F-35 Multirole Joint Strike Fighter
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Aussie Digger
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Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Australia should be trying to acquire some of those CF-18's to try and make up (nubers wise) for the impending loss of our F-111's. They'd be a cheaper option than acquiring F/A-18E/F's or F-15E strike Eagles, to tide us over until the F-35 arrives...
Australia should be trying to acquire some of those CF-18's to try and make up (nubers wise) for the impending loss of our F-111's. They'd be a cheaper option than acquiring F/A-18E/F's or F-15E strike Eagles, to tide us over until the F-35 arrives...
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Aussie Digger
Guest
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Here's an in-depth analysis of the F-35. I don't necessarily agree with him, but it's an interesting read nonetheless. Bear in mind that it is an analysis by a man with a vested interest in the F-111 (his professional career has been based on it, to date) and as now appears the F-22 (he is writing more and more about the F-22)...
ANALYSIS: Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(Australian Aviation, May/June 2002, p 28-32, p 24-27.)
Carlo Kopp, PEng
[email protected]
© 2002, Carlo Kopp
©2002, Aerospace Publications, Pty Ltd, Canberra.
July 15, 2002
1 Part 1 A Cold War Anachronism?
Judging from the media rhetoric in early January this year, one could almost be forgiven for believing that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was the anointed replacement for Australia's F/A-18A and F-111 fleets - no doubt to the annoyance of many in Defence who are immersed in the complexities of AIR 6000 capabilitiesdefinition. The reality of the Joint Strike Fighter is much less sparkling as many would like us to believe. In this month's analysis we will explore some of the issues.
The new LM F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has the distinction of being a `first' in more than one respect. It is the first combat aircraft to leverage the massive US Air Force research & development investment in the F-22 family of aircraft. It is also the first attempt since the 1960s TFX (F-111) program failure to produce a fighter which can meet the needs of all three US services with fighter fleets, as well as the needs of export clients. As the Joint Strike Fighter program includes both conventional, carrier capable and STOVL variants, it is the first ever attempt to create a fighter which spans three very distinct deployment regimes. Finally, it is the first attempt to produce a very low cost aircraft with genuine stealth characteristics.
With the prospect of around 3,000 Joint Strike Fighters for the US services, replacing the F-16A-D, A-10A, F/A-18A-D and AV-8B, and the potential to render all European fighter offerings wholly uncompetitive in the large F-16 and F/A-18 replacement markets, the hope of US manufacturers and their congressional supporters is that the Joint Strike Fighter will become the next F-16 and secure the US industry with an unbeatable advantage in the future `commodity' fighter market. Greed is a powerful motivator in the Joint Strike Fighter program and one which is likely to see most of the obstacles to this aircraft, and its inherent limitations, ignored in the quest for market dominance.
The history of the Joint Strike Fighter (formerly the Joint Advanced Strike Technology - JAST) program is by any measure colourful, its earliest origins tracing back to technology demonstration programs for a Harrier follow-on for the US Marine Corps and multirole fighter for the US Air Force (refer AA December 2001 and http://www.jsf.mil/). The shrinking US aerospace industrial base soon saw significant congressional pressure applied for the initial technology demonstration goal to be extended into a production fighter program. In its current shape the Joint Strike Fighter program could lead to the production of around 3,000 Joint Strike Fighter variants replacing US Air Force F-16Cs, A-10s, US Navy F/A-18Cs, and US Marine Corps and RAF/RN Harrier variants. The lead service in the Joint Strike Fighter program remains the US Air Force.
From the very outset the principal aim of the Joint Strike Fighter program was to produce a low cost mass production strike aircraft which exploits the latest avionic/computer, stealth and production technologies. Given the incessant political threats of F-22 program cancellation held over the US Air Force through most of the 1990s, limiting the air superiority capabilities of the Joint Strike Fighter was a political imperative - moreso given that air superiority capabilities such as high thrust/weight ratio and sustained supersonic cruise are not very compatible with very low unit cost. If the Joint Strike Fighter were to be too snappy a performer in the air superiority game, the F-22 would have been promptly axed thereby shifting USD 20B or more of production costs back by at least a decade much to the delight of vote buyers in the US Congress.
Indeed as recently as a year ago the US Air Force had to defend the F-22 against repeated political attacks, most of which clearly illustrated the almost total technical illiteracy of the F-22's critics. Invariably the argument is that the F-22 is `too big, too costly, too capable' or `built around Cold War needs, thus irrelevant to the modern environment' and that a Joint Strike Fighter can do the job well enough.
The US Air Force crafted the basic definition of the Joint Strike Fighter - its size, performance, load carrying ability and target cost around its principal tactical strike fighter, the Lockheed-Martin F-16CG/CJ. In the mid 1990s US Air Force force structure model the F-15C flew air superiority and air defence tasks, the F-111F, F-15E and F-117A performed the `deep strike' penetration tasks, with the latter used in more heavily defended environments. The venerable Fairchild-Republic A-10A Thunderbolt was used for battlefield interdiction and close air support, together with the F-16CG. Defence suppression was performed by the F-16CG, in concert with AGM-130 firing F-15Es, after the retirement of the formidable F-4G Weasel. In this model targets fall into two distinct bands - those within a 400 NMI radius of friendly runways, and those at 600 NMI and beyond.
This force structure model evolved during the latter part of the Cold War, and combined a relatively diverse mix of fighter capabilities. With the 1970s F-111F, A-10 and F-117A, 1980s F-15C/E and F-16C and a mix of weapons with lineages back to the 1960s, this model was a cumulative aggregation of almost three decades of technology and evolving doctrine. This was the force structure which the US Air Force applied with such devastating effect against the SovBloc modelled Iraqi defences in 1991 and it proved itself convincingly.
There is however one important division which can be drawn through this force structure model - size. With the exception of the small single engine single seat F-16, all of these aircraft are large twin engine fighters designed to push the performance envelope in their respective categories.
The ubiquitious F-16 was a uniquely Cold War phenomenon. With NATO and the Warsaw Pact geographically poised along either side of the Iron Curtain, presenting each other with a concentration of force and targets unprecedented in history, significant imperatives existed for both sides to saturate the theatre with high performance fighters. Whoever won the air superiority game over Central Europe held the decisive advantage in the Cold War standoff. Fighter combat radius and endurance over the target are not issues when the geographical environment puts the two largest military forces on the planet head-to-head across a single frontier.
The Light Weight Fighter (LWF) contest saw the GD YF-16 take the laurels and decisive build numbers over the YF-17. The production F-16A was a day-VFR light weight air combat fighter designed for exceptional transonic agility and good supersonic dash performance when clean, armed with Sidewinders and an internal gun. Its principal role was to destroy enmasse the Soviet and allied Warpac strike fighter fleets in close air combat, and then swing into day-VFR battlefield air interdiction and close air support to eradicate Soviet/Warpac land forces, the latter role to be shared with the F-15A, F-4E and F-111D/E/F. With the Soviet/Warpac fighter fleets dominated by the MiG-21, MiG-23/27 and Su-7/17/22 series, the F-16s would have enjoyed a decisively target rich environment.
With the impending retirement of the F-4E Phantom II, the US Air Force needed a substitute to fill the tactical fighter bomber role. The F-16C, equipped with the LANTIRN Terrain Following Radar and FLIR/laser targeting podset, was to fill this niche. With European theatre geography and threats driving this need, the radius of the F-16 airframe was yet again not an issue.
When the Soviet Empire collapsed, the US Air Force was forced into a massive downsizing program. Under significant budgetary pressure, the remaining F-4E and F-4G aircraft were retired, followed by the F-15A, much of the F-16A fleet and early model F-111A/D/E/G aircraft. By the mid to late nineties, the US Air Force fighter fleet comprised primarily the F-15C, F-16C variants, the F-15E and a small number of F-117As. Most of the massive B-52 fleet was retired and the buy of B-2A `batwing' bombers was chopped from 132 to 60 and then finally 21.
Expectations during this period were that the principal strategic problems the US would confront would be troublesome nations in the Balkans and the Middle East, with ethno-religious conflicts between smaller nation states dominating agenda. In this environment problem nations would be unable to threaten US basing, and the enormous political clout during the `Pax Americana' period would see easy access to basing. Concurrently the US Congress showed little interest in the defence budget, and the US Air Force faced the prospect of an aging and increasingly expensive to run fighter fleet, in a strategic environment where air superiority and safe in-theatre basing were virtually guaranteed.
This was the environment which shaped the Joint Strike Fighter program - a situation in which combat radius, endurance over the target, air superiority performance and availability of in-theatre basing were not principal design imperatives. Cost and industrial base survival pressures were the foremost drivers in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The US Air Force needed a cheap mass production bomb truck to provide a one-for-one replacement of its aging F-16C inventory. The US aerospace industry needed another F-16A with which to saturate export markets and retain their eroding market position against the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon.
Perhaps the greatest misconception about the Joint Strike Fighter program is that it represents a `repeat scenario' when compared to the YF-16/F-16A program - a low cost highly agile air superiority fighter designed to exploit cutting edge technology to provide a shorter ranging supplement to the top end twin engine large fighter (then F-15A, now F-22A) of the period. This misconception misrepresents the central design objectives of the Joint Strike Fighter program against the Light Weight Fighter program, and also ignores the decisive role shift in the F-16 fleet.
In its day the F-16A was perhaps the nastiest close-in air combat fighter in existance, requiring careful tactics by even the top end F-15A air superiority fighter. While the F-16C Block 40/50 is heavier, it is still a respectable air combat fighter even if a dubious bomb truck. The F-16's central design optimisation was the transonic dogfight, reflected in thrust/weight ratio, wing loading, turn rates, climb rates and acceleration. In these parameters it was competitive against the best in the field, even if it could not compete with the thrust/weight ratio, wing loading, climb rates and acceleration of the F-15A.
The Joint Strike Fighter's central design optimisation is in-theatre strike, battlefield interdiction and close air support, reflected in forward sector stealth, internal weapons/fuel capacity and cruise efficiency in clean configuration. In these parameters it outperforms the incumbent F-16C and F/A-18A/C, while providing relatively similar air superiority performance to these types. Against the current yardstick for air superiority performance, the F-22A, the Joint Strike Fighter is a non-contender - its 35 degree class transonic wing and 1:1 thrust/weight ratio are adequate for self-defensive purposes but not in the league for rapidly establishing air supremacy.
Just as the joint Tactical Fighter eXperimental (TFX) or F-111A/B program was cast at an early stage into a conceptual mold of a high speed long range bomb-truck, the Joint Strike Fighter has been cast into the mold of an incrementally improved F-16C / F/A-18C class light bomb-truck, exploiting stealth and modern avionics to provide a survivability edge over its predecessors. The TFX program crashed and burned on the evolving needs of the US Navy, who wanted more air superiority performance and lower carrier landing weights.
Some critics of the Joint Strike Fighter argue that it will `inevitably go the route of the TFX' experiencing cost growth, weight growth and performance loss as it undergoes development and its respective end users load it up with desired design extras to meet their specific needs. Indeed US reports suggest repeated political clashes in recent years, as the US Marine Corps and Navy sought performance and capability improvements which conflicted with US Air Force unit cost targets. Given that the maritime users of the Joint Strike Fighter do not have an F-22 equivalent to gain the high ground in an air battle, it is not inconceivable that we might see downstream disagreements in the Joint Strike Fighter program as these players try to fill this crucial gap in their basic capabilities.
The broader strategic issue for the Joint Strike Fighter will be its basic sizing in a world environment which sees two mutually supporting strategic trends - `problem nations' acquiring ballistic missiles, both mobile and semi-mobile, weapons of mass destruction, and a concurrent trend to implementing `shoot-and-scoot' SAM/AAA air defence tactics. In air power theoretic terms, the use of `shoot-and-scoot' SAM/AAA and ballistic missile/WMD technologies represent an `anti-access' strategy. Such strategies aim to deny the use of nearby runways by threatening ballistic missile or WMD attacks on runways as well as hosting nations, while providing a persistent and highly mobile air defence threat (A good summary of emerging ballistic missile capabilities in this area is at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/index.html, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/index.html).
Prior to the 11th September, long term US Air Force envisaged a two tier force structure model: the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) , an Air Expeditionary Force comprising 48 x F-22A and 12 x B-2A, would break the opponent's air defences and launch high tempo attacks on critical command/control/communications, WMD sites and ballistic missile forces. As the opponent's defences would crumble, a `sustainment' Air Expeditionary Force, comprising the Joint Strike Fighter, B-1B and B-52H, would then hammer the opponent to collapse. This model makes two implicit assumptions - the enemy cannot bombard friendly runways with ballistic missiles, and these runways are close enough to permit a viable sortie rate (missions/day) by the Joint Strike Fighter and F-22.
If the opponent chooses to play the ballistic missile bombardment game, then this model does get into some difficulty, since the 400-600 nautical mile range of evolved Scud class missiles presents difficulties for the Joint Strike Fighter - nearby nations might deny basing access and bases which are made available might be shut down by ballistic missile strikes. This is less of an issue for the supercruising F-22, as with decent tanker support it can sustain a high sortie rate from a much greater distance - the F-22 can transit to targets at roughly twice the speed of contemporary fighters and the Joint Strike Fighter.
This was a principal strategic argument against the whole concept of the Joint Strike Fighter prior to the September 11th events. Since then we have seen a pivotal shift in bombardment tactics, with long endurance `loitering bombardment' used to successfully engage and destroy fleeting and highly mobile ground targets. This in turn mitigates against smaller fighters and decisively favours aircraft which have larger bomb loads and endurance. The argument that Afghanistan was a `one-off' does not hold up to scrutiny - a campaign against Iran, Iraq, the PRC or more than one African problem nation could see the very same geographical problem issues arise yet again. Well spoken diplomacy is no match against the threat of domestic terrorism across porous Third World borders, or ballistic missile attacks with conventional or even WMD warheads - all being convincing disincentives to the basing of a US-led Air Expeditionary Force.
Whether one is hunting a high technology Russian mobile SAM system, a mobile ballistic missile system, or a bunch of terrorists in a four wheel drive or BTR-60, the inevitable reality is that the best technique is `loitering bombardment' which is not the forte of smaller fighters - including the Joint Strike Fighter.
The revived argument in the US promoting new build B-2C `batwings' and an F-111/FB-111A class `regional bomber' illustrates this important shift in the bombardment paradigm - and the increasing long term exposure of close-in based Air Expeditionary Forces to MRBM attacks. The argument pits direct operational needs for striking radius, sortie rates and bombloads in difficult to export or non-exportable top tier assets against the limited yet highly exportable and thus potentially profitable JSF.
Here's an in-depth analysis of the F-35. I don't necessarily agree with him, but it's an interesting read nonetheless. Bear in mind that it is an analysis by a man with a vested interest in the F-111 (his professional career has been based on it, to date) and as now appears the F-22 (he is writing more and more about the F-22)...
ANALYSIS: Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(Australian Aviation, May/June 2002, p 28-32, p 24-27.)
Carlo Kopp, PEng
[email protected]
© 2002, Carlo Kopp
©2002, Aerospace Publications, Pty Ltd, Canberra.
July 15, 2002
1 Part 1 A Cold War Anachronism?
Judging from the media rhetoric in early January this year, one could almost be forgiven for believing that the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was the anointed replacement for Australia's F/A-18A and F-111 fleets - no doubt to the annoyance of many in Defence who are immersed in the complexities of AIR 6000 capabilitiesdefinition. The reality of the Joint Strike Fighter is much less sparkling as many would like us to believe. In this month's analysis we will explore some of the issues.
The new LM F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has the distinction of being a `first' in more than one respect. It is the first combat aircraft to leverage the massive US Air Force research & development investment in the F-22 family of aircraft. It is also the first attempt since the 1960s TFX (F-111) program failure to produce a fighter which can meet the needs of all three US services with fighter fleets, as well as the needs of export clients. As the Joint Strike Fighter program includes both conventional, carrier capable and STOVL variants, it is the first ever attempt to create a fighter which spans three very distinct deployment regimes. Finally, it is the first attempt to produce a very low cost aircraft with genuine stealth characteristics.
