Germany

[kato]

So Germany's planned acquisition, or more precisely the debates around it, signal that Germany is first interested in a nuclear shield, and only after that air defenses against conventional threats.

There is an interview (in German) with the Bundeswehr Inspector General on the MoD homepage from yesterday which contains the following section on a ABM system:

Braucht Deutschland einen Raketenschutzschirm, ähnlich wie Israel?
Wir unterscheiden zwischen drei Ebenen des Schutzes: Die erste ist der Schutz der beweglichen Kräfte am Boden. Da haben wir nur noch geringe Fähigkeiten, aber schon in der letzten Legislaturperiode die Anschaffung neuer Systeme angestoßen. Das muss nun umgesetzt werden. Die mittlere Schicht wird durch das Patriot-Abwehrsystem geschützt, das modernisiert werden muss. Die dritte Schicht bezieht sich auf den Schutz vor Raketen, die etwa in Kaliningrad stehen, die berüchtigten Iskander. Sie können fast alle Ziele in Westeuropa erreichen, und es fehlt ein Abwehrschirm. Die Israelis und die Amerikaner verfügen über die entsprechenden Systeme. Welchem von beiden geben wir den Vorzug? Schaffen wir es, ein Gesamtsystem in der NATO aufzubauen? Diese Fragen müssen wir nun beantworten. Bisher ist nur eines klar: Wir haben weder die Zeit noch das Geld, diese Systeme selbst zu entwickeln. Denn die Raketenbedrohung ist bereits vorhanden und bekannt.

Translation by me:
Q : "Does Germany need a missile defense system similar to Israel?"
A : We differentiate three layers of protection: The first is the protection of mobile ground forces. In this we only have few capabilities remaining, but have already begun the procurement of new systems in the last legislature period. This has to be implemented now. The middle layer is protected by the Patriot defense system which has to be modernized. The third layer refers to the protection from missiles such as for example those in Kaliningrad, the infamous Iskander. They can reach nearly all targets in Western Europe, and a defense system is missing. The Israelis and the Americans have such systems. Which of the two do we favour? Will we mange to build a common system within NATO? We have to answer these questions now. So far only one thing is clear: We do not have the time or money to develop such systems on our own. The missile threat is already present and known.

Further down in the interview however GI Zorn also states that: "priority is given to [...] rapid visibility of material within the forces".

The first layer described by him has an upgrade planned, but that does not have rapid visibility (unless Rheinmetall suddenly test-fires a IRIS-T SLS Boxer module next week...). The middle layer has an upgrade planned, but that does not have rapid visibility since it's about keeping the same system. With regard to air defense as described by GI Zorn it's the third layer that with off-the-shelf procurement can achieve rapid visibility.


Note:
With regard to the layering described, the first layer consists of multiple systems in three sub-layers, which are all only marginally covered right now. There is an upgrade path for all three sub-layers.

 

[kato]

For other "high-visibility" projects:

• The Ministry of Defense plans to immediately procure new personal protection equipment for the entire Bundeswehr for about 2.358 billion Euro - ballistic vests, helmets, new uniforms and new backpacks, in each case several hundred-thousand, with delivery before 2025.
• The above is without a budget, funding or plans to ask parliament in advance - and largely seen as a "test balloon" by the MoD to see how far they can go and to create a precedent for near-future procurement.

• The budget committee of parliament will discuss a proposal tomorrow in which the MoD seeks approval to buy 140 missiles for the five German IAI Eitan (Heron TP) drones for about 152 million Euro.
• The draft would negate a budget committee decision from June 2018 which expressly forbade procuring armament or training for such for the drones.

 

[John Fedup]

@kato …any funds being planned for longer term German developed missile technology?

 

[kato]

Not in a "visible" fashion

Plans for "first-layer" air defense (second and third sub-layer) as of mid last year have the Air Force fielding batteries that have 2 IRIS-T SLM and 6 IRIS-T SLS launchers. Four batteries planned per army division.

Notionally both systems could be bought off-the-shelf from Diehl pretty quickly (without further development). At least as of last year the Luftwaffe wanted preferably armoured vehicles for the SLS launcher platoons though, with the charts showing some Boxer-like graphic placeholders. The only armoured vehicle on which a IRIS-T SLS launcher so far has been integrated is based on the Hägglunds Bv410.

Since GI Zorn in the above interview also seems to suggest buying off-the-shelf new Hägglunds "without bespoke modifications" for the mountain infantry (and that would be Bv410 then) this might be not be a maintenance/logistics problem at all though.

 

[swerve]

There is an interview (in German) with the Bundeswehr Inspector General on the MoD homepage from yesterday

There's a lot of interesting stuff in that interview. He seems to be suggesting that the procurement system is faulty, with bureaucratic obstructions (not the staff, but the rules they have to work by) & that the Bundeswehr should buy more OTS kit without "special requests" (the UK could also benefit from that), giving a few examples of which the Hägglunds vehicle is one.

