Fantasy discussion on Next Gen SAF platforms & Systems

[OPSSG]

@SSJArcher Krich, please engage in some assessment of actual comparative capability and it’s trend line, rather than a rush to judgement on only 1 measure of effectiveness, with little regard to ground reality.

(i) If you had read my prior reply on ‘Post 2 of 2: Educating Ahmad on the RSAF’s baseline capability as a Tertiary Air Force’ in totality, instead of cherry picking, you would not have asked this question. A multi-factorial analysis would be a far more interesting discussion.​

​

(ii) The strength of deterrence (D) as military force (F) is multiplied by the ability to use such firepower (A). In other words:​

​

D = F x A​

​

The D=FxA formula explain why countries armed with nuclear missiles that can destroy the world several times over failed to deter terror attacks on their soil. FxA also explains why South Korea has to tolerate North Korea’s sinking of it’s navy ship and artillery attack on its territory in 2010. It also explains why your 5,000 cruise missile plan is not workable.​

But I do applaud your attempt to discuss the topic unconventionally in multiple posts — unfortunately, you have a flawed conceptual understanding of DETERRENCE. In addition, defence diplomacy is one of the twin pillars of Singapore’s defence policy and complements Singapore’s deterrence efforts. At the strategic level, within the regional arena, Singapore aims to shape and promote a robust, open and inclusive security architecture. I hope other members will add to this discussion later on the various weaknesses in your posts.

What is the definition of tertiary air force? If it's merely the possession of AEW&C systems that confer this status upon an air force, would not the Royal Thai Air Force also qualify? They operate the Swedish Saab 340 AEW&C systems.

May I also suggest reading the 2 threads linked below, your question is further answered in them — in a manner beyond buzzwords:

1. Air Power 101 for New Members
2. A brief history of Lo

A tertiary air force has to have a robust capability perform the 4 roles of Air Power in a contested environment, within its threat matrix (see the old 101 thread from 2013, for details and concepts). Currently, the Thai Air Force does not have a robust capability in all 4 roles. The fact is the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has a fragile capability, if the threat is too high end for us to handle. By way of contrast, the Thai Air Force does not yet have the full set of capabilities to perform all 4 roles of Air Power (where air to air refuelling, SEAD and EW support is to be provided in a coalition). To address these short comings, they are training with the Chinese, the Australians and the Americans to improve their air force’s capability for large force employment, given their shoe string budget for fleet renewal. In this respect, Singapore has transferred 7 F-16A/Bs to Thailand in the past to help them increase their fighter fleet (and sortie generation), so as to enhace Thailand’s ability to conduct OCA and DCA to protect their AWACS. Fortunately for Thailand, despite their ageing fighter fleet, their potential opposition has become too lame and incompetent to be a threat.

IMO, the RSAF is developing more capability over time but it is still fragile, in the face of expected future opposition capability by 2061. There are inherent limits as to Singapore’s ability to mitigate these real risks, due to a lack of strategic depth — that we cannot be complacent about or do it alone. There are announced plans to close 1 of 4 air bases in Singapore that will further hinder our ability to be robust — which needs risk mitigation. This is a political decision that I agree with, given the lack of land, the pressing need to increase water catchment areas and also to need to further surrender some more SAF training areas on the main island for development. Again being mitigated by technology but off topic to our discussion here.

 

[SSJArcher Krich]

@SSJArcher Krich, please engage in some assessment of actual comparative capability and it’s trend line, rather than a rush to judgement on only 1 measure of effectiveness, with little regard to ground reality.

(i) If you had read my prior reply on ‘Post 2 of 2: Educating Ahmad on the RSAF’s baseline capability as a Tertiary Air Force’ in totality, instead of cherry picking, you would not have asked this question. A multi-factorial analysis would be a far more interesting discussion.​

​

(ii) The strength of deterrence (D) as military force (F) is multiplied by the ability to use such firepower (A). In other words:​

​

D = F x A​

​

The D=FxA formula explain why countries armed with nuclear missiles that can destroy the world several times over failed to deter terror attacks on their soil. FxA also explains why South Korea has to tolerate North Korea’s sinking of it’s navy ship and artillery attack on its territory in 2010. It also explains why your 5,000 cruise missile plan is not workable.​

But I do applaud your attempt to discuss the topic unconventionally in multiple posts — unfortunately, you have a flawed conceptual understanding of DETERRENCE . In addition, defence diplomacy is one of the twin pillars of Singapore’s defence policy and complements Singapore’s deterrence efforts. At the strategic level, within the regional arena, Singapore aims to shape and promote a robust, open and inclusive security architecture. I hope other members will add to this discussion later on the various weaknesses in your posts.

Thanks for your explanation and response.

My question simply asked for the meaning of tertiary air force.

The remainder of my message addressed member @Ahmad 's concerns regarding the ability of Indonesia to invade or knock out SAF in one swift blow, not necessarily today but in the future within the context of a theoretical framework.

Although the long winded explanations presented in those two threads are somewhat unrelated to the topic at hand, thank you for presenting them. None of them addressed the definition of a tertiary air force.

Since you have presented the definition of a tertiary air force, I thank you again.

(ii) The strength of deterrence (D) as military force (F) is multiplied by the ability to use such firepower (A). In other words:​

​

D = F x A​

​

The D=FxA formula explain why countries armed with nuclear missiles that can destroy the world several times over failed to deter terror attacks on their soil. FxA also explains why South Korea has to tolerate North Korea’s sinking of it’s navy ship and artillery attack on its territory in 2010. It also explains why your 5,000 cruise missile plan is not workable.​

But I do applaud your attempt to discuss the topic unconventionally in multiple posts — unfortunately, you have a flawed conceptual understanding of DETERRENCE . In addition, defence diplomacy is one of the twin pillars of Singapore’s defence policy and complements Singapore’s deterrence efforts. At the strategic level, within the regional arena, Singapore aims to shape and promote a robust, open and inclusive security architecture. I hope other members will add to this discussion later on the various weaknesses in your posts.

You may be taking things personally as it involves the existence of your country. No need to take things personally and try to justify Singapore's multifaceted approach at dealing with its perceived or real strategic threats. As a detached observer with no real dog in the fight, I can probably see things better than citizens of involved countries and objectively decide if plan A might be able to knock out Singapore, or if plan B might be able to do so better.

Singapore, as a tiny country with very little land, population and geopolitical potential, can influence very little. As much as it may try to promote certain agenda within the region, the much bigger countries may not choose to follow Singapore. We have seen that clearly when Dr M from Malaysia cared little for all the repeated warnings from Singapore's Minister of Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to remove Malaysian government vessel in the waters off Tuas.

Indonesia, as the largest country in the ASEAN region and the world's fourth most populous country, has little reason to follow Singapore's directive in the coming years and decades. While Singapore's policy makers may be trying their best to shape regional and global events to their favour, more often than not, it is the outside world that shapes Singaporean decision makers' choices rather than the other way around.