With the prospect of around 3,000 Joint Strike Fighters for the US services, replacing the F-16A-D, A-10A, F/A-18A-D and AV-8B, and the potential to render all European fighter offerings wholly uncompetitive in the large F-16 and F/A-18 replacement markets, the hope of US manufacturers and their congressional supporters is that the Joint Strike Fighter will become the next F-16 and secure the US industry with an unbeatable advantage in the future `commodity' fighter market. Greed is a powerful motivator in the Joint Strike Fighter program and one which is likely to see most of the obstacles to this aircraft, and its inherent limitations, ignored in the quest for market dominance.
The history of the Joint Strike Fighter (formerly the Joint Advanced Strike Technology - JAST) program is by any measure colourful, its earliest origins tracing back to technology demonstration programs for a Harrier follow-on for the US Marine Corps and multirole fighter for the US Air Force (refer AA December 2001 and http://www.jsf.mil/). The shrinking US aerospace industrial base soon saw significant congressional pressure applied for the initial technology demonstration goal to be extended into a production fighter program. In its current shape the Joint Strike Fighter program could lead to the production of around 3,000 Joint Strike Fighter variants replacing US Air Force F-16Cs, A-10s, US Navy F/A-18Cs, and US Marine Corps and RAF/RN Harrier variants. The lead service in the Joint Strike Fighter program remains the US Air Force.
From the very outset the principal aim of the Joint Strike Fighter program was to produce a low cost mass production strike aircraft which exploits the latest avionic/computer, stealth and production technologies. Given the incessant political threats of F-22 program cancellation held over the US Air Force through most of the 1990s, limiting the air superiority capabilities of the Joint Strike Fighter was a political imperative - moreso given that air superiority capabilities such as high thrust/weight ratio and sustained supersonic cruise are not very compatible with very low unit cost. If the Joint Strike Fighter were to be too snappy a performer in the air superiority game, the F-22 would have been promptly axed thereby shifting USD 20B or more of production costs back by at least a decade much to the delight of vote buyers in the US Congress.
Indeed as recently as a year ago the US Air Force had to defend the F-22 against repeated political attacks, most of which clearly illustrated the almost total technical illiteracy of the F-22's critics. Invariably the argument is that the F-22 is `too big, too costly, too capable' or `built around Cold War needs, thus irrelevant to the modern environment' and that a Joint Strike Fighter can do the job well enough.
The US Air Force crafted the basic definition of the Joint Strike Fighter - its size, performance, load carrying ability and target cost around its principal tactical strike fighter, the Lockheed-Martin F-16CG/CJ. In the mid 1990s US Air Force force structure model the F-15C flew air superiority and air defence tasks, the F-111F, F-15E and F-117A performed the `deep strike' penetration tasks, with the latter used in more heavily defended environments. The venerable Fairchild-Republic A-10A Thunderbolt was used for battlefield interdiction and close air support, together with the F-16CG. Defence suppression was performed by the F-16CG, in concert with AGM-130 firing F-15Es, after the retirement of the formidable F-4G Weasel. In this model targets fall into two distinct bands - those within a 400 NMI radius of friendly runways, and those at 600 NMI and beyond.
This force structure model evolved during the latter part of the Cold War, and combined a relatively diverse mix of fighter capabilities. With the 1970s F-111F, A-10 and F-117A, 1980s F-15C/E and F-16C and a mix of weapons with lineages back to the 1960s, this model was a cumulative aggregation of almost three decades of technology and evolving doctrine. This was the force structure which the US Air Force applied with such devastating effect against the SovBloc modelled Iraqi defences in 1991 and it proved itself convincingly.
There is however one important division which can be drawn through this force structure model - size. With the exception of the small single engine single seat F-16, all of these aircraft are large twin engine fighters designed to push the performance envelope in their respective categories.
The ubiquitious F-16 was a uniquely Cold War phenomenon. With NATO and the Warsaw Pact geographically poised along either side of the Iron Curtain, presenting each other with a concentration of force and targets unprecedented in history, significant imperatives existed for both sides to saturate the theatre with high performance fighters. Whoever won the air superiority game over Central Europe held the decisive advantage in the Cold War standoff. Fighter combat radius and endurance over the target are not issues when the geographical environment puts the two largest military forces on the planet head-to-head across a single frontier.
The Light Weight Fighter (LWF) contest saw the GD YF-16 take the laurels and decisive build numbers over the YF-17. The production F-16A was a day-VFR light weight air combat fighter designed for exceptional transonic agility and good supersonic dash performance when clean, armed with Sidewinders and an internal gun. Its principal role was to destroy enmasse the Soviet and allied Warpac strike fighter fleets in close air combat, and then swing into day-VFR battlefield air interdiction and close air support to eradicate Soviet/Warpac land forces, the latter role to be shared with the F-15A, F-4E and F-111D/E/F. With the Soviet/Warpac fighter fleets dominated by the MiG-21, MiG-23/27 and Su-7/17/22 series, the F-16s would have enjoyed a decisively target rich environment.
With the impending retirement of the F-4E Phantom II, the US Air Force needed a substitute to fill the tactical fighter bomber role. The F-16C, equipped with the LANTIRN Terrain Following Radar and FLIR/laser targeting podset, was to fill this niche. With European theatre geography and threats driving this need, the radius of the F-16 airframe was yet again not an issue.
When the Soviet Empire collapsed, the US Air Force was forced into a massive downsizing program. Under significant budgetary pressure, the remaining F-4E and F-4G aircraft were retired, followed by the F-15A, much of the F-16A fleet and early model F-111A/D/E/G aircraft. By the mid to late nineties, the US Air Force fighter fleet comprised primarily the F-15C, F-16C variants, the F-15E and a small number of F-117As. Most of the massive B-52 fleet was retired and the buy of B-2A `batwing' bombers was chopped from 132 to 60 and then finally 21.
Expectations during this period were that the principal strategic problems the US would confront would be troublesome nations in the Balkans and the Middle East, with ethno-religious conflicts between smaller nation states dominating agenda. In this environment problem nations would be unable to threaten US basing, and the enormous political clout during the `Pax Americana' period would see easy access to basing. Concurrently the US Congress showed little interest in the defence budget, and the US Air Force faced the prospect of an aging and increasingly expensive to run fighter fleet, in a strategic environment where air superiority and safe in-theatre basing were virtually guaranteed.
This was the environment which shaped the Joint Strike Fighter program - a situation in which combat radius, endurance over the target, air superiority performance and availability of in-theatre basing were not principal design imperatives. Cost and industrial base survival pressures were the foremost drivers in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The US Air Force needed a cheap mass production bomb truck to provide a one-for-one replacement of its aging F-16C inventory. The US aerospace industry needed another F-16A with which to saturate export markets and retain their eroding market position against the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon.
Perhaps the greatest misconception about the Joint Strike Fighter program is that it represents a `repeat scenario' when compared to the YF-16/F-16A program - a low cost highly agile air superiority fighter designed to exploit cutting edge technology to provide a shorter ranging supplement to the top end twin engine large fighter (then F-15A, now F-22A) of the period. This misconception misrepresents the central design objectives of the Joint Strike Fighter program against the Light Weight Fighter program, and also ignores the decisive role shift in the F-16 fleet.
In its day the F-16A was perhaps the nastiest close-in air combat fighter in existance, requiring careful tactics by even the top end F-15A air superiority fighter. While the F-16C Block 40/50 is heavier, it is still a respectable air combat fighter even if a dubious bomb truck. The F-16's central design optimisation was the transonic dogfight, reflected in thrust/weight ratio, wing loading, turn rates, climb rates and acceleration. In these parameters it was competitive against the best in the field, even if it could not compete with the thrust/weight ratio, wing loading, climb rates and acceleration of the F-15A.
The Joint Strike Fighter's central design optimisation is in-theatre strike, battlefield interdiction and close air support, reflected in forward sector stealth, internal weapons/fuel capacity and cruise efficiency in clean configuration. In these parameters it outperforms the incumbent F-16C and F/A-18A/C, while providing relatively similar air superiority performance to these types. Against the current yardstick for air superiority performance, the F-22A, the Joint Strike Fighter is a non-contender - its 35 degree class transonic wing and 1:1 thrust/weight ratio are adequate for self-defensive purposes but not in the league for rapidly establishing air supremacy.
Just as the joint Tactical Fighter eXperimental (TFX) or F-111A/B program was cast at an early stage into a conceptual mold of a high speed long range bomb-truck, the Joint Strike Fighter has been cast into the mold of an incrementally improved F-16C / F/A-18C class light bomb-truck, exploiting stealth and modern avionics to provide a survivability edge over its predecessors. The TFX program crashed and burned on the evolving needs of the US Navy, who wanted more air superiority performance and lower carrier landing weights.
Some critics of the Joint Strike Fighter argue that it will `inevitably go the route of the TFX' experiencing cost growth, weight growth and performance loss as it undergoes development and its respective end users load it up with desired design extras to meet their specific needs. Indeed US reports suggest repeated political clashes in recent years, as the US Marine Corps and Navy sought performance and capability improvements which conflicted with US Air Force unit cost targets. Given that the maritime users of the Joint Strike Fighter do not have an F-22 equivalent to gain the high ground in an air battle, it is not inconceivable that we might see downstream disagreements in the Joint Strike Fighter program as these players try to fill this crucial gap in their basic capabilities.
The broader strategic issue for the Joint Strike Fighter will be its basic sizing in a world environment which sees two mutually supporting strategic trends - `problem nations' acquiring ballistic missiles, both mobile and semi-mobile, weapons of mass destruction, and a concurrent trend to implementing `shoot-and-scoot' SAM/AAA air defence tactics. In air power theoretic terms, the use of `shoot-and-scoot' SAM/AAA and ballistic missile/WMD technologies represent an `anti-access' strategy. Such strategies aim to deny the use of nearby runways by threatening ballistic missile or WMD attacks on runways as well as hosting nations, while providing a persistent and highly mobile air defence threat (A good summary of emerging ballistic missile capabilities in this area is at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/index.html, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/index.html).
Prior to the 11th September, long term US Air Force envisaged a two tier force structure model: the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) , an Air Expeditionary Force comprising 48 x F-22A and 12 x B-2A, would break the opponent's air defences and launch high tempo attacks on critical command/control/communications, WMD sites and ballistic missile forces. As the opponent's defences would crumble, a `sustainment' Air Expeditionary Force, comprising the Joint Strike Fighter, B-1B and B-52H, would then hammer the opponent to collapse. This model makes two implicit assumptions - the enemy cannot bombard friendly runways with ballistic missiles, and these runways are close enough to permit a viable sortie rate (missions/day) by the Joint Strike Fighter and F-22.
If the opponent chooses to play the ballistic missile bombardment game, then this model does get into some difficulty, since the 400-600 nautical mile range of evolved Scud class missiles presents difficulties for the Joint Strike Fighter - nearby nations might deny basing access and bases which are made available might be shut down by ballistic missile strikes. This is less of an issue for the supercruising F-22, as with decent tanker support it can sustain a high sortie rate from a much greater distance - the F-22 can transit to targets at roughly twice the speed of contemporary fighters and the Joint Strike Fighter.
This was a principal strategic argument against the whole concept of the Joint Strike Fighter prior to the September 11th events. Since then we have seen a pivotal shift in bombardment tactics, with long endurance `loitering bombardment' used to successfully engage and destroy fleeting and highly mobile ground targets. This in turn mitigates against smaller fighters and decisively favours aircraft which have larger bomb loads and endurance. The argument that Afghanistan was a `one-off' does not hold up to scrutiny - a campaign against Iran, Iraq, the PRC or more than one African problem nation could see the very same geographical problem issues arise yet again. Well spoken diplomacy is no match against the threat of domestic terrorism across porous Third World borders, or ballistic missile attacks with conventional or even WMD warheads - all being convincing disincentives to the basing of a US-led Air Expeditionary Force.
Whether one is hunting a high technology Russian mobile SAM system, a mobile ballistic missile system, or a bunch of terrorists in a four wheel drive or BTR-60, the inevitable reality is that the best technique is `loitering bombardment' which is not the forte of smaller fighters - including the Joint Strike Fighter.
The revived argument in the US promoting new build B-2C `batwings' and an F-111/FB-111A class `regional bomber' illustrates this important shift in the bombardment paradigm - and the increasing long term exposure of close-in based Air Expeditionary Forces to MRBM attacks. The argument pits direct operational needs for striking radius, sortie rates and bombloads in difficult to export or non-exportable top tier assets against the limited yet highly exportable and thus potentially profitable JSF.
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
And now for Part 2...
ANALYSIS: Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(Australian Aviation, May/June 2002, p 28-32, p 24-27.)
Carlo Kopp, PEng
[email protected]
© 2002, Carlo Kopp
©2002, Aerospace Publications, Pty Ltd, Canberra.
July 15, 2002
Part 2 Sizing up the Joint Strike Fighter
The public rhetoric surrounding the Joint Strike Fighter is no less deceptive to the uninitiated as the public rhetoric surrounding many of the other current production types being bid for AIR 6000. In all instances we hear the `latest avionics technology' and`stealth performance' as key attributes of a `modern high tech fighter' designed to `meet the threats of the future'.
In comparing the Joint Strike Fighter against the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, F-16C/B60 and F/A-18E/F, the Joint Strike Fighter will have a decisive advantage in its very moden integrated avionic architecture, which is modelled on that of the F-22A but built using militarised commercial computing technology. With a battery of GigaHertz clock speed processors, high speed digital busses with around 1,000 times the throughput of the Mil-Std-1553B busses in the teen series and Eurocanard fighters, it is no contest - the Joint Strike Fighter is in an unbeatable position. While growth versions of the teen series and Eurocanard fighters might see a similar integrated avionic architecture in the post 2010 period, this is unlikely to be a revenue-neutral design change.
Against all of these contenders, the Joint Strike Fighter has an unassailable survivability advantage in its use of evolved second generation stealth technology, again derived from the F-22A technology base. With a forward sector radar cross section cited to be `close to the F-22' the Joint Strike Fighter will present a challenging target to forward sector radar guided threats.
As a bomb truck, the Joint Strike Fighter falls into a similar payload class to these players, but with the important distinction that it carries its bombs or missiles internally, and it has an internal fuel capacity similar to that of these competing aircraft loaded up with external fuel tanks. In practical terms this means that the Joint Strike Fighter can carry a similar load of fuel and bombs without the critical transonic regime drag penalty of external stores. Therefore it can carry the same bomb load further using a similar fuel load. Claims that the X-35 demonstrator exceeded the Joint Strike Fighter combat radius requirement should come as no surprise - the cited figure of 600+ nautical miles is credible and a distinct gain over the F-16C and F/A-18A/C. This radius is however unlikely to be acheivable if the F-35 is heavily loaded with external stores, since it will like its competitors incur a major drag penalty.
Claims that the Joint Strike Fighter is an `F-111 class bomb truck' are scarcely credible, especially if the F-111 is armed with internal JDAMs or `small bombs' - a variable geometry wing and 34,000 lb of internal fuel is impossible to beat in the bomb trucking game. The comparison of a clean F-35 against an F-111 loaded with external BRU-3A/Mk.82 is not representative of what a post 2020 F-111 weapons configuration would look like. The only decisive system level advantage the Joint Strike Fighter has against the F-111 is its use of second generation stealth technology - no radar cross section reduction on the F-111 will make it competitive against this type. In terms of avionics, if the RAAF retains the F-111 post-2020 then Joint Strike Fighter generation technology would most likely find its way into the Pig and thus render this comparison meaningless.
As an air combat fighter the Joint Strike Fighter is more difficult to compare, since the differences against the teen series and Eurocanards are less distinct. In terms of achievable radar performance its small aperture radar will fall broadly into the same class as its direct competitors. While transonic turn rate performance figures remain classified, the F-35 is a 9G rated fighter and is thus apt to deliver highly competitive transonic close-in dogfight performance against the teen series and Eurocanards. The empty weight of the F-35, at 26,500 - 30,000 lb is deceptive insofar as it must be compared against a conventional competitor's weight including external pylons and empty fuel tanks - nevertheless it is in the empty weight class of an F-15 or F/A-18E rather than F-16C or F/A-18C.
With a nominal payload of 2,000 lb of AAMs the USAF F-35 yields a combat thrust/weight ratio around 1.1:1 which is competitive against a modestly loaded F-16, F/A-18A/C or Eurocanard, but with a typically better combat radius or combat gas allowance - however it is not in the class of an F-15C let alone F-22A. Therefore the F-35 should provide competitive acceleration and climb performance at similar weights to the F-16, F/A-18A/C or Eurocanards. With the upper portions of the split inlets likely to produce good vortices, the F-35 should provide respectable high alpha performance and handling, especially if flight control software technology from the F-22A was exploited fully.