To me, it looks very sensible.

 

[kato]

He seems to be suggesting that the procurement system is faulty, with bureaucratic obstructions (not the staff, but the rules they have to work by)

That's something generally agreed upon in public.

It's also not always the rules per se but instead a combination of the below five issues:

• Funding rules resulting in trade-offs to get a certain procurement project through - there have always been members on the defense committee who, to paraphrase it, see themselves as representatives of their electoral district first.
• Defense industry actively lobbying to shape requirements in order to remove competition in order to be able to dictate prices.
• Functionality and requirement creep on the user side. Most largescale procurement projects are extremely affected by that.
• Sometimes questionable authoritative decisions by senior officials in favour of signing of certain contracts.
• Not strictly applying existing internal rules starting from legal review of contracts and going as far as not shifting personnel placed in "corruption-susceptible" posts every couple years.

The problem about it is also that perception within the armed forces runs a bit differently. Parliamentary budget control is seen primarily as a nuisance, predefining functional requirements and restricting yourself to those is seen as a hindrance, and working "around the rules" is a common sport in any public service anyway. And those are not even German peculiarities either.

In addition BAAInBw, the procurement agency, is artificially inflated, and people both within and outside the armed forces seem to think that there's literally 5000-6000 people working on contracting and "not getting it done". The reality is that one-third of those posts are not in procurement at all, and one-third of posts is not filled because they can't find personnel.

 

[mariohot]

Not in a "visible" fashion

Plans for "first-layer" air defense (second and third sub-layer) as of mid last year have the Air Force fielding batteries that have 2 IRIS-T SLM and 6 IRIS-T SLS launchers. Four batteries planned per army division.

Notionally both systems could be bought off-the-shelf from Diehl pretty quickly (without further development). At least as of last year the Luftwaffe wanted preferably armoured vehicles for the SLS launcher platoons though, with the charts showing some Boxer-like graphic placeholders. The only armoured vehicle on which a IRIS-T SLS launcher so far has been integrated is based on the Hägglunds Bv410.

Since GI Zorn in the above interview also seems to suggest buying off-the-shelf new Hägglunds "without bespoke modifications" for the mountain infantry (and that would be Bv410 then) this might be not be a maintenance/logistics problem at all though.

what about IRIS T SLX system, Egypt bought it,,,it should have more then 80 km range? I can´t find anything about it on Diehl web page

 

[kato]

what about IRIS T SLX system, Egypt bought it,,,it should have more then 80 km range? I can´t find anything about it on Diehl web page

Not in the Bundeswehr plans, that's the layer they have Patriot with PAC-2 for (68+ km range). 170 PAC-2 missiles were brought to current GEM-T standard to equip the SAM contingent for VJTF 2023 (procurement was in 2020 for 213 million Euro).

Diehl right today placed a marketing article (in German) on their website regarding IRIS-T SL. In it they state that "in case of a quick procurement decision" deliveries "to the German customer" could begin by Q3/2022, also emphasizing full NATO interoperability and a package deal including radars for which they've started a cooperation with Hensoldt.

Offered system is IRIS-T SLM "augmented" by IRIS-T SLS.

IRIS-T SLX in that article is portrayed as a "capability improvement under development".

 

[mariohot]

Not in the Bundeswehr plans, that's the layer they have Patriot with PAC-2 for (68+ km range). 170 PAC-2 missiles were brought to current GEM-T standard to equip the SAM contingent for VJTF 2023 (procurement was in 2020 for 213 million Euro).

Diehl right today placed a marketing article (in German) on their website regarding IRIS-T SL. In it they state that "in case of a quick procurement decision" deliveries "to the German customer" could begin by Q3/2022, also emphasizing full NATO interoperability and a package deal including radars for which they've started a cooperation with Hensoldt.

Offered system is IRIS-T SLM "augmented" by IRIS-T SLS.

IRIS-T SLX in that article is portrayed as a "capability improvement under development".

thanks for answer...probbably SLX will be replacement for Patriots in future

 

[kato]

Somewhat doubtful, since Patriot also covers the lower-echelon tactical ABM layer with PAC-3 in Bundeswehr service - and SLX is "under development", hence not relevant to current procurement plans.

A current off-the-shelf possibility for Patriot upgrade, if seen as sufficiently needed, could be SkyCeptor as offered by Raytheon to Poland half a year ago. SkyCeptor integrates the Stunner missile from IAI's David's Sling into a Patriot battery for tactical ABM. Systemwise the Luftwaffe could augment this with SLM (or SLX) as was planned for MEADS.

