Fantasy discussion on Next Gen SAF platforms & Systems

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 4: Sentinel-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels — Options for Ramming

1. The new Maritime Security and Response Flotilla has 4 former Fearless-class patrol vessels (refurbished and re-inducted into service), known as Sentinel-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels (MSRVs). These will operate beside two Maritime Security and Response Tugboats (MSRTs) to enable more calibrated responses, in a troubled peace scenario.

2. In addition to refitting the vessels to extend their operational lifespan, the Sentinel-class MSRVs will be installed with a range of calibrated capabilities. This includes a Long Range Acoustic Device and Laser Dazzler System to allow crew to project verbal warnings and issue visual warnings; a Typhoon Mk 25mm Gun, a 76mm OTO Melara Gun and a 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun; and fenders that enable the ship to come alongside vessels to be boarded. The installation of a fender system and modular ballistics protection, will be really useful to deter against future Malaysian intrusions.

Name	Pennant Number
MSRV Sentinel	55
MSRV Guardian	56
MSRV Protector	57
MSRV Bastion	58

3. MSRV Sentinel and MSRV Guardian will enter into operational service on 26 Jan 2021, while MSRV Protector and MSRV Bastion will be refurbished and operationalised in the coming months.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1354078781867253762

• Once a navy engages in ramming as a tactic against an aggressor, we must be prepared that the aggressor will shoot back, just as the North Koreans did on 15 June 1999 and on 29 June 2002. South Korean patrol boat PKM-357 (Chamsuri-class vessel) succumbed to damage and sank in the 2002 battle — with 6 killed and 18 wounded — when it was hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup.

• I note that for Korea, the replacement for the Chamsuri-class is the Yun Youngha-class missile patrol vessel or PKX-A(PKG), that is armed with 4 ASCMs. Even the PKX-B variant includes 130 mm guided rockets on the stern, on top of a 76mm main gun. If any aggressor shoots at any Singapore patrol vessel, the aggressor must know the redline has been crossed and an ASCM is on the way to destroy the aggressor’s vessel — our naval platform mix must have escalation dominance.

4. This is Singapore’s very own Geobukseon (Korean Turtle ship used to fight invaders), after the 2018 incident — Singapore's Ministry of Defence even released a video showing the Republic of Singapore Navy and Singapore's Police Coast Guard issuing warnings to Malaysian government vessels in Singapore waters.

5. The Geobukseon and Korea’s Admiral Yi Sun-sin might be unknown to the majority of people outside of Asia; IMHO, the Malaysian buoy-laying vessel - the Jabatan Laut Polaris, that intruded in 2018 will pushed, shouldered or rammed, the next time the Malaysians try to intrude again, and this is a not-very-subtle message: "We will fight you, and we will win."

 

[CheeZe]

The MSRF will operate new purpose-built vessels from 2026. The future purpose-built vessels are still in the early stages of concept design. They are expected to be larger than the Sentinel-class MSRVs and have longer endurance to operate at sea for up to a few weeks. Additionally, these vessels will be designed for lean manning with modular capabilities.

Will those purpose-built vessels operate alongside of or replace the Sentinel-class?

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 4: Sentinel-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels — Options for Ramming

6. These Geobukseon like Bolt-on ballistic armour panels on the Sentinel-class MSRVs can come close quickly to land a boarding team or prevent the enemy from achieving their objective. The next Malaysian vessel that intrudes will take physical damage trying to get into position. As Collin Koh explains “in a maritime standoff with opposing naval or MLE forces this modification helps when there’s shouldering involved, so that the MSRV won’t suffer damages similar to that of USS Yorktown after being bumped by Soviet frigate Bezzavetny in Black Sea in 1988.” MLE stands for Maritime Law Enforcement.

7. The MSRF will operate new purpose-built vessels from 2026. The future purpose-built vessels are still in the early stages of concept design. They are expected to be larger than the Sentinel-class MSRVs and have longer endurance to operate at sea for up to a few weeks. Additionally, these vessels will be designed for lean manning with modular capabilities.

Will those purpose-built vessels operate alongside of or replace the Sentinel-class?

8. Based on previous announcements, the 4 new ships being built are to replace the Sentinel-class. The Singapore Navy can’t hire and retain enough people, which is why only 12 RSN crewed vessels and 2 tug boats are allocated for maritime security — whose main role is to deter terrorists from the sea (and not just deter Malaysia, which if successful is an ancillary goal).

9. The two Maritime Security and Response Tugboats are on long term lease, and I am sure British ramming or shouldering tactics from the 3rd Cod War was studied before deciding to bring in tugboats into the force structure, which was used extensively by the British.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 2: Is this an attempt at generating propaganda or based in intelligence accessments?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1431528036856307715

1. Thankfully some Ministers, like Dr Ng, are building bridges and making the SAF relevant; to externalise Singapore’s security concerns with regard to a change of government in Malaysia. As a small country, it is in our interest to get along with Malaysia. I believe that Singapore’s security will be improved if all our Ministers were more focused on what they need to do, instead of trying to scare up a bogey man, unless they have actual intelligence on Malaysian plans for more hostility at 2018 levels.

2. The United States Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2019 stated that Malaysia remained a “source, transit point, and, to a significantly lesser extent, destination country for terrorist groups including ISIS, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), al-Qa’ida, and Jemaah Islamiya.”

