Fantasy discussion on Next Gen SAF platforms & Systems

[Ahmad]

In my opinion Indonesia will be able to invade Singapore particularly after the year 2030. All of military hardware that Singapore has only can withstand from Indonesian invasion from now until the next 10 years. If we read Indonesian minimum essential force we know that Indonesia has the ability to make substantial damage to Singapore and have chance to invade it after the year 2030. Of course it is in the assumption that Indonesia will still be able to grow economically 5-6 % until it reach 2030-2035.

I dont think Indonesia will eventually do the invasion when the situation is in Indonesia advantage but rather saying its capability to do it. after 2030.

 

[Ananda]

@Ahmad, what assets that we have after 2030 that you will think have more than enough 'parity' to 'theoritically' invade Singapore, relative to what Singapore has by then in 2030 ?

Let's see,
By 2030, if what the planners plan come to fruition TNI-AU probably have 10 Fighter SQ, 6 medium Transport SQ, 6 Light Transport SQ..which Fighters probably consists more of F-16 including the V and some Flankers.
That will not be enough to invade Singapore which consists of F-15E, F-16 (that some already upgrade to V standards), and by that time already 1 operational SQ of F-35.

How about Navy, probably by 2030 we got many LCU, 12-16 LST and 8-12 LPD and if the planner got what they plan 1-2 LHD (that PAL already prepared the design). Seems large enough Amphibious assets to move one division, but as the largest archipelago we always have relative large Amphibious force. How else we move around forces between island.
However to used that to invade Singapore, we need those amphib to be escort with enough ASW Frigates/Corvettes (say 24) and at least 6 AAW Large Frigates.
Singapore Navy will at least by that time also build enough Frigates and Corvettes/Litoral forces to handle invasion forces of 6 Large AAW and 24 ASW.
Those 6 Large AAW and 24 ASW is the most we can have by 2030+, "if" we build enough budget and Industries support.

Thus by their AF and Navy in 2030, Singapore still maintain enough parity to their neighbors to make it hard any regional powers (and that Includes Australia or India) to launch invading forces.

Singapore knows their livelihood depends on trade and that means they have to make anyone think twice to invade them.
Something that even Soekarno, did not plan to do. Despite some historian says Soekarno have Territory ambition on 'Konfrontasi', I have seen enough documents that saying otherwise.
Soekarno did not have plan to Invade Malayan peninsula or Singapore. He wants British and Australian forces preoccupied defending Malaya and Singapore, while he can support 'leftist' North Borneo forces to control Sabah and Sarawak to create their own 'revolutionary' state independent from British influenced.

I put it in here, cause even at that time Soekarno know that it need large 'Global power' to invade Singapore. Japan is large global military power in WW2. Thus in this scenario only China or US that has enough power to send invading forces to Singapore.

Add:
Any invasion to Singapore in my opinion need to do what Japanese done in WW2. That's invade Malayan peninsula first. As in WW2 with British make Singapore as 'fortress Singapore', at the moment Singapore also make their defense in sense as 'fortress'. However Singapore seems learned what British failed in WW2. To defence Singapore, you have to be more mobile and do preemptively.

Let's see why I put even India is not sufficient enough (even in 2030+) to invade Singapore. If by that time (as plan) India will have 3 Aircraft carriers, but their CV is smaller than US CVN. At most Indian CV altogether can only provide 5 SQ of fighters bombers. That only enough to provide air cover for Invasions force.
Let's see what Japan done when they want to take Fortress Singapore, they done (even with larger CV force than India now or in 2030), by landed in peninsula and work down from there. British force eventough fight on peninsula, but enough of them are stay in Singapore to guard potential invasion from sea (which Japan had not done it because it's much more riskier).

Thus if a force like India (which is larger than Indonesia now or in 2030+), will have difficulty to launch invading forces from sea as Japan face in WW2. Then they have to land in Peninsula.
This in sense talking about Indian force has to 'pacified' Malaysian Armed Forces or Malaysian Armed Forces has cooperate with Indian Forces to invade Singapore. In that case Singapore force I bet will not stay waiting in Singapore..but will take preemptively to fight in Peninsula outside Singapore.

Again I put this 'scenario' just to show unless you (the invading force) are a 'Global' power, Singapore by them selves still have enough power to defend it self.

All of this off course in scenario where US already completely taking itself from Global power and only stay home. Where everyone else have no 'alliance' left and has to defend it self.
Even then I do see Singapore' still able to defend it self from other neighbors or regional powers.

It will be different if we talk about China, with US gone and they manage to completely armed their whole 'man made' island in SCS with 4 CV and 2 CVN as many predicted China will have by 2030+.

 

[Ahmad]

@Ahmad, what assets that we have after 2030 that you will think have more than enough 'parity' to 'theoritically' invade Singapore, relative to what Singapore has by then in 2030 ?

Let's see,
By 2030, if what the planners plan come to fruition TNI-AU probably have 10 Fighter SQ, 6 medium Transport SQ, 6 Light Transport SQ..which Fighters probably consists more of F-16 including the V and some Flankers.
That will not be enough to invade Singapore which consists of F-15E, F-16 (that some already upgrade to V standards), and by that time already 1 operational SQ of F-35.

How about Navy, probably by 2030 we got many LCU, 12-16 LST and 8-12 LPD and if the planner got what they plan 1-2 LHD (that PAL already prepared the design). Seems large enough Amphibious assets to move one division, but as the largest archipelago we always have relative large Amphibious force. How else we move around forces between island.
However to used that to invade Singapore, we need those amphib to be escort with enough ASW Frigates/Corvettes (say 24) and at least 6 AAW Large Frigates.
Singapore Navy will at least by that time also build enough Frigates and Corvettes/Litoral forces to handle invasion forces of 6 Large AAW and 24 ASW.
Those 6 Large AAW and 24 ASW is the most we can have by 2030+, "if" we build enough budget and Industries support.

Thus by their AF and Navy in 2030, Singapore still maintain enough parity to their neighbors to make it hard any regional powers (and that Includes Australia or India) to launch invading forces.

Singapore knows their livelihood depends on trade and that means they have to make anyone think twice to invade them.
Something that even Soekarno, did not plan to do. Despite some historian says Soekarno have Territory ambition on 'Konfrontasi', I have seen enough documents that saying otherwise.
Soekarno did not have plan to Invade Malayan peninsula or Singapore. He wants British and Australian forces preoccupied defending Malaya and Singapore, while he can support 'leftist' North Borneo forces to control Sabah and Sarawak to create their own 'revolutionary' state independent from British influenced.

I put it in here, cause even at that time Soekarno know that it need large 'Global power' to invade Singapore. Japan is large global military power in WW2. Thus in this scenario only China or US that has enough power to send invading forces to Singapore.

Add:
Any invasion to Singapore in my opinion need to do what Japanese done in WW2. That's invade Malayan peninsula first. As in WW2 with British make Singapore as 'fortress Singapore', at the moment Singapore also make their defense in sense as 'fortress'. However Singapore seems learned what British failed in WW2. To defence Singapore, you have to be more mobile and do preemptively.

Let's see why I put even India is not sufficient enough (even in 2030+) to invade Singapore. If by that time (as plan) India will have 3 Aircraft carriers, but their CV is smaller than US CVN. At most Indian CV altogether can only provide 5 SQ of fighters bombers. That only enough to provide air cover for Invasions force.
Let's see what Japan done when they want to take Fortress Singapore, they done (even with larger CV force than India now or in 2030), by landed in peninsula and work down from there. British force eventough fight on peninsula, but enough of them are stay in Singapore to guard potential invasion from sea (which Japan had not done it because it's much more riskier).

Thus if a force like India (which is larger than Indonesia now or in 2030+), will have difficulty to launch invading forces from sea as Japan face in WW2. Then they have to land in Peninsula.
This in sense talking about Indian force has to 'pacified' Malaysian Armed Forces or Malaysian Armed Forces has cooperate with Indian Forces to invade Singapore. In that case Singapore force I bet will not stay waiting in Singapore..but will take preemptively to fight in Peninsula outside Singapore.

Again I put this 'scenario' just to show unless you (the invading force) are a 'Global' power, Singapore by them selves still have enough power to defend it self.

All of this off course in scenario where US already completely taking itself from Global power and only stay home. Where everyone else have no 'alliance' left and has to defend it self.
Even then I do see Singapore' still able to defend it self from other neighbors or regional powers.

It will be different if we talk about China, with US gone and they manage to completely armed their whole 'man made' island in SCS with 4 CV and 2 CVN as many predicted China will have by 2030+.

Indonesia can put many SAM battery in Batam and bombarded the city using Rhan rocket family. Singaporean air force cannot strike Indonesian rocket launch since Batam is protected by SAM system. Large troops have also already arrive in Batam to defense the island and can be used for amphibious landing. Also I predict in 2030 Indonesia may already have mastered cruise missile technology and it can be used to attack any military target in Singapore from Batam. Mass production of Rhan rocket, SAM system, and land attack cruise missile will be a determining factor on the success of invasion. After the bombardment that can take 1 month Singaporean will lose their moral and fighting spirit. Indonesia is also quite upper hand in the sea as Singaporean navy will not be protected by their fighter jet as SAM system put in Batam can cover whole Singapore territory. On the other hand Indonesian cruise missile target Singaporean SAM battery and radar. Any fighter plane that take off from Singapore will become a target. Indonesian cruise missile also will attack all of Singaporean air force asset and infrastructure. The outcome can be different if Singapore also has large land attack cruise missile stock pile.