 

[mariohot]

Somewhat doubtful, since Patriot also covers the lower-echelon tactical ABM layer with PAC-3 in Bundeswehr service - and SLX is "under development", hence not relevant to current procurement plans.

A current off-the-shelf possibility for Patriot upgrade, if seen as sufficiently needed, could be SkyCeptor as offered by Raytheon to Poland half a year ago. SkyCeptor integrates the Stunner missile from IAI's David's Sling into a Patriot battery for tactical ABM. Systemwise the Luftwaffe could augment this with SLM (or SLX) as was planned for MEADS.

Thanks,
Any information about LFK NG missile, or it is canceled definitelly?

 

[kato]

Definitely cancelled, and never went beyond an analysis phase that ended around 2010/2011.

For mobile low-layer air defense, i.e. its intended application, MBDA and Rheinmetall have instead been trying to sell MPCS with Mistral 3 to the Bundeswehr since 2016. In fact they're still advertising it specifically for the Bundeswehr.

The current concept in the Bundeswehr now places IRIS-T SLS at this layer.

 

[mariohot]

Definitely cancelled, and never went beyond an analysis phase that ended around 2010/2011.

For mobile low-layer air defense, i.e. its intended application, MBDA and Rheinmetall have instead been trying to sell MPCS with Mistral 3 to the Bundeswehr since 2016. In fact they're still advertising it specifically for the Bundeswehr.

The current concept in the Bundeswehr now places IRIS-T SLS at this layer.

makes sense......IRIS-T sls range is 12 km ....LFK NG range should be 10 km.......so it fits....but Rheinmetall has plan for mobileSkyranger air defence system which should be a C-RAM like IRon Dome...( well similar)

 

[Big_Zucchini]

The budget committee of parliament will discuss a proposal tomorrow in which the MoD seeks approval to buy 140 missiles for the five German IAI Eitan (Heron TP) drones for about 152 million Euro.

Do we have a source on that? Others say it's 140 drones, not missiles.

Turning to Israel, Germany to get weaponized drones for the first time

After years of debate, defense committee approves purchase of 140 Heron TP armed drones from Israel, in contract worth $165 million

www.timesofisrael.com

Both reports sound odd. Munitions worth over $1 million per drone including support? In Israel? Sounds unrealistic.

A single such advanced drone only $1 million? Also unrealistic.

 

[Vivendi]

Do we have a source on that? Others say it's 140 drones, not missiles.

Turning to Israel, Germany to get weaponized drones for the first time

After years of debate, defense committee approves purchase of 140 Heron TP armed drones from Israel, in contract worth $165 million

www.timesofisrael.com

Both reports sound odd. Munitions worth over $1 million per drone including support? In Israel? Sounds unrealistic.

A single such advanced drone only $1 million? Also unrealistic.

According to Ulrike it's 140 missiles:
Ulrike Franke on Twitter: "I can’t believe that this needs to be said, but no, the Bundeswehr is not getting 140 armed drones ‍. Germany is buying 140 missiles to arme its FIVE leased Heron TP drones." / Twitter

 

[kato]

Others say it's 140 drones, not missiles.

Yeah, there's a non-corrected press agency release that claims the "140 drones", it's fairly widespread by now. Most German press outlets have by now corrected it to either say "missile sets", "missiles" or outline the below specific numbers. Example: Verteidigungsausschuss: Bewaffnete Drohnen für die Bundeswehr

The actual order consists of:

• 60 inert training missiles, unit cost possibly 458,000 Euro
• 80 live missiles, unit cost possibly 477,000 Euro
• Simulator and training package - incl. infrastructure and conversion kits - for about 86.94 million Euro total

The third item has to be seen in the context that according to the public defense budget the total training costs - at IAF base Tel Nof - for Heron TP between 2018 and 2021 for the Bundeswehr were a combined 152.43 million.

The type of missile is unknown. In 2017 there was a consideration for 60 inert training missiles at nearly the same cost as above; the system was called "Jedi" at the time, and was rumoured to possibly be an adapted IMI Wip Shot (rather unlikely due to price differential though). Currently the armament is occasionally named as "Special Payload", but that's just the general IAF moniker for strike armament on UAVs.
For cost comparison, the above unit cost figures are by scale about the same level - a bit higher - as for current procurement of short-range AAM like IRIS-T or AIM-9X.

The defense committee approved the buy while stipulating conditions for their usage.

The Heron TP drones themselves are not owned by the Bundeswehr, but instead leased from Airbus subsidiary ADAS. The above training costs are due to ADAS also providing this jointly with the IAF. The Bundeswehr has options to expand the leased fleet to 6 or 7 aircraft, as well as to expand annual flight hours bought at the expense of cutting training.

 

[swerve]

That's something generally agreed upon in public.