Seen in that light, whether Singapore promotes an open and inclusive regional security architecture is immaterial because the greater powers will do what they can and smaller powers must bend to the wishes of greater powers.

From your thread on Airpower 101, what I have understood is that you consider a number of countries' air forces to be tertiary air forces including those of the Saudi, Israeli, Turkish, UAE, Australian, Colombian, Spanish and a few other countries. You also deem the allocated defence budget of a given armed force as the decisive factor in determining the ability of that military to carry out warfare to further its interests. I'd take a contrarian view but not here because that would derail the discussion.

If some of those armed forces I have listed above are indeed tertiary air forces, then it would confirm that Singapore's Armed Forces or defence diplomacy are not notable for their exceptionalism. Rather, ASEAN armed forces' incompetence or inability to form and nurture capable armed forces make Singapore stand out as a diminutive but competent armed force within the regional context.

 

[SSJArcher Krich]

No country possesses enough warheads of sufficient firepower (measured in Joules of energy or multiples of it, or equivalent units such as tonnes of TNT equivalent) to destroy the world once. No country can destroy the world multiple times over. Popular misconceptions should not be widely circulated just because they happen to appeal to a wider audience and generate greater readership or viewership.

Even if all nuclear weapons in the world were detonated at once a single location, the destruction would only affectWhat Would Happen If Every Single Nuke In The World Went Off At The Same Time? 284,000 square kilometers around that location in the form of radiation, and anybody within an area 5.8 million square kilometers around the location of detonation would suffer third-degree burns.

The consequence may cause a nuclear winter in that sunlight may find it difficult to reach the plants on the Earth's surface. Without photosynthesis, enough food may not be produced for humanity to carry out its day to day activities. You may want to compare the energy released by the most powerful nuclear bomb, the Tsar Bomba, to that of the 1883 Krakatoa Volcanic eruption. A volcanic eruption can release more energy than the mightiest thermonuclear device ever built by human beings. Things must be seen in the right context.


If you are talking about the USA in relation to events of 2001, then the causes and effects are not entirely clear. It can be hypothesized that the military industrial complex was left without a job, an enemy or a bogeyman, in the absence of the USSR. They needed to create one and an excuse was needed to justify constant warmaking.

Other explanations suggest Israel's influence on the US policy making apparatus. Due to Israeli vice like grip on American or European policymaking, potential Israeli enemies had to be softened up or attacked and eliminated through proxy. The proxy being the United States and its coterie of ''allies'' and partners.

Numerous other explanations may also be proffered in relation to the American initiated so called "War on Terror", which has killed innumerable number of innocent civilians without any repercussion and any modicum of justice meted out. To think that any country, institution or individual can get away with justifying such wanton mass murder and criminality would be naive.

It would also be naive to think that ''partners in crime'' of the USA, like Singapore, can escape the inevitable. We should be cognizant of the fact that an isolated, pariah entity like the DPRK has managed to detonate nuclear devices and tested ICBMs (Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles) that can target anywhere within the continental United States. The DPRK is also trying to develop second strike capability by developing what is suspected to be a submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles.

Iran has been a close partner, in defence affairs, of the DPRK for a few decades now. It wouldn't be unwise to believe nuclear proliferation is only a matter of time and nuclear deterrence, against potential invasion, can be achieved more economically and readily by a greater number of developing or non-aligned countries.

Regarding South Korean inability to respond to North Korea, apart from the threat of a costly war that can result in half of its population - concentrated in Greater Seoul region - decimated and that can draw in China, there is also the small matter of North Korean nuclear capability. South Korea is also bound to fight under American command if a war breaks out, which means the USA dictates terms and RoK follows. The Moon Jae-in admin has been trying to take control of OPCON from the US general in charge of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command.


Lastly, my suggestion involved a large number of ballistic missiles (5,000 was not an indicative number). A large force can be assembled. Hezbollah has acquired or produced in excess of 100,000 rockets and ballistic missiles to cover the entirety of ''Israel", as an example.

Finally, thank you for answering the question on the meaning of a tertiary air force.

 

[ngatimozart]

No country possesses enough warheads of sufficient firepower (measured in Joules of energy or multiples of it, or equivalent units such as tonnes of TNT equivalent) to destroy the world once. No country can destroy the world multiple times over. Popular misconceptions should not be widely circulated just because they happen to appeal to a wider audience and generate greater readership or viewership.

Even if all nuclear weapons in the world were detonated at once a single location, the destruction would only affectWhat Would Happen If Every Single Nuke In The World Went Off At The Same Time? 284,000 square kilometers around that location in the form of radiation, and anybody within an area 5.8 million square kilometers around the location of detonation would suffer third-degree burns.

The consequence may cause a nuclear winter in that sunlight may find it difficult to reach the plants on the Earth's surface. Without photosynthesis, enough food may not be produced for humanity to carry out its day to day activities. You may want to compare the energy released by the most powerful nuclear bomb, the Tsar Bomba, to that of the 1883 Krakatoa Volcanic eruption. A volcanic eruption can release more energy than the mightiest thermonuclear device ever built by human beings. Things must be seen in the right context.


If you are talking about the USA in relation to events of 2001, then the causes and effects are not entirely clear. It can be hypothesized that the military industrial complex was left without a job, an enemy or a bogeyman, in the absence of the USSR. They needed to create one and an excuse was needed to justify constant warmaking.

Other explanations suggest Israel's influence on the US policy making apparatus. Due to Israeli vice like grip on American or European policymaking, potential Israeli enemies had to be softened up or attacked and eliminated through proxy. The proxy being the United States and its coterie of ''allies'' and partners.

Numerous other explanations may also be proffered in relation to the American initiated so called "War on Terror", which has killed innumerable number of innocent civilians without any repercussion and any modicum of justice meted out. To think that any country, institution or individual can get away with justifying such wanton mass murder and criminality would be naive.

It would also be naive to think that ''partners in crime'' of the USA, like Singapore, can escape the inevitable. We should be cognizant of the fact that an isolated, pariah entity like the DPRK has managed to detonate nuclear devices and tested ICBMs (Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles) that can target anywhere within the continental United States. The DPRK is also trying to develop second strike capability by developing what is suspected to be a submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles.

Iran has been a close partner, in defence affairs, of the DPRK for a few decades now. It wouldn't be unwise to believe nuclear proliferation is only a matter of time and nuclear deterrence, against potential invasion, can be achieved more economically and readily by a greater number of developing or non-aligned countries.

Regarding South Korean inability to respond to North Korea, apart from the threat of a costly war that can result in half of its population - concentrated in Greater Seoul region - decimated and that can draw in China, there is also the small matter of North Korean nuclear capability. South Korea is also bound to fight under American command if a war breaks out, which means the USA dictates terms and RoK follows. The Moon Jae-in admin has been trying to take control of OPCON from the US general in charge of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command.