Where the F-35 is apt to be less than a stellar performer is in the supersonic Beyond Visual Range combat regime, which is the sharp end of air superiority performance. This is primarily a consequence of the wing planform design which is in the 35 degree leading edge sweep angle class, thus placing it between the sweep of the F/A-18A/C and F-16A/C. Wing sweep in this class is good for transonic bomb trucking and tight turning, but incurs a much faster supersonic drag rise with Mach number against the supersonic intercept optimised wing planforms seen in the F-15, Typhoon, Rafale and indeed the F-22A. The important caveat is that the teen series and Eurocanards wear a hefty supersonic drag penalty from carrying external missiles and drop tanks, whereas the F-35 will have a clean wing in this regime.
In the absence of published hard numbers for supersonic acceleration, energy bleed and persistence performance, the only reasonable conclusion is that the F-35 is likely to be competitive against the teen series and Eurocanards in combat configuration but decisively inferior to the F-22A.
Another factor in the BVR game is radar performance, limited by the power/aperture of the radar design. While hard numbers on the F-35's radar are yet to be published, what is available suggests an 800-900 element phased array which is in the class of the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards but well behind the massive 2200 element APG-77 in the F-22A. With a superior processing architecture to the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards the Joint Strike Fighter is very unlikely to have inferior radar performance, but may not have a decisively large detection range advantage either.
If used as an air defence interceptor and air superiority fighter, the F-35 will deliver similar capabilities to the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards at similar weights - its limitations in thrust/weight ratio and thus climb rate/acceleration, and wing optimisation for transonic regimes, will limit its ability to engage high performance supersonic threats by virtue of basic aerodynamic performance. Its small radar will also put limitations on achievable BVR missile engagement ranges, although this will be mitigated by very good forward sector stealth performance. A threat with a large infrared search and track set may however get a firing opportunity in a high altitude clear sky engagement. The radar performance bounds will also present similar limitations to those seen with the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanard series when hunting for low flying cruise missiles - without close AWACS support the F-35 may not be very effective in this demanding role.
It is worth noting that the F-35 is not an all-aspect stealth design like the F-22A and YF-23 which have carefully optimised exhaust geometries and thus excellent aft sector radar cross section. The axisymmetric F-135 nozzle is not in this class and thus the F-35 is clearly not intended for the deep penetration strike role of the F-22A.
Attempting to make an all encompassing comparison of the F-35 against current fighters is fraught with some risks, insofar as the design will further evolve before production starts and many design parameters, especially in avionics, may shift. In terms of basic sizing and performance optimisations probably the best yardstick is that the F-35 is much like a `stealthy but incrementally improved F/A-18A/C' which closely reflects the similarity in the basic roles of the two types - strike optimised growth derivatives of lightweight fighters.
The F-35 is clearly out of its league against the F-22A in all cardinal performance parameters, with the exception of its bomb bay size which is built to handle larger weapons than the F-22A. Disregarding stealth capability and baseline avionics, the F-35 is also out of its league against the F-111 in the bomb trucking role by virtue of size and fixed wing geometry.
All of these analytical arguments are essentially contingent upon the JSF meeting its design performance and cost targets. This remains to be seen since the JSF is arguably the highest technological risk program in the pipeline at this time. Key risk factors derive from its reliance upon `bleeding edge' technology to achieve the combination of capability for its size and cost. There are no less than five areas of concern: the COTS derived avionic system departs from established technology and is in many respects a repeat of the F-111D Mk.II avionics idea; the reliance upon software goes well beyond established designs and software systems with many millions of lines of code are not reknowned for timely deliveries; any durability problems with the hot running F135 engines would be handled by derating which cuts into an already marginal thrust/weight ratio; differing needs and expectations by the JSF's diverse customer base could cause divergence in program objectives and cost blowouts in `common' areas; the sheer complexity of what the JSF project is trying to achieve in melding untried technologies with diverse missions could create unforseen problems in its own right. Until we see production JSFs coming off the production line, it remains a high risk option.
The Joint Strike Fighter is a most curious blend of the F-22 technology base, state-of-the-art avionics and Cold War era strategic thinking - in its own way as much a Cold War anachronism as the Eurocanards. Insofar as one of its prime design aims is to shoot down the Eurocanards in the commercial dogfight, it represents an instance of an anachronistic fighter sizing strategy and associated cost structure becoming a principal design driver over achievable combat effect and long term strategic usefulness.
2.1 Joint Strike Fighter vs A6K
With the F-35 being the holy grail of budget minded force planners throughout the West, it has developed some followers in the Canberra defence establishment, especially amongst players who see little importance in the RAAF's established doctrinal and strategic thinking or developing regional environment. Indeed, if we pretend that the PRC doesn't exist and India's strategic competition with the PRC in the region doesn't concern us, and that cruise missiles are not the hottest selling item across the wider region, then the F-35 becomes an attractive proposition - a cheap to buy, cheap to run, stealthy hi-tech fighter which is an incremental improvement over the RAAF's somewhat anaemic F/A-18A Hornet.
As a bomb truck, disregarding stealth performance, the F-35 falls into the gap between the F/A-18A and F-111. As an air combat fighter, it will offer modest performance gains over the F/A-18A HUG and the advantage of stealth. In the eyes of many this is apt to be a `good compromise' at a `good price'.
These arguments may appear superficially reasonable, but are based upon a number of premises which are not reasonable. Regional strategic issues may have disappeared from the press and TV bulletins but remain as they were a year ago:
1.The regional arms race has yet to show signs of abating, and with the War on Terrorism forcing the US to make significant political concessions to China and India we should expect to see both players doing their best to shop for Russian (and Israeli) technology while world attention is focussed elsewhere.
2.Shifting tactics in nations opposed to the West will see mobility become the basic tactic for evading air power, given that Afghanistan has proven yet again that bunkers, caves and tunnels are no defence against air power. Loitering bombardment will become the baseline tactic for defeating mobility, demanding larger fighters.
3.Mobile ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are the most rapidly proliferating weapon class in Asia today, and given their value in implementing `anti-access' strategies against Western air power, and political coercion, this is unlikely to change soon. Korea has made a successful business out of the export of extended range Scud derivative technology.
4.The cumulative total of Su-27/30 orders in Asia still remains around the 500 aircraft mark, representing an environment where a 600 nautical mile class subsonic combat radius is not a decisive strategic advantage against the Sukhoi's similar or better radius performance.
5.Turmoil in the Middle East is likely to see long term growth in alternative sources of oil and gas, accelerating development in Australia's Timor Sea and North West Shelf energy industries - and Australia's strategic vulnerability as a result.
6.Uncertainties in the RAAF gaining basing access in South East Asia during a regional crisis remain. While the War on Terrorism may have shifted the focus of Australia's regional interactions, the reality is that much of the region is culturally Muslim and whatever the outcome of the war, political sensitivies in the region will be exacerbated over the nearer and longer term.
The sad reality is that the regional strategic drivers remain as is - they are a consequence of the ongoing economic and military growth in Asia. While India's current relationship with the West has thawed, this situation may not persist over coming decades - the strategic timeline which concerns A6K planning.
What the War on Terrorism will produce, other than major strategic changes in the Middle East and Central Asia, is an increased move to mobility in Asian armed forces as the Afghan campaign is understood fully. It is also apt to produce a longer term demand for coalition campaign forces to support the US in expeditionary warfare.
If we make the assumption that A6K will aim to field only new technology fighters with a very long term development future, then the only relevant candidates are the F-22 and F-35 - both stealthy and using the latest generation avionic architectures and engines.
Numerous strategies exist - with or without F-111 replacement - for implementing the A6K program. If the F-111 is to disappear in 2015-2020, then the choices are a single type replacement using only the F-22, or only the F-35, or some Hi-Lo mix of the F-22 and F-35. If the F-111 is to be stretched beyond 2020, then the F/A-18A could be replaced with either the F-22 or the F-35. This provides no less than 5 possible force structure models, each with different funding needs and capability mixes. Which is best? That depends on the priorities of the observer.
The case for a mix of F119 powered F-111s and F-22s was argued in some detail in AA late last year and presents a robust case in capabilities, with the benefit of significant domestic spending but the drawback of some developmental risk. The case for an F-22 and F-35 mix depends crucially on the perceived importance of bomb-trucking performance vs survivability of the F-35 against the F-111. The F-35's stealth advantage must be weighed against the F-111's superior ability to haul big loads over big distances - with an F-22 escort to kill opposing fighters and SAMs the survivability argument may prove narrower than many may think. A mix in which transonic F-35s escort supercruising F-111s is arguably non-viable and is merely a new technology reimplementation of the existing F/A-18 and F-111 mix.
The alternatives of single type total force replacements with the F-22 or F-35 also raise interesting issues. While the F-35 at this time carries larger bombs than the F-22, it is a decidely inferior performer in the air combat game and the deep penetration strike game. With supercruise capability in a baseline bombing role using `small bomb' payloads the supercruising F-22's higher sortie rate at longer ranges suggests that one F-22 can perform a similar workload to a pair of F-35s, with the caveat that two or more F-35s will be needed to perform the air defence coverage of a single F-22. In terms of deterrent credibility and potency in combat, the F-22 is unbeatable, in terms of political whining from air power detractors of every ilk, it is a guaranteed magnet (deja vu - F-111 1967?). Conversely, a pure F-35 force structure is apt to leave important capability gaps in air superiority, cruise missile defence and deep penetration strike, while pushing up total numbers and thus aircrew demands - the latter likely to be a major long term issue with ongoing demographic shifts.
A key factor in any F-22 vs F-35 contest is that the F-35 order book is full, but the F-22 buy was hatcheted from around 750 down to 332 thus providing significant incentives for an export sale of an aircraft which would be exclusively available, like the F-111 during the 1960s, only to close and trusted allies of the US. US sources suggest a revived build of 750 F-22s would push the unit cost down to USD 74M, similar to an F-15E.
Which of these strategies proves to be most attractive to Australia's leadership is yet to be seen - and if the government is serious about the A6K effort this will not be known until a decision is reached around the middle of the decade.
What is clear at this stage is that the fighter market is stratifying in a manner without precedent - two decades ago a buyer had more than one choice in any given size/weight/performance class. By 2010 this will be untrue - in non-stealthy fighters there is apt to be only the F/A-18E/F and Typhoon with different weights, aerodynamics and mission avionic capabilities, and in stealthy fighters the F-22 and F-35 which are much more diverse in capabilities than their teen series predecessors, the F-15 and F-16. Therefore a choice of fighter will determine the choice of strategy/doctrine since different classes of fighter provide distinctly different possibilities - and limitations - in roles and missions.
One might ask the question of whether the `classical' model of a fighter competition is even relevant any more? With the only gains from the competitive process likely to be in ancillary benefits such as domestic support programs - aircraft prices being largely fixed by the domestic markets of the manufacturers - one might seriously contemplate the primary focus of the A6K evaluation being in assessing the ability of particular fighter types or mixes/numbers thereof to perform the intended roles, rather than the historical game of playing manufacturers off to secure the best pricing package.
In the context of A6K, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is most notable in terms of the roles andmissions it cannot do well, rather than those it can. If air superiority and long range strike are thelong term priorities which government policy ostensibly declares them to be, then the F-35may not be the best choice for replacing the F/A-18A or the F-111, either singly or in amix.
Admin: A-D, would you mind making these smaller in future. Better to have multiples than a single one that is a monster to read at one go.
And now for Part 2...
ANALYSIS: Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(Australian Aviation, May/June 2002, p 28-32, p 24-27.)
Carlo Kopp, PEng
[email protected]
© 2002, Carlo Kopp
©2002, Aerospace Publications, Pty Ltd, Canberra.
July 15, 2002
Part 2 Sizing up the Joint Strike Fighter
The public rhetoric surrounding the Joint Strike Fighter is no less deceptive to the uninitiated as the public rhetoric surrounding many of the other current production types being bid for AIR 6000. In all instances we hear the `latest avionics technology' and`stealth performance' as key attributes of a `modern high tech fighter' designed to `meet the threats of the future'.
In comparing the Joint Strike Fighter against the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, F-16C/B60 and F/A-18E/F, the Joint Strike Fighter will have a decisive advantage in its very moden integrated avionic architecture, which is modelled on that of the F-22A but built using militarised commercial computing technology. With a battery of GigaHertz clock speed processors, high speed digital busses with around 1,000 times the throughput of the Mil-Std-1553B busses in the teen series and Eurocanard fighters, it is no contest - the Joint Strike Fighter is in an unbeatable position. While growth versions of the teen series and Eurocanard fighters might see a similar integrated avionic architecture in the post 2010 period, this is unlikely to be a revenue-neutral design change.
Against all of these contenders, the Joint Strike Fighter has an unassailable survivability advantage in its use of evolved second generation stealth technology, again derived from the F-22A technology base. With a forward sector radar cross section cited to be `close to the F-22' the Joint Strike Fighter will present a challenging target to forward sector radar guided threats.
As a bomb truck, the Joint Strike Fighter falls into a similar payload class to these players, but with the important distinction that it carries its bombs or missiles internally, and it has an internal fuel capacity similar to that of these competing aircraft loaded up with external fuel tanks. In practical terms this means that the Joint Strike Fighter can carry a similar load of fuel and bombs without the critical transonic regime drag penalty of external stores. Therefore it can carry the same bomb load further using a similar fuel load. Claims that the X-35 demonstrator exceeded the Joint Strike Fighter combat radius requirement should come as no surprise - the cited figure of 600+ nautical miles is credible and a distinct gain over the F-16C and F/A-18A/C. This radius is however unlikely to be acheivable if the F-35 is heavily loaded with external stores, since it will like its competitors incur a major drag penalty.
Claims that the Joint Strike Fighter is an `F-111 class bomb truck' are scarcely credible, especially if the F-111 is armed with internal JDAMs or `small bombs' - a variable geometry wing and 34,000 lb of internal fuel is impossible to beat in the bomb trucking game. The comparison of a clean F-35 against an F-111 loaded with external BRU-3A/Mk.82 is not representative of what a post 2020 F-111 weapons configuration would look like. The only decisive system level advantage the Joint Strike Fighter has against the F-111 is its use of second generation stealth technology - no radar cross section reduction on the F-111 will make it competitive against this type. In terms of avionics, if the RAAF retains the F-111 post-2020 then Joint Strike Fighter generation technology would most likely find its way into the Pig and thus render this comparison meaningless.
As an air combat fighter the Joint Strike Fighter is more difficult to compare, since the differences against the teen series and Eurocanards are less distinct. In terms of achievable radar performance its small aperture radar will fall broadly into the same class as its direct competitors. While transonic turn rate performance figures remain classified, the F-35 is a 9G rated fighter and is thus apt to deliver highly competitive transonic close-in dogfight performance against the teen series and Eurocanards. The empty weight of the F-35, at 26,500 - 30,000 lb is deceptive insofar as it must be compared against a conventional competitor's weight including external pylons and empty fuel tanks - nevertheless it is in the empty weight class of an F-15 or F/A-18E rather than F-16C or F/A-18C.
With a nominal payload of 2,000 lb of AAMs the USAF F-35 yields a combat thrust/weight ratio around 1.1:1 which is competitive against a modestly loaded F-16, F/A-18A/C or Eurocanard, but with a typically better combat radius or combat gas allowance - however it is not in the class of an F-15C let alone F-22A. Therefore the F-35 should provide competitive acceleration and climb performance at similar weights to the F-16, F/A-18A/C or Eurocanards. With the upper portions of the split inlets likely to produce good vortices, the F-35 should provide respectable high alpha performance and handling, especially if flight control software technology from the F-22A was exploited fully.
Where the F-35 is apt to be less than a stellar performer is in the supersonic Beyond Visual Range combat regime, which is the sharp end of air superiority performance. This is primarily a consequence of the wing planform design which is in the 35 degree leading edge sweep angle class, thus placing it between the sweep of the F/A-18A/C and F-16A/C. Wing sweep in this class is good for transonic bomb trucking and tight turning, but incurs a much faster supersonic drag rise with Mach number against the supersonic intercept optimised wing planforms seen in the F-15, Typhoon, Rafale and indeed the F-22A. The important caveat is that the teen series and Eurocanards wear a hefty supersonic drag penalty from carrying external missiles and drop tanks, whereas the F-35 will have a clean wing in this regime.