 

[ngatimozart]

@Ahmad if Indonesia for some reason decided to go to war with Singapore, she would have to very seriously consider the reaction of Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Most likely Japan would not be very happy either. Of those Australia would most likely have the most angry reaction and Indonesia may find itself fighting a war on two fronts. New Zealand would most likely support Singapore and Australia as well, diplomatically and militarily.

If other countries are drawn in, then a regional wide war could result, meaning the involvement of outside players which would change the region and may result in negative consequences for Indonesia.

 

[Ananda]

Indonesia can put many SAM battery in Batam and bombarded the city using Rhan rocket family. Singaporean air force cannot strike Indonesian rocket launch since Batam is protected by SAM system. Large troops have also already arrive in Batam to defense the island and can be used for amphibious landing. Also I predict in 2030 Indonesia may already have mastered cruise missile technology and it can be used to attack any military target in Singapore from Batam. Mass production of Rhan rocket, SAM system, and land attack cruise missile will be a determining factor on the success of invasion.

Ok @Ahmad. Ngati already put diplomatic repurcasion in the Region if we invade Singapore.
But let's entertain your 'scenario' that this is between Indonesia and Singapore alone, and nobody else involve.

Let's see on missile. Cruise Missiles ?..do we have cruise missiles program ? We are now only building 122mm unguided rocket, and we are not in the next stage of building guided rockets yet. Where are not having running program yet on guided missile whether it's SSM or SAM.
How do you so sure by 2030 we already have build our own SSM, SAM, and Cruise Missiles. Because if you want to invade another nation you have to make sure your own industries capable to build their own missiles ? We are not putting much budget on missile R&D..we are only beginning to build capabilities to produce our own propellant..we do not have working guidance system and I really doubt we can have our own cruise missiles at only a decade from now. SSM probably, since it's next stage after guided rockets.
Unless we spend at least 5% or more of our GDP on missile development like what Iran and North Korea did..which we even not spend 2% of our GDP on military budget..how we are going to spend on missile R&D that much ?
Cause if you want to build your own missiles, then you have to build your R&D by your own. Look at LAPAN road maps for building satellite launch vehicle. Initially by 2019 (this year) LAPAN should already tested the main rocket..but until know they are only testing RX450 which basically is the booster for that launch vehicle. They are not testing on main rockets because they haven't given enough budget on R&D..thus they have to prioritize their budget and slow down the pace.
All of this shown, until now we are not investing much on rocket and missile R&D.

But let's entertaint your scenario again somehow by 2030 we already have enough our own Guided Rocket, SSM, SAM and Cruise Missiles. You say by having enough SAM in Batam island, it will 'pacified' Singapore AF since those SAM can track the Fighter taking off and shoot them down in take off.
Well..where did I hear that argument ? Oo Right..that the Argument Syria has on having SAM network tracking Israel fighters in their AB. Guess what ..it didn't work like that. Since Israel has air superiority and electronic warfare (EW) superiority.

Do we have Air Superiority by 2030 against Singapore ? Do we have EW superiority ? Singapore is Israel student, and they have effective EW since the 90's..and we only begin playing with EW. In sense we are behind at least two decades on EW. Is EW Important ? Well look at desert Storm..Saddam SAM system easily destroyed due to superior EW by US.
Look how Israel EW silence Syrian (recently Iran's in Syria) radar system and their SAM.

China now put so much missile toward Taiwan..but they also make sure those missiles guarded by the AF that are much larger than Taiwan has..if not..then Taiwan AF can silence them.
Modern warfare already shown that Air Superiority and EW superiority is the 'key' to win. Especially in early stage of engagement.
Are we having both Air and Electronics superiority over Singapore by 2030 ? I don't think so..at best we only catching up.

Singapore has build their force and maintain 'edge' regionally on the matter that Important..Air and Electronics Warfare..
Incidently seems you forgot that Singapore has build their own anti rocket and missile grid like Iron Dome and their Aster 30 system (which also can target our Fighters that closing in on them).

That's why I said before only 'Global' power (with have large Air Power with large EW capabilities) that can overwhelmed Singapore defense. None of their neighbors (that's include us or even Australia) or even regional powers like India can sufficiently bring enough Air Power with enough EW capacity to Singapore door step to overwhelmed their defense.

Off course your scenario at war between us and Singapore alone will not happen in real world. Like Ngati says..it will change balance of power in region..and nobody likes that.

And last thing..like I said in earlier post..even Soekarno in 'Konfrontasi' era did not have plan to invade Peninsula Malaya and Singapore..it's simply to much effort.
That's in the era where Indonesia at that time have 'relatively' larger military forced compared to the neighbors.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: Why Ahmad’s 2 prior posts are not logical.

I see that certain people are misinformed about the gap in the capabilities of the TNI and the SAF (which cannot be closed by 2030). Ahmad’s 2 prior posts are not logical from a geo-political or a military perspective, for these reasons:

One, from a geo-political perspective, Singapore would want to avoid war. Currently, our bilateral relations are so good that Indonesia’s President Jokowi is attending our 9 August 2019 National Day celebrations.

Indonesia can put many SAM battery in Batam

Two, you are using the wrong tactics. The TNI is not so stupid to station SAMs in Batam, as Batam is within range of Singapore 155mm artillery and HIMARS batteries, which means we don’t need to use the RSAF to attack your SAM sites in Batam. The newest TNI tri-service base inaugurated in Dec 2018, is in Natuna Besar, over 580 km from Singapore. BTW, Batam is already under a SAM system, as it within the detection range of Singapore’s integrated and networked SAM system. Singapore has 2 radar-equipped aerostats that provide surveillance of air and sea as far as 200 km (125 mi.) away. Each aerostat is operated by just eight people, all on the ground. These investments will ensure continuous and high quality radar coverage even without its G550s taking off.

bombarded the city using Rhan rocket family.

Three, R-han’s 122mm range is less than 35km; whereas our 155mm artillery’s range is more than 44km and our HIMARS range is 72km. The Donbass conflict between Ukraine and Russia has shown that artillery is still king on the battlefield. While no Singapore army base is safe from a battery of R-hans firing bomblets, likewise Singapore’s counter artillery strikes are extremely hard to prevent. You should note that within seconds of firing, Singapore’s artillery hunting radars (see: the new Safari radar system) would detect and calculate the origin of these 122mm R-han rockets — to enable accurate and speedy counter battery fire. Our older Arthur artillery hunting radar capability was deployed to Afghanistan (see Mindef’s video on this deployment).

• The TNI will not station weapon systems within 72km of Singapore (i.e. within range of our HIMARS rockets), if their goal is to attack Singapore.
• Each HIMARS can fire 6 M31 unitary rockets simultaneously at multiple targets, including at enemy air defence systems. The SAF’s HIMARS Battery Command Post took ergonomics into consideration to increase crew endurance for sustained operations.
• Israeli companies, like: (i) Rafael have exported the SPIKE NLOS (30 km range) missile system to South Korea; and (ii) UVision offers Loitering Munitions (LM). The HERO series is comprised of advanced LM systems (Hero-20, Hero-30, Hero-70, Hero-120, Hero-250, Hero-400EC, Hero-900, and Hero-1250), designed for different missions at various ranges using warheads of various types. The Hero 400EC (a 2.1-meter, 40 kg LM with a speed of 50-100 knots that can operate up to 150 km from its launcher), which can be launched from a launcher, a vehicle or a ship. UVision has partnered with Raytheon in order to adapt UVisions' Hero-30 LM for the US. This type of LM has an endurance of 2 hours, and a multi-purpose warhead, and includes concrete piercing, anti-tank, and anti-personnel that handle different types of targets. The Hero-400EC provides for mid-air abort, automatic re-entry into loitering mode, or return to the recovery area using a parachute. While Singapore is not known to officially operate LMs, like the IAI Harop or the Hero 400EC, these were used to kill SAM Systems in Syria.

​

• To maximise realism in training, the SAF Wargame Centre also uses battle simulations to create enemy land forces on plasma screens that test how our operations staff cope with challenging scenarios such as having more targets than assets to strike, which forces commanders to prioritise targets, to fully use the integrated strike capability, with our 155mm artillery, HIMARS, fighters and AH-64D Apaches.

Singaporean air force cannot strike Indonesian rocket launch since Batam is protected by SAM system.

Four, this sort of scenario does not make tactical sense — the distance between Batam and Singapore is less than 30km.

Large troops have also already arrive in Batam to defense the island and can be used for amphibious landing.