​

(a) I wish Malaysia to be more serious about counter-terror cooperation in the region. In 2016, Malaysia suffered from an immigration scandal when the immigration department sacked and suspended officers who caused deliberate lapses in its security system. As many as 37 officers were found guilty of interfering with the Malaysian Immigration System (MyIMMs). The MyIMMs is linked to Interpol’s I-Checkit system to enable authorities to verify within seconds if a passport had been reported lost or stolen. The system was deliberately switched off in two major international airports in Kuala Lumpur. When this happened, passports were stamped manually, and as a result, travelers were able to evade security and passport authenticity screenings​

(b) The 9/11 Commission Report also highlighted the fact that in 1999, four of the 9/11 attackers — Tawfiq bin Attash (Khallad), Abu Bara al-Yemeni, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Khalid al-Mihdhar — had been sent to Kuala Lumpur before heading for the United States. Apart from making Malaysia merely a transit point, two of them stayed longer to study “airport security and conduct casing flights” (flights to determine targets).​

(c) The Vibes (an overseas safety information posted on Japan's embassy in Malaysia), urged Japanese citizens to avoid visiting places that are "easily targeted by terrorism." While the warning was issued to Japan nationals in Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar, if I were in Indonesia, Malaysia or the Philippines, it pays to be just a little more careful. According to the alert, these places include "western-related" facilities, such as restaurants, hotels, and tourist facilities.​

I find the idea that NSmen don't have enough bullets to shoot due to budgetary reasons while the SAF can afford a quartet of F-35s to be sad yet hilarious.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1431525324303441920

3. Ministers in Singapore say and do things that make you go, why? I see that often. It so ridiculous — it’s a video upload of military training in Malaysia — it is perfectly normal for the Malaysian Army to conduct training to seize choke points like bridges.

4. Unless the minister explains with involved reasoning, the solution is to laugh along with our Malaysian friends at these Singaporean Ministers who seem not sincere. Just as deterrence relies on mutual understanding, so is peace. The peaceful people to people relations is not to be taken for granted.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 2: Is this an attempt at generating propaganda or based in intelligence accessments?

5. In Oct 2018, Malaysia Transport Minister Anthony Loke declared that “the altered port limits of Johor Bahru are in Malaysia’s territorial sea and it is well within Malaysia’s right to draw any port limit in our territorial sea in accordance with our national laws.” Following this declaration, by Dec 2018, as part of their luminal warfare plan, Malaysian vessels started daily intrusions into Singapore’s Tuas port limits (which they now claim) and one Malaysian vessel was even involved in a collision with a merchant vessel. In response, Foreign Minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, stated that Singapore is not afraid to use “sharp elbows” to defend its national interests. He also suggested it was unlikely that the spat would be over soon. Even after the airspace concessions, Singapore cancelled a meeting to discuss joint border developments in protest against Johor’s Chief Minister, Osman Sapian, for posting a photo on Facebook of himself aboard a Malaysian vessel in Singaporean waters the day after the foreign ministers met.

6. On 11 Sep 2021, Rodzi Md Saad, Malaysia’s director general of Majlis Keselamatan Negara Malaysia (MKN), as a VIP paid a visit to Malaysia’s Abu Baka Maritime Base — opposite the formerly disputed Petra Branca — in an AW-139 helicopter (9M-PMD). Nothing wrong with a Malaysian VIP visiting their own base, right? Except for a minor detail on this 9-11 visit. The Royal Malaysia Police helicopter, 9M-PMD, flew over Pulau Tekong’s air space for about 2 minutes — which is home to Singapore’s Basic Military Training Centre.

​

(a) Flight tracking data shared by Alert 5 and Mike Yeo showed that the Malaysian helicopter deliberately crossed into Singapore airspace. Even if the Malaysian pilots had ignored the suite of modern navigation systems in 9M-PMD and flown by pure visual flight rules, according to Mike Yeo’s calculations, the Malaysians would have seen they were flying across the median line of the Johor Strait and over land, at Pulau Tekong. They were intruders flying at 170-180km/h in Singapore air space for about 2 minutes — a typical micro-aggression to test the RSAF’s reaction time and find out more about our ROEs and TTPs.​

​

(b) Singapore scrambled 2 F-16s armed with AIM-9Xs and AIM-120-C7s around 9.20am, Singapore time, when 9M-PMD flew over Pulau Tekong. The RSAF’s air sovereignty fighters had about 4.5 minutes of reaction time (from the time the AW139 changed course 13 km away from our borders) and when they reached Pulau Tekong/Singapore airspace. Given that the total reaction time from change of direction to departure was 6.5 minutes — I understand why the AW139 helicopter did not get a verbal warning.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1436712252963385344

7. 100% justified that the RSAF scrambled F-16s on Saturday morning (Sep 11) in response to "a potential air threat", as the Ministry of Defence said. The scramble was due to 9M-PMD actually crossing into (and not merely approaching) Singapore airspace. "After ensuring that our security was not compromised, we stood down our aircraft," said a ministry spokesperson. This was response to queries about a report of a Malaysian police helicopter that flew into Singapore airspace. The spokesperson did not provide details of the "potential air threat". I see Malaysian attempts at mis-direction on what they do wrong onto others as being not only unhelpful but destructive of trust.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1437253700997636108