In the absence of published hard numbers for supersonic acceleration, energy bleed and persistence performance, the only reasonable conclusion is that the F-35 is likely to be competitive against the teen series and Eurocanards in combat configuration but decisively inferior to the F-22A.
Another factor in the BVR game is radar performance, limited by the power/aperture of the radar design. While hard numbers on the F-35's radar are yet to be published, what is available suggests an 800-900 element phased array which is in the class of the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards but well behind the massive 2200 element APG-77 in the F-22A. With a superior processing architecture to the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards the Joint Strike Fighter is very unlikely to have inferior radar performance, but may not have a decisively large detection range advantage either.
If used as an air defence interceptor and air superiority fighter, the F-35 will deliver similar capabilities to the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanards at similar weights - its limitations in thrust/weight ratio and thus climb rate/acceleration, and wing optimisation for transonic regimes, will limit its ability to engage high performance supersonic threats by virtue of basic aerodynamic performance. Its small radar will also put limitations on achievable BVR missile engagement ranges, although this will be mitigated by very good forward sector stealth performance. A threat with a large infrared search and track set may however get a firing opportunity in a high altitude clear sky engagement. The radar performance bounds will also present similar limitations to those seen with the F-16C/B60, F/A-18E/F and Eurocanard series when hunting for low flying cruise missiles - without close AWACS support the F-35 may not be very effective in this demanding role.
It is worth noting that the F-35 is not an all-aspect stealth design like the F-22A and YF-23 which have carefully optimised exhaust geometries and thus excellent aft sector radar cross section. The axisymmetric F-135 nozzle is not in this class and thus the F-35 is clearly not intended for the deep penetration strike role of the F-22A.
Attempting to make an all encompassing comparison of the F-35 against current fighters is fraught with some risks, insofar as the design will further evolve before production starts and many design parameters, especially in avionics, may shift. In terms of basic sizing and performance optimisations probably the best yardstick is that the F-35 is much like a `stealthy but incrementally improved F/A-18A/C' which closely reflects the similarity in the basic roles of the two types - strike optimised growth derivatives of lightweight fighters.
The F-35 is clearly out of its league against the F-22A in all cardinal performance parameters, with the exception of its bomb bay size which is built to handle larger weapons than the F-22A. Disregarding stealth capability and baseline avionics, the F-35 is also out of its league against the F-111 in the bomb trucking role by virtue of size and fixed wing geometry.
All of these analytical arguments are essentially contingent upon the JSF meeting its design performance and cost targets. This remains to be seen since the JSF is arguably the highest technological risk program in the pipeline at this time. Key risk factors derive from its reliance upon `bleeding edge' technology to achieve the combination of capability for its size and cost. There are no less than five areas of concern: the COTS derived avionic system departs from established technology and is in many respects a repeat of the F-111D Mk.II avionics idea; the reliance upon software goes well beyond established designs and software systems with many millions of lines of code are not reknowned for timely deliveries; any durability problems with the hot running F135 engines would be handled by derating which cuts into an already marginal thrust/weight ratio; differing needs and expectations by the JSF's diverse customer base could cause divergence in program objectives and cost blowouts in `common' areas; the sheer complexity of what the JSF project is trying to achieve in melding untried technologies with diverse missions could create unforseen problems in its own right. Until we see production JSFs coming off the production line, it remains a high risk option.
The Joint Strike Fighter is a most curious blend of the F-22 technology base, state-of-the-art avionics and Cold War era strategic thinking - in its own way as much a Cold War anachronism as the Eurocanards. Insofar as one of its prime design aims is to shoot down the Eurocanards in the commercial dogfight, it represents an instance of an anachronistic fighter sizing strategy and associated cost structure becoming a principal design driver over achievable combat effect and long term strategic usefulness.
2.1 Joint Strike Fighter vs A6K
With the F-35 being the holy grail of budget minded force planners throughout the West, it has developed some followers in the Canberra defence establishment, especially amongst players who see little importance in the RAAF's established doctrinal and strategic thinking or developing regional environment. Indeed, if we pretend that the PRC doesn't exist and India's strategic competition with the PRC in the region doesn't concern us, and that cruise missiles are not the hottest selling item across the wider region, then the F-35 becomes an attractive proposition - a cheap to buy, cheap to run, stealthy hi-tech fighter which is an incremental improvement over the RAAF's somewhat anaemic F/A-18A Hornet.
As a bomb truck, disregarding stealth performance, the F-35 falls into the gap between the F/A-18A and F-111. As an air combat fighter, it will offer modest performance gains over the F/A-18A HUG and the advantage of stealth. In the eyes of many this is apt to be a `good compromise' at a `good price'.
These arguments may appear superficially reasonable, but are based upon a number of premises which are not reasonable. Regional strategic issues may have disappeared from the press and TV bulletins but remain as they were a year ago:
1.The regional arms race has yet to show signs of abating, and with the War on Terrorism forcing the US to make significant political concessions to China and India we should expect to see both players doing their best to shop for Russian (and Israeli) technology while world attention is focussed elsewhere.
2.Shifting tactics in nations opposed to the West will see mobility become the basic tactic for evading air power, given that Afghanistan has proven yet again that bunkers, caves and tunnels are no defence against air power. Loitering bombardment will become the baseline tactic for defeating mobility, demanding larger fighters.
3.Mobile ballistic missiles and cruise missiles are the most rapidly proliferating weapon class in Asia today, and given their value in implementing `anti-access' strategies against Western air power, and political coercion, this is unlikely to change soon. Korea has made a successful business out of the export of extended range Scud derivative technology.
4.The cumulative total of Su-27/30 orders in Asia still remains around the 500 aircraft mark, representing an environment where a 600 nautical mile class subsonic combat radius is not a decisive strategic advantage against the Sukhoi's similar or better radius performance.
5.Turmoil in the Middle East is likely to see long term growth in alternative sources of oil and gas, accelerating development in Australia's Timor Sea and North West Shelf energy industries - and Australia's strategic vulnerability as a result.
6.Uncertainties in the RAAF gaining basing access in South East Asia during a regional crisis remain. While the War on Terrorism may have shifted the focus of Australia's regional interactions, the reality is that much of the region is culturally Muslim and whatever the outcome of the war, political sensitivies in the region will be exacerbated over the nearer and longer term.
The sad reality is that the regional strategic drivers remain as is - they are a consequence of the ongoing economic and military growth in Asia. While India's current relationship with the West has thawed, this situation may not persist over coming decades - the strategic timeline which concerns A6K planning.
What the War on Terrorism will produce, other than major strategic changes in the Middle East and Central Asia, is an increased move to mobility in Asian armed forces as the Afghan campaign is understood fully. It is also apt to produce a longer term demand for coalition campaign forces to support the US in expeditionary warfare.
If we make the assumption that A6K will aim to field only new technology fighters with a very long term development future, then the only relevant candidates are the F-22 and F-35 - both stealthy and using the latest generation avionic architectures and engines.
Numerous strategies exist - with or without F-111 replacement - for implementing the A6K program. If the F-111 is to disappear in 2015-2020, then the choices are a single type replacement using only the F-22, or only the F-35, or some Hi-Lo mix of the F-22 and F-35. If the F-111 is to be stretched beyond 2020, then the F/A-18A could be replaced with either the F-22 or the F-35. This provides no less than 5 possible force structure models, each with different funding needs and capability mixes. Which is best? That depends on the priorities of the observer.
The case for a mix of F119 powered F-111s and F-22s was argued in some detail in AA late last year and presents a robust case in capabilities, with the benefit of significant domestic spending but the drawback of some developmental risk. The case for an F-22 and F-35 mix depends crucially on the perceived importance of bomb-trucking performance vs survivability of the F-35 against the F-111. The F-35's stealth advantage must be weighed against the F-111's superior ability to haul big loads over big distances - with an F-22 escort to kill opposing fighters and SAMs the survivability argument may prove narrower than many may think. A mix in which transonic F-35s escort supercruising F-111s is arguably non-viable and is merely a new technology reimplementation of the existing F/A-18 and F-111 mix.
The alternatives of single type total force replacements with the F-22 or F-35 also raise interesting issues. While the F-35 at this time carries larger bombs than the F-22, it is a decidely inferior performer in the air combat game and the deep penetration strike game. With supercruise capability in a baseline bombing role using `small bomb' payloads the supercruising F-22's higher sortie rate at longer ranges suggests that one F-22 can perform a similar workload to a pair of F-35s, with the caveat that two or more F-35s will be needed to perform the air defence coverage of a single F-22. In terms of deterrent credibility and potency in combat, the F-22 is unbeatable, in terms of political whining from air power detractors of every ilk, it is a guaranteed magnet (deja vu - F-111 1967?). Conversely, a pure F-35 force structure is apt to leave important capability gaps in air superiority, cruise missile defence and deep penetration strike, while pushing up total numbers and thus aircrew demands - the latter likely to be a major long term issue with ongoing demographic shifts.
A key factor in any F-22 vs F-35 contest is that the F-35 order book is full, but the F-22 buy was hatcheted from around 750 down to 332 thus providing significant incentives for an export sale of an aircraft which would be exclusively available, like the F-111 during the 1960s, only to close and trusted allies of the US. US sources suggest a revived build of 750 F-22s would push the unit cost down to USD 74M, similar to an F-15E.
Which of these strategies proves to be most attractive to Australia's leadership is yet to be seen - and if the government is serious about the A6K effort this will not be known until a decision is reached around the middle of the decade.
What is clear at this stage is that the fighter market is stratifying in a manner without precedent - two decades ago a buyer had more than one choice in any given size/weight/performance class. By 2010 this will be untrue - in non-stealthy fighters there is apt to be only the F/A-18E/F and Typhoon with different weights, aerodynamics and mission avionic capabilities, and in stealthy fighters the F-22 and F-35 which are much more diverse in capabilities than their teen series predecessors, the F-15 and F-16. Therefore a choice of fighter will determine the choice of strategy/doctrine since different classes of fighter provide distinctly different possibilities - and limitations - in roles and missions.
One might ask the question of whether the `classical' model of a fighter competition is even relevant any more? With the only gains from the competitive process likely to be in ancillary benefits such as domestic support programs - aircraft prices being largely fixed by the domestic markets of the manufacturers - one might seriously contemplate the primary focus of the A6K evaluation being in assessing the ability of particular fighter types or mixes/numbers thereof to perform the intended roles, rather than the historical game of playing manufacturers off to secure the best pricing package.
In the context of A6K, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is most notable in terms of the roles andmissions it cannot do well, rather than those it can. If air superiority and long range strike are thelong term priorities which government policy ostensibly declares them to be, then the F-35may not be the best choice for replacing the F/A-18A or the F-111, either singly or in amix.
Admin: A-D, would you mind making these smaller in future. Better to have multiples than a single one that is a monster to read at one go.
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Thoughts,
1. The shortening by 14" of the STOVL JSF weapons bay most assuredly DOES 'pose a problem' inherent to carriage of large glide munitions like JSOW and theoretically any Quickshot/SWAK equivalent JDAM. I also expect it will effectively deny any 'straight across' derivation of HARM (AARGM or now ASARM) and probably a couple of other key 'fattyXlongie' weapons to include, yes, Harpoon.
OTOH, I don't really understand the importance of a 2,000lb internal weapons carriage option /anyway/ since most of the post-OIF analysis showed that even superpenetrators in the GBU-37 class were not doing much to the Iraqi presidential complexes and the only reason you go after hardXdeep targets is because you either lack the ordnance or the targeting to kill 'live' threats (IADS and TBM etc.) as they popup.
What I am /vastly/ more concerned over is the likelihood that the BRU-61/GBU-39 combination has yet to be photographed ONCE inside an F-35 weapons bay (as has already occured on the F/A-22).
2. The ability to kill naval targets is indeed important when one is surrounded by blue water but the reality remains that most targets are small and many are becoming increasingly well protected against the 'single or few', subsonic, sea skimmer threat. OTOH, again, no one has really evaluated the capabilities of an AMSTE or AMSTE+Seeker mod ballistic munition to fly downrange a -sufficient- distance (glide kits again) to retain the requisite stealth threshold (low band, high power naval radars and the need to open the bay doors and caviterize the jet etc.). My understanding of the SDB is that it can fly 15nm cross range, 25-30nm down range with 1.5m of penetration. And as much as 50nm downrange with contact det. From supercruise, figures as high as 80nm have been mentioned. All of these distances are competitive with Gen-II/III AShM such as Penguin, Harpoon and Exocet while questions about guidance precision and even aimpoint selection all deserve further analysis based on the EOTS imaging range (Sniper is a 40nm system) and the ability of the EDGE capable transceiver on the SDB is inherent to it's functioning within a potentially even greater ranging AMSTE (as a high rez InSAR/ISAR radar linked sideband type munition 'steering update' system).
All this -before- the notion of independent seekers and even alternate airframe/propulsion methods such as LOCAAS or a weaponize MALD.
I know this, I would not waste a Harpoon on a sampan or a PCI type 'pirate' threat as China sponsored throughout the SCS in much of the late 80's and early 90's. Nor would I necessarily believe that one munition could ever penetrate a DDG level netted defense of the type apt to include mixed 2s6 and SA-15 type 'turrets' and even (they certainly will have the power and weight for it) first gen 'Sea Light' type DEWS.
Multiple, Multilevel, Fast and/or VLO munition types offer SO MUCH more potential. Both in their ability to seriously disable or -optionally- sink a small craft. And in their ability to penetrate inner zone defenses which are getting to be increasingly thick and (optical) hard to beat. Indeed, were I to take on the 'ultimate threat'; a carrier battle group, I'm still not sure that a swarm of 100-200 small munitions, flying a 100-150km long skirmish line, might not be a better means to find the formation; assign ships and then perform coordinated attacks on _key points_, trading warhead weight for aimpoint selectivity (into the hangar, into the cats and pendants, into the apertures, into any fueled airframes or loaded VLS/rails etc.).
If a faster, longer reaching, 'radar/MRM equipped' F-117 is the only definition by which a not-so-cheap (100 million and rising last I read) JSF is considered to be a reasoned approach to strike warfare then I'm afraid not just the U.S. but the entire world is deluded as to both the value of the hammer class munitions and the nature of the threat/mission requiring them having completely changed.
3. STOVL is a complete and utter JOKE.
One of the AvLeak mentioned cues to how they are 'really solving this problem' is the (paraphrased) "Adjusted bringback and hover margins around the boat". Which effectively amounts to a reduction in mission fuel if not actual tankage. Something which ALL of us watching the program have long suspected will be the case in terms of accepting a 12Klb-to-400nm effective radius change.
This being the result of never having integrated a mission-system into the X-35's wherein the 'weapons bay' volume was instead given freely to auxilliary systems packaging and even things like stroke length and weight of the landing gear was 'not a factor'.
In many ways, even what is being halfway-admitted now is illusory if not outright venal in it's attempt to disguise facts for any STOVL=CAS mission assumption of 'external only' stores carriage itself gives way under the realization that pylon activation will bring with it a _minimum_ 500lb weight penalty per station and that drag (sway braces alone...) and weight will further be spiked by notion of podded rockets or multiracked weapons.
i.e. the 12Klb limit is itself roughly equivalent to the combined (max) internal/external fuel combination of the F-16. Yet the F-16C.50+ and E, with their 132/232 EFE (32Klbst and probably 20+ mil) are themselves now moving towards 600 gallon fuel tanks and CFT _for a reason_.
While the notion that operating from a microcarrier or a matting based shortstrip with a 40Klbst engine and perhaps 8-9Klbs of fuel (Harrier II equivalent) to compensate for your 'CAS load' externals is entirely moronic. Since now you are looking at perhaps 100-200nm worth of radius feeding that /monster/ of a 'fighter' profiled engine.
Next let's take the high road here and not lie about what a helo-cruiser (LHA/LHD or the Aussie equivalent) REALLY is: an assault ship for putting maximum people ashore in vertical envelopement operations. i.e. helos and tiltrotors.
It is NOT a strike warfare platform and it CANNOT function as one so long as the total fixed wing 'detachment' component size is all of about 8 airframes strong.
