German Navy

[Redlands18]

possibilities that germany will establish permament military base on far east and indo-pacific region? in future

While i am no expert on Germany, i would think that to be highly unlikely. This is probably more about Germany helping to ensure Trade Routes stay open and free of interference then any willingness to fight a war in the Indo-Pacific region. And where would they build a permanent Military Base?

 

[mariohot]

While i am no expert on Germany, i would think that to be highly unlikely. This is probably more about Germany helping to ensure Trade Routes stay open and free of interference then any willingness to fight a war in the Indo-Pacific region. And where would they build a permanent Military Base?

in australia

 

[Redlands18]

in australia

Ahhh no, Australia is not open to the idea of permanent foreign Military bases. If we won’t allow our most important Ally to open one then Germany would have no chance.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

Ahhh no, Australia is not open to the idea of permanent foreign Military bases. If we won’t allow our most important Ally to open one then Germany would have no chance.

If im not wrong the USMC has a permanent presence with at least 1200 marines in North-Australia (Darwin). But i dont know if they have an own base, maybe they are stationed in an Australian base.

 

[Redlands18]

If im not wrong the USMC has a permanent presence with at least 1200 marines in North-Australia (Darwin). But i dont know if they have an own base, maybe they are stationed in an Australian base.

Thats a annual Trg detachment that last for 6 months from April to October, its not a permanent Military base.

 

[kato]

While i am no expert on Germany, i would think that to be highly unlikely. This is probably more about Germany helping to ensure Trade Routes stay open and free of interference then any willingness to fight a war in the Indo-Pacific region. And where would they build a permanent Military Base?

The mission is about showing the flag in the context of Germany's new Indo-Pacific strategy outline published last september. You can find that one here - now available in English too (3 MB PDF linked at the bottom - 72 pages in total).

The relevant part here is mentioned on page 15:

The Federal Government will step up its security policy engagement in the Indo-Pacific. To this end, it will [...] expand security and defence cooperation in the region together with its partners. This may include attending security policy forums, taking part in exercises in the region, elaborating joint evacuation plans, seconding liaison officers and various forms of maritime presence.

The mission - sending a frigate to the Indo-Pacific region - was originally planned in 2020, before the guidelines were published. It was planned to send F220 Hamburg on a cruise of:

1. La Reunion : taking part in the biannual "Indian Ocean Naval Symposium" (Germany is an observer there, France was host nation for 2020)
2. Indian Ocean : activating DEFRAM/FNFA joint German-French flotilla for exercises in the Indian Ocean
3. visiting various ports around the Indian Ocean on the way to Australia : holding joint exercises with national navies in the area

In timewise planning, this was to have been a 5-month cruise - and the Indo-Pacific Policy still being discussed was likely to be published while the ship was in the region, thus making it a very strong signal.
The cruise however was postponed due to the pandemic - the IONS meeting for 2020 (the main "reason" the cruise was planned around in the first place) was also postponed to December and then hosted by India, largely virtual through video conference.

The cruise now this year is somewhat adapted to the already published Indo-Pacific Policy in shifting its focus on to the western Pacific. The exact route was highly controversial and a subject of heatened discussion in the government coalition and between different parts of the cabinet in February; in particular the possibility of a port visit in China and the political repercussions of either planning one or leaving it out was debated. The route as decided in early march will decidedly not involve Germany in any sort of FONOPs but will also not make a port visit in China.

 

[mariohot]

The mission is about showing the flag in the context of Germany's new Indo-Pacific strategy outline published last september. You can find that one here - now available in English too (3 MB PDF linked at the bottom - 72 pages in total).

The relevant part here is mentioned on page 15:


The mission - sending a frigate to the Indo-Pacific region - was originally planned in 2020, before the guidelines were published. It was planned to send F220 Hamburg on a cruise of:

1. La Reunion : taking part in the biannual "Indian Ocean Naval Symposium" (Germany is an observer there, France was host nation for 2020)
2. Indian Ocean : activating DEFRAM/FNFA joint German-French flotilla for exercises in the Indian Ocean
3. visiting various ports around the Indian Ocean on the way to Australia : holding joint exercises with national navies in the area

In timewise planning, this was to have been a 5-month cruise - and the Indo-Pacific Policy still being discussed was likely to be published while the ship was in the region, thus making it a very strong signal.
The cruise however was postponed due to the pandemic - the IONS meeting for 2020 (the main "reason" the cruise was planned around in the first place) was also postponed to December and then hosted by India, largely virtual through video conference.