Five, almost every landing craft the aggressor uses to carry troops to invade Singapore by sailing across the Straits of Singapore will be sunk by our Apache helicopters, our anti-tank missiles or by our tanks. I respect the TNI and we are sure that the TNI knows that such an attack is only possible at a very, very high cost in casualties to Indonesian troops even as they are forming up (less than 30% chance of survival). Beyond the above limitations, you will need to discuss the protection of the logistics lines by sea needed to invade Singapore. To meet the conventional threat presented by Singapore's forces, the TNI will need to meet and exceed both the RSAF and the Singapore Navy operating in the 3 dimensions of air warfare, surface warfare, and underwater warfare before they can move or sustain their invasion forces near the Singapore Straits.

in 2030 Indonesia may already have mastered cruise missile technology and it can be used to attack any military target in Singapore from Batam.

Six, if you have cruise missiles, they need to be stationed far away and if fired at Singapore, they will be intercepted by our Aster 30 missiles, cued by our integrated and networked air defence system.

Plus we also have harpoon missiles on our ships and aircraft, like the Fokker 50 MPA, that can be used for land attack of any aggressor cruise missile launch sites.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: Educating Ahmad on the RSAF’s baseline capability as a Tertiary Air Force

Mass production of Rhan rocket, SAM system, and land attack cruise missile will be a determining factor on the success of invasion. After the bombardment that can take 1 month Singaporean will lose their moral... On the other hand Indonesian cruise missile target Singaporean SAM battery and radar... Indonesian cruise missile also will attack all of Singaporean air force asset and infrastructure.

Seven, Singapore will not sit back while we are under attack for a month. Do you know how much damage a single 76mm naval gun can do in 1 minute? We have more naval capabilities than you can imagine; and it will be the aggressor’s morale that will be poor from the damage inflicted after a month of hostilities. Beyond the navy, since 1987 the RSAF is the only tertiary air force in Southeast Asia (SEA), which means any SAM system you employ is only a road bump. The RSAF is an air force with the capability to detect, track and engage airborne, naval and ground targets that is a golden mile ahead of any other air force in SEA. Buying more fighters does not mean becoming more capable. By 2030, Singapore’s capability would have grown. At that time, we would be operating 60 F-16Vs, 40 F-15SGs, and a few F-35s (1st order of 4 placed in 2019), plus the following force multipliers:

(i) The RSAF is the only air force in SEA with an AWAC squadron that can provide coverage (with 4 G550 CAEWs), giving data-linked RSAF pilots situational awareness. Sunho Beck, writing in Aviation Week (1 Oct 2007) said that the G550 CAEW can detect fighter sized targets up to 370 km away and carries unique dual-band, phased-array radar with 2 L-band side antennas and 2 S-band end antennas which are connected to a common radar unit. The system software has been optimised by DSTA and the local defence industry.

(ii) The RSAF has acquired a squadron of 6 A330MRTT (replacing the older KC-135Rs) and again, it is only the tanker squadron in SEA that have crews that have been deployed in a theatre of war (in support of the American led Operation Enduring Freedom). The RSAF deployed KC-135R tankers (in 5 deployments for 3 month stretches each time) in support of coalition forces in Iraqi, between 2004 and 2008, and offloaded 14 million pounds of fuel.

(iii) The RSAF is the only air force in SEA capable of conducting Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) missions and it also has an Electronic Warfare (EW) capability. While it is known that the RSAF takes part in Red Flag but what is lesser known is that the RSAF also takes part in other exercises which is SEAD oriented. Further, the F-15SGs are AESA radar equipped and are known to have internal EW systems. BTW, the RSAF has not fully declassified its SEAD and EW capabilities, that's why this capability is not often described.

(iv) With detachments based in Australia (basic wings course), France (advanced jet training) and the US (for F-15SG and F-16C/D training), the RSAF's pilots certainly are trained to western standards. Each RSAF squadron has more actual flight hours and simulator hours than any other squadron in any other air force in SEA. I shall not bother to list the countries that RSAF pilots train with and against in Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) in various overseas exercises, as there are too many. IMHO, RSAF pilots have lots of DACT experience that can't be matched by other air forces in SEA.

(v) The RSAF is also the largest and most advanced UAV operator in SEA. The RSAF is a operator of the Hermes 450 and the Heron 1 (replacing the Searcher IIs). The SAF’s UAVs have gone to war in Afghanistan and in the past also deployed to Indonesia to resolve the Mapenduma hostage crisis in 1996 (at the request of the TNI), making the RSAF the air force with the most operationally experienced UAV teams and with the most advanced ISR capabilities in SEA.

Eight, since November 2014, the SAF has deployed planners, liaison officers, intelligence fusion officers, medical teams, trainers, imagery analysis teams, and KC-135Rs for use against the terror group, Islamic State (IS) alongside Australian and NZ forces (in support of the American led coalition for Operation Gallant Phoenix). As many in DT may remember, the Singapore Navy deployed our ships to fight pirates under CTF-151 and in other missions in the Northern Arabian Gulf (from 2003 to 2008) to defend the Iraqi oil platforms (which were subject to suicide attacks by dhows in April 2004), as part of a US led coalition. As one American noted:

"One of the great undiscussed aspects of the coalition of the willing for Iraq has been the steady contribution of Singapore's Navy for security for the Iraqi oil platforms KAAOT and ABOT... specifically providing the Iraqi Navy with a base at sea for training and operations. This isn't a small thing, by using large amphibious ships as forward bases, the Iraqi Navy saves 3 days round trip to and from port for provisions..."​

I have spoken to ADMk2 on the trends in Australian and Singaporean force development over the last few years. We agree that both countries seem to be developing complementary capabilities and this means different but complementary equipment, for slightly different roles. Both Defence Ministers do consult each other for overseas deployments, engage in burden sharing for operations, and have formalized this as an annual meeting (the relationship has grown by leaps and bounds since East Timor). Case in point, RAAF acquires Growlers and RSAF acquires the F-15SG, giving us complementary aircraft to form a combined strike package and the same or similar logic may apply to the F-35 or the A330 MRTT acquisitions by the two respective air forces. Or the acquisition of the Canberra Class and the future JMMS, LHDs by our two navies, which provide complementary naval capabilities for coalition action for a wider range of contingencies — the interested public in Indonesia should support the TNI to increase interoperability with us and join our coalition to enhance Indonesian security rather than thinking like a fanboy.

The outcome can be different if Singapore also has large land attack cruise missile stock pile.

Nine, we have in our inventory air and sea launched Harpoon missiles (over 270 km range), the XM395 by Orbital ATK and a stock pile of glide bombs like:

• the GBU-39 small diameter bomb (over 70 km range), the GBU-53/B small diameter bombs II (over 110 km range), which are much cheaper than the Harpoon; and the AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon (over 130 km range), to be used with recon pods, which work together with to kill SAM systems at stand-off ranges, and other classified surface attack capabilities. Land attack generally uses some sort of navigational guidance, like INS, GPS, Terrain Contour Matching, etc to get the missile to the target. GPS in particular will give good accuracy for stationary targets.

• As Ananda has pointed out, the RSAF’s control of the air, control of the electromagnetic spectrum and effective use of LO platforms sets the stage for additional aerial operations, and it also sets the conditions for the SAF’s naval or ground forces to operate to their full combat potential without substantial interruption of their scheme of maneuver from enemy air attacks or attacks using the electromagnetic spectrum.

• In 2013, the then Chief of the USAF's Pacific Air Forces Gen. Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle, in an interview said: “Singapore is doing very innovative things with their F-15s, notably in evolving the capabilities of the aircraft to contribute to maritime defense and security. We are looking very carefully at their innovations and can leverage their approach and thinking as well,” he said. “This will certainly grow as we introduce the fleet of F-35s in the Pacific where cross national collaboration is built in.”

- One can imagine F-15SGs, using their AESA radars or recon pods (eg. the DB-110 Airborne Reconnaissance System or the RecceLite XR, which enable its users to look at, or scan areas of interest over 140km away) and distributing information over datalinks providing updated, over the horizon targeting information for the Formidable-class frigates.
- Or working with the Type 218SG submarines in a similar fashion.
- Or do the same for Australia's Hobart-class Air Warfare destroyers in a future coalition ops scenario.​

• Due to the RSAF’s advanced strike capabilities, within 1 month of initiation of hostilities by Indonesia, 1/2 of TNI-AL’s more capable warships will be at the bottom of the sea and the majority of the TNI-AU’s fighters will be grounded (due to Singapore’s space based ISR and EW capabilities on air and sea platforms).

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: Points support Ananda’s Posts

@Ahmad if Indonesia for some reason decided to go to war with Singapore, she would have to very seriously consider the reaction of Australia, New Zealand and the UK... Of those Australia would most likely have the most angry reaction and Indonesia may find itself fighting a war on two fronts...

If other countries are drawn in... may result in negative consequences for Indonesia.

Thank you all for the replies to point out the problems. Let me share my supporting points.

Ok @Ahmad. Ngati already put diplomatic repercussions...

One, Singapore aligns our interests with that of Australia, France, Germany, US, NZ and so on. Indonesia, as a G20 member, and the most populous country in ASEAN, is the leader of ASEAN. While the rotating ASEAN chair controls the agenda, Indonesia's leadership will affect ASEAN's effectiveness.

But let's entertain your 'scenario' that this is between Indonesia and Singapore alone...