8. It’s disappointing to watch the Malaysian officials and some of their citizens lying, when the RSAF had a firing solution via a radar track of 9M-PMD. In this case, it is reasonable for the RSAF to elect not to fire a SAM missile at the Malaysians for this 2 minute long intrusion on 9-11, without conducting a visual intercept.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 4: C-130H Replacement options in context of contingencies or the Malayan Campaign

1. As WWII has shown, a good defence plan for Malaya (against the then external Japanese invasion from the north) from should start at the appropriate geographical choke point in Thai territory (see Appendix 2 for Map of the opening blows in the Pointer Monograph on page 64). The Imperial Japanese Army landed in Thai territory and proceed to march south. There is also a Pointer Monograph on the mistakes in the Malayan Campaign, including a chapter on operational art shortcomings by LTC (NS) Singh and I quote A/P Farrell from the Monograph below:

"The only conceivable scenario in which the 21st century SAF will be fighting on its own is the direct defence of Singapore itself in circumstances where Singapore’s allies are unwilling, or unable, to assist its defence. SAF operations in Cambodia and East Timor were part of larger multi-national efforts and we must assume this will remain the more likely scenario for a long time to come.​

​

The defence and fall of Malaya and Singapore provide a stark if general warning in this respect. Defeat was probably unavoidable for the British Empire in Malaya after the fall of France in 1940, certainly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. But disaster, the rapid and humiliating collapse of the defence on the mainland, need not have happened.​

​

One important reason why it did was the failure of the defenders, especially Malaya Command, to manage the inherent problems of fighting as a coalition. The frustration and pressure of retreat and defeat naturally magnified those problems. Inter- operability in all respects, including moral and psychological, spells the difference between victory and defeat in coalition operations. The SAF must learn to work effectively with foreign partners, just as they must learn to work with it. Finger pointing based on national differences, once started, can be impossible to stop."​

2. In page 58, of Tim Huxely's book (Defending the Lion City), he said:

"For example, from the late 1970s MINDEF developed plans for contingencies which might have arisen from the presence of Soviet forces in Vietnam, such as Soviet air attacks in retaliation for any Singaporeans intervention in defence of Thailand, or in the event of a wider conflict between rival super-power-led coalitions."​

3. This was a huge concern when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978. At that time, Singapore and Thailand were wondering if the Vietnamese would continue further south.

4. Fast forward to 2021, Singapore needs to replace its C-130s which it operates (i.e. 10 very old aircraft). For the SAF to work effectively with foreign partners, it must have the tools to fly in our vehicles into theatre. The leading contenders are:

​

(a) LM KC-130T/J — it can carry six 463L pallets, or 92 ground troops or 64 paratroopers and equipment;​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1441463441873571841

​

(b) Airbus A400Ms— it can carry nine 463L pallets and 54 passengers, or 116 paratroopers, or 37 tons of oversized equipment; or​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1441315943603335171

​

(c) KHI C-2s — it can carry eight 463L pallets, passengers, or paratroopers, or 32 tons of oversized equipment (and still fly at 0.8 mach & pull 2.5G).​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1444829443466268674

 

[STURM]

Interestingly Huxley in his book does not mention a large ammo/spares reserve in Thailand in which the U S, Malaysia, Singapore contributed to. The idea was that the RTA would be able to use this reserve in the event the Vietnamese crossed the Cambodian border.

I have only found a single reference to this reserve, in a paper written by an academic on ASEAN cooperation. We now know that the Vietnamese had no intention of venturing out of Camodia but the possibility was taken very seriously by Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. According to a former General I spoke to many years ago, there was a tacit understanding between the MAF and SAF that in the event of trouble, the SAF would cross the causeway and head up north to jointly defend the border.

You might find this interesting.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 4: C-130H Replacement options in context of contingencies or the Malayan Campaign

Interestingly Huxley in his book does not mention a large ammo/spares reserve in Thailand in which the U S, Malaysia, Singapore contributed to.

5. It makes sense; as the people Tim Huxley interviewed in the SAF could not say anything about it due to OSA.

The idea was that the RTA would be able to use this reserve in the event the Vietnamese crossed the Cambodian border.

6. Agreed. LKY also wrote in his memoirs that China, the United States, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand spent more than US$1.3 billion in a largely secret program in the 1980s to support Khmer Rouge and non-Communist guerrillas in Cambodia fighting Vietnamese troops and allied Cambodian forces. Only LKY can write it (as no one will dare to apply OSA on him) — Mindef will just declassify the relevant docs needed as part of his staff’s fact checking process for his memoir.

7. The Khmer Rouge was driven from Phnom Penh by a Vietnamese-led invasion in January 1979 after a reign of terror and forced labor that lasted nearly four years and killed more than 1 million people. The administration of President Ronald Reagan was persuaded to support the ultimately successful effort to get Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia in September 1989 so that elections under United Nations supervision could be held.

8. If we had the A400M, it will really speed up delivery of troops to the forward defence line in Thailand or increase our capability to deliver aid to the Philippines or Indonesia for HADR missions. I continue to hope that the SAF will examine it as an option for the C-130 replacement. In 1989, I was flown up to Thailand in a Charlie, just before my birthday; which was spent working on our mission plan — the SAF was committed to defending Thailand as ASEAN’s frontline state at that time.

I have only found a single reference to this reserve, in a paper written by an academic on ASEAN cooperation.

