.... study in depth as many historical examples of areas made up of several ethnicities already engaged in a bloodbath while occupied by a foriegn (and at least somewhat disliked) power as possible.
Done
What does that MEAN really? You think the Bush/Cheney approach for the last approx 6 yrs has been a result of a reasoned, in-depth study of the history of the region and "nation-building"/occupying? That they've
done this?
.... Then read Liddel Hart's Strategy. And maybe Keegan's A History of Warfare.
Pointless
REALLY? Do tell.
A serious reading of Liddel Hart's strategy and reflecting upon it would not be something our US policy "deciders" could benefit from? Even the chapter on Guerilla/Insurgency warfare? Liddel Hart's Strategy is devoid of useful advice? Excuse me while I choke down a guffaw or two.
As for Keegan's A History Of Warfare, what parts, specifically do you find to be pointless? The part about war being more/less than a Clauzwitzian concept of sophisticated European states pursuing politics by other means? Or the contrast between Western "hoplite" traditions of warfare seeking decisive battle as opposed to "irreglular" methods of fighting, incidentally responsible for many Arabian military successes in the initial rapid spread of Islam? Please talk about those specific aspects of the book you found to make the entire book pointless to strategists and strategy-making politicians considering the current situation in the Middle East. Unless of course, you want to admit that you haven't read it and therefore can't speak to the issue one way or the other after all.
...which would make it look like replying repeatedly with the single word "pointless" was not an attempt at an intelligent response at all, but just a bit of patronizing? I know I'm new, but still. I was hoping for something resembling DISCUSSION from you.
.... meet with army, corps, and divisional commanders to get their realistic perspective of what is happening in Iraq, INSISTING to, for instance, the divisional commanders that they must speak with total candor....
Pointless
Blah Blah Blah. "pointless" does not a reasoned... ANYTHING make. The way I've heard it, generals have been increasingly speaking out about how they dissagree with how the war in Iraq is being fought. One of the most obvious issues has been that divisional commanders have come forward saying they DID want more men and that they are needed to get the job done, while the people at the top keep saying they don't want more soldiers. NO ONE in the general media seems to be discussing the fact that the "no higher troop deployment" argument is based on a static army size. Faced with using the soldiers they have, the generals would rather avoid a do-or-die scenario in which they cannot rest/refit troops to keep combat effectivity high while having some reserves on hand in case something else happens. How could an accurate and candid assessment by divisional commanders be POINTLESS? Considering that the top generals seem to be toeing the Bush/Cheney party line? Please.
.... form a rational grand strategy for the war on terror and a rational strategy for Iraq
The "War on Terror" and current operations in Iraq have only one thing in common...the region of operations.
...thus my designation of a grand strategy for a war on terror as well as a strategy for Iraq.
I have formed THE rational strategy for Iraq, which is the ONLY rational strategy, and which was not used in 2003 by the USA.
...which I understand remains unassailable by virtue of its not being posted on these forums.
Forming a rational strategy for "War on Terror" is not so easy considering the enemy is irrational by 'Western' standards.
However not impossible. American generals came into WW2 believing that fighting tanks with tanks was an irrational approach. Perhaps it was, perhaps it wasn't. Their mistake was to form no doctrine for what would be done when the enemy chose to oppose his tanks to theirs, despite their view of its being irrational. A study of what had already been done with tanks and what was currently being done would have prompted a rational approach to dealing with the essentially (as they viewed it) "irrational" approach by the enemy of not saving one's tanks for a classic breakthrough.
I was saying that an actual study of historical situations similar to the one the US is currently in would lead to a more rational, effective approach. I certainly would not agree that irrationality trumps rationality. One can certainly predict the other's future actions better than the other. More often than not irrationality equals predictability. (isn't one definition of insanity doing the same thing over and over?)
In order to form rational strategies the analyst must first be honest to oneself and one's clients. To do so is to accept that the war is with Islam in general, and particular sections of Islamic society in particular. Based on this is is easily realised that the 'war' can not be won militarily.
...the very reason I cited John Keegan's book. A classic "decisive battle" doesn't seem to be in the cards, no matter how badly the neocons or Clauzwitz wish for it.
I fear you misunderstand how societies in general, and the Islamic society in particular work. The 'iron fist' is the only social model known, accepted and desired in the Islamic world. There is one other option, but since it forms the core of my solution idea, I am not going to reveal it here (in the hope that someone in the powers-that-be may actually decide to listen).
I was thinking of both sides of the coin. Do we have any similar historical examples in which the "iron fist" approach was NOT the solution that ended up working? Does the iron fist approach really work? (I hear a hearty "yes" coming from you, so...) Finally, is this a viable option, considering it is America that would be acting on an "iron fist" policy.