Lastly, my suggestion involved a large number of ballistic missiles (5,000 was not an indicative number). A large force can be assembled. Hezbollah has acquired or produced in excess of 100,000 rockets and ballistic missiles to cover the entirety of ''Israel", as an example.

Finally, thank you for answering the question on the meaning of a tertiary air force.

Ok where to start? First of all IFL science is not a reputable source, so the argument you base on it is full of fallacies. An all out nuclear war would decimate the human population and in all probability destroy enough of it to make extinction of homo sapien a high probability. In fact extinction of most forms of higher order life on the planet is highly probable. Most scientific research suggests that a nuclear winter would last for two years, during which time all plant life would die because it would be unable to photosynthesize, due to the very high levels of albedo, (reflectivity of solar radiation into space). That means no food for herbivores and omnivores who in turn are food sources for omnivores and carnivores. Also the fresh water supply is comprised with radioactive elements and other harmful pollutants making it deleterious to the ongoing health of all that drink it. Thirdly, vast areas of once fertile soils are poisoned for decades, and some for centuries with radioactive elements, so once the atmosphere clears cannot be used for agriculture.

I very strongly recommend that you undertake some proper research because what you posted in the above post is based upon a fallacy. There are plenty of reputable sources for such material and I haven't even touched on super volcanoes and their catastrophic eruptions. The arguments you present in the rest of your post, I suggest that you have based on views taken out of context of the references cited.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 4: Bunking Myths for SSJArcher Krich
@SSJArcher Krich, I struggle to continue this conversation — due to the extreme selectivity in your use of examples, while disregarding other important hard and soft power dimensions — your approach seems to be just make missiles and rockets without regard to its usability during a time of tension between countries. Your posts reflects your lack of understanding of military capability development cycles or even basic geography, as inherent constraints.

Indonesia has always failed to fulfill its potential and all these expectations of higher GDP and higher defence budget to the tune of $40 billion may or may not come true by the year 2030.

We have seen how Indonesia continues to avoid increasing its firepower in the face of increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and its Minimum Essential Force phase II had to be changed because Indonesia just could not carry out the plans it needed to.

1. Indonesia’s weapon acquisition programs under the various phases of its Minimum Essential Force (MEF) plans, is progressing — your argument on Indonesia avoiding an increase in its firepower is not valid and not supported by evidence.

2. IMO, Sino-Indonesian relations are broadly sound, as the nature of their mutual dispute is over fisheries enforcement (i.e. the same type of dispute as between Vietnam and Indonesia). Indonesia was among the first to recognise to PRC on 1 Oct 1949. China has replaced Japan as Indonesia’s largest trading partner. Indonesia also began to look to China for investment in infrastructure projects, such as roads, bridges, and power plants. China is now Indonesia’s third largest foreign investor after Singapore and Japan. PRC is not an existential threat — which why your selective use of irrelevant facts does not fit the region’s concerns. Whereas the biggest threat the TNI faces is domestic separatism.

3. With regard to the TNI AU:

• In 1990 Indonesia acquired 8 F-16As and 4 F-16Bs from the US — 10 of which remain operational.
• Since 2010, Indonesia have started executing its MEF plans. From 2013 onwards, the TNI AU acquired 16 Su-27/30 from the Russians.
• It operates 16 T-50i, which were delivered by KAI between September 2013 and January 2014. One of which crashed in December 2015, were procured under a USD400 million contract signed in 2011.
• Indonesia acquired another 19 F-16Cs and 5 F-16Ds ending a five-year program that has brought the former US Air Force and Air National Guard jets up to modern standards before all 24 jets were delivered to Indonesia. By 2020, the TNI AU is expected to order another 2 squadrons of F-16Vs.
• In a contract supposedly signed on 14 February 2018, the Russians are supposed to start delivery of the 1st of 11 Sukhoi Su-35S for the TNI AU end of this year (but details are lacking or stalled).

Thanks to the above aircraft acquisition programs, the TNI AU has 4 squadrons (growing to 6) of fighters which is certainly more modern than Iran’s vintage fighter fleet. Therefore, with one example, on TNI AU capability development, I have shown that your statement is untrue.

Both Singapore and Indonesia are mostly weapons importers.

4. Pure description is not analysis. Further, the above statement is misleading, as both Singapore and Indonesia have their respective arms industries, with limited but notable export success in both cases. Let me provide two points of clarification below, to provide evidence to support my argument and set the context.

One, Indonesia’s concept of MEF divides the defence development into four stages. Within each step, the allocation of defence GDP will be gradually increased. Correspondingly, the allocation of the defence budget for non-military infrastructure (supporting and reserve components) such as logistics and human capital will also be increased. R&D has become a main concern specifically as the new defence law. The Indonesian defence industry is under the limelight, especially in emphasizing its third stage of development (2020-2024). During the first (2010-2014) and second stages (2015-2019) of development, the Indonesian government focused on creating a set of regulations while simultaneously pioneering the development of absorptive capability (in the form of reliable manpower or human capacity and the basic capacity to manufacture). This would be achieved vis-à-vis various R&D collaborations. Having achieved that, the third stage of MEF will be one that will work towards consolidating the credibility of the defence industry.

• Indonesian defence companies had secured exports worth USD284.1 million between 2015 and 2018. These sales were from four companies: aerospace manufacturer PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI), shipbuilders PT PAL and PT Lundin, and land systems company PT Pindad.
• PTDI secured exports worth USD161 million through sales of the CN235 and NC212 transport aircraft the company builds under licence from Airbus, and that PT PAL's exports were valued at USD86.9 million for the sale of two Strategic Sealift Vessels to the Philippines. Recent customers of the CN235 are thought to include Senegal, while Vietnam and Thailand have reportedly ordered the NC212 aircraft.
• PT Pindad has won export contracts worth USD32.6 million for the sale of munitions and weapons and that PT Lundin secured exports worth USD3.6 million for the supply of small patrol craft to Sweden and Russia. PT Pindad's new customers are thought to be countries in Southeast Asia and Africa.
• Beyond building frigates and patrol vessels locally (see: Indonesia: 'green water navy'), the TNI-AL has also started to churn out Teluk Bintuni-class landing ship tanks, and Semarang-class landing platform docks (so that the TNI-AL can retire its ex-US Navy Landing Ship Tanks).

Two, Singapore has its own defence companies and engineering ecology from 1,000 scientists and engineers to about 5,000 today. And it’s a generational effort to invest, with a steady drum beat of new equipment (or contracts with 3rd parties, like Oman, Thailand, UAE and UK) to feed the defence ecology with work.