Two, the fight alone scenario to defend Singapore from a full on invasion by the TNI by 2030 is very unrealistic (partly because the TNI does not have the logistics for an invasion nor the desire to do so). IMHO, attacking Singapore with 1 to 2 divisions in high intensity warfare may lead to at best a stalemate (and external intervention by the US, Australia, NZ and UK) or a loss for the aggressor.

...probably by 2030 we got many LCU, 12-16 LST and 8-12 LPD and if the planner got what they plan 1-2 LHD (that PAL already prepared the design). Seems large enough Amphibious assets to move one division...

However to used that to invade Singapore, we need those amphib to be escort with enough ASW Frigates/Corvettes (say 24) and at least 6 AAW Large Frigates...

Three, any attack in 2030 under Ahmad‘s proposed scenario without first sinking the very capable Singapore Navy and our 4 Type 218SG submarines, is doomed to failure. Further, the SAF with 1 to 2 divisions in defence will outnumber a division of attackers as they attempt to land; and we will be able to counter attack to their depth with our other forces not used for defence. IMO it’s always possible to kill some Singaporeans, while we prepare for our counter attack. But our counter attack to the depth of the aggressor, is designed to break the will of the aggressor.

Indonesia has acquired Yakhont from Russia and already test it, the range is 300+ km. And also already aquired C-705 Chinese missile technology to produce at Indonesia, the range is 100+ km.

Some said that Indonesia want to produce up to 1000 C-705...

But, with this progress from Indonesia, will it take serious to capability Singapore Air Force ?

Four, while it is not possible for Singapore to defend against 1,000 cruise missiles, it is also not likely that Indonesia will build or buy 1,000 cruise missiles. But we have the naval capability defend against a limited number of cruise missiles and I would like to point out that:

• By 2030, the Singapore Navy would operate 4x 2,200 ton Invincible Class submarines (Type 218SG), 6x 3,200 ton Formidable Class frigates (equipped with up to 24 Harpoon missiles, and 32 Aster missiles, each), and 8x 1,200 ton Independence Class LMVs (equipped with 12 MICA VL each); and started the ship building program for the 5,000 ton MRCVs — which can attack land targets (using Harpoon missiles) or conduct a limited defence against cruise missiles (using Aster and MICA missiles), should the need arise. The 130m x 18m MRCV will be armed with a 76/62 mm naval gun, a vertical launch system (rendering shows up to 38 cells), two-30 mm remotely controlled and two-12.7 mm guns, surface-to-surface missile launchers, two-chaff decoy launchers and two-anti torpedo decoy launchers, as well as space for a 15-ton helicopter and unmanned surface and air systems capabilities.

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• IMO, there is no need for Indonesia to buy 1,000 cruise missiles for Singapore to take the TNI-AU seriously — both countries can grow stronger together. The SAF gains tremendously by training with the TNI, as we have a conscript army, whereas, the TNI is a professional army. We also share a maritime border with Indonesia and we need your help to patrol these waters together. Having a stronger naval presence for Indonesia (well within your country's capability with the current size of Indonesia's economy), is key to ensuring that your country is less affected by China’s 9-dash line claims in West Natuna.

​

• And as a leader of ASEAN, a strong Indonesia can serve to mediate between hostile parties (be it intra-ASEAN hostility or with China or Taiwan) over disputes in the South China Sea. Like China, Vietnam is also keen to push back against other claimants.

In my opinion Indonesia will be able to invade Singapore particularly after the year 2030... If we read Indonesian minimum essential force we know that Indonesia has the ability to make substantial damage to Singapore and have chance to invade it after the year 2030...

Five, the SAF regularly trains to kill rocket systems, with a C4ISR system that features real-time updates of the ground situation picture by integrating the Heron 1 video feeds into an augmented reality display. Using advanced graphics rendering technology, static geographical data (e.g. landmarks, road names, building types, vegetation) are overlaid on top of the real-time video captured by the UAV. Multiple moving enemy targets, such as tanks and multiple launch rocket systems, employing “shoot and scoot” tactics can be destroyed in a single pass by fighters, AH-64D attack helicopters, or by our HIMARS batteries. We have 6 divisions (2Pdf, 3rd, 6th, 9th Divisions and AOR in 21st and 25th Divisions) and in many war scenarios, we only need 1 to 2 divisions to defend Singapore, leaving 3 divisions for rotational deployment for a forward defence scenario.

• Invading Singapore means an aggressor has to have the logistics ability bring at least 3 Mechanized divisions for the main effort; and a marine division for the minor effort. The aggressor will need the logistics ability to deliver 200 to 280 MBTS, in face of determined opposition by the SAF, to fight the SAF in echelon, for their main invasion effort (and the aggressor will also have to deploy 10 to 14 fighter squadrons as a tertiary air force), if they hope to have a chance to win. It’s logistics that is killer, just to keep these number of people supplied (see the link provided on the Desert Shield logistics and the staging required). The division is the lowest organizational level at which military operations can be conducted and self-supported for an extended period of time. Seven US Army divisions deployed to Saudi Arabia for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm — with Singapore contributing a medical team. The deployment of the US Army’s 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), involved 18,000 soldiers, 1,575 tracked vehicles, 3,500 wheeled vehicles, 90 helicopters and the division's supporting equipment and supplies. The sea deployment of the division's heavy equipment required seven fast sealift ships (FSS) and three roll on/roll off (RO/RO) ships.
• But the issue is not just logistics but the time and space required to deploy such a large number of troops — which will trigger intelligence alarm bells by all major powers.

Indonesia does not have the logistics and no other ASEAN country is planning to host tens of thousands of foreign troops to invade Singapore.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: Spending for deterrence

But let's entertaint your scenario again somehow by 2030 we already have enough our own Guided Rocket, SSM, SAM and Cruise Missiles. You say by having enough SAM in Batam island, it will 'pacified' Singapore AF since those SAM can track the Fighter taking off and shoot them down in take off.

Six, without air superiority, no competent general will try to conduct an amphibious landing via the Singapore Straits as a main effort (as the ammo usage rate, the death rate and WIA rate for an aggressor would overwhelm their css and medical support). It will be a turkey shoot of the aggressors (for the SAF as defenders); and we have some limited but additional capability in this area. The lack of realism for military aspect of invading Singapore from Batam is covered by my prior 2 posts.

Well..where did I hear that argument ? Oo Right..that the Argument Syria has on having SAM network tracking Israel fighters in their AB. Guess what ..it didn't work like that. Since Israel has air superiority and electronic warfare (EW) superiority.

Seven, we are agreed. The Israelis also sell their EW solutions, as this video below shows.

Do we have Air Superiority by 2030 against Singapore ? Do we have EW superiority ? Singapore is Israel student, and they have effective EW since the 90's..and we only begin playing with EW...Well look at desert Storm... Saddam SAM system easily destroyed due to superior EW by US.

Look how Israel EW silence Syrian (recently Iran's in Syria) radar system...

Eight, agreed, except that we are not as capable: (1) in defence science as France, Germany, Israel or the US; and (2) our EW and ISR capabilities for attack are much less than Australia’s substantial capabilities with their Growlers, P8As, Wedge-tail, JORN, their G550 EW aircraft and so on.

Modern warfare already shown that Air Superiority and EW superiority is the 'key' to win. Especially in early stage of engagement. Are we having both Air and Electronics superiority over Singapore by 2030 ? I don't think so..at best we only catching up. Singapore has build their force and maintain 'edge' regionally on the matter that Important..Air and Electronics Warfare.

Incidentally seems you forgot that Singapore has build their own anti rocket and missile grid like Iron Dome and their Aster 30 system (which also can target our Fighters that closing in on them).

That's why I said before only 'Global' power (with have large Air Power with large EW capabilities) that can overwhelmed Singapore defense. None of their neighbors (that's include us or even Australia)... can sufficiently bring enough Air Power with enough EW capacity to Singapore door step to overwhelmed their defense...

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/675183216014290946

Nine, agreed and details of EW, intelligence and air power concepts can be found in AirPower 101.

Unless we spend at least 5% or more of our GDP on missile development like what Iran and North Korea did..which we even not spend 2% of our GDP on military budget...

They are not testing on main rockets because they haven't given enough budget on R&D..thus they have to prioritize... until now we are not investing much on rocket and missile R&D.

Ten, Singapore used to spend up to 5% of our GDP on defence in the early days. Today, we spend about 3% — because the capability gap viz-a-viz hostile parties like Malaysia is growing wider, each year (to my surprise). In fact, the SAF does not want to appear too capable. We just need to show enough to deter Malaysia (who are likely to be hostile for the next 3 years with Dr M as PM). Good intelligence enabled Singapore to slow down our replacement rate for cutting-edge equipment.

Eleven, Indonesians can’t arbitrarily decide to attack Singapore, as at any time some important Indonesians are staying here. For example, in June 2019 former first lady Ani Yudhoyono, passed away in Singapore (as she came here for medical treatment), with former president Yudhoyono by her side. Jokowi’s son also studied in Singapore for years and graduated from a prestigious Singapore school in 2014.

