True, though it is a significant vote of confidence in the capability when multiple users have declared they will use Block 3i as their IOC capability...
During Parliamentary hearings on 16 May 2013 (see
PDF transcript of proceedings) of Australia’s Joint Committee On Foreign Affairs, Defence And Trade:
(i) Vice Admiral Peter Jones, Chief, Capability Development Group, Department of Defence; and
(ii) Air Vice Marshal Kym Osley, Program Manager, New Air Combat Capability, Defence Materiel Organisation, Department of Defence,
discusses some aspects of the F-35′s air-to-air performance and are quoted below from the following pages:-
Pages 6-7:
Vice Adm. Jones: Maritime strike capability is a high-capability priority for Australia, and also is a very high US Department of Defense priority for block 4A, planned for release to service in the 2020-21 timeframe. Defence assess a medium risk that the implementation of the Joint Stand-Off Weapon, or JSOW C-1 maritime strike weapon, could be delayed to beyond the planned F-35A final operating capability date of 2023. This risk will be reassessed once the final block 4A content and priorities are confirmed in around September 2013 and advised as a part of the AIR 6000 phase 2A/2B second-pass consideration to government.
A high risk remains in the area of generating a suitable mission data load for the F-35A at IOC. The mission data load contains threat parameters, weapons information and other mission data. Ways of mitigating this risk are being investigated, including the sourcing of an initial mission data load from the United States.
From a schedule perspective, software remains a key risk; however, the risk appears to be reducing. The block 2B release is expected to be delivered to the fleet in mid-2015, and block 3I in 2016, representing about a four year schedule buffer to the planned Australian IOC of 2020.
The independent DMO SCRAM review assessed about 11 months of schedule risk in the block 3F software. This assessment appears valid with about three months slip now forecast by the US JSF Program Office.
The block 3F fleet release is planned for the third quarter of 2017, but could be as late as mid-2018 if the risk is realised. Defence will have better idea of fleet release date for block 3F after the block 3 critical design review in mid-2013.
<snip>
Pages 7-8:
SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIR: Thanks so much for that update on the JSF. I found it quite interest-ing, since we last were briefed at Avalon. I was interested in the cost. There appears to be a significant reduction in terms of what was projected. Did that have any bearing in terms of Japan coming on board with a JSF and anything to do with the decision by the US government to start winding back on defence? Can you elaborate on whether that had any bearing on the prices that you have indicated at today's hearing?
Air Vice Marshal Olsey: The costs that were just covered that indicate the way the price is trending down are from, as you heard, the Selected Acquisition Report 2011. The inputs to that include things such as the latest expected orders that have come in from the partner nations and any adjustments that are made — including any adjustments made because of the Japanese announcement. So the SAR 11 figures did include the adjustments for the FMS customers that were known at the time that the SAR estimate came out. The next SAR estimate that comes out in a short time, in the next few months, will take into account any developments in the 12 months since that last estimate came out. So, if any further FMS customers or any adjustments to partner numbers occur, they will be reflected in the latest annual estimate. Those annual estimates are valid as at this point in time.
SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIR: No, I was interested in whether the Japanese inclusion in the program had a bearing on it overall.
Air Vice Marshal Osley: The
short answer is any FMS customer including the Japanese does reduce the price for the other partners. That is a downward trend on the cost. Of course there are upward trends on the cost— that is, should the expected ramp down in labour time on certain parts not be achieved then that would be an upward trend on the dollar figures.
<snip>
Pages 9-10:
Air Vice Marshal Osley: As you are well aware there is a dual path on the helmet. We currently have the VSI Gen II helmet. The VSI Gen III helmet, which will have an improved low-light night vision capability will be coming in about 2015 and that will then take over. We will know longer have the VSI Gen II. We will go to an all VSI Gen III helmet. You are well aware that the other path is a BAE helmet that has a night vision goggle arrangement attached to it as an interim helmet and as an alternate helmet to the VSI helmet. At the moment both paths are being progressed but of course the flight testing was all about the VSI Gen II helmet. I think you are across the issues but I will briefly cover them. Alignment is a key one. You hop into the aircraft and on occasion the helmet display may not be aligned with the earth. That requires you to get out of the aircraft and have it realigned on the ground. They are working on a proposal to have that, whereby you in fact fine-tune that prior to getting in the aeroplane; the pilot can do it as part of his normal checkout procedures. At the moment you have to return the helmet and basically go back and have it adjusted in the workshop. They are making it so that it is pilot-adjustable.
The next one is green glow, and that is a factor of the design of the helmet, using LCDs. It implies that there is a whole lot of extraneous light that is coming in at night around the display. Even though it is noted by a few of the test pilots it is not considered an operationally significant issue for them and they can overcome that one.
The third one is jitter. There were in excess of 35 flight tests; I believe there were 38 by the time I had been to Edwards, and there were more being planned. The initial results were that they were seeing positive improvements from the modifications that had been made. So, they had adjustments to the software to counteract the jitter, and in the pre-jitter software the pilot considered that it was acceptable but that it would require some workarounds and some compensation operationally. The post-modification ones for the anti-jitter in the software were showing significant improvement. That is all I could get out of them at the time, from the commander there.
The fourth issue is DAS latency—that is, the display has a lag in it. That lag has proven in the test flights to not be significant, so it is no major concern. It is expected to meet USAF operational requirements. They have tested it and measured it and the USAF is now considering that data, but it is looking good.
The final one is the night vision camera. The Generation II helmet is not compliant in its night vision capability, and that is an issue not so much for the USAF — it can achieve their operational requirements — but
for the US Marine Corps, in particular for fine motor skills of landing on the deck of an LHD and the fine motor skills involved in air refuelling off KC-130s at night doing the probe refuelling. It is a problem both with the amount of resolution you have and with the location of the camera, as you are aware.
That will be fixed in the Generation III helmet by using a better system, and they are working on that. And in the interim of course the US Marine Corps are assessing whether it is operationally acceptable to go to IOC in 2015 with it, noting that they also have the alternate helmet as the backup at this time.
So, that is a readout of where we are up to at this point in time. It is an ongoing issue, and we do expect more clarity on it later in the year. But the indication from a Royal Australian Air Force point of view is that the only issue that is basically a red at the moment is the night vision camera, and from our perspective we can achieve our IOC missions with the system as it is. It is not necessarily a red for us, from an operational perspective. I will finish by saying that
the helmet mounted display will not meet the specification that was planned. That is a given; it cannot meet the specification. It is a very tight specification and the Generation II will not do that.
But it is looking like being operationally acceptable.
Senator FAWCETT: Perhaps you could talk to me about the weapons road map for the Joint Strike Fighter and your current thinking around short-range and medium-range air-to-air, and also your plans for the collaboration with Norway in the Joint Strike Missile.
Air Vice Marshal Osley: The road map is that we will go to initial operating capability with a minimum of the Block 3I capabilities, and those weapons, from an air-to-air point of view, are limited to the AMRAAM.
Senator FAWCETT: So, no short-range?
Air Vice Marshal Osley: That is with Block 3F, and we are expecting that that will be implemented either for IOC or soon after IOC, but the minimum requirement for IOC is the AMRAAM as part of the Block 3I. The AIM-9X software will be in the load but it will not be certified and tested until Block 3F.
Just to make it clear: at this point in time we are of course progressing on the assumption that we are aiming to get block 3F in there, with block 3I as our fallback. The weapons road map for block 3F is to have the air-to-air mode — obviously, the gun, the AIM-9X and the advanced AMRAAMs. Then, after that, we are looking at other projects. We have projects in the DCP to look at the next range of air-to-air weapons to take over in the longer term.
<snip>