It makes me think of an interview with the scientist who was proposing a newer, bigger supercollider be built:
"so does this have some military application, Mr Liederman?"
"Well, no."
"No defense applications for our country whatsoever?"
"No... but it will help make our country more worth defending."
America doesn't want to be "that guy." The results of the recent election clearly show this. While ruling with an iron fist or saying anything up to organ failure isn't torture (therefore, really a re-naming of execution as "torture") might lead to more effective war-fighting in some sense, it isn't what Americans want and gives up the VERY valuable moral high ground. The US needs to be (get back to being) the good guy. Anyone who doesn't keep that in mind will find his party getting voted out of a majority. Making the US worth defending is of primary importance, above defense. There most definitely should be some things that are truly beneath us.
Dear Pinky, what is the greatest source of grievance in the Islamic world against the 'West'? Imagine if the demand for oil was dramatically and rapidly reduced?
Western bases/troops stationed in Islamic countries. Perpetual western meddling and pressuring in the Middle East including but not limited to toppling established governments and military conquest. The creation of Israel. A total unwavering military and economic support of Israel.
Without the need for oil, the US would not have a great compulsion to place troops in the Middle East or to apply pressure to countries in the region. A general "need" to meddle would be gone. As the Middle East would no longer be of such vital strategic importance, any compulsion to aid Israel would be greatly reduced. The US could then play with a stronger hand or choose not to play at all.
Money going to terrorists would markedly decrease. So far Al Queda has been flush with cash. Think about where that cash has ultimately been coming from.
Unfortunately I need to inform you that being 'well read' in WW2 history may not enable you to apply this knowledge to every strategic situation.
Unfortunately I need to remind you that I explained that I have also read on general strategy and in general am better informed/read than the average layman, so the assumption that my understanding of strategy is based exculsively on WW2 history is misguided, especially considering that the only 2 books I cited in my post were not about WW2.
It would certainly also depend on WHAT books on WW2 I had read. The 2nd to last book I have read recently (The most recent one being John Julius Norwich's A Short History of Byzantium) was Manstien's Lost Victories. I highly recommend it. His thoughts on Strategy, Grand Strategy, as well as how the top levels of the military interact with the political leadership ring true to this day and could be used to understand the effectiveness (or lack therof) of the neocon's approach to the war on terror and in Iraq.
Iran is a nation of 70 million people. Even if the US was able to destroy its conventional military structure, it could not destroy all combat capability. What this would produce is a largely radicalised population of millions. Not only that, but there is one thing to surely unite enemies, and that is a common enemy which the US would become to both Sunni and Shi'a followers.
Would US be able to stop this army of 'bugs' advancing into the Gulf states? I fear that it would be well and truly beyond not just US, but NATO also.
This comes a lot closer to what I was hoping for. Some conjecture on what could/would happen. It sounds like you agree with me to the extent that a western-style standing army on the field would be defeated. It seems to me that even combinations of allied countries in the region could be beaten (their western-style standing armies, that is) each in turn with an "internal lines" strategy. So I'm interested in a little more detail with what you envision. Millions of men crossing national boundaries dispersed over the entire frontier? How will they be supplied with ammunition and food? How will they be effectively controlled? How will they prevent becomnig a starving mob that could be rounded up by more rapidly moving, organized, concentrated forces?
War with Iran is NOT an option, particularly since it would have severe impact on US economy.
You're coming around to my views now. Eliminate oil dependence to achieve feedom of action. Mind you, my question was what if Iran attacked the US, but it behooves the US to be as unaffected as possible by the economic consequences of a war with any oil-producing country. Surely it would be bad to be militarily attacked by Iran AND suffer the consequent economic problems?
Quite simply the situations with "War on Terror" and situation in Iraq are but a part of a very long historical continuity which gradually moved out of the 'Western' focus with rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, but begun to re-emerge almost immediately with its dissolution in 1918.
I'd be interested to get a good picture from you of that historical continuity and the strategical implications that follow from it.
The "strategy" that HAS been followed by the US seems to almost defy explanation. If you take Bush's stated aims for granted, it's a case of ineptitude and choosing the wrong basic goals. If only Iraq were a stable, prosperous democracy. "If only" unfortunately does not constitute a strategy. Surely they cannot be THAT stupid? So one attempts to reverse-engineer the strategy by looking at what has been done. Clearly one needs to seal up the borders to prevent arms and insurgents from entering the country, yet this was never done. The only explanation that makes sense to me is, they simply wanted to open up a new "theatre of war" (like the British fighting the Nazis in other theaters when they couldn't confront them on the continent) that would compel the enemy to oppose our military forces with forces of their own, with a consequent drain in men and resources... an attempt to draw the enemy into a sort of reverse-asymetric warfare. However I don't think Americans would approve making someone's country a battlefield just so you can open up another field of war.