(i) Acting as a friendly power, Singapore had given Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) 19 SF-260s and other equipment; plus we helped train your Leopard 2 tank instructors. After the Dec 2004 Tsunami, the SAF deploying over a 1,500 personnel, was the first on Meulaboh to deliver aid. After Indonesia’s AirAsia plane QZ8501 crashed into the Java Sea on 28 Dec 2014, the Singapore Navy joined the search and found the main fuselage but Indonesian behaviour continues to be problematic (eg. Indonesia is intercepting aircraft – outside their airspace – International Ops 2019 – OPSGROUP). IMHO, Singapore would not be able to play a constructive role in helping the TNI and Indonesia, if we were not capable of defending ourselves. Ironically, Singapore's strength enables us to have the confidence to give the Indonesians help in their time of need and helps build bridges between the two countries.​

(ii) We are also the largest investor in Indonesia. If the largest investor, stops new investments, your Indonesia’s growth will be affected. If the largest investor starts selling Indonesian assets, investor sentiment would change. As such, why would anyone in Indonesia even consider invading Singapore? If there is an attack on Singapore by the TNI, Indonesia’s FDI inflow will dry up within months — this will hurt TNI’s long term funding for its modernisation efforts.​

Twelve, the port in Singapore is a global trans-shipment hub, and any attack on Singapore from Batam would hurt trade in Asia and Oceania; and countries such as Australia, China, France, UK, US, India, Japan, and S. Korea will be concerned and would more than likely offer to assist in securing this vital SLOC. The port of Singapore is so important that there are dozens of military liaison officers from many countries stationed at Changi RHCC and Information Fusion Centre, where we can conduct large-scale multinational operations at short notice.
.

 

[Todjaeger]

There are two other important considerations regarding the defence of Singapore (and in reality apply anywhere) the first of these is the depth of defence available. Due to the size and nature of the geography in and around Singapore, there really is no depth available for defence within Singapore, which in turn forces defence planning to anticipate engaging hostile forces either immediately upon entry to Singaporean territory, or preferably engage in a forward defence with hostiles being engaged before they are within Singapore's airspace, home waters, or on Singapore's soil.

The other important consideration has to do with the changing face of warfare itself, and that is the importance of gaining and maintaining information superiority. Of the ASEAN member-nations, Singapore appears to have invested the most resources as well as devoted the most effort into developing C4ISR capabilities which could achieve and maintain information superiority

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: The Big Picture

Thanks for sharing your views. Let me add a few more points below to add context on how threats to Singapore’s interests are being mitigated:

There was one strategy that failed miserably, 75 years ago today.

Today we commemorate the capitulation of Singapore Island in 1942 when nearly 80,000 allied troops surrendered to a very much smaller Japanese force and entered into just over 31/2 years of miserable captivity from which many did not return...

One, as WWII has shown, a good defence plan for Malaya (against the then external Japanese invasion from the north) from should start at the appropriate geographical choke point in Thai territory (see Appendix 2 for Map of the opening blows in the Pointer Monograph on page 64). The Imperial Japanese Army landed in Thai territory and proceed to march south. There is also a Pointer Monograph on the mistakes in the Malayan Campaign, including a chapter on operational art shortcomings.

...there really is no depth available for defence within Singapore, which in turn forces defence planning to anticipate engaging hostile forces either immediately upon entry to Singaporean territory, or preferably engage in a forward defence with hostiles being engaged before they are within Singapore's airspace, home waters, or on Singapore's soil.

Two, on 15 February 1942, the British Imperial garrison of Singapore, surrendered to a numerically smaller Japanese assault force. Learning from past mistakes, Singapore understands that to be fore-warned is to be fore-armed. For example:

• Uncovering of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 2001 was by a tip-off from the public. However, terrorists are adapting their tactics to evade detection and this includes the use of encrypted messaging applications. Most of the weapons used by militants during the recent conflict in Marawi came across the sea.
• The 2016 terrorist plot from Batam, Indonesia was thwarted by the authorities through intelligence sharing. The 6 suspects, who were members of an ISIS -linked cell, had planned a rocket attack on Marina Bay from Batam. The suicide attacks in Surabaya in May 2018, and the June 2016 Puchong nightclub attacks in Malaysia, are grave warnings that terrorism can become endemic in this region.
• More troubling is Malaysia’s in-direct support for a Hamas rocket engineer Dr Fadi Mohammad al-Batsh to operate with impunity in KL (who was assassinated on 21 April 2018 near his residence in KL). In 2019, Malaysia also witnessed a series of successive visits by high-ranking delegations from Hamas, indicating the growing ties between these two parties at a time when the movement is facing a tight political siege by many Arab countries. Hamas’ most recent visit to Malaysia came under the chairmanship of its former head of office, Khaled Meshaal. The program was crowded with meetings between Hamas’ leaders, the Malaysian government and opposition political leaders, in a rare scene among the movement’s visits to various countries. See also: Hamas considers Malaysia its gateway to Asia and Malaysia to open embassy to Palestine

Three, beyond terrorists from Malaysia and Indonesia, ISIS is trying establish their Caliphate in the Philippines. ASPI has a report, The Marawi crisis—urban conflict and information operations, that examines both the capability aspects of kinetic hard power and the lessons from soft-power information operations. For a US SOTF 511 perspective, see: Experimenting With the Art of Mission Command. Externally, SOTF 511 sent liaisons to the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) Logistics Support Facility in Singapore to ensure smooth logistics support. Interagency liaisons at SOCPAC and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii improved deconfliction with other government stakeholders. This helped build trust and cooperation between SOCPAC, SOTF 511 and its interagency partners.

• The 2017 Battle of Marawi also demonstrated that it takes night fighting equipment, a high standard of C3, combat trauma management and interoperability with supporting arms (such as, precise joint fires and armoured engineers) to fight and win in the urban environment — sadly things which are lacking for the AFP.
• One Company from the AFP’s 2nd Infantry Division employed over 10,000 mortar rounds in 3 months. Offensive support came primarily in the form of Close Air Support, intimate support from mortars, and employing a 105mm gun in a direct fire role. Despite the extraordinary firepower was employed to enable the seizure of Marawi City, the AFP took a long time to dominate the avenues of approach (resulting in isolated initial forces), until their combat engineers were able to help position their armour. ‘Murder holes’ were also utilised in stairwells. Knowing the AFP would have to make entry to clear the building, the ISIS snipers would cut a hole through the stair well and sit off some distance. Once the AFP made entry the ISIS sniper would have a clear line of sight of the door way and stairwell entry allowing him to score a centre of mass hit.
• ISIS laid siege to Marawi City on 23 May 2017, lasting 153 days and becoming the longest urban war in Philippine history. The AFP had to talk to religious leaders and local leaders to ask non-combatants to leave on their own accord. In some cases to rescue hostages, including the delivery of handphones by drones to these hostages.
• It took the Philippines at least twice as long as comparable urban battles and attributable to capability shortfalls, and training, which the AFP acknowledged. Before AFP troops went sent into retake the city, troops were given 2 weeks of urban warfare training. To make matters worse, AFP platoons had not conducted extensive training in combat trauma management, and their Role 2 and Role 3 equivalent medical facilities were not accustomed to the very high volume of casualties during urban fighting—a significant number of which were non-battle injuries.
• It took the Philippines at least twice as long as comparable urban battles and attributable to capability shortfalls, and training, which the AFP acknowledged. In the Battle of Marawi, they ran out of certain types of ammunition and was fortunate that the US was willing to resupply them at short notice. The AFP also have very limited access to military grade UAVs, encrypted communications and most crucially, night fighting equipment (NFE); indeed, the only forces well equipped with NFE were those from Philippine SOCOMD and MARSOG. This meant the majority of forces were static at night. Lack of proper equipment slowed operational tempo and also resulted in 53 unnecessary AFP deaths in the Battle of Marawi. There were instances where their initial reinforcements were trapped for up to 5 days. With the help of outside partners such as Australia, Singapore and the US, the AFP sought to address their short comings. SAF's assistance included sending a C-130H to transport humanitarian supplies, use of the SAF's urban training villages for AFP troops, and a detachment of UAVs to enhance the AFP's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
• The Australian documentary below explains the Australian train and assist program and why this remains a breeding ground for ISIS. Official death toll for the battle in Marawi stood at 1,131 (919 terrorists and 165 soldiers and policemen) with over 1000 injured and also took the lives of 47 civilians.

• Given the complexity of the region, it is accurate to say that the security problems faced by Singapore go beyond the traditional need for intelligence on state actors from the past and we cannot predict the deployments the SAF is required to undertake.
• If you told a Singaporean conscript in 1989, that 1,500 SAF personnel (both regulars and conscripts) would as ‘a fist of fury, reach out as a hand of hope’ to help Aceh after the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, or that another 1,500 have operated under CTF 151 as part of the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden, or that more would deploy to combat theatres in Afghanistan (492), and Iraq (998), or that Singapore would offer assistance to counter terrorists in the Philippines, he would think you are crazy.