The cruise now this year is somewhat adapted to the already published Indo-Pacific Policy in shifting its focus on to the western Pacific. The exact route was highly controversial and a subject of heatened discussion in the government coalition and between different parts of the cabinet in February; in particular the possibility of a port visit in China and the political repercussions of either planning one or leaving it out was debated. The route as decided in early march will decidedly not involve Germany in any sort of FONOPs but will also not make a port visit in China.

very clear, but as all western powers are shifting their policies toward indo-pacific region, it is expected that all western powers will estabvlish some sort of permanent presence in this region, we are not talking about fighting a war, but permanent showing the flag,

 

[kato]

Ahhh no, Australia is not open to the idea of permanent foreign Military bases. If we won’t allow our most important Ally to open one then Germany would have no chance.

P.S. on that:

If there would ever be a "permanent german presence" in the area - or a semi-permanent one, say regular rotations - there's about a 90% chance it would be based out of Noumea. And merely of a supplementary, not autonomous nature. Not that i see such a presence as either mandated by current policy nor required in any form nor likely to happen in any form within the foreseeable future.

Beyond providing existing infrastructure Noumea fulfills relevant defense-related provisions, in particular with regard to Art 42 TEU.

Also, well...

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1214853522145103872

Soldiers of JgBtl 292, part of the Brigade Franco-Allemande, have relatively recently trained at the Centre d'Instruction Nautique Commando de la Nouvelle-Calédonie.

 

[kato]

Second PS:

The planned air force deployment to Australia will be part of Australian Exercise Pitch Black 2022. It's planned to deploy several Eurofighters and a A330 MRTT to the exercise for several weeks. As of January details were still under discussion between Germany and Australia.
It has also been explicitly mentioned by the government that the exercise participation occurs on the basis of the new Indo-Pacific policy.

The last Air Force deployment to Australia was in November 2020, when a new A350 for the Air Force was long-range tested by performing a nonstop flight from Cologne to Canberra. It continued from Canberra on to Papeete in Polynésie française, and from there flew nonstop back to Germany for a round-the-world trip. The trip was performed for crew training.

 

[ngatimozart]

very clear, but as all western powers are shifting their policies toward indo-pacific region, it is expected that all western powers will estabvlish some sort of permanent presence in this region, we are not talking about fighting a war, but permanent showing the flag,

Permanent European bases may not be welcomed in the region. Some nations have dark memories of European colonialism. I also can't see Germany funding a base in the Indo Pacific because it doesn't exactly lavish its military with funds. To be honest showing the flag means nothing. If you want to do that you can sail a warship around the region every 5 years or so.

If you are going to permanently deploy forces here then they have to have a good reason. Showing the flag isn't one because it reeks of colonialism and we've had 600 years of that in the region. Are you going to deploy your forces here as part of a security accord with a friendly nation or group of nations within the region? Will you come to their aid if they are attacked? If not, why not?

There are lots of things to consider.

 

[Systems Adict]

very clear, but as all western powers are shifting their policies toward indo-pacific region, it is expected that all western powers will estabvlish some sort of permanent presence in this region, we are not talking about fighting a war, but permanent showing the flag,

Just to put my tuppance worth into this topic.

WHY do you "expect" (which I read to mean believe), that Western powers want to maintain bases in the indo-pacific region ?

Most (but not all), countries in the region are well established / relatively stable & when looking at the creation / expansion of their own Military forces, they often host foreign nations in reciprocal training activities. There will also be local treaties within the area /National laws in place to prevent Western countries from making such provocative moves, not least that Western powers do not generally have the ability to undertake such activities, due to funding constraints, or their own laws.

Naturally, some nations have Embassies & staff in countries in the region, but again, these are token facilities, controlled by numerous global rules & legislation (e.g. United Nations), to prevent one Western nation being too influential / controlling over one in the indo-pacific region.

Just because western countries are being 'active' in the region doesn't mean that they want to put 'boots on the ground'.

From a 'Global perspective', the largest nations that wield the most 'power', are often considered nations to be 'observed' & the recent shift in policy by the West to look at China is something that has taken several decades to start the wheels turning, based on the growth of their Military forces & the production of land / exercising rights to claim areas in the South China sea as 'sovereign soil'.

As stated in the comments above, there are lots of things to consider & just because one nation is taking part in activities in the region, doesn't mean that they want a permanent base ?

SA

 

[spoz]

P.S.:

While crossing the South China Sea it has been confirmed that Bayern will avoid any Chinese territorial waters (while reaffirming support for the UN interpretation of the Philipino 200-nm zone).