We now know that the Vietnamese had no intention of venturing out of Camodia but the possibility was taken very seriously by Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. According to a former General I spoke to many years ago, there was a tacit understanding between the MAF and SAF that in the event of trouble, the SAF would cross the causeway and head up north to jointly defend the border.

You might find this interesting.

9. Thank you so much for sharing. I continue to believe that the SAF and MAF will work together to help each other, or to engage in the common defence of West Malaysia — as a threat to Malaysia is a threat to Singapore.

​

(a) On 28 Dec 2014, Malaysia requested Singapore's water purification capabilities to assist in the flood relief efforts in Kelantan. 34 SAF personnel, 4 Civil Defence Force personnel and one PUB chemist, was flown by RSAF C-130Hs to the flood-hit areas — this assistance reduced the risk of waterborne diseases and improved access to clean water.​

​

(b) I continue to believe that if any Malaysian PM calls for help, the SAF will be given permission to help. The 29th edition of the annual bilateral maritime exercise, Exercise Malapura, was successfully held from 20 to 27 Sep 2021. Ships participating in the exercise included RSS Stalwart (with an embarked S-70B), and two Victory-class missiles corvettes, RSS Vigilance and RSS Vigour. Malaysia participated with a Lekiu-class frigate (KD Lekiu), a Kasturi-class corvette (KD Lekir), a Handalan-class corvette (KD Handalan) and a Super Lynx helicopter.​

​

(c) The enduring importance of the FPDA was on display, when personnel from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom) took part in:​

​

(i) Exercise Bersama Gold 2021 (XBG21) that was held from 4 to 18 Oct 2021 (traditionally known as Exercise Bersama Lima), XBG21 will see the participation of 2,600 personnel, 10 ships, one submarine, six maritime helicopters, three maritime patrol aircraft, 25 fighter aircraft, two support aircraft, and one command and control aircraft.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1445350191318528008

​

(ii) Exercise Suman Warrior was held (online) on 5 to 14 July 2021. The Defence Chiefs also welcomed that the FPDA will continue to boost its transparency through the formalisation of its observer programme, which provides the opportunity for regional countries, like Indonesia, to understand and observe major exercises. These efforts will ensure the FPDA maintains its relevance and effectiveness in supporting peace and security in this region.​

​

(d) The Warrior CSP is gone, Ajax, is not fixable (and even if it was won't see unit service before 2025), and the Boxer production is too slow under current delivery plans — the British Army has managed to go over 20 years without buying any new AFVs, or even upgrading old ones seriously. While Singapore continues to give lip-service to the FPDA, certain facts have changed, including the long term loss of British AFV capability. The British Army has gone from being able to deploy:​

​

(i) a corps (of 60k) in 1989;​

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(ii) a division (of 12k) in 2009;​

​

(iii) to less than a brigade minus (of 4.5k) in 2021.​

​

 

[STURM]

Ken Conboy in his "Cambodia"s Wars" writes about the assistance provided to the Kkmer resistance. Unlike Malaysia which only provided non lethal aid, Singapore provided weapons, including Carl Gustav. A number of Khmers who completed training in Malaysia were also sent across the causeway for further training.

 

[ngatimozart]

When you really look at it, the Vietnamese did both the Cambodian people and the region as a whole a service, by dispatching the Khmer Rouge to the bottom pits of hell.

 

[STURM]

The problem is that the Khmer Rouge melted away following the invasion. What followed was a protracted insurgency campaign, Vietnam and its puppet governnent controlling major urban centres but the Khmer Rouge and other groups controlling much of the countryside. Neither side being able to gain victory.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Estonia becomes 2nd buyer of Gabriel-based missile after Finland:

https://www.iai.co.il/estonia-awards-contract-to-proteus-for-blue-spear

This missile is marketed by multiple entities. The Estonian program acquires the Blue Spear, offered by IAI and ST Engineering, while another derivative is currently offered to the UK, called Sea Serpent and offered by IAI and Thales.

It is rumored Israel and Singapore are already using this missile in some variants, making the possible number of distinct variants 3 or even 4.

 

[OPSSG]

It is rumored Israel and Singapore are already using this missile in some variants, making the possible number of distinct variants 3 or even 4.

One unique selling point is distinct variants — having a hot production line, enables Singapore and Israel to swing the production timeline allocation (to win an international tender like the Estonian program).

IMO, Singapore can afford to acquire at a slower rate. The RSN wants to phase in the Blue Spear and phase out the Harpoon — for it to be really attractive for DSTA, I guess that there are 3 things Singapore needs:

​

(a) the ability to customise Blue Spear by changing the booster to increase its range and increased mid-course guidance options;​

​

(b) the ability to customise Blue Spear by changing the warhead for different blast effects in land attack mode — as more blast modes are tested the Estonian program will benefit from it via an engineering change order to swap out a warhead; and​

​

(c) the qualification of Blue Spear for launch by air (the Fokker 50 MPA & F-15SG) and underwater (Type 218SG & Archer Class submarines).​

 

[OPSSG]

Part 3 of 4: Sentinel-class Maritime Security and Response Vessels — Options for Ramming

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1070981463661785088

10. IMO, the Singapore Navy will war game the next maritime dispute scenario, & decide the escalation steps in accordance with the rules of engagement and be industrious in their efforts to provide video footage to the international press of Malaysian first use of weapons. Keeping in mind that on 9 Feb 2019, the idiots on the Malaysian buoy-laying vessel Polaris and collided with a Greece-registered bulk carrier ship, MV Pireas (IMO: 9342853), in Singapore waters — earning some minor bad PR for the Malaysian government. As the collision was not considered to be very serious under the IMO Marine Casualty Investigation Code, MV Pireas was allowed to proceed with its journey to Tanjung Pelepas.