Once you realize this, the idea that your 'shorter radius' jet is somehow better in /smaller numbers/ becomes untenable. Because 200-300 CTOL or even 60-80 CVTOL jets will ALWAYS 'be there' in a fashion better suited to surged reduction of an enemy IADS. Or in Continuous Overhead Presence support of forces in the field.
No one in their right minds will put STOVL into the field because they are too easy to backtrace by both direct signature and logistical footprint in the modern age. They are further vulnerable to all kinds of unconventional attack (mortar, rockets, MANPADS under the approaches) and CONTINUE to pose almost insurmountable up and away performance penalties not only to their own effectiveness but also, in the JSF, with what they have done to the other variants.
4. I don't believe in the wisdom of thinning skins or redistributing root loads as a function of 'redesign' before first flight. I /particularly/ don't believe in such BS as a function of 'SDD=Production Ramp' deciding to purchase an airframe with NO alternative choices available 'because the teen jets are conceptually too old' (the F-16E effectively IS the CTOL F-35 with merely cosmetic differences in effective standoff/warload options vs. total unrefueled radius and equivalent aperture suites).
And I find it telling that the Lunchmeat is so far behind the eightball on this that they are 'asking as an offer' to deliver USAF jets at Block-1 capability spec with only internal AMRAAM/JDAM, to be followed by Block-2 delivery of first-export airframes with again the most basic of 'expanded' munitions options like fuel tanks and AAM.
IMO, all of this /stinks/ of the initial F-16A equivalent production lots with all the 'cold worked, reskinned and rewinged' structural problems that they went through before early retirement. As a function of carrying heavy A2G loads at low level as well as flying ACM-T as often as possible.
It may very well be that the provision of denser structural rib/stringer spacing and the nature of composite 'directional flex' distributed loading will help in this area (ironically both of these being features more associated with the X-32 program) but given the program's fore-ordained procurement decision; it irritates me that ALL these factors are coming oink-urgently together to rape the airframe of a decent _FSD_ (ironbird meets mission systems) envelope clearance effort with all stores and weapons combinations as any proper Seek Eagle program would have demanded in the 1970's.
5. The whiners among the Euros who think that a measily Level 2 or 3 commitment of funds is doing anything more than buying them 'out the door' pricing (rather than retail plus ammortization of R&D) are fools of the first order. This is a 245 BILLION dollar program. The U.S. is virtually -dependent- on arms exports to provide even an attempt at balanced trade. Even the last 'Deal Of The Century' effort with separate Fokker/SABCA FACO lines still mandatorily required major elements of Ft. Worth subcomponent first order supplier to be 'accepted' as non competitively bid preconditioning. OTOH, Flubber and Gripen are roughly 45 and 60 million dollar platforms which will /never/ be made cheaper because they respectively have not one but FOUR national supplier bases, spares generation and training systems/munitions clearance efforts to deal with. As well as a single host manufacturer whose home production of the followon Lot-III/JAS-39C has been virtually destroyed by SweAF downsizing and which can in any case produce no more than about 15-18 airframes per year. i.e. the perfect examples of what happens when you micropurchase something to death and try to make it a function of international 'consortia' pork politic.
Knowing how crowded the LM Ft. Worth main production hall is, I myself have HUGE doubts as to the ability of the company to generate a 120 airframe/year new production capacity from it. But the fact remains that if even if you are suckered by the notion of a 48-50 million dollar JSF (the 'official' price quoted at the SDD contract announcement on defense.mil) as being real rather than before all the R&D and production ramp and military construction etc. are factored in; the fact remains that this price will ONLY be guaranteed so long as U.S. predominance of sub and prime work share is assured. Indeed, you can 'Congressionally' count on it. As well it should be so long as the USAF alone provides up to 1/2 of the hoped for 3,000 sales.
OTOH, what amazes me about the U.S. 'take it or leave it' hubris is that there is virtually nothing available on the nature or extent of 'penalty clause' financial outcomes from our side if the 'failure to meet contractual guarantees' of the offset/workshare element. Given our massive national debt, now set to soar well over 5 trillion dollars before 2010, any 'cheap fighter' attempt to finance the JSF overseas which suddenly rebounds as a foreclosured loan will likely add ten times it's 'weight' in real dollars at the time of commitment (not least because of USD weakness over Iraq and Oil). This too will increase cost factors.
IMO, nobody not supplying forces to OEF/OIF during the active military phase /needs/ a 600+nm interdictor as an 'air defense' aircraft. While those which did should be able to count on the U.S. to supply overhead presence 'free of charge'. Once you realize that the cost of neutrality is not exile from the world scene so much as /savings/ in real expeditionary 'crusading' money; the superior alternatives immediately become obvious:
A. Nobody in Europe needs more than Meteor + OTIS + AMSAR on a Gripen or late F-16 airframe to defend their airspace from anything coming out of Russian skies. This is furthermore a capability by which 10-20 jets can do the work previously assigned to 60 or more. Gripen is expensive to acquire but many of it's systems offer the potential to debunk U.S. MilStd dominance as effective (COTS ethernet IIRR) 'exclusionary' controls of specific systems enablement while the platform itself is typically quoted as being 2,000-2,500 dollars per flight hour to run which beats even the F-16 by almost 1K$:FH. In this, the Germans may well have been proven correct in the early 1990's for wanting to ditch Flubber for 'Eurofighter Lite'. And a FAST switch to 'mass purchase/shared production'; along with the remaining Eastern European states would also go a LONG ways towards cementing EU alliances as independent-yet-common-market military production source.
B. Universal purchase of 'light' fighter interceptors, even down to the projected 25 million dollar A-50 and MAKO-F variants for maintenance of ADIZ security more or less means that strike can be undertaken exclusively by either cruise based systems or unmanned interdiction which is itself both vastly less expensive and MAGNIFICENTLY more capable than any existing manned penetrator. Up to and including the Raptor in many ways. INF and MTCR be hanged, the ability to fly a jet 1,000nm with 4,000lbs of ordnance, loiter for 2-3hrs and come home -without training- is simply too useful to ignore. Even as the presence of multiple outside-U.S. sourced expert system integrators (France, Sweden and Israel among many others) is just not to be ignored. Targeting will not be a problem either as line of sight microwave datalinks are effectively unjammable and prewar intelligence gathering will allow most nations, even without U.S. overhead assistance to generate sufficient GPS-as-signature databases through nothing more than EOS or walkabout espionage as to hit critical infrastructure targets which our own 'no collateral' policies will not frag. But which could easily rip a threat nation's economy apart, no matter what the condition of martial victory or defeat.
C. Despite their covert bloodthirst in proving an ability to conduct ranged strike warfare against the Phantom Menace which is Indonesia; Australia is in much the same state as the EU in that their massive water barrier, Jindalee and Wedgetail will effectively GIVE THEM 'friendly neighbor' warning of any Su-30 type inbound threat /hours/ before arrival. While the clustering of much of their society along the coastal plains requires vastly more airframes than a mere 60 JSF could provide. Indeed, the only real advantage which the JSF brings: stealthy-at-range intercept is itself invalidated if the type's crossroling to interdiction interferes with or denies adequate DCA coverage. While a system like the A-50 with a modernized APG-68 or Grifo or Elta alternatives, integrated by passive datalink into a nationwide ADGE and operating with silent-BVR tactics would likely provide equal if not better (by numbers) air defense capabilities, even against the monster Flanker 'variants' with their purported AESA's and LRAAM etc. Certainly a combined Aster equipped Frigate and landbased SAM force would be superior to either in providing both terminal high-density (supersonic and multi-cruise) and 'self defending' approaches (missile trap) capabilities. At lower yearly costs.
Whew, tired fingers for now. I will finish reading what all you have commented on and see if I can't add some more later... KP
Thoughts,
1. The shortening by 14" of the STOVL JSF weapons bay most assuredly DOES 'pose a problem' inherent to carriage of large glide munitions like JSOW and theoretically any Quickshot/SWAK equivalent JDAM. I also expect it will effectively deny any 'straight across' derivation of HARM (AARGM or now ASARM) and probably a couple of other key 'fattyXlongie' weapons to include, yes, Harpoon.
OTOH, I don't really understand the importance of a 2,000lb internal weapons carriage option /anyway/ since most of the post-OIF analysis showed that even superpenetrators in the GBU-37 class were not doing much to the Iraqi presidential complexes and the only reason you go after hardXdeep targets is because you either lack the ordnance or the targeting to kill 'live' threats (IADS and TBM etc.) as they popup.
What I am /vastly/ more concerned over is the likelihood that the BRU-61/GBU-39 combination has yet to be photographed ONCE inside an F-35 weapons bay (as has already occured on the F/A-22).
2. The ability to kill naval targets is indeed important when one is surrounded by blue water but the reality remains that most targets are small and many are becoming increasingly well protected against the 'single or few', subsonic, sea skimmer threat. OTOH, again, no one has really evaluated the capabilities of an AMSTE or AMSTE+Seeker mod ballistic munition to fly downrange a -sufficient- distance (glide kits again) to retain the requisite stealth threshold (low band, high power naval radars and the need to open the bay doors and caviterize the jet etc.). My understanding of the SDB is that it can fly 15nm cross range, 25-30nm down range with 1.5m of penetration. And as much as 50nm downrange with contact det. From supercruise, figures as high as 80nm have been mentioned. All of these distances are competitive with Gen-II/III AShM such as Penguin, Harpoon and Exocet while questions about guidance precision and even aimpoint selection all deserve further analysis based on the EOTS imaging range (Sniper is a 40nm system) and the ability of the EDGE capable transceiver on the SDB is inherent to it's functioning within a potentially even greater ranging AMSTE (as a high rez InSAR/ISAR radar linked sideband type munition 'steering update' system).
All this -before- the notion of independent seekers and even alternate airframe/propulsion methods such as LOCAAS or a weaponize MALD.
I know this, I would not waste a Harpoon on a sampan or a PCI type 'pirate' threat as China sponsored throughout the SCS in much of the late 80's and early 90's. Nor would I necessarily believe that one munition could ever penetrate a DDG level netted defense of the type apt to include mixed 2s6 and SA-15 type 'turrets' and even (they certainly will have the power and weight for it) first gen 'Sea Light' type DEWS.
Multiple, Multilevel, Fast and/or VLO munition types offer SO MUCH more potential. Both in their ability to seriously disable or -optionally- sink a small craft. And in their ability to penetrate inner zone defenses which are getting to be increasingly thick and (optical) hard to beat. Indeed, were I to take on the 'ultimate threat'; a carrier battle group, I'm still not sure that a swarm of 100-200 small munitions, flying a 100-150km long skirmish line, might not be a better means to find the formation; assign ships and then perform coordinated attacks on _key points_, trading warhead weight for aimpoint selectivity (into the hangar, into the cats and pendants, into the apertures, into any fueled airframes or loaded VLS/rails etc.).
If a faster, longer reaching, 'radar/MRM equipped' F-117 is the only definition by which a not-so-cheap (100 million and rising last I read) JSF is considered to be a reasoned approach to strike warfare then I'm afraid not just the U.S. but the entire world is deluded as to both the value of the hammer class munitions and the nature of the threat/mission requiring them having completely changed.
3. STOVL is a complete and utter JOKE.
One of the AvLeak mentioned cues to how they are 'really solving this problem' is the (paraphrased) "Adjusted bringback and hover margins around the boat". Which effectively amounts to a reduction in mission fuel if not actual tankage. Something which ALL of us watching the program have long suspected will be the case in terms of accepting a 12Klb-to-400nm effective radius change.
This being the result of never having integrated a mission-system into the X-35's wherein the 'weapons bay' volume was instead given freely to auxilliary systems packaging and even things like stroke length and weight of the landing gear was 'not a factor'.
In many ways, even what is being halfway-admitted now is illusory if not outright venal in it's attempt to disguise facts for any STOVL=CAS mission assumption of 'external only' stores carriage itself gives way under the realization that pylon activation will bring with it a _minimum_ 500lb weight penalty per station and that drag (sway braces alone...) and weight will further be spiked by notion of podded rockets or multiracked weapons.
i.e. the 12Klb limit is itself roughly equivalent to the combined (max) internal/external fuel combination of the F-16. Yet the F-16C.50+ and E, with their 132/232 EFE (32Klbst and probably 20+ mil) are themselves now moving towards 600 gallon fuel tanks and CFT _for a reason_.
While the notion that operating from a microcarrier or a matting based shortstrip with a 40Klbst engine and perhaps 8-9Klbs of fuel (Harrier II equivalent) to compensate for your 'CAS load' externals is entirely moronic. Since now you are looking at perhaps 100-200nm worth of radius feeding that /monster/ of a 'fighter' profiled engine.
Next let's take the high road here and not lie about what a helo-cruiser (LHA/LHD or the Aussie equivalent) REALLY is: an assault ship for putting maximum people ashore in vertical envelopement operations. i.e. helos and tiltrotors.
It is NOT a strike warfare platform and it CANNOT function as one so long as the total fixed wing 'detachment' component size is all of about 8 airframes strong.
Once you realize this, the idea that your 'shorter radius' jet is somehow better in /smaller numbers/ becomes untenable. Because 200-300 CTOL or even 60-80 CVTOL jets will ALWAYS 'be there' in a fashion better suited to surged reduction of an enemy IADS. Or in Continuous Overhead Presence support of forces in the field.
No one in their right minds will put STOVL into the field because they are too easy to backtrace by both direct signature and logistical footprint in the modern age. They are further vulnerable to all kinds of unconventional attack (mortar, rockets, MANPADS under the approaches) and CONTINUE to pose almost insurmountable up and away performance penalties not only to their own effectiveness but also, in the JSF, with what they have done to the other variants.
4. I don't believe in the wisdom of thinning skins or redistributing root loads as a function of 'redesign' before first flight. I /particularly/ don't believe in such BS as a function of 'SDD=Production Ramp' deciding to purchase an airframe with NO alternative choices available 'because the teen jets are conceptually too old' (the F-16E effectively IS the CTOL F-35 with merely cosmetic differences in effective standoff/warload options vs. total unrefueled radius and equivalent aperture suites).
And I find it telling that the Lunchmeat is so far behind the eightball on this that they are 'asking as an offer' to deliver USAF jets at Block-1 capability spec with only internal AMRAAM/JDAM, to be followed by Block-2 delivery of first-export airframes with again the most basic of 'expanded' munitions options like fuel tanks and AAM.
IMO, all of this /stinks/ of the initial F-16A equivalent production lots with all the 'cold worked, reskinned and rewinged' structural problems that they went through before early retirement. As a function of carrying heavy A2G loads at low level as well as flying ACM-T as often as possible.
It may very well be that the provision of denser structural rib/stringer spacing and the nature of composite 'directional flex' distributed loading will help in this area (ironically both of these being features more associated with the X-32 program) but given the program's fore-ordained procurement decision; it irritates me that ALL these factors are coming oink-urgently together to rape the airframe of a decent _FSD_ (ironbird meets mission systems) envelope clearance effort with all stores and weapons combinations as any proper Seek Eagle program would have demanded in the 1970's.
5. The whiners among the Euros who think that a measily Level 2 or 3 commitment of funds is doing anything more than buying them 'out the door' pricing (rather than retail plus ammortization of R&D) are fools of the first order. This is a 245 BILLION dollar program. The U.S. is virtually -dependent- on arms exports to provide even an attempt at balanced trade. Even the last 'Deal Of The Century' effort with separate Fokker/SABCA FACO lines still mandatorily required major elements of Ft. Worth subcomponent first order supplier to be 'accepted' as non competitively bid preconditioning. OTOH, Flubber and Gripen are roughly 45 and 60 million dollar platforms which will /never/ be made cheaper because they respectively have not one but FOUR national supplier bases, spares generation and training systems/munitions clearance efforts to deal with. As well as a single host manufacturer whose home production of the followon Lot-III/JAS-39C has been virtually destroyed by SweAF downsizing and which can in any case produce no more than about 15-18 airframes per year. i.e. the perfect examples of what happens when you micropurchase something to death and try to make it a function of international 'consortia' pork politic.