It's also not always the rules per se but instead a combination of the below five issues:

• Funding rules resulting in trade-offs to get a certain procurement project through - there have always been members on the defense committee who, to paraphrase it, see themselves as representatives of their electoral district first.
• Defense industry actively lobbying to shape requirements in order to remove competition in order to be able to dictate prices.
• Functionality and requirement creep on the user side. Most largescale procurement projects are extremely affected by that.
• Sometimes questionable authoritative decisions by senior officials in favour of signing of certain contracts.
• Not strictly applying existing internal rules starting from legal review of contracts and going as far as not shifting personnel placed in "corruption-susceptible" posts every couple years.

The problem about it is also that perception within the armed forces runs a bit differently. Parliamentary budget control is seen primarily as a nuisance, predefining functional requirements and restricting yourself to those is seen as a hindrance, and working "around the rules" is a common sport in any public service anyway. And those are not even German peculiarities either.

Highlighted parts: all true of British procurement, sometimes at great cost. Look at the fiasco of our AFV procurement for the last 25 years, for example.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

The third item has to be seen in the context that according to the public defense budget the total training costs - at IAF base Tel Nof - for Heron TP between 2018 and 2021 for the Bundeswehr were a combined 152.43 million.

Holy something that's a very expensive training program!
Something tells me this isn't just ordinary training.

 

[kato]

Something to mention since procurement agency BAAInBw tweeted about it:

Deliveries of the first HX2 8x8 series trucks equipped with the IAC "Integrated Armored Cabin" and Supashock ALHS swap-body loading system for the Bundeswehr has begun.

The RMMV trucks are ordered in three variants within two framework contracts:

1. about 1,100 HX2 6x6 5-ton trucks (with an actual maximum payload of 9 tons)
2. about 2,200 HX2 8x8 15-ton trucks (with an actual maximum payload of 18 tons)
3. about 4,000 HX2 8x8 15-ton trucks with Supashock ALHS

Out of overall 7,271 vehicles available for call-up until 2027 about 1,862 seem to have been ordered and mostly delivered so far. The third item above includes an unknown number of vehicles equipped with the IAC "Integrated Armoured Cabin", so far about 40% of the 570 vehicles ordered from that one in 2020 have included the IAC.

The version with the regular cabin is called UTF (Ungeschütztes Transportfahrzeug - Unprotected Transport Vehicle) in the Bundeswehr. Overall deliveries started in 2019.

The HX2 8x8 trucks can use either the same swap-bodies as the 3rd generation MULTI (RMMV SX) trucks they replace or can carry standard ISO 20-foot containers. The ALHS trucks have the necessary equipment to switch these on their own, on the others you need a crane or forklift to switch them. Proportionally there is a wide shift towards such ALHS vehicles with the new generation - there were only about 500 MULTI.

The vehicles can be optionally equipped with a FLW100 RWS, default armament is a 7.62mm MG on standard ring mount. The current order from 2020 now being delivered will also all be equipped with the Rheinmetall ROSY smoke launcher system.

The only other significant users of HX series trucks with similar numbers of several thousand in service are Australia and the UK (although for the UK that seems to be mostly HX1, not HX2). The Supashock ALHS system the vehicles are equipped with was developed in Australia.


In the Bundeswehr - unlike in other countries - the RMMV HX2 trucks will not be the only vehicles of their specification or load class. There is a parallel new framework contract with Iveco for 8x8 Iveco Trakker trucks, adding up to 1,048 new trucks between 2021 and 2028 to an existing fleet of about 2,000 vehicles. The RMMV vehicles will primarily be used in logistics while the Iveco vehicles are used in various military carrier functionalities (transporting specific equipment).
There are additionally about 3,000 "partially militarized" trucks of similar size (Iveco Eurocargo and MAN TGA are common) in service that were bought over the last 15 years and are owned by national company BwFuhrParkService leasing them to the Bundeswehr. These are not being replaced by UTF.

 

[kato]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1510950181822472199

The army has recently tested THeMIS UGVs from Estonian company Milrem under arctic conditions - at up to -30°C - in Norway during exercise Ice Crystal 2022.

It's part of a longer series of tests of off-the-shelf UGV from a number of companies under a variety of conditions - e.g. in woods or urban terrain. This was apparently the first participation in a regular live exercise of the 231st Mountain Infantry Battalion.

UGVs in the Bundeswehr are notionally envisioned as future mobility assets for heavy weapons platoons of medium infantry companies, i.e. to facilitate transport of 40mm GMW and Spike LR launchers for dismounted use by fire support squads, in addition to auxiliary cargo functions in constrained terrain (evacing wounded, moving in ammunition etc).
Possible future procurement is typically cited at 200+ of this size class (500+ kg payload) around 2027. The Bundeswehr owns a single THeMIS itself for such tests since 2019, which was used here.