(a) In the 2018 intrusions in the waters off Tuas, armed members of the Malaysian special forces, in civilian attire, were present on the intruding Malaysian boats, which means they will use small arms and other weapons to resist boarding.​

(b) That being the case, the next goal is to use the Sentinel-class to damage the enemy vessel enough to force them to retreat; and to use the tug boats to give chase and literally push them out of our waters. The Sentinel-class are intended to soak damage and it is expected that Malaysian vessels will shoot at the Singapore Navy, once the decision is made to push them out.​

(c) If ramming occurs by choice, external party neutrality will be seen as a favourable outcome for Singapore, as the stronger naval power with a bigger defence budget. Malaysian pride is likely to prevent a quick settlement that may result in a period of hostility and tensions. The second and third order effects following from such an incident will be unfortunate and counter-productive for countries sharing a border.​

11. Taking a lesson from the 3rd Cod Wars, where UK activated from reserve two frigates (refitting them as specialist ramming craft with reinforced wooden bows), the same can be done to mobilise the Sentinel-class from our reserves (if the need arise).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1447000449773572098

12. Malaysia will study its options with regards to the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) 2008 decision to award Pedra Branca to Singapore, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob said on 9 Oct 2021. I am so bored with this 1991 game being replayed again and again by the Malaysians. I wish they would learn from their embarrassment in 2018. I think UMNO just can’t learn from their own mistakes.

13. Not sure if Ismail Sabri Yaakob is a racist asshat or a politician that sees an opportunity, with his electoral base that is growing more hardcore — but he is known for playing up identity politics, to compete with PAS on being religious fundamentalist — he is now the Prime Minister — all thanks to a back room deal that could potentially lead to racial riots, if he continues down this path of identity politics. Many Malaysians do not seem particularly pleased with his appointment.

(a) In Feb 2015, Sabri told Malays to leverage on their numbers as the majority of Malaysian consumers and boycott Chinese businesses, saying that it will force them to reduce the prices of their goods, as per Astro Awani. Despite public backlash, he refused to apologise over his Facebook post, and merely replied that his statement were targeted at "unscrupulous merchants", reported Malay Mail. He added that it was a "coincidence" that majority of them belonged to the Chinese ethnicity.​

(b) In Aug 2015, Sabri was embroiled in controversy again, following his proposal to establish a digital mall "especially for Malay businessmen", reported Astro Awani. MARA Corp Chairman, Akhramsyah Muammar Ubaidah Sanusi, later admitted that the creation of the digital mall was a politically-motivated move and not a business-driven one, reported The Rakyat Post. The initiative was meant to be replicated across other states in Malaysia, but failed due to poor sales.​

(c) In Nov 2015, Sabri said he should not be labeled as racist simply because he voiced the interests of the Malays and Bumiputera. Ismail Sabri said as Barisan Nasional (BN) component party, MCA should understand his responsibility as an Umno leader in helping the Malays because other BN component party leaders would do the same for their respective community.​

14. Malaysia's Covid-19 infections continue to soar despite multiple Movement Control Orders previously implemented by Ismail Sabri Yaakob when he was still Minister of Defence. To assist the Malaysians, in Sep 2021, the Singapore Government contributed another 100,000 doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine to Johor state. This is in addition to the 20,000 Sinovac vaccine doses given by Singapore to Johor on 29 July 2021.

15. For context, I note that in Aug 2021, for the 2nd time UMNO brought down a Malaysian Government — first, Dr M’s Pakatan Harapan and now Muhyiddin’s Bersatu. Congrats to UMNO’s Ismail Sabri Yaakob on being selected as PM No. 9. It’s no surprise really that the new, unelected Malaysian Government led by an allegedly racist Prime Minister needs to manufacture a threat from Singapore by actively looking to manufacture a disagreement.

16. Not waiting for Malaysia to escalate tensions, public works at Pedra Branca to improve existing facilities will continue. This includes providing berthing for vessels and additional logistics, administrative support and communications facilities on the 0.9 ha island that are expected to start by the end of 2021. It will also include land reclamation of about 7ha, the Singapore Government said on 5 July 2021. The planned development is to enhance maritime safety and security and improve search and rescue capabilities in the area.

(a) Land reclamation works will be carried out within 0.5 nautical miles of Pedra Branca and in Singapore territorial waters off the island. One nautical mile is about 1.85km. "All works carried out will be in accordance with Singapore's domestic laws and international law," said a spokesman for the Ministry of National Development (MND), adding that they are expected to take several years to complete.​

​

(b) The island, located about 44km off mainland Singapore's eastern coast, now hosts amenities such as the Horsburgh Lighthouse, a helipad, desalination plant, facilities for a vessel traffic information system, as well as a communications tower and rebroadcast station.​

 

[STURM]

to compete with PAS on being religious fundamentalist — he is now the Prime Minister — all thanks to a back room deal that could lead to racial riots.