• In 2019, delivery of the Hunter AFV for the SAF and in 2018, the unveiling of the Bronco 3. On 26 January 2019, ST Marine launched the 8th LMV, RSS Fearless for the Singapore Navy. On 18 August 2018 and 24 March 2018, ST Marine launched the 7th (RSS Dauntless) and 6th (RSS Fortitude) LMVs.
• On 23 September 2017 and 18 March 2017, St Marine launched the 5th (RSS Indomitable) and 4th (RSS Justice) LMVs.
• In June 2016, ST Marine supplied the fourth Al-Ofouq class vessel (Khassab) for the Royal Navy of Oman. On 16 April 2016 and 13 October 2016, ST Marine launched the 3rd (RSS Unity) and 2nd (RSS Sovereignty) LMVs.

​

​

• On 3 July 2015, ST Marine launched the 1st LMV (RSS Independence). The unveiling in the same year of the Terrex 2 and 3, for the US Marines and Australian Army supply competitions that ST Kinetics ultimately lost later. In November 2015, the Marine Corps chose SAIC (working with ST Kinetics) to build competing prototypes for the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. SAIC, offered a variant of the Singaporean Terrex, in a developmental contract worth US$121.5 million.
• On 17 September 2014 (Sadh), 14 June 2014 (Al-Shinas), and 29 January 2014 (Al-Seeb), ST Marine launched 3 of the 4 Al-Ofouq class vessels for the Oman Navy.
• In 2012 ST Marine delivered H.T.M.A.S. Ang-Thong to the Thai Navy and also secured in April a contract worth €534.8m (about S$880m) to design and build four 75m patrol vessels for the Oman Navy.
• In 2010, the second gen light strike vehicle. In 2009, ST Kinetics started delivery of (i) 100 Warthog ATVs to the British Army for use in Afghanistan, and (ii) the Terrex for the SAF.
• In November 2008, ST Marine secured a contract worth about S$200m to build an Endurance class LPD for Thailand. The UAE bought 46 Agrabs in a 2007 contract, then worth 390 million Dirham (US$ 106m). The 3-man operated 10-ton Agrab vehicle carries the Singapore made 120mm SRAMS, and 58 mortar rounds.
• In 2005, ST Kinetics commenced the delivery of the Bionix II, and the Trailblazer; and in 2004, the Primus and Bronco, all for the SAF.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 4: Explaining the difference between hard and soft power

Singapore, as a tiny country with very little land, population and geopolitical potential, can influence very little. As much as it may try to promote certain agenda within the region, the much bigger countries may not choose to follow Singapore. We have seen that clearly when Dr M from Malaysia cared little for all the repeated warnings from Singapore's Minister of Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to remove Malaysian government vessel in the waters off Tuas.

Indonesia, as the largest country in the ASEAN region and the world's fourth most populous country, has little reason to follow Singapore's directive in the coming years and decades. While Singapore's policy makers may be trying their best to shape regional and global events to their favour, more often than not, it is the outside world that shapes Singaporean decision makers' choices rather than the other way around.

5. A state’s hard military power is only one aspect, we need to look at power holistically — in both hard power and soft power dimensions, as it relates to the physical geography of the region. Do take a look at Lowy Institute’s recently released the 2019 edition of the Asia Power Index, a ranking 25 countries in terms of power they wield in the Asia-Pacific region, where Singapore is ranked 8th out of 25. Singapore is also the only country to break into the top five for defence networkswithout any formal alliance commitments, reflecting the depth and diversity of its non-allied security partnerships in the region. However, Singapore's success and small size poses unique strategic challenges. Its lowest ranking - in 13th place - occurs in the resilience measure as a result of being the least energy self-sufficient country in the region. Let me share some additional points to help you understand the concepts of deterrence and diplomacy in my prior post above, and how military capability relates to state power.

(i) To this aggressor, Singapore’s Defence Minister, Dr Ng only spoke once to indicate a concern on the intrusion in the waters off Tuas. What Dr Ng says only once, from a position of power, sets the geo-political context for this grey zone event, as Singapore has escalation dominance against that aggressor due to hard power.

• It is irrational of the Malaysians to seek a quarrel with Singapore as an equal at the negotiating table. But losing to Singapore in a military engagement is not the worse case scenario. The worse case scenario is further fragmentation of Malaysia - where the regions lose confidence in Dr M’s ability to lead. The 2013 Lahad Datu standoff from February to March 2013, is instructive of the need for Malaysia to defend and police Sabah from terrorist threats arising from the Philippines. A military conflict with Singapore will result in the loss of Malaysia’s ability to defend Sabah.
• Singapore does engage in diplomacy, with a hard power edge, to manage our relations with our neighbours. Please do some basic research on the geopolitics of the region and read prior information shared in this thread before making your misguided assertions.

(ii) One of LKY's great contribution as a statesman is his leadership team's invention of what some American scholars have called geo-economics in the late 1960s/70s. It is a comprehensive approach to what is today called a 'whole-of-government' approach to affairs between states. Singapore use of hard power is always part of a 'whole-of-government' approach — be it with soft diplomacy or with coercive diplomacy. The Singapore Government's soft power approach is to essentially function as a 'consulting organisation' (i.e. Singapore Consulting) to other governments in the area of geo-economics. A past client of Singapore Consulting, is China. While China may have out grown Singapore, they acknowledge Singapore's role in China's growth — which is why the Singapore Government has such good access to China's leadership -- a resource that the Americans and the Taiwanese have tapped on from time to time. From an objective point of view, Singapore has warm and viable economic or military ties with 4 of the 5 permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — which means any unprovoked attack on Singapore will invite international condemnation and possible external intervention — due to the port of Singapore serving as a key node in global commerce and SLOC. China, Japan, Taiwan and Korea all trade through Singapore as a global transhipment hub (one of the largest in the world).

Therefore, D=FxA for any potential aggressor. Where ‘A’ is the ability of an aggressor to use its firepower against Singapore.
​

(iii) It is not surprising that you are unaware of Singapore’s soft power, in the sphere of defence diplomacy; and also ignorant of the scale of Singapore military-military relations with other powerful countries that are too numerous to mention (i.e. 10 countries, host Singapore troops in 46 major exercises, all year round).

(iv) Singapore and Malaysia, the two former colonies that were the core reason for the founding of FPDA, have successfully developed their armed forces and the threat of aggression from Indonesia has rescinded. As Tim Huxley notes in his book Defending the Lion City, Singapore has continuously enhanced its military, forming a “poison shrimp” or deterrence strategy. Singapore has and will continue to have a high-technology military, and is part of other regional pacts, yet it still values the role of the FPDA. The FPDA helps maintains Singapore’s interoperability with other armed forces and keeps countries like the UK engaged in the region. Malaysia’s armed forces are not as advanced as Singapore’s. If Malaysia can dial back its hostility towards Singapore, under Dr M or for the remainder of Pakatan Harapan’s term of office, the FPDA can be a means to train Malaysia’s armed forces. Currently, Malaysian bases facilitate FPDA military structures and this further complements bilateral defense relationships with ASEAN regional partners. Malaysia also has other pressing defense concerns such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and constant training with FPDA forces will enhance Malaysia’s armed forces.