Knowing how crowded the LM Ft. Worth main production hall is, I myself have HUGE doubts as to the ability of the company to generate a 120 airframe/year new production capacity from it. But the fact remains that if even if you are suckered by the notion of a 48-50 million dollar JSF (the 'official' price quoted at the SDD contract announcement on defense.mil) as being real rather than before all the R&D and production ramp and military construction etc. are factored in; the fact remains that this price will ONLY be guaranteed so long as U.S. predominance of sub and prime work share is assured. Indeed, you can 'Congressionally' count on it. As well it should be so long as the USAF alone provides up to 1/2 of the hoped for 3,000 sales.
OTOH, what amazes me about the U.S. 'take it or leave it' hubris is that there is virtually nothing available on the nature or extent of 'penalty clause' financial outcomes from our side if the 'failure to meet contractual guarantees' of the offset/workshare element. Given our massive national debt, now set to soar well over 5 trillion dollars before 2010, any 'cheap fighter' attempt to finance the JSF overseas which suddenly rebounds as a foreclosured loan will likely add ten times it's 'weight' in real dollars at the time of commitment (not least because of USD weakness over Iraq and Oil). This too will increase cost factors.
IMO, nobody not supplying forces to OEF/OIF during the active military phase /needs/ a 600+nm interdictor as an 'air defense' aircraft. While those which did should be able to count on the U.S. to supply overhead presence 'free of charge'. Once you realize that the cost of neutrality is not exile from the world scene so much as /savings/ in real expeditionary 'crusading' money; the superior alternatives immediately become obvious:
A. Nobody in Europe needs more than Meteor + OTIS + AMSAR on a Gripen or late F-16 airframe to defend their airspace from anything coming out of Russian skies. This is furthermore a capability by which 10-20 jets can do the work previously assigned to 60 or more. Gripen is expensive to acquire but many of it's systems offer the potential to debunk U.S. MilStd dominance as effective (COTS ethernet IIRR) 'exclusionary' controls of specific systems enablement while the platform itself is typically quoted as being 2,000-2,500 dollars per flight hour to run which beats even the F-16 by almost 1K$:FH. In this, the Germans may well have been proven correct in the early 1990's for wanting to ditch Flubber for 'Eurofighter Lite'. And a FAST switch to 'mass purchase/shared production'; along with the remaining Eastern European states would also go a LONG ways towards cementing EU alliances as independent-yet-common-market military production source.
B. Universal purchase of 'light' fighter interceptors, even down to the projected 25 million dollar A-50 and MAKO-F variants for maintenance of ADIZ security more or less means that strike can be undertaken exclusively by either cruise based systems or unmanned interdiction which is itself both vastly less expensive and MAGNIFICENTLY more capable than any existing manned penetrator. Up to and including the Raptor in many ways. INF and MTCR be hanged, the ability to fly a jet 1,000nm with 4,000lbs of ordnance, loiter for 2-3hrs and come home -without training- is simply too useful to ignore. Even as the presence of multiple outside-U.S. sourced expert system integrators (France, Sweden and Israel among many others) is just not to be ignored. Targeting will not be a problem either as line of sight microwave datalinks are effectively unjammable and prewar intelligence gathering will allow most nations, even without U.S. overhead assistance to generate sufficient GPS-as-signature databases through nothing more than EOS or walkabout espionage as to hit critical infrastructure targets which our own 'no collateral' policies will not frag. But which could easily rip a threat nation's economy apart, no matter what the condition of martial victory or defeat.
C. Despite their covert bloodthirst in proving an ability to conduct ranged strike warfare against the Phantom Menace which is Indonesia; Australia is in much the same state as the EU in that their massive water barrier, Jindalee and Wedgetail will effectively GIVE THEM 'friendly neighbor' warning of any Su-30 type inbound threat /hours/ before arrival. While the clustering of much of their society along the coastal plains requires vastly more airframes than a mere 60 JSF could provide. Indeed, the only real advantage which the JSF brings: stealthy-at-range intercept is itself invalidated if the type's crossroling to interdiction interferes with or denies adequate DCA coverage. While a system like the A-50 with a modernized APG-68 or Grifo or Elta alternatives, integrated by passive datalink into a nationwide ADGE and operating with silent-BVR tactics would likely provide equal if not better (by numbers) air defense capabilities, even against the monster Flanker 'variants' with their purported AESA's and LRAAM etc. Certainly a combined Aster equipped Frigate and landbased SAM force would be superior to either in providing both terminal high-density (supersonic and multi-cruise) and 'self defending' approaches (missile trap) capabilities. At lower yearly costs.
Whew, tired fingers for now. I will finish reading what all you have commented on and see if I can't add some more later... KP
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Kurt, would you mind breaking these up into smaller bites in future? Multiple posts is acceptable rather than a huge single response.
Also, could you please email me on [email protected] ? (it's a spam trap but I will get it)
cheers. gf
Kurt, would you mind breaking these up into smaller bites in future? Multiple posts is acceptable rather than a huge single response.
Also, could you please email me on [email protected] ? (it's a spam trap but I will get it)
cheers. gf
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Logistically it should make the GAO purr like a kitten, common support train, common spares with some existing fixed wingers. All in all, an evolutionary step.
You'll be pleased to note that 2 F-404's for "engining" up the X-45C have just been delivered. Although it has been detuned to run at Mach .8, it will still be a decent spear carrier. 1200km range, 40,000ft and 4500lbs of loadout. In addition, if they elect to do it, then can get the sig on it to sing and act like any aircraft in the fleet. Any OPFOR sensor system will then be obliged to send up either a missile or an interrogator, either way, the loss of an unmanned if confronted is still more desirable than losing a $2m pilot, plus an $nnn million dollar platform.
Logistically it should make the GAO purr like a kitten, common support train, common spares with some existing fixed wingers. All in all, an evolutionary step.
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
F-111's in long range strike/maritime strike. The selection options are still vague as the govt doesn't want to commit itself to an early announcement which would also announce a shift in policy (to some extent)
The issue of SAMming up the frigates is already in hand with ESSM, and a CIWS that might involve SADRAL. The other issue of SAM's is somewhat of a more difficult issue. IMHO Fixed site SAM's are assets waiting to be slotted. That could be from sat guided munitions that are air launched, or from naval assets that are sat updated. A cruiser that is "mule" guided is still a difficult target, but probably an easier one. In my view, mobility of the ADS is critical.
As you state in your A-50 scenario, that is the scenario and battle effective solution that the RAAF determined with Wedgetail. All of the threat analysis I have seen of the Su-27 and Su-30 derivatives, does not place them in a high threat model to Australian forces - thats not meant no imply complacency - bit the weaknesses of the platforms are known.
98% of australias population is on the coast, a high proportion of that is on the east coast and/or southern, south western coastal areas, hence the capacity for any nation to start threatening Australia is reduced to platforms such as the following:
Intercontinental cruise missiles
Intercontinental Ballistics
Sub launched variants of the above
AAR assisted long range strikers (which would still seem them restricted to a narrow angle of approach.
a strike on the JORN and SWR networks would require an intercontinental strike - and the odds are pretty high that the BMEWS station would track them immediately. After all, we were able to identify SCUD launches in Iraq from the Nurrungar Station - that was closed in 1999 as the Pine Gap facility was able to achieve the same levels of detection and discrimination. In real terms, we are able to see aircraft movements on the ground via JORN within the advertised specs. The advertised range bears little connection to what it has achieved - and what the US is clearly aware of.
In real terms, the JSF is therefore tagged as a sympathetic platform, and one designed to work in co-operation with allies of similar training, doctrine and logistics. IMV, there are other alternatives to select, but that's beside the point.
Frames are currently sitting on the 100 mark. What is now not defined is whether Australia will go the interim solution. That could well see 20-24 aircraft separately purchased as lead ups. They would be to replace theKurt Plummer said:
F-111's in long range strike/maritime strike. The selection options are still vague as the govt doesn't want to commit itself to an early announcement which would also announce a shift in policy (to some extent)
Kurt Plummer said:
The issue of SAMming up the frigates is already in hand with ESSM, and a CIWS that might involve SADRAL. The other issue of SAM's is somewhat of a more difficult issue. IMHO Fixed site SAM's are assets waiting to be slotted. That could be from sat guided munitions that are air launched, or from naval assets that are sat updated. A cruiser that is "mule" guided is still a difficult target, but probably an easier one. In my view, mobility of the ADS is critical.
As you state in your A-50 scenario, that is the scenario and battle effective solution that the RAAF determined with Wedgetail. All of the threat analysis I have seen of the Su-27 and Su-30 derivatives, does not place them in a high threat model to Australian forces - thats not meant no imply complacency - bit the weaknesses of the platforms are known.
98% of australias population is on the coast, a high proportion of that is on the east coast and/or southern, south western coastal areas, hence the capacity for any nation to start threatening Australia is reduced to platforms such as the following:
Intercontinental cruise missiles
Intercontinental Ballistics
Sub launched variants of the above
AAR assisted long range strikers (which would still seem them restricted to a narrow angle of approach.
a strike on the JORN and SWR networks would require an intercontinental strike - and the odds are pretty high that the BMEWS station would track them immediately. After all, we were able to identify SCUD launches in Iraq from the Nurrungar Station - that was closed in 1999 as the Pine Gap facility was able to achieve the same levels of detection and discrimination. In real terms, we are able to see aircraft movements on the ground via JORN within the advertised specs. The advertised range bears little connection to what it has achieved - and what the US is clearly aware of.
In real terms, the JSF is therefore tagged as a sympathetic platform, and one designed to work in co-operation with allies of similar training, doctrine and logistics. IMV, there are other alternatives to select, but that's beside the point.
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Hey gf0012-aust,
>>
You'll be pleased to note that 2 F-404's for "engining" up the X-45C have just been delivered. Although it has been detuned to run at Mach .8, it will still be a decent spear carrier. 1200km range, 40,000ft and 4500lbs of loadout. In addition, if they elect to do it, then can get the sig on it to sing and act like any aircraft in the fleet. Any OPFOR sensor system will then be obliged to send up either a missile or an interrogator, either way, the loss of an unmanned if confronted is still more desirable than losing a $2m pilot, plus an $nnn million dollar platform.
>>
Yeah, I kinda expected the 'big Chukar' option to be put on the table though I must say I would e more pleased if they did the logical thing which was to make them recoverable node-jammers for both conventional IADS rollback work and blanket suppressing local cell/mobile phone nets in the current wombat hunt.
The EA-18 is too vulnerable and single-strobe sourced inept while ICAP-III and AARGM have both been cancelled and the EB-52 is just so much Big Crow vaporware. A palletized system, even if it's just a paiir of ALQ-xxx gangwired around a common set of technique encoding options and a satcomm link back to an RC-135/M2CA would give /vastly/ wider penetration of layered IADS and truly help exploit the VLO option to operate beyond the notion of a narrow raid corridor.
Especially Post-C, I frankly don't think the J-UCAS airframe has the energy factoring to be useful as a jink weasel and would rather they put that kind of money into ASARM or some equivalent (FRSW) hypervelocity standoff weapon with a smart enough seeker or submunition as to be able to snuff a physical signature against a decoy-dense background rather than 'follow the lobe, or is it a strobe?' chase increasingly sophisticate blink-to-blank RF.
I should like to object to your range categorization though-
http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/1288981/posts
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/x-45-ucav/specs.html
http://www.deagel.com/pandora/?p=pm00051001
http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jun_03_28.php
All seem to support a general specification of 2-3hrs at 1,000nm and a maximum in/out radius more on the order of 1300-1500nm (2400km anyway, I'm tired...).
All of which looks to become even better when/if the AAR program takes differential GPS into formation keeping.
You absolutely /cannot/ shortchange anything about the UCAV 'promise' lest the manned community dogpiles the least little weakness. Most especially when Flug Review now has the super-Cized vehicle running at around 3,000 dollars per kilogram for the airframe and 17 grande for the mission systems.
i.e. They will prolong, stretch out and 'improve' the DARPA UDS spec to the point where it costs as much as a 'real' airplane and then, ho ho, you'd better be ready to tout the 'no training' advantages of a 40 million dollar UCAV.
Which is exactly the /opposite/ road I wanted to take because I always KNEW that the 2Klb munition capability was bogus with SDB and intelligent ARM as your principle D1/R1 and COP munitions:mission set.
>>
Logistically it should make the GAO purr like a kitten, common support train, common spares with some existing fixed wingers. All in all, an evolutionary step.
>>
The only way anybody will purr is if they acknowledge the Pure Waste inherent to three tactical air forces for one nation and attempt to design a 'pool' system whereby not only are aircrews replaced outright (currency and deployment/tactical training) but ships OR lubberized airpower can surge or go on constant rotation cruise intervals without worry about 'whose airwing is it this turn around?'. Because you have 1,500 airframes which are _truly_ basing mode common and can define your 'reserve' component airpower by the ability to cross-uniform deploy whereever necessary or access-denied available.
Sigh, I hate it when I start to foam at the mouth like this...;-)
KP
Hey gf0012-aust,
>>
You'll be pleased to note that 2 F-404's for "engining" up the X-45C have just been delivered. Although it has been detuned to run at Mach .8, it will still be a decent spear carrier. 1200km range, 40,000ft and 4500lbs of loadout. In addition, if they elect to do it, then can get the sig on it to sing and act like any aircraft in the fleet. Any OPFOR sensor system will then be obliged to send up either a missile or an interrogator, either way, the loss of an unmanned if confronted is still more desirable than losing a $2m pilot, plus an $nnn million dollar platform.
>>
Yeah, I kinda expected the 'big Chukar' option to be put on the table though I must say I would e more pleased if they did the logical thing which was to make them recoverable node-jammers for both conventional IADS rollback work and blanket suppressing local cell/mobile phone nets in the current wombat hunt.
The EA-18 is too vulnerable and single-strobe sourced inept while ICAP-III and AARGM have both been cancelled and the EB-52 is just so much Big Crow vaporware. A palletized system, even if it's just a paiir of ALQ-xxx gangwired around a common set of technique encoding options and a satcomm link back to an RC-135/M2CA would give /vastly/ wider penetration of layered IADS and truly help exploit the VLO option to operate beyond the notion of a narrow raid corridor.
Especially Post-C, I frankly don't think the J-UCAS airframe has the energy factoring to be useful as a jink weasel and would rather they put that kind of money into ASARM or some equivalent (FRSW) hypervelocity standoff weapon with a smart enough seeker or submunition as to be able to snuff a physical signature against a decoy-dense background rather than 'follow the lobe, or is it a strobe?' chase increasingly sophisticate blink-to-blank RF.
I should like to object to your range categorization though-
http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/1288981/posts
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/x-45-ucav/specs.html
http://www.deagel.com/pandora/?p=pm00051001
http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jun_03_28.php
All seem to support a general specification of 2-3hrs at 1,000nm and a maximum in/out radius more on the order of 1300-1500nm (2400km anyway, I'm tired...).
All of which looks to become even better when/if the AAR program takes differential GPS into formation keeping.
You absolutely /cannot/ shortchange anything about the UCAV 'promise' lest the manned community dogpiles the least little weakness. Most especially when Flug Review now has the super-Cized vehicle running at around 3,000 dollars per kilogram for the airframe and 17 grande for the mission systems.
i.e. They will prolong, stretch out and 'improve' the DARPA UDS spec to the point where it costs as much as a 'real' airplane and then, ho ho, you'd better be ready to tout the 'no training' advantages of a 40 million dollar UCAV.
Which is exactly the /opposite/ road I wanted to take because I always KNEW that the 2Klb munition capability was bogus with SDB and intelligent ARM as your principle D1/R1 and COP munitions:mission set.
>>
Logistically it should make the GAO purr like a kitten, common support train, common spares with some existing fixed wingers. All in all, an evolutionary step.
>>
The only way anybody will purr is if they acknowledge the Pure Waste inherent to three tactical air forces for one nation and attempt to design a 'pool' system whereby not only are aircrews replaced outright (currency and deployment/tactical training) but ships OR lubberized airpower can surge or go on constant rotation cruise intervals without worry about 'whose airwing is it this turn around?'. Because you have 1,500 airframes which are _truly_ basing mode common and can define your 'reserve' component airpower by the ability to cross-uniform deploy whereever necessary or access-denied available.