Neither him nor his party are trying to compete with PAS on a religous level. What he is trying to do is to maintain the level of support his party has and to atttact votes from the few million 18 year olds who by law are eligible to vote the next General Elections.

There have always been racial tensions beneath the surface but chances of actual large scale riots are slim.

It would be simplistic to label PAS as being religious fundamentalist party as the party is divided into various factions and despite its religious rhetoric has a tradition of actually toning down at a later date and keeping up with the times - it has a hardline faction, as well as a more progressive one. Note that despite its rhetoric and the reputation of being religously intolerent to other faiths, there are hardly any complains from the non Muslim population [who by and large vote for PAS] in states PAS has ruled for decades, as well as states it recently gained power in.

It would also be a mistake to assume that PAS's support base is limited to working class rural Malays solely or largely because of the party's Islamic agenda. It also has a sizeble support base from middle class Malay professionals who see it as a nationalist, not a fundamentalist party. I will also add that PAS was once aligned to a majority Chinese secular party.

Things are very politically fluid at the moment with various dynamics at play, some of which are hard or confusing for outsiders to fully comprehend. All the political parties accept the current status quo and are preparing for the next General Elections. Sure, Sabri's appoinment as PM was not welcomed by some Malaysians but it was also welcomed by some.

Personally, I'm not enamoured of polticians, regardless of where they're from.

Malaysia's Covid-19 infections continue to soar despite multiple Movement Control

Actually it hasn't .. There has actually been a slight increase for the past week or so and the majority of newly infected people do not require being placed on ventilators or the ICU, placing less strain on the medical system.

Vacinations rates are quite good and like Singapore [where cases have soared over the past few days], Malaysia is to turning to the learning to live with Covid phase.

I note that in Aug 2021, for the 2nd time UMNO brought down a Malaysian Government — first, Dr M’s Pakatan Harapan

Also note that there's a bit more to the narrative than that. Last year's governent fell after the PM resigned, due to actions taken by members of his coalition who are in opposition now. UMNO received the cooperation it needed in order to play a huge role in bringing down the goverment but it wasn't alone.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 3 of 4: C-130H Replacement options in context of contingencies or the Malayan Campaign

10. This is last mile delivery training for the logistics function via a C-130H — these aircraft are old and need to be replaced in due time.

11. The 2 shared YouTube links of a single ASEAN country, that is a member of the FPDA, conducting unilateral military training for air-land-sea integration of Singapore Army logistics, where the air and sea terminal companies of the 3rd division are practising to bring men and material ashore.

12. Fellow ASEAN members can be assured that if there is a need, the SAF has the combat logistics to deliver material and aid to ungoverned spaces in support of our fellow ASEAN member under the ambit of ADMM. The SAF is very grateful to our mates in Australia for making this routine training possible. Thank you, Australia.

13. Given that the unipolar American moment has passed, IMHO Team Biden and it’s successor administration will only act, if an ally or partner is committed to an action. Due to the emergence of a multi-polar world order in South East Asia, the SAF as flag bearer of Singapore interests, the organization must be prepared to form a coalition of the willing, should the need arise. With China, it is increasingly likely that training for NEO or HADR with the Chinese is the right way forward. Singapore can’t afford to alienate larger powers by trying to do much more than CBMs.

(a) This is the reason that Secretary Austin’s Singapore lecture has a section called "The Imperative of Partnership;" and his vision of ‘integrated deterrence,’ uses existing military capabilities, and builds new ones. All in the hope of deploying these military capabilities in ways that are tailored to a region's security landscape.​

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(b) Team Biden has demonstrated that America helps those who want to help themselves — they are no longer concerned with black lash from China, over weapons sales or military technology transfer to partners, allies and customers. As Bilahari Kausikan wrote: "reliability is a two-way street: For those willing to cooperate, Biden is prepared to provide the tools to meet the challenge posed by China to an extent without recent precedent, as the decision to share nuclear submarine technology with Australia illustrates."​

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(c) Let me say what worries me — it’s not the idiotic fanboys. What worries me is that there is no trust in the bilateral military-to-military relationship between US and China, and there is no trust in the bilateral military-to-military relationship between Japan and China, or even to plan for CBMs.​

14. Singapore’s forward defence strategy has now shifted focus to the maritime domain (in ungoverned spaces), which automatically means a focus on the Singapore Navy’s bilateral working relationships with the Australian Navy, the Brunei Navy, the US Navy and the TNI AL. With the mobility of the future Joint-Multi-Mission Ship (JMMS), it could act as a C4ISR platform for military operations in the littorals. These sea control and amphibious missions could be carried out from an unexpected quarter, complicating the insurgent’s or enemy’s calculus in either the Straits of Malacca and beyond or in the South China Sea.