• First, the FPDA could maximize the effect of its various annual military exercises. It should consider drawing in larger assets, such as the British Queen Elizabeth class carriers or the Australian Canberra class Landing Helicopter Docks. These exercises could also draw upon related assets of members for HADR, foreign assistance, maritime domain awareness, counter piracy, and even environmental expertise to enhance weapons sales or the provision of platforms/vessels by Australia, UK and Singapore (i.e. pool the provision of military or other security related aid to enhance attractiveness of offerings to observer countries). This is especially true for the UK, whose plans for the East Asian region have still not been defined for the near future.

• Second, while non-member states have been invited to observe FPDA exercises, non-members, like Brunei, Indonesia, India or Japan could be allowed to observe or participate in FPDA exercises. This might be a controversial change, given that not all not all states have resolved their differences. Yet, the inclusion of other countries could also help decrease tensions between regional countries and, in fact, enhance FPDA militaries.

• Third, the consultative nature of the FPDA needs to match the changing security environment in the wider East Asian Region. This is not to say that the FPDA defense ministers and defense chiefs do not consider this as part of their discussions. Rather, they need to intensify their outlook on the FPDA’s position in East Asia’s future. The FPDA is indeed a perfect complement for other regional defense agreements including the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, the Malacca Straits Patrol, and U.S. defense partnerships.

 

[Todjaeger]

No country possesses enough warheads of sufficient firepower (measured in Joules of energy or multiples of it, or equivalent units such as tonnes of TNT equivalent) to destroy the world once. No country can destroy the world multiple times over. Popular misconceptions should not be widely circulated just because they happen to appeal to a wider audience and generate greater readership or viewership.

Even if all nuclear weapons in the world were detonated at once a single location, the destruction would only affectWhat Would Happen If Every Single Nuke In The World Went Off At The Same Time? 284,000 square kilometers around that location in the form of radiation, and anybody within an area 5.8 million square kilometers around the location of detonation would suffer third-degree burns.

The consequence may cause a nuclear winter in that sunlight may find it difficult to reach the plants on the Earth's surface. Without photosynthesis, enough food may not be produced for humanity to carry out its day to day activities. You may want to compare the energy released by the most powerful nuclear bomb, the Tsar Bomba, to that of the 1883 Krakatoa Volcanic eruption. A volcanic eruption can release more energy than the mightiest thermonuclear device ever built by human beings. Things must be seen in the right context.


If you are talking about the USA in relation to events of 2001, then the causes and effects are not entirely clear. It can be hypothesized that the military industrial complex was left without a job, an enemy or a bogeyman, in the absence of the USSR. They needed to create one and an excuse was needed to justify constant warmaking.

Other explanations suggest Israel's influence on the US policy making apparatus. Due to Israeli vice like grip on American or European policymaking, potential Israeli enemies had to be softened up or attacked and eliminated through proxy. The proxy being the United States and its coterie of ''allies'' and partners.

Numerous other explanations may also be proffered in relation to the American initiated so called "War on Terror", which has killed innumerable number of innocent civilians without any repercussion and any modicum of justice meted out. To think that any country, institution or individual can get away with justifying such wanton mass murder and criminality would be naive.

It would also be naive to think that ''partners in crime'' of the USA, like Singapore, can escape the inevitable. We should be cognizant of the fact that an isolated, pariah entity like the DPRK has managed to detonate nuclear devices and tested ICBMs (Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles) that can target anywhere within the continental United States. The DPRK is also trying to develop second strike capability by developing what is suspected to be a submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles.

Iran has been a close partner, in defence affairs, of the DPRK for a few decades now. It wouldn't be unwise to believe nuclear proliferation is only a matter of time and nuclear deterrence, against potential invasion, can be achieved more economically and readily by a greater number of developing or non-aligned countries.

Regarding South Korean inability to respond to North Korea, apart from the threat of a costly war that can result in half of its population - concentrated in Greater Seoul region - decimated and that can draw in China, there is also the small matter of North Korean nuclear capability. South Korea is also bound to fight under American command if a war breaks out, which means the USA dictates terms and RoK follows. The Moon Jae-in admin has been trying to take control of OPCON from the US general in charge of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command.


Lastly, my suggestion involved a large number of ballistic missiles (5,000 was not an indicative number). A large force can be assembled. Hezbollah has acquired or produced in excess of 100,000 rockets and ballistic missiles to cover the entirety of ''Israel", as an example.

Finally, thank you for answering the question on the meaning of a tertiary air force.

Honestly, I struggle to see how almost the entirety of this post is anything other than Off Topic for the thread at hand, which is namely, "The best strategy to defending Singapore Island".

I bring this up because this and other content within the post is frowned up and against the Forum Rules for a few reasons. Namely that Off Topic content derails the discussion that members are interested in engaging in on the subject of a given thread, degrading the overall quality of derailed threads and also the forum in general. Other content raised which involves politics and/or conspiracy theories are both similarly frowned upon and against the forum rules, for pretty much the same reasons, they bring down the quality of discussion and debate on the forum since it is difficult if not outright impossible to have a rationale, fact-based discussion with someone who makes and believes their own evidence. In a related vein, members can and should expect to be challenged to provide proof and/or sources when making claims, with again a very dim view being taken when the proof and sources do not support the claims being made, or the claims misrepresent what the actual source says. The OT commentary about Hezbollah comes to mind as an example, with the link actually stating the following;

The Israeli military has said Hezbollah has between 100,000 and 120,000 short-range missiles and rockets, as well as several hundred longer-range missiles.

There is a considerable difference in terms of capabilities as well as ability to effectively launch a large number of Katyusha-type artillery rockets, and a similar number of Scud or other short/medium-ranged ballistic missiles.

A few things remain unexplained regarding the notion raised of Indonesia getting ballistic missiles which it could use to threaten Singapore. One of the first things which would need to be explained would be how/why would it be in Indonesia's interests to do so, given that Singapore is a key SLOC port between Europe, Africa, the Mideast and Asia and the western coasts of North and South America. There are a number of countries who would likely involve themselves if that SLOC was threatened, never mind actually cut. Another would be the related questions of how many launchers and artillery rockets and/or ballistic missiles would be needed, where the budget to purchase them would come from (since Indonesia has a number of defence programmes and capabilities which require funding) and where could the capability be raised, trained, sustained and operate from, without attracting attention? I specifically mentioned attracting attention because if it suddenly came out that Indonesia was establishing a ground-based long-ranged strike capability, it would cause concern within ASEAN-Pacific region and would also likely kick off a regional arms race.