Sigh, I hate it when I start to foam at the mouth like this...;-)
KP
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
But, there is an attempt to reduce platforms with the new all in one. That is (supposed to) merge Compass, Rivet and other loose platforms into a multi. What's your take on that?Kurt Plummer said:
Taking a recidivists view, do you really need a hyper athletic unmanned spear carrier when it's cheaper to work on throwing hypersonics at the target?Kurt Plummer said:
I can only counter with last weeks copy of DefenseNews - so I'm open to criticism on range - and I didn't actually do a protracted search. I threw it into the mix as bait.Kurt Plummer said:
There is the view that with 1000 plus spare F-16's coming up, that it's cheaper to convert them into UCAV's. IIRC the conversion costings were approx 1/10th the value of an X-47. It's not as if the experience isn't there to do the changeover. I would have assumed that QF-16's were already being trialed as the QF-4's were being reduced.Kurt Plummer said:
Again, taking a different recividists view - wouldn't a QF-16 keep the load out issues to a minimum. take out the pilot and with the weight saved you can then start adding weasel packages etc... It's not sexy, but it's short term deliverable. That all hinges on whether you want to make a clear statement about 21st century change.Kurt Plummer said:
That's true enough, but this is a quantum leap in change, the only way you will get this pushed through so that you have an ideal and sensible logistics and capability matrix that is universal is if you have someone like Rumsfeld prepared to mix it up with the uniforms - I suspect that this is way out of his league at the momentKurt Plummer said:
Yes, I have seen you foam on this before.Kurt Plummer said:
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
gf0012-aust,
>>
Frames are currently sitting on the 100 mark. What is now not defined is whether Australia will go the interim solution. That could well see 20-24 aircraft separately purchased as lead ups. They would be to replace the
F-111's in long range strike/maritime strike. The selection options are still vague as the govt doesn't want to commit itself to an early announcement which would also announce a shift in policy (to some extent)
>>
I would prefer to go in with Storm Shadow, TIALD/AASM and Meteor on a CFT'd Flubber than play mind-over-matter games with close approach on JDAM and a pair of AMRAAM.
Sorry but as much as I /don't think/ highly of the Typhoon, it's better to be able to sling long range munitions and force the enemy to come to you to prevent losing their IADS in-situ (where we have the stealth munition advantage and lo-to-horizon cruise penetration options on a smart-target seeker) than it is to go blundering over their homedrome AND S-300 site looking for trouble without an internal hypervelocity DEAD option and all of 2 BVR shots compared to the veritable airborne SAM site that is Flanker.
Not to mention 800nm overwater radii in a single-glowing-hole jet is just /begging/ for trouble. The USAF, up to 1993, had Cat-A lost about 237 F-16's (the F-15 total was something like 25) and of those _35%_ had been due to engine failure of one sort or another. 83 jets X 25 million each = 2.07 BILLION dollars in hardware writeoffs.
By comparison, they had lost FIVE jets, total, in combat.
Now, even given you have a better engine in the F135 (an order of magnitude more reliable at say 25% X 15% of comparitive 237/1500 equivalent loss ratios), losing 15 (of 100) 60-70 million dollar JSFs is gonna run about 900 million bucks. Of which the 25% = 225 million that are engine-out for cause is roughly sufficient to buy you the tanker you need to support the F/A-22 or Typhoon or indeed /any/ twin hole alternative 'guzzler'.
In any case, I wouldn't send a raid that didn't both saturate threat defenses with no-learning-curve-possible total aimpoints (i.e. the potential to hit every prominent node in the ADGE). And put the enemy at dire risk of being out sortied in the air by continual 'creeping' raid intervals that eventually caught his Zulu force in a combat turn and plastered them as well.
And given the absolutely lousy internal carriage volumetrics (deep but not wide) of the F-35, that means that I will want at least 2X24 /planned/ (16X2 GBU-31= 30 aimpoints per mission, leaving 4X4 Sweep and 4X2 SEAD) raid forces with about 2-4 ramp reserves each in case this 'just like a car' uber reliable jet actually does redball. So we are talking 60 airframes per day right there.
NOT including escorts for the Wedgetail, Tanker or ADIZ reentry delousing coming back.
Can you imagine trying to maintain a decent CONTINENT wide QRA force with the remaining 20 or so airframes?
Even if you 'bias west' on the basis of no terrorist hijackings to slam an airliner into the Sydney Opera House or what have you; it just doesn't make sense to me to both buy an airframe that is so comparitively lousy at A2A.
All based on the notion of 'preparing for the worst' of a covertly justified longrange interdiction campaign with a system of systems (all the added sorties and platforms that the JSF needs) which further stresses the INT mission itself.
A simple stock of standoff munitions and converti-bombtruck A2A platforms would better accomplish the 'secondary' D1R1 attack mission (rollback of the IADS). And the F/A-22 would simply slingshot GBU-39 from so far out that it's unlikely even an S-300 or Flanker could even see it.
>>
The issue of SAMming up the frigates is already in hand with ESSM, and a CIWS that might involve SADRAL. The other issue of SAM's is somewhat of a more difficult issue. IMHO Fixed site SAM's are assets waiting to be slotted. That could be from sat guided munitions that are air launched, or from naval assets that are sat updated. A cruiser that is "mule" guided is still a difficult target, but probably an easier one. In my view, mobility of the ADS is critical.
>>
Sadral, hmmm, okay, I guess I was thinking Simbad as an 'SA/N-5' laughable equivalent instead of an openframe RAM pedestal. Either way, I have to doubt the utility of a MANPADS based system for dealing with overwater glint in the inner-zone against multiple AShM inbounds (slew to track to shoot to new slew). I don't think much of RAMs seeker either but at least that's an AIM-9 motor with LOAL RF as an 'option'.
ESSM, no matter how big a motor they stick on it is always going to be a dated-SARH concept so long as that fancy launch-to-bearing TVC cannot in fact include a predesignated (ARH or IR) TVM handoff (S-Band Datalink) to a truly autonomous homing runup-the-lane mode. Particularly if you don't have AEGIS, the option to sprayfire CW illumination all over the place is just not sufficient IMO.
With hybrid and all-supersonic propulsion out to 100-200km now /the standard/ for both coastal defense and air launch AShM; you simply can't wait for the enemy to cross the 10-20nm short horizon with a threat weapon. You HAVE TO go git'im using tropobounce or an AEW cue to at least /launch/ in the 30nm zone.
50G airframe and 10" motor be damned, SARH just screws up the game plan completely for proper OAB attrition.
Speaking of which, even with the bigger backend, ESSM is little more than a midzone weapon with what, 30 klicks of downrange touch-someone? Not enough for a missile trap system in the deep-blue approaches IMO.
I myself liked RIM-156 in the SM-3/6 as both a starting point for upper tier (300km motor equals midcourse/crosstrack defense on IRBMs) and as the best (ERAM) means for an OTH (Hawkeye 2K or GHawk/RTIP with AESA and big bore IRST) snapdown cue into lane on any and all kinds of subhorizoning threats.
In this, a GAINS midcourse out to a tangential oblique A-Pole angle off and flick-back lets you hit even retrograde targets if need be to run the inbound down from a favorable ARH trough glint and fuzing angle.
Even if (late acquisition from helo-AEW in the absence of a fixed wing=big deck presence) you have to bite a big chunk out of the total downrange kinematic and endgame speeds (say 45km at Mach 2.8 for a low parabola trajectory shape instead of the optimum M4+ to 100km+) it's still the ONLY way to 'my 1,600lb SAM vs. your 2,500lb AShM!' exploit the inherent deep-cell VLS advantage of shipborne magazines way that makes the airlaunch or boxshot AAW alternatives seem anemic for kinematic.
Aster-15/30 offers similar capabilities though they don't advertise them as such.
In terms of landlaunch, the way forward is again 'over hill' with silent launch boxes and remote emitters ala JLENS. If the inbound enemy raid can back trace your weapon doppler or launch plume to spike the box (or nail a 100+ km refused emitter behind it) then he is truly more sophisticated than /any/ of the current +20 and +40 year models are now predicting for PacRim roadmap threats.
>>
As you state in your A-50 scenario, that is the scenario and battle effective solution that the RAAF determined with Wedgetail. All of the threat analysis I have seen of the Su-27 and Su-30 derivatives, does not place them in a high threat model to Australian forces - thats not meant to imply complacency - but the weaknesses of the platforms are known.
>>
One of the things Carlo Kopp mentions in the preceding briefs is that the Su-27's own inability to engage from supercruise or 'equivalent pole' (R-37/Ks-172) distances is not 'fixed in stone'. With some materials updates to the airframe and a ramp reschedule, the Flanker will likely supercruise on the AL-41 or a derived technology insert to existing engines. This would effectively ensure that it WILL come after you in the deep blue of any strike on Jakarta. And with all of 4 AMRAAM, you would be hard pressed to keep it from breaking past the support mission escorts , even if it can't actually /see/ the JSFs.
On it's way to ravage their gas and targeting.
Which brings us right back to justifying a defensive posture based on a 600+nm interdictor which needs more 'enablement' than it's worth and which is a /lousy/ alternative DCA jet compared to say a Meteorized Flubber.
While adopting fewer (= smaller spares tail and larger pilot manning ratio) F/A-22 is the 'unacknowledged but still vastly more lethal' (sorties per day on supercruise there and back again) way out of things. Because 20-40 such jets effectively would not need an AEW platform and in coming off the tanker perhaps 200-300nm out would would so stretch even an Uber Flankers ADI AOR so much as to make it ineffective. Now add to this the certainty that the flat-six stations of a Raptor is much better able to flex-configure and SSC option doubles their standoff range. And the overally ability to loose your shots from farther, faster, makes a 'supersonic but still blind' Su-30++ still out of it's league.
Of course, again, all of this comes on the sly as the predominant attitude of 'just for Air Dominance' effectively masks the offensive mission with an advertised need to provide extended EEZ and wide-island air defense on a limited budget.
>>
In real terms, the JSF is therefore tagged as a sympathetic platform, and one designed to work in co-operation with allies of similar training, doctrine and logistics. IMV, there are other alternatives to select, but that's beside the point.
>>
EVERYONE I read, from Roche to O'Hanlon, says that the CTOL JSF is going to take as much as a 1/3rd hit in numbers, even if J-UCAS is late or crib killed. Just as a consequence to the notion that nobody fights back anymore (yeah, yeah) and IAMs are able to go 1-for-1 or even (SDB) many-for-many to the point where we have more allocateable weapons than taskable targeting for them on a per sortie basis.
If that happens, the JSF price guarantee will crumble and you WILL be looking at, not 60-80 but 80-100 million dollars per airframe as the linchpin USAF F-35A buy nosedives into the 1,000-1,200 airframe levels.
At that price, the Flubber and Rafale both look frankly /better/ to me. Because they fulfill a wider range of tasks in a permissive (defensive) environment and bring a superior penetration option (Scalp/SS) to the 'first day of war' table.
If you remain seduced by the sales pitch that Lunchmeat and FMS Club-Fed throw at you for JSF, you will regret it.
Not least because the natural European response to price war JSF denial of 'NATO' home as much as export sales is gonna be to drop their own Gen-4 canard clones, skip our Gen-5 generic mini-Raptor and head right on into Gen-6 which _will be uninhabited_.
'They Have The Technology'... Because it is cheap.
KP
gf0012-aust,
>>
Frames are currently sitting on the 100 mark. What is now not defined is whether Australia will go the interim solution. That could well see 20-24 aircraft separately purchased as lead ups. They would be to replace the
F-111's in long range strike/maritime strike. The selection options are still vague as the govt doesn't want to commit itself to an early announcement which would also announce a shift in policy (to some extent)
>>
I would prefer to go in with Storm Shadow, TIALD/AASM and Meteor on a CFT'd Flubber than play mind-over-matter games with close approach on JDAM and a pair of AMRAAM.
Sorry but as much as I /don't think/ highly of the Typhoon, it's better to be able to sling long range munitions and force the enemy to come to you to prevent losing their IADS in-situ (where we have the stealth munition advantage and lo-to-horizon cruise penetration options on a smart-target seeker) than it is to go blundering over their homedrome AND S-300 site looking for trouble without an internal hypervelocity DEAD option and all of 2 BVR shots compared to the veritable airborne SAM site that is Flanker.
Not to mention 800nm overwater radii in a single-glowing-hole jet is just /begging/ for trouble. The USAF, up to 1993, had Cat-A lost about 237 F-16's (the F-15 total was something like 25) and of those _35%_ had been due to engine failure of one sort or another. 83 jets X 25 million each = 2.07 BILLION dollars in hardware writeoffs.
By comparison, they had lost FIVE jets, total, in combat.
Now, even given you have a better engine in the F135 (an order of magnitude more reliable at say 25% X 15% of comparitive 237/1500 equivalent loss ratios), losing 15 (of 100) 60-70 million dollar JSFs is gonna run about 900 million bucks. Of which the 25% = 225 million that are engine-out for cause is roughly sufficient to buy you the tanker you need to support the F/A-22 or Typhoon or indeed /any/ twin hole alternative 'guzzler'.
In any case, I wouldn't send a raid that didn't both saturate threat defenses with no-learning-curve-possible total aimpoints (i.e. the potential to hit every prominent node in the ADGE). And put the enemy at dire risk of being out sortied in the air by continual 'creeping' raid intervals that eventually caught his Zulu force in a combat turn and plastered them as well.
And given the absolutely lousy internal carriage volumetrics (deep but not wide) of the F-35, that means that I will want at least 2X24 /planned/ (16X2 GBU-31= 30 aimpoints per mission, leaving 4X4 Sweep and 4X2 SEAD) raid forces with about 2-4 ramp reserves each in case this 'just like a car' uber reliable jet actually does redball. So we are talking 60 airframes per day right there.
NOT including escorts for the Wedgetail, Tanker or ADIZ reentry delousing coming back.
Can you imagine trying to maintain a decent CONTINENT wide QRA force with the remaining 20 or so airframes?
Even if you 'bias west' on the basis of no terrorist hijackings to slam an airliner into the Sydney Opera House or what have you; it just doesn't make sense to me to both buy an airframe that is so comparitively lousy at A2A.
All based on the notion of 'preparing for the worst' of a covertly justified longrange interdiction campaign with a system of systems (all the added sorties and platforms that the JSF needs) which further stresses the INT mission itself.
A simple stock of standoff munitions and converti-bombtruck A2A platforms would better accomplish the 'secondary' D1R1 attack mission (rollback of the IADS). And the F/A-22 would simply slingshot GBU-39 from so far out that it's unlikely even an S-300 or Flanker could even see it.
>>
The issue of SAMming up the frigates is already in hand with ESSM, and a CIWS that might involve SADRAL. The other issue of SAM's is somewhat of a more difficult issue. IMHO Fixed site SAM's are assets waiting to be slotted. That could be from sat guided munitions that are air launched, or from naval assets that are sat updated. A cruiser that is "mule" guided is still a difficult target, but probably an easier one. In my view, mobility of the ADS is critical.
>>
Sadral, hmmm, okay, I guess I was thinking Simbad as an 'SA/N-5' laughable equivalent instead of an openframe RAM pedestal. Either way, I have to doubt the utility of a MANPADS based system for dealing with overwater glint in the inner-zone against multiple AShM inbounds (slew to track to shoot to new slew). I don't think much of RAMs seeker either but at least that's an AIM-9 motor with LOAL RF as an 'option'.
ESSM, no matter how big a motor they stick on it is always going to be a dated-SARH concept so long as that fancy launch-to-bearing TVC cannot in fact include a predesignated (ARH or IR) TVM handoff (S-Band Datalink) to a truly autonomous homing runup-the-lane mode. Particularly if you don't have AEGIS, the option to sprayfire CW illumination all over the place is just not sufficient IMO.
With hybrid and all-supersonic propulsion out to 100-200km now /the standard/ for both coastal defense and air launch AShM; you simply can't wait for the enemy to cross the 10-20nm short horizon with a threat weapon. You HAVE TO go git'im using tropobounce or an AEW cue to at least /launch/ in the 30nm zone.
50G airframe and 10" motor be damned, SARH just screws up the game plan completely for proper OAB attrition.
Speaking of which, even with the bigger backend, ESSM is little more than a midzone weapon with what, 30 klicks of downrange touch-someone? Not enough for a missile trap system in the deep-blue approaches IMO.
I myself liked RIM-156 in the SM-3/6 as both a starting point for upper tier (300km motor equals midcourse/crosstrack defense on IRBMs) and as the best (ERAM) means for an OTH (Hawkeye 2K or GHawk/RTIP with AESA and big bore IRST) snapdown cue into lane on any and all kinds of subhorizoning threats.