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(a) Hopefully, the SAF can also address Pinoy and Indonesian HADR concerns when the JMMS program starts to cut steel in the 2030s as replacements for the four 7,600 ton Endurance Class LPDs. The JMMS (that is to be built), can not only carry H225Ms, Satcom equipped CH-47Fs (for beyond line-of sight communications) and various types of UAS, it could also act as a forward arming and refuelling point at sea to support land-based F-35Bs on sorties. But UAS carriage is not only about ISR. Rather, these unmanned systems can provide early warning, conduct EW; and serve as a communications relay for ships in a task group and for ship to shore communications.​

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(b) The eventual acquisition of up to 12 F-35Bs in around 2026 to 2028 will enable the 21st Division and its 7th Singapore Infantry Brigade (7 SIB), as an infantry formation specializing in heliborne and amphibious operations, supported by the future JMMS to operate more like a mini Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) of the US Marines with its aviation combat element forward deployed on a land base in Brunei or Malaysia.​

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(c) Supported by Singapore Navy ships from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd flotillas — it is likely that troops from 7SIB is the force of choice to be deployed in a coalition with foreign diplomats, a large contingent of policemen from different countries and international aid workers in a complex situation. The only issue is that the all professional side of the SAF is too small, in size, at only one evergreen battalion that is found in the Army Deployment Force.​

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(d) Details of the JMMS are currently sketchy, but they will reportedly have double the capacity of the current Endurance Class vessels. As Ben Ho has written: “What is perhaps clearer is that Singapore is likely to continue its long-standing gradualist approach towards arms procurement. The JMMS should be no different in this regard. Post-2030, when the platform is expected to launch, we can expect to see an ‘Endurance 1.5’ rather than an ‘Endurance 2.0’ to enter service.”​

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(e) Before I go on, let me spell out certain abbreviations:​

(i) AI = Artificial Intelligence;​

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(ii) CONOPS = Concept of Operations;​

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(iii) CBMs = Confidence Building Measures​

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(iv) ECA = Enemy Cause of Action;​

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(v) EW = Electronic Warfare includes three major subdivisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support;​

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(vi) HADR = Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief;​

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(vi) OCA = Own Cause of Action;​

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(vii) OPSEC = Operational Security;​

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(viii) OODA = Observe, Orient, Decide, Act;​

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(ix) RCP = Relative Combat Power;​

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(x) STOVL = Short TakeOff Vertical Landing;​

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(xi) NEO = Non-combatant Evacuation;​

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(xii) ISR = Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; and;​

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(xiii) LO = Low observable or stealth.​

 

[OPSSG]

Part 4 of 4: C-130H Replacement options in context of contingencies or the Malayan Campaign

15. If air-sea battles occur in waters around Southeast Asia, it’s likely to be FPDA countries and/or Americans (to support an ally or partner) vs a insurgent group or a hostile power (which may or may not be China).

(a) Australia is a resident power, with troops in Malaysia; and their P-8As fly out of RMAF Butterworth, since 2018, as part of Operation Gateway. This is a key element in the bilateral-defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia. And by the way, the FPDA’s HQ IADS in Butterworth has an Australian Commander and a Singaporean Deputy Commander.​

(b) Likewise, the America is a resident power in Southeast Asia due to the 1990 MOU, where they gain access to Changi. By American actions of reassurance to a reliable partner (eg. VP Harris’ high profile visit to Singapore and Congress support to continue to sell STOVL F-35Bs to the RSAF), the Americans remain relevant to Singaporean security aspirations. I note that in any discussion on Singapore troops in America, including those under a MOU in Guam, there is a need to keep in mind that the Commander of RSAF detachments in America is an American but he is accustomed to listening to his Singaporean deputy commander — to provide cover for any local blow back (eg. noise complaints or military accident investigations).​

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(c) This means that the SAF has to learn from U.S. Marines STOVL operations to transform the capabilities of 7SIB. It would be interesting to see what other early warning, ISR, EW; and communications relay tricks Singapore can learn from the Americans prior to the launch of the JMMS. I am watching with interest the U.S. Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) UAS Expeditionary Program of Record (POR). Under this POR for 16 new MQ-9As, the U.S. Marine Corps will begin procuring these group 5 UAS in 2022. The MAGTF will IOC this ISR capability in 2025 in support of INDOPACOM requirements. Each MQ-9A has an endurance of over 26 hours, speeds of 220 KTAS and can operate up to 45,000 feet. The MQ-9A has a 1,746 kg payload capacity that includes 1,361 kg of external stores, which is much higher than that of any UAS in Singapore service. Tier 1 missions for the POR is now early warning, ISR, EW; and communications relay. Offensive air support is now a Tier 2 mission, and aerial escort and cargo are listed as important but potentially being re-allocated to other systems in the MAGTF.​

16. Increased computational power on Singaporean fighters, attack helicopters, frigates and submarines have resulted in the widespread use of decision support engines in target selection. Don’t just look at RSAF LO fighters or EW pods on the F-16Vs, rather, to understand current capability, it must be located as a competing C4ISR system for the Blue force to be used against the Red force. The SAF has predictive algorithms to identify and predict ECAs and guide OCAs along an optimal path. Analytics translators could then take the model outputs and work with commander 7SIB to modify initial military training curricula and identify at-risk forces and enable early intervention to prevent loss through enemy action. The OODA loop that the SAF is building by design intended to be short.

17. American observers of Singaporean performance at Exercise RIMPAC 2021, Exercise Pacific Griffin 2021, Exercise Forging Sabre 2021 and Red Flag 2021, understand the high-end nature of these war games. The SAF is a proficient user of AI (and a host of advanced sensors), to sense make and thereafter to attack an aggressor, at a time and place of our choosing. This mapping imagery analysis capability of the Singapore Army enhances the RSAF’s omnidirectional deterrence messaging, without causing offence to our neighbours.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1140186889997230080

18. One issue is whether DSTA can manage the MRCV and JMMS build to come in on budget, to enable the RSAF find some spare cash to buy a few A400Ms, that have matured and can carry a few types of Singapore made armoured vehicles. The 5,000 ton MRCV in particular, can give the SAF an edge in deploying distributed ISR and communications relays with greater resilience to battle losses.