As a regular contributor on DefenceTalk over a long period of time, I would recommend reading posts more, researching (here on DT and elsewhere) to answer questions as well as to gather supporting information for one's own posts, and keeping one's posts On Topic for the thread they are in as well as politics and conspiracy free. It is worth keeping in mind that members of the Mod Team (and one in particular) really do not have much of a sense of humour when it comes to posting content and behavior that detracts from the forum, which is why I had been stressing the need to pay attention to the forum rules, which also includes making flame bait and/or derogatory comments which includes comments bashing other countries. It might not have been the intent, but the comment;

that ''partners in crime'' of the USA, like Singapore,

is a comment that can be considered derogatory, and therefore also against the forum rules... Hope this helps

 

[John Fedup]

No country possesses enough warheads of sufficient firepower (measured in Joules of energy or multiples of it, or equivalent units such as tonnes of TNT equivalent) to destroy the world.

IMO it will be a biological event that destroys the world not a nuclear war. The biological event could be via terrorism or a state mistake. Perhaps even more likely is a natural pandemic. Enough OT, time to get back to Singapore Island defence.

 

[OPSSG]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284090977586683905

1. A JV, named Proteus Advanced Systems Pte Ltd, was formed to leverage the track record of its parent companies to sell naval missile systems, including an anti-ship missile system called ‘Blue Spear’ — which will enable the factory space for the booster engine to be allocated and built in Singapore.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1283756606467928065

2. According to sources associated with the new JV, Blue Spear (5G SSM) introduces an advanced and novel approach that addresses the challenges of the modern naval arena for years to come. The Blue Spear anti-ship missile is co-developed by ST Engineering and IAI under a development agreement signed between the two countries a few years ago. Based on this work-sharing agreement ST Engineering’s role includes design, development, and production of major sub-systems like the booster motor and warhead.

3. As early as 1966, Singapore began developing an armament industry with the establishment of the Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS). Its first products were manufacturing 5.56 mm ammunition. In 1989, the Singapore Technologies (ST) group was formed as the holding company for local defence companies including CIS. By 1997, Singapore was building solid-propellant rocket motors locally (but in very limited production). The main components of the SPIKE anti-tank missile system — rocket motors and warheads are also being produced locally.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1206841503005511680

4. This means components of the new 5.5 metre long Gabriel V anti-ship missile (that weights around 1,250 kg) will be built in Singapore, namely, the booster motor and warhead. The Gabriel V is to be fitted aboard the existing Hamina-class fast attack craft (as part of the Finnish mid-life update). Deliveries to Finland will start in 2019 and continue through 2025. The Finnish Navy is expected to maintain the new Gabriel V missile in service for a period of 30 years.

5. The long ranged 5G SSM or ‘Advanced Surface Attack Missile’ (ASAM) is said to be optimized with more advanced seeker technology to operate in cluttered or congested littoral environments. As missile deliveries are expected in the second half of this decade, ST Engineering said the setup of the JV is not expected to have a material impact on the consolidated net tangible assets per share and earnings per share of ST Engineering for the current financial year.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284726997998952450

6. This is a logical development of the Israel-Singapore defence relationship, given that RSS Sea Wolf was the first ASEAN Navy ship to fire anti-ship missiles for a naval exercise in Mar 1974 — where two prior generation Gabriel missiles were launched and hit a target barge.

 

[OPSSG]

The Chang Bogo class are a variant of the Type 209 Sub, which has now been in production on and off since the very early 1970s, has to be some kind of record for a Warship design. Of course internally they would be a very different but the Baseline design is the same

1. While the Koreans have significantly evolved the design of the KSS-I Chang Bogo class to meet their own needs, the older designs only have a 2 MW propulsion motor; which in the past served as a limit the ability of the submarine to conduct sprints. There newer sub-systems that allow up to 4 MW.

2. The nine 1,860-ton KSS-II Son Won-il class submarine are each powered by a 4 MW Siemens Permasyn propulsion motor; and this tech was also applied to at least the Type 214 submarines of TKMS.

​

(a) South Korea launched its final KSS-II submarine, at Ulsan Shipyards on 7 Sep 2017. The nine KSS-II and four Greek Type 214 submarines, each have a length of 65 m, a beam of 6.3 m, and a draught of 6 m. It is interesting to note that the Portuguese navy’s Type 214 are larger with slightly different dimensions (with a length of 67.9 m, a beam of 6.3 m and a draught of 6.6 m).​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1293629196678430723

​

(b) South Korea's KSS-I, KSS-II and KSS-III building program suggest a goal of having a rolling average of 18 to 22 submarines to match Japan's medium term goal.​

3. TKMS has:

​

(a) completed 3 batch 2 Dolphin class submarines​

​

(b) built the first of 4 Invincible class submarines; and​

​

(c) orders for 6 new Type-212CD submarines,​

are each of which are to be powered by a propulsion motor (often with a rated power of 4 MW or more).

* The AIP equipped batch 2 Dolphins are larger than the batch 1, Type 212A German submarines. In October 2017, Israel and Germany confirmed that they have finalised a MOU for the purchase of three more Dolphin-class submarines to be delivered starting in 2027. These boats will replace the first three of the class which by then will be about 30 years old.

• Displacement: 2,050 tons surfaced, 2,400 tons submerged
  • Length: 68.8m
  • Beam: 6.8 m (22 ft)
  • Draught: 6.2 m (20 ft)
  • 3 MTU V-16 396 SE 84 diesel engines with three Siemens 750 kW alternators, and a Siemens sustained-power motor of about 3 MW output power
  • Speed: 25 kts submerged
  • Complement: 35 + 15 passengers
  • Armament: Six 21" (533mm) torpedo tubes and four 26" (650mm) torpedo tubes.

4. Siemens started on the R&D of large-scale Siemens Permasyn propulsion motor in 6 MW class for the Australians; and they also plan to cover the product range of 1.5 MW to 8 MW, with the FLEX PM solution — a product range that is well suited to meeting the future requirements of the 3,000 ton KSS-III and Australia’s 4,500 ton Attack class submarines. The new Permasyn motors are planned in three baseline frame sizes, with the diameter determining three power ranges. The specific power rating within one range is then fine-tuned with the length of the stator and rotor. The ultimate size and weight are also driven by the associated inverters, which are integrated in the motor itself. According to Siemens, the specifications for this drive concept have been completed and initial development work has commenced. By way of comparison, Japanese submarines are each powered by a SMC-8 main motor with a maximum output is 5.9 MW, giving the Sōryū-class a superb ability to conduct sprints.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2:

Development and trails of a new submarine class will always be paired with problems and setbacks, but once the problems are solved, it will be by far the most advanced submarine class in the region.