Four in 2018, Singapore’s information fusion centre (IFC) tracked a fishing boat and worked with the TNI to facilitate her capture in the waters off Batam, and a tonne of crystal methamphetamine was discovered on board. Today's threats faced are multi-faceted, trans-national and complex. Singapore understands the need to have the ability to gather information to conduct counter-terrorism operations against both state and non-state actors. Singapore is not shy about working with or learning from others. The SAF engages in intelligence-sharing with many ADMM Plus countries, including Indonesia, the United States, and Australia.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: Details Matter
Five, piracy is a threat although the number of incidents have dropped, with a 92% decrease in piracy incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in 2015-2018, according to the Information Fusion Centre. Recently shipping companies have been advised to implement Security Level 3 — the highest state of alertness under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code — effective from 2200hrs local time 2 July 2019 by Beijing, to increase the security level on ships transiting the Strait of Malacca.

• While Beijing did not specify the reasons for the increased alert level, an internal email alert suggested the threat was from Indonesian parties.
• On 22 Jul 2019 morning, seven pirates boarded a Korean flagged ship, the CK Bluebell and made off with US$13,000 (S$17,700) and belongings including mobile phones, clothes and shoes from the 22-strong crew, South Korea's Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries said (Read more at Pirates attack South Korean cargo ship in South China Sea).
• Working with other countries and agencies will enable us to provide early warning for threats to Singapore and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, allowing authorities to promptly apprehend criminals, pirates or terrorist suspects.

The other important consideration has to do with the changing face of warfare itself, and that is the importance of gaining and maintaining information superiority. Of the ASEAN member-nations, Singapore appears to have invested the most resources as well as devoted the most effort into developing C4ISR capabilities which could achieve and maintain information superiority.

Six, agreed on the importance of C4ISR. The Information Fusion Centre, based in Singapore is an example of such investment.

Seven, beyond forward defence, investing in C4ISR and good intelligence, Singapore also invests in defence science to mitigate risk. The DSO National Laboratories (DSO) is the national defense research agency set up in 1972. Originally named the Electronics Test Centre, it was renamed in 1977 to the Defence Science Organization. Besides setting up DSO, Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), and various local companies to harnesses and exploits science and technology, we have adopted a systems engineering approach. For example, DSTA undertakes design, development, acquisition and systems integration responsibilities, as well as operations and support management. These span the entire spectrum of capability planning, development, and sustainment of weapon systems throughout their life cycle to ensure that the SAF continue to be a formidable fighting force.

Eight, the Next Generation SAF, for it to be a potent and credible force, must harness all of its assets, its manpower as well as technology. By 2030, slightly more than a decade to come, there will be a third reduction in NS recruits. A 33% reduction — that is disruptive change. In addition, when we built ships or procured platforms, they must be able to be operated with a lean force. Other navies operate frigates with crews of between 140 to 180 men. Our frigates which are just as potent operate with half to a third less, a 70 men crew. This is only possible because it was designed that way. For many years now, the SAF has already started to address this disruptive change, through the radical change in its approach to the organisational structure and manpower requirements of SAF systems.

• A key project for the future SAF posture, is the next generation Armoured Fighting Vehicle (NG AFV). Built by ST Kinetics, the new tracked AFV will be able to accommodate three crew as well as up to eight fully-equipped troops. The vehicle weighs 29 tons and will reach maximum speeds of 70 kilometres-per-hour (43.5 miles-per-hour/mph) with a range of 500 kilometres/km (310.8 miles). The NG AFV is equipped with a remote weapons station and will replace the ageing M-113A2 Ultra tracked armoured personnel carriers. Some of these NG AFVs are equipped with a 30 mm remote weapon station (RWS). The dual-axis gyro-stabilised, dual-sight RWS can engage armoured vehicles 2 km away. According to Rafael, the RWS can carry up to 230 rounds of 30mm ammunition and 500 rounds for the co-axial machine gun. A highlight of the RWS is the ATGM launcher that can be installed on its left side, which is positioned horizontally and retracted under armour protection during travel and raised when preparing to fire its two ATGMs.​

​

These NG AFVs variants are scheduled to enter service in 2019 with the Armoured Infantry battalions and supported by the Bronco. The AFVs in use with 4th, 8th, 54th and 56th Singapore Armoured Brigades are the Bionix I, Bionix II and the NG AFVs.​

​

• Earlier in November 2016, the Singapore Army inducted the Belrex Protected Combat Support Vehicle (PCSV) to support the Terrex motorised infantry battalions. Based on the Marauder mine-resistant, ambush protected vehicle, the four-wheel drive Belrex PCSV vehicle measures has a gross weight of 20 tons. It accommodates two crew members, up to eight troops at the rear or 4,000 kg of equipment.​

​

​

Nine, the selection, motivation and retention of future leaders matter — so we can meet our objectives or do routine things well. Like LTC Cai Dexian, as an army officer. He was an SAF Scholar in 2003, who was deployed to Afghanistan in 2012, where he was XO to the ISAF’s Director of Operations, and after the tour he was awarded a US Bronze star for his contributions to operations. Other examples of routine work or course attendance include:

(i) Mr Tan Bing Wen, a DSTA scholar, who helped put into place Singapore’s air defence system. It is because we have an air defence system that we can scramble fighters in to time intercept stray civilian aircraft, who intend to enter our airspace without a flight plan; or​

​

(ii) Senior LTC Wong Foo Chan, Deputy Commander NDU, who topped the US Navy SEAL Course in 1999 and won the best trainee award in the Green Beret Course in 2001, completing the Special Forces course with a broken rib and a broken ankle due to a hard landing during a parachute jump, two weeks before the end of the course; or​

​

(iii) Maj Sam Tan, a naval officer and SAF Merit Scholar, sent to study in the United States Naval Academy, who emerged as top graduate in his 2012 batch of 1,099 American and foreign cadets.​

These are not gargantuan tasks, for a country at peace. But there are small routine tasks that each in the SAF and it’s defence science community must do well to keep the SAF humming, as a vibrant and responsive organisation.

 

[Ewok]

It will be really difficult, close to impossible. Land mass is just too tiny. The best defense for Singapore are good ties with more powerful nations who have invested in her

 

[ngatimozart]

@OPSSG, I was reading recently that during the second half 1941 Australian Army Gen Thomas Blamey was in Singapore on his way either to the Middle East or back to Australia when he assessed the defences of Singapore and Malaya. He was appalled by what he saw in that the British officers in Singapore and Malaya responsible for the defence were on a peace time routine and paid scant attention to the defence and collection of intelligence about the Japanese. The impression I got was that Blamey thought that they considered them inferior in all aspects and hadn't bothered about air defence or other such matters and that they were playing the 19th Century Raj. No wonder they were beaten by a vastly inferior force in numbers but superior in quality. The reference is: JEFFREY, G. 2008. A Military History Of Australia, Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, Cambridge University Press.

 

[OPSSG]

It will be really difficult, close to impossible. Land mass is just too tiny. The best defense for Singapore are good ties with more powerful nations who have invested in her.

What nonsense. You are posting without reading.

Do you have any idea about the most densely defended country in South East Asia and the size of our armoured forces available for forward defence?

With a defence budget of S$15.5 billion for FY2019 (up from S$14.8 billion for FY2018), Singapore is the most densely defended country in Southeast Asia. Educate yourself, and watch the above 2019 video of the men and machines on parade, please.

History has taught Singapore not to rely on others for our defence. From August 1967 onwards, Singaporeans assumed and acquired the capability to defend ourselves. In the 2nd video, the Minister of Defence spoke on the spate of training deaths that occurred recently. This capability to defend Singapore is written in blood by 3 generations of Singaporeans.

If you can’t read, at least watch the videos linked in this thread.

@OPSSG, I was reading recently that during the second half 1941 Australian Army Gen Thomas Blamey was in Singapore on his way either to the Middle East or back to Australia when he assessed the defences of Singapore and Malaya. He was appalled by what he saw in that the British officers in Singapore and Malaya responsible for the defence were on a peace time routine and paid scant attention to the defence and collection of intelligence about the Japanese.

Agreed. Thanks for sharing.

For context, I note that this Japanese campaign began on 8 December 1941 (in Asian time zones, but is often referred to as starting on 7 December, as that was the date in American time zone, for the attack on Pearl Harbor), when Japanese forces landed in Singora and Patani in southern Thailand, and Kota Bharu in northern Malaya. The Japanese preparation for the invasion of Malaya and Singapore began in 1941. The Doro Nawa or Taiwan Army Research Department took charge of researching and planning Japanese military strategy in Asia. Masanobu Tsuji was the officer-in-charge of operations and planning in the Malayan sector and the mastermind of the Malayan Campaign. Japanese troops were trained to fight in tropical conditions on Hainan Island in China. They also carried out reconnaissance work in Malaya as part of their preparations.

Ninety minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese battalions began landing at Kota Bharu in north-eastern Malaya. British and Australian aircraft, although outnumbered, engaged the invading force but were little match for the Japanese who retained air superiority throughout the campaign. More Australians died in the fighting for Malaya and Singapore than in any other Australian campaign in WW II (except for Papua from Jul 1942 to Jan 1943). More Australians were captured in this loss than in all the other campaigns in Australian military history combined. More than one third of the men and women captured would die in imprisonment.