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(a) DSTA as procurement manager have done well to bring into capability via the clever procurement of 6 A330MRTTs, and 16 H225Ms, from Airbus.​

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(b) Not only does Singapore needs a tool kit to respond to HADR, NEO and other military operations other than war, the UAS systems that the RSAF are acquiring growing in size and transporting them for overseas exercises, as an administrative step, is a growing pain. It is my view that the A400Ms are certainly a suitable platform in these roles, if the SAF can afford it.​

 

[OPSSG]

Fantasy that conscript battalions are useable

1. Above is a video of 1SIR performing their rostered role of the Alert Red force as the battalion performing standby for X’mas (in support of a tiered mobilisation alert at a brigade level). What the video shows is routine turn-out of the force, along with simulated scenario planning — in case of a terror attack. Many young Singaporean infantry officers still hold on to the fantasy that conscript battalions are useable in the event of a real emergency, against a high end force. This small Alert Red force, holds onto to their ammo for a range of contingencies from peace support to moving out for war.

2. To ensure that the Alert Red force is not defeated in detail, by a larger enemy force, the SAF has excellent intelligence and larger follow-on forces, on tiered readiness to support the conscript troops in initial contact. The strategy is to defeat with superior numbers of speed due to speed of mobilisation — a lesson learnt from the IDF from the Yom Kippur War (fought from 6 Oct 1973 – 25 Oct 1973, where Israeli forces were fighting desperate initial battles). Singapore’s speed of mobilisation of the active and reserve components, to bring numbers to a fight, is a sight to behold at larger scale planning events. There are small scale mobilisations every year, along with the approximate just-in-time refreshers, but during periods of tension (as occurred in 1991 and 2018), the scale of mobilisation goes up, along with the realism and intensity at which the refresher training is conducted based on identified weaknesses.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/957185879633620997

3. To non-Singaporeans, they often lack an understanding of the capabilities and limits of a conscript company structure, with just 3 infantry companies, that is by default run by just a 4 to 5 professionals during the 1st 22 months. Often times, only the infantry Company Commander, the CSM, the 3 platoon sergeants are regular — that play an important role in coaching the NSF section and platoon commanders. Many times, in the SIRs, the 3 platoon commanders and their 12 section commanders are conscripts, fresh out of their respective command and vocation schools. The true capability of each rifle company can only be realized, after the men complete a number of milestones:

(a) the first of which occurs after the battalion turns operational (after their advanced vocation training and battalion proficiency test, at about 7 to 8.5 months after enlistment); and​

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(b) the second of which after the battalion enters the operational reserve pool (or ORD), at the 22nd month of national service (NS). It may surprise outsiders but the most capable units are the ones in their 1st to 5th year of their reserve service. They become more capable as these young men enter tertiary education or become young working adults.​

4. This is why, I say it is a fantasy to think that conscript battalions are useable in the event of a real emergency, against a high end force, without adequate force preparation time allocated. HQ Company is the only place that holds a sizeable regular component to provide war planning and the needed last mile logistics to service the 3 conscript rifle companies and the support company -- in contrast to the all professional Army Deployment Force that is ready 24/7, conscript unit force preparation takes time before the national leadership is willing to send these conscripts into harms way -- HQ company will need weeks to plan and organise the training required to achieve mission success.

5. Meanwhile the crew of RSS Independence is on X’mas patrol to secure Singapore’s SLOCs; with air cover to be provided by Alert 5 fighters. Singapore has not forgotten:

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1480841920859549700

(a) the routine terror threats stopped by close attention to maritime security threats;​

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(b) what happened on 10th Dec 1941, a ferocious naval battle took place in the South China Sea off the coast of Kuantan, Malaysia. It was an encounter between the warships of the Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy's land based attack bombers. The British fleet, comprising of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and four destroyers had sortied from their main base in Singapore two days earlier without the benefit of air cover or submarine screen. Against them were veteran aviators of the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service, battle-hardened by bombing campaigns in China. The outcome was an astounding victory for the Japanese with the sinking of the two British capital ships; and​

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(c) defence of Singapore is much more than just a military response under six pillars of Total Defence, which are (1) Military, (2) Civil, (3) Economic, (4) Social, (5) Digital and (6) Psychological Defence. These explain the actions that the SAF can take to help us deal with the spectrum of military and non-military threats.​

 

[STURM]

Australia is a resident power, with troops in Malaysia; and their P-8As fly out of RMAF Butterworth, since 2018, as part of Operation Gateway.

Apart from those at Butterworth, the only pernanent presence the ADF has is Rifle Company Butterworth. It was originally raised to protect the base against communist attacks but has since evolved into becoming a platform to enable troops to receive jungle training.

There use to be a ADF liasion officer attached to the Malaysian Ministry of Defence, no idea if this is still the case. Prior to the P-8s entering RAAF service P-3s deployed to Butterworth but I have no idea how long their deployments were. Orginally, following the withdrawal of its fighter presence at the base, the Australian government announced that F-18s would be deployed 16 weeks a year.