India's platforms like Mig-29K are proven and they are about to buy the Rafale which is a mature platform as well, The FC-31 is not mature and keep in Mind, India has been operating non Catobar carriers for longer than China.
Agreed.
I also prefer Indian missiles, but the fact remains that Chinese DDGs carry about twice as many.....
maybe.
The thing is, I keep wondering if those PLAN ships are fully-loaded. I have my doubts about that.
And before I forget, the 2nd part;
Oh, and what
about Submarines?
The only thoughts I have on them are about basing two of the Shishmar/209s in the Andaman Islands. With their ability to carry 24 mines externally and their long range, basing them forward makes good sense if you want to take full advantage of opportunities for mischief in sea-lanes vital to the PLAN.
As for the rest, I don’t really see Subs as adjuncts to any fleets. They are hunters, existing solely to seek & destroy enemy ships in the largest possible numbers.
Period.
The Kalvari and Kilos can be evenly split between East & West, while the remaining two Shishmar can be sent into the southern reaches where their long range will serve them well.
REGIONS;
This concerns the three regions of India’s coastal security. I did find how the Solas boats are distributed and show them that way here, but I did not use that as a guide since i have my own ideas about how the smaller units ought to be based;
WEST;
31 x Solas Boats
6 x ISV boats
6 x Car Nicobar patrol vessels
3 x Veer Class missile Corvette
SOUTH;
16 x Solas boats
6 x ISV
4 x Bangaram patrol vessels
1 x Trinkat patrol vessel
3 x Khukri class missile Corvette
3 x Mk. IV LST
1 x Ambika 1,000-ton oiler
EAST;
33 x Solas boats
6 x ISV
5 x Car Nicobar
2 x Veer
2 x Mk. IV LST
ANDAMAN;
5 x ISV
2 x Dvora boats
3 x Car Nicobar
2 x Veer
3 x Mk. IV LST
(also; 2 x Shishmar subs based here but under main fleet command)
Since this is probably a major departure from what already is in place, I should explain myself;
SOUTH; Keeping this group at half the rating of the East & West is probably a bad idea. Not only do they have to keep an eye on unpredictable Sri Lanka and a small island group to the southwest, but it is also likely that they would have to extend operations in to the Maldives in the event of a major war. If your allies are the slightest bit careless, this group might even have to go as far south as Diego Garcia.
So it is that the Khukir class can be found here. They are 10 knots slower than the Veer but also have double the range. That is also why the small oiler is down here, and the old Trinkat is also here to serve as a mobile communications hub. The LSTs are there for the same reason the are in other places; to quickly shuttle reinforcements (about 1 company each plus supplies and equipment) to hot-spots without having to wait for the rest of the fleet.
ANDAMAN; Yes, I have split this off as a separate command, The distances seem too great for this to be part of EAST command region. The danger level is also higher here. If India means to keep these islands (and it should) then it should have a force, however small, that the local commanders know they can depend on…. meaning something that won’t be transferred out on the whim of an Admiral 1,000 miles away.
There is one base there that appears to be more than adequate, but there should be more than just one. There appear to be many small bays and inlets in the area, it should not be difficult to set up two small satellite bases and keep them mostly hidden. Three more false small bases would also be good to have, and it takes surprisingly little to set up a convincing “hidden” base. Normally, some left-over material and a couple of trigger-happy guards is all it takes.
COAST GUARD;
India has a very large and capable Coast Guard;
27 x offshore patrol ships
45 x patrol vessels in the 270-290 ton range
82 x boats
14 x small boats
18 x Hovercraft
I am not going to touch this, no matter how tempting it might be. Surveillance, patrol, interception and Search & Rescue work is not likely to become less important in wartime.
Just the opposite, in fact.
Search & Rescue will be more important than ever, since saving trained Naval crews will be essential for winning a prolonged war. Also; this is another source of moral victory in the event of war, since the PLAN will be more like the Imperial Japanese Navy was 80 years ago. Not only will they be lacking much of what they would need to do so, but the Chinese do not place such a high value on human life.
The exception would be the protection of LOCAL convoys. There will still be plenty of traffic between India’s own ports, after all, and ASW gear needs to be set aside for the Coast Guard for this reason. After all, they already have 36 x twin-engine Dornier’s that have an endurance of 10 hours, so surely this is something the Admiralty already has in mind, right?
Enemy Threats;
There is probably enough being said already about deployments outside of the Indian Ocean, but what about Chinese threats inside that ocean?
This goes beyond what PLAN ships happen to be there in the opening days of a war, and even the high likelihood that Chinese commercial shipping may have weapons hidden aboard to convert them into Commerce Raiders. There are also 15,000 Chinese fishing ships out there, with several thousand in the Indian Ocean at any time. Intelligence reports sent back by such craft are a problem, but there is other sorts of devilry that they could get into.
I think it would be foolish to think that none of those ships have hidden arms lockers and at least a few men aboard with military backgrounds. A few squads of men armed with weapons left over from the days of Mao might not seem like much of a threat, but how many islands out there are equipped to withstand a raid from dozens of men armed with rifles, a couple of machine-guns and perhaps a mortar or an RPG?
How many islands that are rated as unimportant will suddenly become important when some ridiculous little mob of armed men take up residence there, dig in and set up a watch-post and radio transmitter?
Remember; fishing boats produce their own rations.
So, an exception to a lot of what was said above is going to be negated by the scramble to eliminate all PLAN/CCP shipping during the early days of the war. Making a clean sweep of the area first will eliminate a lot of headaches later on, and India’s minor allies can render their best service by helping with this task. For that to happen, a plan must be made ahead of time.
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