I’m intrigued by that statement- it’s going to be a fine line to walk. Anything that in any way can be seen to recognise the disputed Chinese claims in the SCS or ECS, even implicitly, is going to be doing a disservice to the other littoral states and to the cause of rule by law. OTOH, the Chinese view is that it’s “mine, all mine” and anything which in any way runs counter to that will be regarded by them as unfriendly. Germany may be faced with a decision as to whose side it is really on in a zero sum game.

 

[kato]

Anything that in any way can be seen to recognise the disputed Chinese claims in the SCS or ECS, even implicitly, is going to be doing a disservice to the other littoral states

The Indo-Pacific Policy lays out a position that with regard to China Germany and Europe basically need to form their own approach and not get dragged into the evolving US-Chinese dualism. There is no "whose side" to be on, especially when it comes to countries with whom relations on a political-diplomatic level aren't any better than with China.

There are indeed voices in Germany as well that seek a closer position to the US position - mostly the rightwing-hawk, pro-american-led ministry of defence - but these are in contrast to the position of Germany as a whole. Performing FONOPs was never a question in the debate - it's something we don't do. The question debated here was whether the ship should make a port visit in China, or whether leaving such out - especially given past port visits - would be considered an insult to China.

The overall topic is highly problematic in public discourse since US propaganda outlets (such as VoA or "unnamed US DOD spokesmen" in other press) are - in particular recently - actively interpreting virtually any European action in the area as "supporting the US position". This includes this particular German mission already by the way.

Likely in this regard the Navy will be closely watching the current transition of Jeanne d'Arc 21 (French LHD Tonnerre and escorting frigate Surcouf) who are making their way through the South China Sea similarly in a few weeks (and in their case from Haiphong, Vietnam, no less) and which is taking a similarly avoiding path - such as not passing through the Taiwan Strait - on their way to Sasebo. On the way back - around May/June or so - they are planned to pretty much run through Filipino territorial waters only along the contested area.

 

[spoz]

As an Australian whose country is both a liberal democracy in an increasingly anti democratic world and one which is currently experiencing China’s displeasure because we dared to seek an independent assessment of how COVID started; and who sees China’s increasing use of debt diplomacy in the small states of the Pacific; and watches with concern its ignoring of international norms in both ECS and SCS, I’m not sure I can agree that there is not a side to take.

 

[mariohot]

As an Australian whose country is both a liberal democracy in an increasingly anti democratic world and one which is currently experiencing China’s displeasure because we dared to seek an independent assessment of how COVID started; and who sees China’s increasing use of debt diplomacy in the small states of the Pacific; and watches with concern its ignoring of international norms in both ECS and SCS, I’m not sure I can agree that there is not a side to take.

agree, there will be moment when you have to decide do you want to support only trade issues without asking anythnig else or there is something else to ask China

 

[kato]

I’m not sure I can agree that there is not a side to take.

Politics, in particular on an international level, are not a black-and-white affair or limited to single vs global issues, regardless of how much some people want it to be that easy for their convenience.

Or, to quote from the foreword of the German Indo-Pacific Policy guidelines linked above:

All Indo-Pacific concepts allude to the rules-based international order. They differ, however, in terms of their objectives, emphasis on different policy
fields, the importance they ascribe to multilateral approaches and, above all, with respect to the question of China’s involvement as a regional and emerging world power that, to some extent, calls the rules of the international order into question.

and, more importantly, with some bolding:

At the same time, the pandemic has reinforced trends that were already apparent beforehand. These include Asia’s growing economic and
political importance and the increasing strategic rivalry between the US and China.
[...]
The prosperity of our society depends on open shipping routes, physical and digital connectivity and participation in functioning growth markets. A new bipolarity with fresh dividing lines across the Indo-Pacific would undermine these interests. Instead, we need to further diversify our relations with the region – both geographically and with respect to our policy agenda.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

France has offered to lease 4 ATL2 to Germany for an unknown price.

If chosen, in comparison to other solutions this would bring Germany and France in line time-wise for MAWS as a successor project.

Yes.

France offers Germany four Atlantic 2 maritime patrol aircraft

The French Armed Forces Ministry has offered four Breguet Atlantic 2 planes to plug a looming gap in the German Navy’s anti-submarine capabilities, provided that Berlin springs for modernizing the planes.

www.defensenews.com

France and Germany waited both too long with developing the future Maritime Airborne Warfare System.

 

[ngatimozart]

Yes.