1. Let me be humble about this — as a country that until now only operated four refurbished 2nd hand boats — 2 of which are obsolete. Bear with me while I explain why I don’t think the Invincible-class is the most advanced SSK in the Indo-Pacific region — which has about 120 SSKs, half of which are modern.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1301061384269000704

(a) The Type 218SG has eight torpedo tubes and is manned by a crew of 28 (which crew is too small for the CONOPS of the Australian, Indian, Korean or Japanese Navies).​

​

(b) While it is an advanced design in that the Singapore Navy has a big focus on automation, increased automation also carries with it the downside risk of task saturation and lesser crew available for damage control, if it happens.​

​

(c) Larger fleet submarines with 42 to 65 crew members operate differently from smaller submarines with 28 to 35 crew onboard. For example, larger crew means more sonar men on duty for each shift, to enable the tracking of multiple targets. Lean crew submarines will have to perform the same fleet assigned task differently or can’t do the same missions — simply due to a lack of crew.​

2. In 2020, I think the most advanced SSKs in the region are the last 2 Japanese 4,200 ton Sōryū-class submarines — each with a crew of 65. Given the Japanese continuous build strategy, they will always have the most advanced submarines, in a little while (even if someone dethrones them for a few years). Even the older 4,000 ton Oyashio-class have 70 crew berths, more batteries and greater room for growth than our Type 218SGs — in the unlikely event that the Japanese choose to refurbish the Oyashio-class.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1282182473422692360

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2:

"This is the first of three « Invincible-class » submarines under construction at Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems Shipyard (TKMS) in Kiel, Germany."
Does this mean that the fourth one will be build in Singapore, or that the fourth one is not yet under construction in Kiel?

4. It’s a typo, the text of the article says 4. All 4 boats are being built in Germany. No plans for a local build but there is collaboration on the ISUS suite that is jointly being designed by Atlas Electronik and ST Electronics to enable lean manning.

 

[Todjaeger]

I don't pretend to be an expert on RCN submarine operations, but it would seem logical to assume Singaporean submarines operate in a more complex environment than do ours. So, where your guys are used to operating in this zero IR environment, I would suggest that RCN subs do not face the same constraints, given the vastness of the waters in which they operate. Knowing this (and thanks for the education, btw), I certainly have a newfound respect for RSN submariners!

I would be less apt to describe the Singaporean submarine environment as "more complex" and more apt to just state that it is a different environment.

I say this because while the waters around Singapore are warmer, littoral, and amongst the most heavily trafficked, all of which makes it difficult for Singapore to have a sub depart unnoticed, those conditions also make it much more difficult to a "Red Force" sub to close and loiter/lurk in or near Singapore's waters.

OTOH with Canada, while it can be easier to arrange ingress/egress times and routes for RCN subs, the conditions which permit this also make it easier for non-Canadian subs to approach Canadian ports...

 

[OPSSG]

@Todjaeger,

I wanted to provide some details you may not be aware of. Your input is valued but I want to clarify some details relating to submarine operations around the relatively shallow waters around Singapore — so please bear with the additional info provided, for your consideration.

I would be less apt to describe the Singaporean submarine environment as "more complex" and more apt to just state that it is a different environment.

1. At the very least, you would have to say that operating a ship or a boat in the Singapore Straits would constitute as steaming in a complex environment. In August 2017, the USS John S McCain was overtaking the Liberian-flagged tanker Alnic MC while both vessels were transiting the westbound lane in the Middle Channel passage of the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme, when a collision occurred. See: NTSB Accident Report on Fatal 2017 USS John McCain Collision off Singapore - USNI News

2. There has been so many near misses for foreign submarines in Singapore / Indonesian waters that in 2017 Singapore Navy started to provide a dedicated portal for submarine safety information (SSIP) with real time information with real-time tracking of deep draft commercial vessels and hazards to prevent underwater accidents. These include seismic activities, and real-time movement of deep-sea oil rigs and very large crude carriers.

I say this because while the waters around Singapore are warmer, littoral, and amongst the most heavily trafficked, all of which makes it difficult for Singapore to have a sub depart unnoticed,

3. Agreed. It just takes skill and coordination or having a good deception plan for any submarine operator who calls on Changi. US Navy and Australian Navy submarines do regularly call on Singapore as a port, with the SSIP designed to reduce stress for sub drivers in Singapore / Indonesian waters. These waters are also full of contact noise — it is really not easy to safely sail given the presence of deep draft vessels.

those conditions also make it much more difficult to a "Red Force" sub to close and loiter/lurk in or near Singapore's waters.

4. That is not true, from our observation — numerous countries, both friendly and hostile, lurk in our waters as part of their mission. The Singapore Navy has multiple unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) in the water, during our naval exercises in the South China Sea and we know that often multiple foreign submarines are tracking our ships and each other during these times. It is just risky and that prompted the creation of SSIP. Colonel David Foo, Commanding Officer of the Submarine Squadron said, “The portal will help submarines navigate amid unmanned underwater vehicles and warship exercises out at sea.”

5. The free portal, touted as the world’s first, is housed at the RSN’s Information Fusion Centre at Changi Naval Base, and builds on the existing database at the centre. In June 2009, a Chinese submarine accidentally snagged an underwater sonar array being towed by USS John S. McCain. Not all sub drivers are equally competent and we really don’t want them to die trying to observe ship movements in our waters.

 

[OPSSG]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1309469383455117318

7. Test firing of a new anti-ship missile by IAI and the Israeli Navy, likely to be the Blue Spear or ‘Advanced Surface Attack Missile’ (ASAM).

8. The Singapore Navy is a long time user of the Mark II Gabriel missile, with the ASAM (aka Blue Spear) likely targeted for operationalisation on the six Multi-Role Combat Vessels to be retired by 2030 (to replace the RGM-84Cs on Victory Class, which will be retired) and to replace the AGM-84Cs on the five Fokker 50 MPAs, on Singapore’s F-15SGs and F-16Vs. In addition, both the Israeli and Singapore Navies may also be keen to develop a submarine launched version of the ASAM (or Blue Spear) like the UGM-84, by the 2030s. With Finland’s interest for it to replace the MTO 85M, this will ensure missile commonality on land, in air launched platforms and in the surface and underwater navy platforms.

9. The SAF is aiming to develop a coordinated anti-ship and land attack capability via tactical data links between the Singapore Navy’s ships and submarines, the Republic Singapore Air Force’s aircraft and any assets of other ad hoc coalition forces, especially with other FPDA members, like Australia or the UK. When the ASAM (or Blue Spear) is delivered to the SAF, Singapore will be able make key components missiles locally and give the tiny nation state an assured standoff over-the-horizon land or sea attack capability, against capable opposition.

 

[Joe Black]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1309469383455117318

7. Test firing of a new anti-ship missile by IAI and the Israeli Navy, likely to be the Blue Spear or ‘Advanced Surface Attack Missile’ (ASAM).

I wonder what's new with the Gabriel V AShM / ASAM (don't really like the SAM acryomn as SAM is typically used for Surface to Air Missiles) and what's its advantage over the latest gen Harpoon.

I noticed it is in a box launcher, meaning that the wings on the missile body are not foldable. Perhaps a slightly different variant with folderable wings will have to be developed if it were to launch from a sub's 533mm torp tube.

