenas. It is short term multiple projects contracts behaviours that create 'Ngeteng'. There's no prove yet that Prabowo's able to change that behaviours yet. Hopefully he can, but no prove yet.

Edit: Spelling and other minor corrections to improve clarity made.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
We are talking about this current Defense Minister (Prabowo), which everyone know he has been doing aggresive reform on MoD procurement system to stop this ngeteng behavior for good.

His logic is actually very simple and follow that multi-years model. Each year MoD will spend around $5 billion for big ticket procurement (out of $10 billion MoD total budget), and if we stretch it into at least 15 years span, we could have $75 billion worth of purchasing power. It even could reach $90 billion If we take into account 5-10% defense budget increase per-year. MoD would like to use that purchasing power upfront to get the best deal in term of price, offset and maintenance package. However, SMI doesn't seem to have willingness to support the idea. Eventhough she shouldn't need to be worried about our capability to repay the debt.

Bappenas and MoF concern is irrelevant, since they have done a more riskier financing project before (ie. infrastructure projects). Too many infra projects which are unfeasible (economically) have been executed. If they willing to do it for infra (taking the risk), why dont they do it as well for defense?

That's why I believe that our ngeteng behavior is driven by the inability of our FM to think out of the box when it comes to defense procurement.
Sri Mulyani was minister of finance from 2005-2010 during SBY-period, that was the time that the Indonesian government start to modernize TNI in a quite successful way, looking to the limited budget.

Sri Mulyani returned only as minister of finance in 2016, in that time it was already clear that the Jokowi-administration was not interested in modernizing the armed forces but only in infrastructure projects.

So its quite unfair to blame 6 years of slow progress and mismanagement of the current administration on her.
 

DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Just for the sake of us non-Bahasa speakers, what exactly is "ngeteng" behaviour ? Inquiring minds would like to know. ;)
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Just for the sake of us non-Bahasa speakers, what exactly is "ngeteng" behaviour ? Inquiring minds would like to know. ;)
don't believe the behavior of 'ngeteng' or small number of procurement coming from Ministry of Finance.
Sorry, I already put it here. 'Ngeteng' is slang language for procuring in small numbers. Basically the behavior on procurement in multiple contracts each for small number of items.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Defence procurements in multiple contracts for small number of different types but with the same function/role is sadly very common for decades in this country.
It seems that Indonesia has requested the assistance from china to recover the KRI Nanggala 402.


- The Yongxingdao 863 is a Type 925 Submarine Support Ship.
- The second ship seems to be a tug.
- Here some more information about the third one, Tan Suo Er Hao
863 and 195 are already arrived in Indonesia.
Hopefully there is no additional hydrographic research function on the Yongxingdao 863...


 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
PT Lundin/North Sea Boats started with the trials on 28 April to check all of its functions on the water. The X18 Antasena is expected to support TNI operation in swamp, river, coastal and sea as well as coast guard duties.

This « APC » variant of the Combat Boat is primarily designed for troop transport tasks. It will be capable of carrying up to 60 troops, 5 tons of cargo, drones and will be manned by a 5 strong crew.
I can not believe it will all fit in such a small boat of 18 meters long. According to the website of PT Lundin, the X18 Antasena has a crew of 6 and can take an additional 20 troops, that sounds more realistic.



And again a politician who wants to get attention with an empty statement.

Many Americans are against the sale of these historic patrol boats, and BAKAMLA isnt interested in old foreign second hand boats....so nothing to worry about.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
And again a politician who wants to get attention with an empty statement.
That plan is part of MEF if being done on schedule. SBY second term order first batch of three and delivered on Jokowi's first term. Jokowi's first term should already secured order for second batch of three with delivery schedule on Jokowi's second term. While present second term should secured third batch of three with delivery schedule on next administration term (2024-2029). So with MEF schedule by 2029 TNI-AL supposed to be operating at least 8-9 operational MEF program submarines.

However we know Jokowi's first term messed up the second batch order, thus this second term has to come out with solution on how to catch up second batch while still maintaining third batch schedule. At the same time due to COVID, the budgetary problems need some realignment.