In contrast to Japanese efforts, the British effort was inadequate and Winston Churchill was appalled by the lack of effort with regard to northward facing defences. On 15 January 1942, Churchill wrote to General Wavell, about Singapore. On 16 January, Wavell wrote him a most disturbing reply: “I discussed the defence of island when recently at Singapore, and have asked for detailed plans. Until quite recently all plans were based on repulsing seaborne attacks on island and holding land attack in Johore [located in the southern portion of the Malay Peninsula] or farther north, and little or nothing was done to construct defences on north side of the island to prevent crossing Johore Straits, though arrangements have been made to blow up the causeway.” Wavell went on to say: “The fortress cannon of heaviest nature have all-round traverse, but their flat trajectory makes them unsuitable for counter-battery work. Could certainly not guarantee to dominate enemy siege batteries with them.”

Churchill was clearly astounded, and greatly troubled, by Wavell’s message. He responded: “It was with feelings of painful surprise that I read this message on the morning of the 19th. So there were no permanent fortifications covering the landward side of the naval base and of the city! Moreover, even more astounding, no measures worth speaking of had been taken by any of the commanders since the war began, and more especially since the Japanese had established themselves in Indo-China, to construct field defences” (see: Churchill and the Fall of Singapore - The International Churchill Society).

The impression I got was that Blamey thought that they considered them inferior in all aspects and hadn't bothered about air defence or other such matters and that they were playing the 19th Century Raj. No wonder they were beaten by a vastly inferior force in numbers but superior in quality. The reference is: JEFFREY, G. 2008. A Military History Of Australia, Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, Cambridge University Press.

If you are visiting Singapore, there is 75-minute tour at Fort Canning, titled The Battlebox Tour: A Story Of Strategy And Surrender, details the primary reasons for Malaya and Singapore's fall to the Japanese, as well as the roles and functions the various key rooms in the Battlebox played in the war.

LTG Arthur Percival’s (who surrendered Singapore to the Japanese) son, himself a retired brigadier, James Percival, returned to visit the Battlebox in Feb 2019.

 

[ASSAIL]

What nonsense. You are posting without reading.

Do you have any idea about the most densely defended country in South East Asia and the size of our armoured forces available for forward defence?

With a defence budget of S$15.5 billion for FY2019 (up from S$14.8 billion for FY2018), Singapore is the most densely defended country in Southeast Asia. IMHO, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has the fastest sensor shooter cycle in Southeast Asia. It is a known fact that the SAF has: (1) one of the largest fleet of armoured fighting vehicles in Southeast Asia; (2) the heaviest concentration of 155 mm artillery (with the longest ranged precision rocket artillery with its HIMARS batteries); (3) the region's highest density of SAMs and a Short-Range Anti-Munition Capability (operationalised within a networked system); and (4) the biggest number of combat engineer bridging rafts, the largest fleet of fast landing craft and more combat warplanes than any immediate neighbour. Educate yourself, and watch the above 2019 video of the men and machines on parade, please.

History has taught Singapore not to rely on others for our defence. From August 1967 onwards, Singaporeans assumed and acquired the capability to defend ourselves. In the 2nd video, the Minister of Defence spoke on the spate of training deaths that occurred recently. This capability is written in blood by 3 generations of Singaporeans.

If you can’t read, at least watch the videos linked in this thread.

Agreed. Thanks for sharing.

For context, I note that this Japanese campaign began on 8 December 1941 (in Asian time zones, but is often referred to as starting on 7 December, as that was the date in American time zone, for the attack on Pearl Harbor), when Japanese forces landed in Singora and Patani in southern Thailand, and Kota Bharu in northern Malaya. The Japanese preparation for the invasion of Malaya and Singapore began in 1941. The Doro Nawa or Taiwan Army Research Department took charge of researching and planning Japanese military strategy in Asia. Masanobu Tsuji was the officer-in-charge of operations and planning in the Malayan sector and the mastermind of the Malayan Campaign. Japanese troops were trained to fight in tropical conditions on Hainan Island in China. They also carried out reconnaissance work in Malaya as part of their preparations.

Ninety minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese battalions began landing at Kota Bharu in north-eastern Malaya. British and Australian aircraft, although outnumbered, engaged the invading force but were little match for the Japanese who retained air superiority throughout the campaign. More Australians died in the fighting for Malaya and Singapore than in any other Australian campaign in WW II (except for Papua from Jul 1942 to Jan 1943). More Australians were captured in this loss than in all the other campaigns in Australian military history combined. More than one third of the men and women captured would die in imprisonment.

In contrast to Japanese efforts, the British effort was inadequate and Winston Churchill was appalled by the lack of effort with regard to northward facing defences. On 15 January 1942, Churchill wrote to General Wavell, about Singapore. On 16 January, Wavell wrote him a most disturbing reply: “I discussed the defence of island when recently at Singapore, and have asked for detailed plans. Until quite recently all plans were based on repulsing seaborne attacks on island and holding land attack in Johore [located in the southern portion of the Malay Peninsula] or farther north, and little or nothing was done to construct defences on north side of the island to prevent crossing Johore Straits, though arrangements have been made to blow up the causeway.” Wavell went on to say: “The fortress cannon of heaviest nature have all-round traverse, but their flat trajectory makes them unsuitable for counter-battery work. Could certainly not guarantee to dominate enemy siege batteries with them.”

Churchill was clearly astounded, and greatly troubled, by Wavell’s message. He responded: “It was with feelings of painful surprise that I read this message on the morning of the 19th. So there were no permanent fortifications covering the landward side of the naval base and of the city! Moreover, even more astounding, no measures worth speaking of had been taken by any of the commanders since the war began, and more especially since the Japanese had established themselves in Indo-China, to construct field defences (see: Churchill and the Fall of Singapore - The International Churchill Society).

If you are visiting Singapore, there is 75-minute tour at Fort Canning, titled The Battlebox Tour: A Story Of Strategy And Surrender, details the primary reasons for Malaya and Singapore's fall to the Japanese, as well as the roles and functions the various key rooms in the Battlebox played in the war.

LTG Arthur Percival’s (who surrendered Singapore to the Japanese) son, himself a retired brigadier, James Percival, returned to visit the Battlebox in Feb 2019.

In March 1968 I had the honour to begin my training with the first four Midshipmen of the newly created SAF naval arm, my roommate Phillip Cheong was one of them. Last year we held our 50 year reunion in Brisbane and one of them, Tan Peng Yong attended. He had a long and distinguished career in the SAF.
I’ve watched the growth and development of the SAF with great interest and I believe you have an institution that is mature, highly professional and superbly equipped, BZ

 

[OPSSG]

Evolving the SAF’s Force Structure to meet new threats — from deployable, to special, to cyber

1. Singapore’s military modernisation reflects the SAF’s mission:

To enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor. ​

The SAF aims to upgrade its network-centric warfare capabilities for joint operations, with corresponding changes in the organisational force structures and operational conduct to strengthen overall military effectiveness. Its force transformation trajectory can be viewed as a 3 phased approach. The SAF:

(i) introduces progressively more capable systems coupled with the establishment of new units;​

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(ii) establishes new operational commands and focuses on widening its operational flexibility and responsiveness; and​

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(iii) enhances its capability through selection, training and education of capable and committed personnel.​

As the threat scenario changes, Singapore has had to evolve — to augment the conscript model, and had to professionalise a part of the Army. For example, the Army Deployment Force (ADF) was inaugurated on 12 Jul 2016, as a battalion-sized force of army regulars with niche capabilities to respond to threats in both urban and non-urban settings. Equipped with the Peacekeeper protected response vehicle, the Protected Light Utility Vehicle (an armoured Ford Everest ops utility vehicle) and other classified capabilities, "the basic task for the ADF is to act as a rapid response element because speed is important in counter-terrorism (CT)," said Defence Minister Dr Ng Eng Hen in his 2016 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Day interview. "It's not quite like conventional missions where you have time. This time, you have to respond in minutes." "The ability to swiftly deploy a sizeable force to counter threats and assist civil authorities continues to be the ADF's raison d'etre," said its Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Du. "As ISIS continues to be weakened in Iraq and Syria, we see increased activities of the returning fighters in our region. More important than ever, the unit stands ready to respond if terror strikes our shores." In CT scenarios, the ADF works with the Island Defence Task Force, Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) and Home Team agencies as protectors to guard the nation against terror threats. It can also be activated to play a peacekeeper role in Peace Support Operations (in Afghanistan or such other conflict zones) overseas. Another role of the ADF is that of a preserver to ensure safety and provide aid during disaster relief missions.

2. The ADF (as part of the 7th Singapore Infantry Brigade) augments the capabilities of SOCC, and the ADF Guardsmen have to train to meet mission requirements. The Guards' spectrum of operations as part of the 7th Singapore Infantry Brigade has been extended to include Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Peace Support Operations, as was apparent during the 2004 tsunami or the 2011 earthquake relief operations in Christchurch. Notable Guardsmen include Speaker of Parliament, Tan Chuan-Jin, who was then a Colonel and commander of the SAF's Humanitarian Assistance Task force in Meulaboh following the 2004 tsunami.