Singapore being able to build some parts locally could be a game changer for Singapore in that it will help ST to develop its guided munition capability further. Perhaps one day ST could build different kind of missiles and guided munitions locally for SAF, RSAF and RSN?

 

[OPSSG]

what's its advantage over the latest gen Harpoon.

10. There are at least 3 advantages: longer range, local content, and lower price. But I suspect it also has sophisticated waypoint navigation and advanced terminal maneuvers.

I noticed it is in a box launcher, meaning that the wings on the missile body are not foldable. Perhaps a slightly different variant with folderable wings will have to be developed if it were to launch from a sub's 533mm torp tube.

11. They don’t show the full launch sequence, so I am not sure if the wings unfold.

Singapore being able to build some parts locally could be a game changer for Singapore in that it will help ST to develop its guided munition capability further. Perhaps one day ST could build different kind of missiles and guided munitions locally for SAF, RSAF and RSN?

12. I am not sure if this is game changing; but it is good to see the defence industrial base grow.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Gabriel V sold to the Israeli Navy is likely in its "pure" version, developed by IAI over the years.
The Blue Spear, which has input from ST, is likely a variant still in development and more oriented for export.

Not so sure about the price, but the Gabriel V is supposed to give the users all the latest and greatest pieces of tech, like plug and play integration, networked operation, advanced terminal attack sequences blah blah blah, but also targets a market of nations who need to operate in littoral waters (navies operating primarily in blue waters may find the added discrimination capabilities to be an unnecessary expense, and use other weapons with inherent excellent discrimination in littoral combat).

I'd also take the weight claim with a grain of salt. The Gabriel V missile was said, at first, to be designed with the Harpoon's form factor. It is possible the Finnish MoD simply wrote kg instead of lbs.

Regarding AMAP-ADS, now renamed RAP, Rheinmetall's claim that it was the quietest system in the world is only half true.
They achieve that by using an EO sensor, which is inherently passive.
Competing systems use RF sensors, which are inherently active.
But there are 2 factors to consider:

1)The two competing systems, Iron Fist and Trophy, already had EO sensors integrated and even fielded by the time of the video. It was just not public knowledge back then.

2)EO is great for detecting a launch, but its resolution for in-flight tracking isn't so great.
RF is the exact opposite.
Therefore the best (but most expensive and difficult) practice is to use both methods with a fusion of sensors.

What systems with combined sensors do, is keep the radar off while the EO sensors scans, and then switch it on when a launch is detected.
Avoiding detection on the strategic level is no longer relevant when you're already under fire and pinpointed on the tactical level.

 

[OPSSG]

Victory-Class Missile Corvettes : Crooked Masts And Other Quirky Stuff ...

daisetsuzan.blogspot.com

Terrific blog write up on the Victory class missile corvettes by a former Singaporean Naval Officer — he hints that their retirement will be delayed to 2030, instead of earlier plans to retire them in 2025.

 

[OPSSG]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1301107239860617216

1. Modern sonar systems on the Invincible class submarines (Type 218SG) offer a number of acoustic antennas and combined signal processing for broadband and narrowband detection and analysis of target noise:

(i) While broadband detection is used to obtain an overview of the targets, and narrowband processing for detection of target characteristic frequency lines, produced by vibrations of the propulsion systems on surface ships which are radiated into the water.​

(ii) Narrowband processing is therefore essential for target analysis and classification. Frequency line information can be used to separate targets closely spaced in bearing, e.g. during target crossing situations, which cannot be resolved by the broadband passive sonar information alone. Narrowband passive sonar aims at the detection of characteristic frequency lines emitted by a target vessel. There are two related but different origins for such frequency lines:​

(a) the propulsion systems on board a naval ship; and​

(b) the physical effect of cavitation.​

Depending on the origin, it has to be distinguished between tonals, i.e. discrete frequency lines transmitted directly in the water column, and indirect frequency lines. The latter can only be detected by the application of an algorithm which searches for characteristic modulations of the broadband noise emitted by the ship.​

(iii) In addition, target bearing histories containing frequency line information may be used in the Target Motion Analysis module to infer about target course, speed and range without an own-boat manoeuvre. Therefore, narrowband passive sonar tracking provides an additional valuable source of information and enhances the capabilities of a submarine sonar and combat system.​

(iv) Two modes of operation can be used to analyze sound, namely the LOFAR signal processing which is sensitive for direct frequency lines and the DEMON signal processing which has the capability to detect the indirect frequency lines. The acronym LOFAR stands for LOw Frequency Analysis and Recording, DEMON stands for Detection of Envelope MOdulation on Noise.​

2. The combat management system that processes all the above sonar data on the ISUS suite is jointly designed by Atlas Electronik and ST Electronics that is capable of launching the SeaSpider Anti-Torpedo-Torpedo (ATT). This ATT, when fully developed provides a hardkill defence system with the aim of destroying or disabling a torpedo by explosive force. Atlas Elektronik says that SeaSpider can be employed by submarines, either from hull-mounted launch tubes, such as those typically used to employ traditional acoustic decoys, or from its torpedo tubes.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1118991827753996293

3. With low self noise, the Type 218SG’s sense-making systems that include locally developed data analytics and decision support engines (related to LOFAR and DEMON signal processing) is amplified.

4. The Swedish navy — who have in the past, greatly assisted with our MCMVs and submarine programs. “Driven by the small size of their armed forces and the extent and intricacy of their coastline, the Swedes have integrated all their services in a comprehensive littoral anti-access system,” LOC Director, NPS Senior Lecturer Dr. Kalev Sepp said. According to Sepp, the littoral is where hydrography, geography, commerce, fishing, political boundaries and claims, and military maneuver and sustainment issues converge, to complicate both the offense and the defense, and to place exceptional demands on naval, aerial, and land forces that must operate, fight, and influence events there. See: What Does It Take to Win in the Littoral?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1156508243188842498

5. In Dec 2009, Hanoi signed a deal to acquire six Project 636.3MV SSKs, providing a substantial boost to the navy’s undersea capability when compared to Indonesia's two HDW 209s and the two Malaysian Scorpene. But the Kilo class (Project 636.3MV), Nagapasa class (HDW 209) and Scorpene class are not the most advanced boats within ASEAN. The capable operational boats within ASEAN, are the two Archer class submarines that were relaunched in Sweden on 16 Jun 2009 and 20 Oct 2010. As well as 533mm (21 inch, heavy weight) WASS Black Shark torpedoes, Singapore’s Archer class submarines also carry the 400mm (16 inch) (possibly the Torped 47).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1349717954129231874

6. And this is where it gets secretive: the Archer class can launch two at the same time from a single tube. These anti-submarine torpedoes are optimized to kill enemy submarines, and enables the Archer class to fire 12 torpedoes out of its six 533mm and three 400mm torpedo tubes, before reload of tubes — in other words fire more torpedoes before reloads than the eight torpedo tubes of the Type 218SG.