France offers Germany four Atlantic 2 maritime patrol aircraft

The French Armed Forces Ministry has offered four Breguet Atlantic 2 planes to plug a looming gap in the German Navy’s anti-submarine capabilities, provided that Berlin springs for modernizing the planes.

www.defensenews.com

France and Germany waited both too long with developing the future Maritime Airborne Warfare System.

Agree. They should have started this project 10 years ago, as soon as the USN said that it was retiring its P-3s. They just might have got the Norwegian order and a couple of other Euro ones as well.

 

[kato]

There's plans to replace the larger 1000-ton Schwedeneck class of three ships at WTD71 as well within the next few years - for about 137 million, although that's not proceeded far enough to fall into the current stimulus package. There were previously considerations to outsource WTD71's fleet to external contractors instead, mostly when FDP was still a part of the government.

Overall Plans for the trials boat fleet renewal in this regard are, based on an March 2020 news article and April 2020 inquiry answer from the government:

• two new STS "Security, Transport and Tug" boats (20m length) for 13 million Euro (tender started in 2019)
• four new SVK "Sea Trials, Coast" boats (50m length) for 60 million Euro by 2023 (tender for two started in 2020, third option to be bought from Corona Aid, fourth not secured yet)
• six new SVS "Sea Trials, Sea" boats (65m length) for 420 million Euro (!) by 2025 (not tendered out yet)

- The 20m STS class would replace three existing Type 743 workboats (AM6, AM7, AM8) bought in 1971 that do general duties in e.g. towing target ships or placing materials or supporting ships and divers in trials at sea. Third vessel is considered superfluous and for the old workboats is only maintained due to downtime stemming from age.

- Four boats of the 65m SVS class would be assigned to the Navy in general, not WTD71. These would be a direct replacement of the four Type 905 Todendorf class security boats (29m length) used to secure the Putlos coastal training grounds on the sea side against civilian ships and maritime mammals. For the purpose SVS is probably quite a bit oversized, so there may be new duties involved here as well.

- Two boats of the 65m SVS class would replace two Type 748 Schwedeneck class vessels (57m length). These larger trials boats are in recent years regularly deployed to e.g. Norway to assist in German trials there, hence procuring a similar-sized, slightly larger class for such purposes.

- The four 50m SVK class vessels would replace a third vessel of the Type 748 Schwedeneck class, the two boats of the Type 745 Stollergrund class (39m length) and the trials boat Wilhelm Pullwer (32m length, built 1966) with a unitary, relatively cheap class of ships.

Of the replaced classes one Schwedeneck, one Todendorf and two Stollergrund were previously decommissioned and sold. These serve with the Lebanese Navy (the Todendorf as a patrol boat), the Israeli Navy (a Stollergrund as a trials boat) and demilitarized for two civilian research institutes in Germany and Israel (the Schwedeneck and a Stollergrund). In general these three classes, built around late 80s to mid 90s, are still considered worthwhile ships, although they're getting a bit old.

The only other ship that WTD71 runs in its "Maritime Support Center" outside of these replacement classes is the large trials ship Planet, a 3,850-ton SWATH vessel built in 2005. Any other boats - there's some workboats for survey work - will be cut.

The sizes chosen for SVK and SVS as well as the strong hints of basing it off available commercial designs and the inhouse experience with Planet suggest to me a possible relatively straightforward buy of SWATH vessels from Abeking & Rasmussen with possible competition from TKMS. A&R has sold three 61m SWATHs and a 50m SWATH as pilot baseships, TKMS has sold two 49m SWATHs to customs (run with the borderguard). Size- and tonnage-wise this would present a massive jump from previous fleets btw, we'd be talking 2,000-ton vessels here.

The two "fleets" of WTD71 and Putlos are usually not mentioned in line-ups of the German Navy, but have traditionally been earmarked in a wartime reserve role as patrol boats since the 70s. In regular service the ships are unarmed (outside Planet's torpedo launchers).

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

Agree. They should have started this project 10 years ago, as soon as the USN said that it was retiring its P-3s. They just might have got the Norwegian order and a couple of other Euro ones as well.

Germany Seemingly Selects P-8A Poseidon Over ATL2 As ‘Interim’ Replacement For P-3C MPA

Well, ive have the feeling that this isnt a "temporary stop-gap solution" at all. Such an acquisition you make for at least 30 years.

Germany Seemingly Selects P-8A Poseidon over ATL2 as 'Interim' Replacement for P-3C MPA - Naval News

According to official documents, Parliamentary State Secretary Thomas Silberhorn, the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) would have selected the Boeing P-8A Poseidon as an interim solution to the replacement of the soon to be retired P-3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft of the German Navy.

www.navalnews.com