Before troopers can don the ADF patch, they have to make it through a 21-week Combat Qualification Course (CQC) — see 1st video on CQC. Every new evolution gets tougher than the last, with a short water break and temperature check between each. Trainees grit their teeth as they carry a 20kg weight up and down a flight of stairs. They then proceed for more physical training drills. The course is designed to test the physical and mental readiness of trainees before they are posted to the ADF's operational companies. Upon completion of CQC, ADF’s companies are sent for overseas training, with foreign forces, such as, with the Australian Army or the US Marines. The 2nd video explains the role and training of these army professionals.

The ADF’s overseas live-fire training include the 22nd edition of the annual bilateral Exercise Valiant Mark, which ran from 25 August to 12 September 2018.

3. In addition, Singapore will set up a new Special Operations Command Centre (SOCC) (Fact Sheet: Enhancing the SAF's Counter-Terrorism Capabilities) as part of a wide-ranging effort to enhance the ability of the SOTF and the ADF to conduct counter-terrorism operations, Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen announced during a media briefing on 28 June 2019. According to the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), the SOCC will function as a hub for planning, monitoring, and managing military responses to concurrent terrorist and homeland contingencies. The centre will be situated in the eastern Hendon Camp and is expected to be commissioned by the end of the year. It will also work closely with other agencies when required. The centre will be equipped with organic command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems to support operational planning, co-ordination, and to sense-make acquired data. Efforts to improve the capabilities of Singapore’s SOTF is similar in some aspects to Australia’s parallel A$500 million (over the next 4 years alone) effort in project GREYFIN (see: Backing Australian special forces with cutting edge equipment | Prime Minister of Australia).

4. The special operations community and our regular forces maintain especially close ties with their counterparts in both America and Australia (where a lot of overseas training is conducted). Under the Australia-Singapore Military Training Initiative (ASMTI), Singapore will invest approximately AUD 2 billion to acquire, design, develop and construct military training areas through expanding the existing Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA) and establishing a new training area in North Queensland. When the Initiative reaches maturity, up to 14,000 Singaporeans will conduct training in Central and North Queensland over 18 weeks a year for 25 years. The SAF is immensely grateful to the Americans for training Singaporeans in their various naval and army schools. I also note that Singapore has operators embedded in US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Tampa, Florida. Recently, GEN Clarke of USSOCOM was in Singapore for a working visit from 3 to 5 June 2019. Further, in 2018, the SAF deployed combat engineer trainers and tactical trainers to support the evolving operational needs of the coalition forces in Iraq. The team sent to Iraq comprise of combat engineer trainers specialising in counter-IED tactics, weapons and combat tactics trainers, and a medical team of a medical officer and a medic.

5. “In (an age of) cyber attacks and biological pandemics, ground zero can arise anywhere and spread far very quickly,” Dr Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s minister of defence said. The SAF sees cyber attacks as a serious trend, as an open economy connected to the rest of the world, Singapore is particularly susceptible to such threats, Dr Ng added. The SAF will invest “substantially” to train more cyber defence personnel, doubling the manpower of its Cyber Defence Operations Hub by 2020.

I’ve watched the growth and development of the SAF with great interest and I believe you have an institution that is mature, highly professional and superbly equipped, BZ

6. Thank you for your kind words. We owe a lot to Australia in helping Singapore develop specific capabilities for our armed forces and in particular the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) at numerous instances. To list merely one of many examples, on 29 January 1983, the then Lieutenant Geoff Ledger, of the RAN conducted the riskiest rescue during the Sentosa cable car disaster after an oil rig snagged the cable system (Read more at PM Lee honours Australian rescuer in 1983 Sentosa cable car disaster). Commodore Ledger was serving with the Republic of Singapore Air Force instructing basic and advanced students on Iroquois and Squirrel helicopters at that time. He received a Silver Commendation Medal from the Singapore Government and made headlines when he put his flying skills to the test leading a rescue operation to save 13 people during the Sentosa Cable Car disaster.

 

[SSJArcher Krich]

In my opinion Indonesia will be able to invade Singapore particularly after the year 2030. All of military hardware that Singapore has only can withstand from Indonesian invasion from now until the next 10 years. If we read Indonesian minimum essential force we know that Indonesia has the ability to make substantial damage to Singapore and have chance to invade it after the year 2030. Of course it is in the assumption that Indonesia will still be able to grow economically 5-6 % until it reach 2030-2035.

I dont think Indonesia will eventually do the invasion when the situation is in Indonesia advantage but rather saying its capability to do it. after 2030.

With all due respect, I disagree.

Indonesia has always failed to fulfill its potential and all these expectations of higher GDP and higher defence budget to the tune of $40 billion may or may not come true by the year 2030.

We have seen how Indonesia continues to avoid increasing its firepower in the face of increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and its Minimum Essential Force phase II had to be changed because Indonesia just could not carry out the plans it needed to.

Both Singapore and Indonesia are mostly weapons importers. As a result, their defence budgets may be a good proxy for how powerful their military punch might be. Given that, however, training, logistics, systems integration and combined arms training remain important facets where Indonesia may be lagging for decades to come.

If it were a more militarily advanced country like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea or Japan instead of Indonesia and Malaysia next door, then it's very much possible that Singapore would have been invaded or decimated by now.

With countries like Indonesia or Malaysia, or any ASEAN country for that matter, including Viet Nam, I don't see that potential. Not within that timeline - 2030. If you had said that Indonesia by 2050 would be in a good position to overwhelm Singapore's military - alone - without any outside intervention, that I could probably concur with.

However, these are all estimates and forecasts and none of us really know how the future will pan out. A lot of unforeseen events could occur that throw all our calculations off balance. Time will tell.

 

[SSJArcher Krich]

Indonesia can put many SAM battery in Batam and bombarded the city using Rhan rocket family. Singaporean air force cannot strike Indonesian rocket launch since Batam is protected by SAM system. Large troops have also already arrive in Batam to defense the island and can be used for amphibious landing. Also I predict in 2030 Indonesia may already have mastered cruise missile technology and it can be used to attack any military target in Singapore from Batam. Mass production of Rhan rocket, SAM system, and land attack cruise missile will be a determining factor on the success of invasion. After the bombardment that can take 1 month Singaporean will lose their moral and fighting spirit. Indonesia is also quite upper hand in the sea as Singaporean navy will not be protected by their fighter jet as SAM system put in Batam can cover whole Singapore territory. On the other hand Indonesian cruise missile target Singaporean SAM battery and radar. Any fighter plane that take off from Singapore will become a target. Indonesian cruise missile also will attack all of Singaporean air force asset and infrastructure. The outcome can be different if Singapore also has large land attack cruise missile stock pile.

If you modify the equipment, the same principle could be used to knock out Singapore.

1. Deploy a pair of AEW&C for battle management and providing airborne surveillance, detection, tracking and targeting solutions for aerial, naval and ground targets. Somewhere around Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan or the Riau Islands would do good.

2. Deploy an integrated air Defence system that is multi-layered. The longest ranged and highest altitude system should be somewhat equivalent to Bavar 373 produced by Iran, for example, or you could go for Russian S-400 systems that Turkey has recently procured. Ring Singapore around with these set of short, medium and long range surface to air missile systems. Essentially, with an integrated air defence network, you can impose a virtual no fly zone over Singapore from any of your neighbouring islands. Sumatra, Kalimantan, Riau Islands, Batam or Bintan.

3. Deploy domestically produced medium range ballistic missiles that you have obtained the technology for production from a friendly country such as China, Iran, Pakistan or possibly, Turkey.

Let's say, a standing force of 5,000 ballistic missiles powered by solid fuel would set you back at most $5 billion in production cost at most. Maintenance, training for personnel, periodical test firing, deployment of decoys and varying the location of these forces might set you back another $1-2 billion, approximately.

I am pretty sure Indonesia could afford that sunk cost today if it wished to, and certainly by 2020 it would be within the realms of possibility.

You would not need to wait till it's 2030 to decimate Singapore's military, critical C&C centers, arms depots overground and soften Singapore up to lay the groundwork for a possible invasion.

There is no need to invade unless necessitated by circumstances. Just the availability of that capability would send alarm bells ringing and force Singaporean defence planners to acknowledge Indonesia as their regional superior, I would think. That recognition would serve the purpose all too well.

 

[SSJArcher Krich]

Post 2 of 2: Educating Ahmad on the RSAF’s baseline capability as a Tertiary Air Force

Beyond the navy, since 1987 the RSAF is the only tertiary air force in Southeast Asia (SEA), which means any SAM system you employ is only a road bump. The RSAF is an air force with the capability to detect, track and engage airborne, naval and ground targets that is a golden mile ahead of any other air force in SEA. Buying more fighters does not mean becoming more capable. By 2030, Singapore’s capability would have grown. At that time, we would be operating 62 F-16Vs, 40 F-15SGs, and a few F-35s (1st order of 4 placed in 2019), plus the following force multipliers:

What is the definition of tertiary air force? If it's merely the possession of AEW&C systems that confer this status upon an air force, would not the Royal Thai Air Force also qualify? They operate the Swedish Saab 340 AEW&C systems.