Unless they are cutting some other programs, or doing some 'miracle' works (which we know this administration has no track record on that), I don't see that plan of 8-10 submarine can be achieve by 2029.

They should swallowing their political possition on local Industry involvement and begin ordering either second hand assets or build them overseas. Even India with much larger budget, much advance defense domestic Industry while also facing problematic bureaucracy, can get in touch with reality. They are doing some order build domestically while at same time order some from overseas yards to catch up with defense development need.

FB_IMG_1620446677689.jpg

The comments on TNI-AL submarine plan come from same session in Parliament, in which TNI-AL informed them on Nanggala condition. They put the information on Nanggala record of torpedo excersise, just to quelled rumours that the Submarine was not in shape for torpedo excersise. The picture from Keris FB page.



There's Political pressure for MinDef and TNI especially TNI-AL to come out with definitive answer on what happens with Nanggala. That's why TNI accepting China offer to try salvage Nanggala. What happens on Nanggala already become Political debate for 2024 election preparation.

Some Politicians from Jokowi's party (and their supporters on line) already throw the blame toward SBY's Administration cause give overhaul Project to ROK DSME and not Germany TKMS. While the opposition supporters blame Jokowi's Administration failures to do proper maintenance as scheduled.

There's enough stupid morons in both Political spectrum, but then eventough it will cost much, the pressure for salvaging Nanggala already big enough to be denied.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
An interesting article about the 32 meter mini-submarine design of BPPT. H.I. Sutton compares the Indonesian design with the North-Korean MS-29 Yono and Iranian Ghadir classes. There are some similarities ofcourse, but it is very unlikely that there is any connection, after all Indonesia didnt bought or illegally copy the North-Korean design. That the general configuration is similar is not more than logic. It doesnt make sense to completely change this, moving the propulsion part to the front, having the torpedo compartment in the middle and put the command area in the backside in order to make an "original design" is just stupid.

The article also discuss about smaller and earlier designs.


Outlook
It seems unlikely that the KSM-32 will be built, although there are likely those hoping that it will. Indonesia had already identified a need for more submarines, even before the tragic loss of KRI Nanggala (402) last month. But it is likely to opt for full size submarines. Local production seems very likely, but whether Indonesia will take the risk on an indiginous design remains to be seen.
In that i have to agree with him.
 

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Ananda

The Bunker Group
that i have to agree with him.
I do see that also. Unless they find some other yards outside PAL to manufacture the design. Before, I read media report that they (BPPT) will try to cooperate with a yard in Batam.

If they are using BPPT budget and not Defense budget, there's probability they will try to build one as prove of concept. However I'm also don't see this concept become operational class. They might be using it to gain experience to build coastal submarine class. Something in the range of Type 206.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Not much new information is written in this article.

The first videos of the X18 Antasena trials start to appear on internet.
I dont know if this is 40 kts, but its for sure fast!



It seems that some navy officers are now certified to operate the ScanEagle. Looking to the images, the course was probably not only about flying the ScanEagle UAV, but also learning about assembling, preparation for flight, maintenance and analyzing the incoming data.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
first videos of the X18 Antasena trials start to appear on internet
John Cockerill already prepared similar turret in Antasena project (3030 type) with either rockets or missiles pod.


Wondering the stability factor on that turret being equip with rocket system on Antasena boats. They (Lundin) already prepared Missiles variance, however with different configuration installment.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group

Joint Production concept. According to this, is the policy aspects that Japan will try to circumstances their own armed export policies.

This's new revelation (at least for me), which I thought Japan already handle their own armed export policies.


Thus based on that Sankei articles, the terminology for armed products export can't be circumstances by Export with Tech Transfer. However has to be with Joint Production. In sense, Japan provide technology, materials and know how as part of joint production effort. Technicallity on sense it can provide ways saying it will be different versions from JSMDF 30FFM/DDX own version.

Interesting that Sankei articles talking about Italian and Turkish competition. Italian FREMM design as competitors is known factor, however Turkey Frigates is something not much talk in here. This considering their own Frigate design is also still new project, and talk of Turkish involvement with TKMS on 214 Submarine is more being talked in Indonesian media and Forums.
 
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