In this, a GAINS midcourse out to a tangential oblique A-Pole angle off and flick-back lets you hit even retrograde targets if need be to run the inbound down from a favorable ARH trough glint and fuzing angle.
Even if (late acquisition from helo-AEW in the absence of a fixed wing=big deck presence) you have to bite a big chunk out of the total downrange kinematic and endgame speeds (say 45km at Mach 2.8 for a low parabola trajectory shape instead of the optimum M4+ to 100km+) it's still the ONLY way to 'my 1,600lb SAM vs. your 2,500lb AShM!' exploit the inherent deep-cell VLS advantage of shipborne magazines way that makes the airlaunch or boxshot AAW alternatives seem anemic for kinematic.
Aster-15/30 offers similar capabilities though they don't advertise them as such.
In terms of landlaunch, the way forward is again 'over hill' with silent launch boxes and remote emitters ala JLENS. If the inbound enemy raid can back trace your weapon doppler or launch plume to spike the box (or nail a 100+ km refused emitter behind it) then he is truly more sophisticated than /any/ of the current +20 and +40 year models are now predicting for PacRim roadmap threats.
>>
As you state in your A-50 scenario, that is the scenario and battle effective solution that the RAAF determined with Wedgetail. All of the threat analysis I have seen of the Su-27 and Su-30 derivatives, does not place them in a high threat model to Australian forces - thats not meant to imply complacency - but the weaknesses of the platforms are known.
>>
One of the things Carlo Kopp mentions in the preceding briefs is that the Su-27's own inability to engage from supercruise or 'equivalent pole' (R-37/Ks-172) distances is not 'fixed in stone'. With some materials updates to the airframe and a ramp reschedule, the Flanker will likely supercruise on the AL-41 or a derived technology insert to existing engines. This would effectively ensure that it WILL come after you in the deep blue of any strike on Jakarta. And with all of 4 AMRAAM, you would be hard pressed to keep it from breaking past the support mission escorts , even if it can't actually /see/ the JSFs.
On it's way to ravage their gas and targeting.
Which brings us right back to justifying a defensive posture based on a 600+nm interdictor which needs more 'enablement' than it's worth and which is a /lousy/ alternative DCA jet compared to say a Meteorized Flubber.
While adopting fewer (= smaller spares tail and larger pilot manning ratio) F/A-22 is the 'unacknowledged but still vastly more lethal' (sorties per day on supercruise there and back again) way out of things. Because 20-40 such jets effectively would not need an AEW platform and in coming off the tanker perhaps 200-300nm out would would so stretch even an Uber Flankers ADI AOR so much as to make it ineffective. Now add to this the certainty that the flat-six stations of a Raptor is much better able to flex-configure and SSC option doubles their standoff range. And the overally ability to loose your shots from farther, faster, makes a 'supersonic but still blind' Su-30++ still out of it's league.
Of course, again, all of this comes on the sly as the predominant attitude of 'just for Air Dominance' effectively masks the offensive mission with an advertised need to provide extended EEZ and wide-island air defense on a limited budget.
>>
In real terms, the JSF is therefore tagged as a sympathetic platform, and one designed to work in co-operation with allies of similar training, doctrine and logistics. IMV, there are other alternatives to select, but that's beside the point.
>>
EVERYONE I read, from Roche to O'Hanlon, says that the CTOL JSF is going to take as much as a 1/3rd hit in numbers, even if J-UCAS is late or crib killed. Just as a consequence to the notion that nobody fights back anymore (yeah, yeah) and IAMs are able to go 1-for-1 or even (SDB) many-for-many to the point where we have more allocateable weapons than taskable targeting for them on a per sortie basis.
If that happens, the JSF price guarantee will crumble and you WILL be looking at, not 60-80 but 80-100 million dollars per airframe as the linchpin USAF F-35A buy nosedives into the 1,000-1,200 airframe levels.
At that price, the Flubber and Rafale both look frankly /better/ to me. Because they fulfill a wider range of tasks in a permissive (defensive) environment and bring a superior penetration option (Scalp/SS) to the 'first day of war' table.
If you remain seduced by the sales pitch that Lunchmeat and FMS Club-Fed throw at you for JSF, you will regret it.
Not least because the natural European response to price war JSF denial of 'NATO' home as much as export sales is gonna be to drop their own Gen-4 canard clones, skip our Gen-5 generic mini-Raptor and head right on into Gen-6 which _will be uninhabited_.
'They Have The Technology'... Because it is cheap.
KP
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
It's the peeling the onion issues.
And thats the main thing.
I think you'll find that the ADF is not working on the JSF being the sharp end of the spear from day 1. The philosophy in all the war games has been to draw out the "enemy" and engage on your terms. There is little need for the RAAF to go local and mix it up.Kurt Plummer said:
No objections from me. People can argue all they like about the reliability of singles, but the reason why we went to twins in the first place was redundancy.Kurt Plummer said:
and that is sympathetic with what I'm stating about ADF actions on Day 1. Long range strike doesn't necessarily have to be the exclusive province of a spear throwing fixed wing combat platform.Kurt Plummer said:
True,the wedgies are also tasked as battlefield management - so AWAC's, AEW&C are functional elements, but not necessarily the tasking de rigeur of the platform. They are more likely to be assisting skimmers and subs than directing air strikes.Kurt Plummer said:
Which is the perennial "eggs in one basket" syndrome. It's why I'm sympathetic to a force mix and balance that is has relevant tasking flexibility - you can't turn the JSF into a long range striker - not matter what weaps it has in place. The further out you are to launch, the easier it can become for said weapons to be intercepted by IADS.Kurt Plummer said:
Don't quote me on Sadral. it was thrown into conversations recently, but I'm unsure how committed the comments were.Kurt Plummer said:
Thats true, but it's also an issue of combined arms. striking long range platforms that have to breach our Sea/Air gap means a greater reliance on subs and specwarries at day 1.Kurt Plummer said:
It's the peeling the onion issues.
this starts to get into other areas which are inapprop to talk about in here. but the capacity and advantage to detect LR VLS launches and landbased launches already exists. In real terms we do have the capability to detect VLS from ships, and certainly can detect SLBM launches.Kurt Plummer said:
Fundamentally agree, but I do get frustrated with Kopp - he is a bit of a technical prima donna.Kurt Plummer said:
I think you'll find the RAAF is going to move into sympathetic and symbiotic unmanned solutions pretty quickly - in fact I'd be betting that we are probably going to do it at a speed that closely follows the US, sooner than the UK and probably in sync with the french timeline. The downside for the french being that they want autonomous and indigenous solutions. We learnt long ago that the technology we don't have but need we can share by exchanging ours. We do that pretty effectively now. Most Australians really have no idea how much technology we engage in developing, and how much of that goes to allies. So the issue of identifying approp technology and getting it in place is not restricted by problems of technical ludditeness, but decision making intertia. The concept of BAM's was fundamentally Australian, but we needed US synergies to bring it to fruition. Once the US gets hold of the ball - then things move at a pace that we can hardly envision - but it gets going.Kurt Plummer said:
And thats the main thing.
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
gf0012-aust,
>>
But, there is an attempt to reduce platforms with the new all in one. That is (supposed to) merge Compass, Rivet and other loose platforms into a multi. What's your take on that?
>>
Just to make sure we're on the same page-
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/e-767-mc2a.htm
IMO, the E-10 Multisensor/Mission Command And Control Aircraft has a LOT of problems inherent to it.
1. It comes too soon after the E-8 program and the APY-2/RSIP upgrades for the E-3. Admittedly these are antiquated systems which themselves are desperately in need of a new carrier airframe as well as mission equipment package but the fact remains that we haven't hit what I would call a 'stable' (everybody is on a sequentially spaced development schedule) airpower curve in a long while and programs for similar capabilities seem to overlap each other in the funding conduit way too much to be justified. Mind you, the first artists concept of the MC2A was in fact a 747 with an olympic swimming pool sized 'waterbed overhead' so it has always been hard to treat this platform seriously.
2. The use of heavies in support of OOTW/SSC mission sets is both fiscally foolish and utterly unnecessary as the airframe payload and electrical power generation capability is simply not necessary for most such scenarios. Indeed, it generates bottlenecks of HDLD (High Demand, Low Density) platform taskings around which system capabilities tend to 'cluster'. And thus you end up buying inventory as much as platform size to support ALL the capabilities that might use that ISR/BMC3 platform. Rather than just the few that each needs at a given time. This gets further uglified when you are looking at operating out of primitive or 'embarrassed' nations with a jet that effectively MUST have a 12-15Kft runway.
Ironically, given my utter incredulence at the USN's willing abdication of independent strike warfare 'top down' RST/BMC3 capabilities, I find that the notion of an MMA-as-767-400 is /vastly/ more appealing than the shrimp-737-800 remans. Because, with some 12Knm worth of radius and potentially the ability (ala EC-135) to bring refuel it's own escort (or X-47 penetrating BAMS-littoral assets) as an EP-3 type mission replacement the 767 can both fly higher, stay longer and ultimately SEE FURTHER than any rinky dink 737 class system. Whether operating out of Guam or Diego or Sigonella/Akrotiri 'And Parts East'.
3. There isn't a total RIMA system package confirmation yet.
Because we are so afraid to move towards a truly nodeal netcentric architecture.
IMO, the reality is that the 'battle management' portion of the skillset needs to be isolated in much smaller Challenger or GVI or BBJ type airframes wherein an ability to operate at a high line of sight (40-50K) with a MINIMUM necessary console operator set for each of a range of configured plaltforms is combined with a much lower per-hour flight costs. This would then leave the comms relay architecture (ROBE and U-2S etc.) to be replaced with a dedicated UAV along the lines of the MQ-9 turbojet system.
And relegate -ALL- area surveillance and point-target (low level) 'sweeping' ISR to drones and combat aircraft like the RQ-4 and X-45 with XTRA/EOTS combined packages.
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/hfradar.pdf
The above is more or less about RTIP inserts but provides a couple of map illustrations for how much better the RQ-4 AEW/AGS _dual mission_ system is apt to be, without a heavy in the mix at all.
At which point you are left asking 'what does a 767 /do/ as a mission platform, which truly justifies it's existence as a type classified inventory purchase onto which you can lumpsum 20-40 SMA variants? Of course the answer is tanking and intertheater (80-120Klbs for 4-6,000nm between 10Kft concrete runways) airlift. i.e. it is the KC-135/KC-10 replacement which will dictate the economics of any MC2A addon purchase. And we need some because we somehow have deluded ourselves that RoRo transport and airdrop should be allowed to dictate the platform configuration to the extent that fleet size/aging issues and economic operating policies are 'unimportant'. Which is ludicrous when you consider it takes an act of god to activate CRAF (most of whose airframes are also /junk/) and further, if it takes you anywhere from 30 days to 3 years to 'get around' (access denial) to entering the conflict zone any notion of suprise 'forced entry' surprise attack by Barney is a non starter anyway. For the C-17 has been completely compromised by the aerodynamics of STOL, airdrop and outsized loads i.e. the C-5 in a C-141 ramp spot. And as a result it is shortlegged, expensive to operate and STILL has yet to demonstrate payload:range which I would consider competitive with even a late model IL-76.
Given that the entire KC-135R program is one gigantic (CFM engines, Pacer cockpit, wings, fuel system) moneypit of shrinking returns from a platform too old to be efficient at ONE role let alone all the addons apt to be asked of it in an OOTW intensive deployment system. I just don't see the sense in DMS paying for a 1950's platform.
Once you integrate a MUCH SIMPLER set of special mission airframe requirements (basically ELINT and Naval Theater Wide BMC3 only at present) within a probably 2-airframe type variation (long and short fuselage) for BOTH the major BMC3 required services, you can work to isolate the total replacment costs and timeframe for a proper exploitation of the 50Kft ETOPS capabilities inherent to a truly modern (COTS global-depot spares too) airframe.
And yet to get //there// you need to redefine how the ground units are going to operate and how large an individual deployment force structure package you will have for the OOTW/SSC/MRC/MTW intensity scale. After the idiocy of GWOT.
4. IMO, particularly for places like AfG and The Boz, the U.S. army ACS (Aerial Common Sensor) platform-
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/emb145.htm
Is probably the way forward. Because I can take 1 or 2 mission aperture variations and work them into a single platform buy of 40-60 which then can then be 'sent where configuration needed' to control the whole package of uninhabited 'sanitizing the empty' platforms much further ahead. Wherein on-airframe systems use the same over or under array and perhaps even transmit gear (microwave is the future of CDL high rate datalinking) but are generally dedicated to comms rather than (AGS=ASTOR etc.) LOS-sensor aids. And thus the /value/ of the platform is isolated from it's mission designate which is effectively RST/ABCCC coordinator for other gatherers. Isolating your targeting from your fires platforms is one of the MAJOR rules of firepower which we foolishly ignore when we attempt to make Tacair the be-all-end-all of both hunting and engagement through a mediocre at best tasking/vetting/release allocation system.
And when the USAr start to get Predators and see how very nicely their 'Guardrail Replacement' ERJ-145s also provides airborne command post linkage to (much shorter sightline= cheaper sensor fits for resolution-X) the drones they will probably walk away from the AF on the microtarget set, hunting GWOTbats.
>>
There is the view that with 1000 plus spare F-16's coming up, that it's cheaper to convert them into UCAV's. IIRC the conversion costings were approx 1/10th the value of an X-47. It's not as if the experience isn't there to do the changeover. I would have assumed that QF-16's were already being trialed as the QF-4's were being reduced.
>>
QF NOLOs are designed to be hit.
My assumption has always been that the UCAV, with it's absent empennage and 'simplified' (no cockpit) lifting body shape would isolate the bowtie aspects from which I had to worry about acquisition deep in a threat overlapped defensive belt. _Before_ I added VLO materials and edge treatments 'relative to the home use/export sensitivity of the customer'.
This then letting me accept a takeoff T/Wr on the order of .35-.55 for a platform whose operating/transit height of 40K ft will likely leave very little smash to play with.
As now outlined-
http://www.aeronautics.ru/archive/future/f16-ucav-foas_001.jpg
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/spr00/thompson.htm
The F-16 UCAV will never be able to match that signature threshold for all-round (depthed) penetration, nor, IMO have a reasonable chance to save much on hourly flight costs (3,600-5,000 dollars per hour, depending on who you read) as it was simply never designed to be a 'crated' weapons system and everything which made it work in the 1970's-80's (F-16A through C.25 as first-conversion types) will be in a position of severe DMS for maintenance even if otherwise kid-gloved in peacetime.
I frankly also have a LOT of doubts as to it's ability to fly an aggressive profile with wings that are going to be hitting critical Mach numbers closer in nature to a U-2 than a fighter.
These are NOT the days of BQ-17 Aphrodite type projects and I think that the 'psychologic adjustment period' mentioned in the above brief is too much a sop to saying "If we make it bad enough, everybody will laugh it off...". Such is unforgiveable because the nature of warfare is increasingly such that a single sortie platform may be tasked to hit 3-4 even 5 or more targets /critical/ to the advancement of an initial air campaign prosecution plan. And if said mission aircraft is less capable than required, it may not live to do so, thereby threatening other systems which are in turn unable to protect from area defense systems whose kill vehicles are increasingly autonomous after launch and fully capable of defending a hemisphere of airspace 40-60nm in radius.
i.e. Aphrodite failed in a way that embarrassed no one because it was designed to target specific mission sets for which it was solely at risk. UCAVs /must/ succeed in a way that enables other platforms. Because high intensity warfare planning is much more an integrated affair as a function particularly of hitting Time Critical IADS relocatables.
In terms of saved volume, I have read various ideas on flying the (F-16) airframes 'manned' to the combat theater and then yanking the seat and canopy there to avoid NOLO concerns over foreign sovereign territory. As well as permanently replacing the space with a forward mounted fuel tank as an alternative to the original 'big wing' planform. None of which supports the notion of a rapid onset GS Conops or even a FFTS naval one.
In OOTW, IMO, the problem is that much of the high quality (range known on complex signal) 'weasel gear' is both too expensive to take forward 'just for the heck of it' and too atypical for the current mission set (GWOTbat huntin'...) to justify the independent development of a tired airframe as some kind of 'transitional D4' (dull, dumb, dirty, dangerous) mission sets to which the Falcon's high residual performance and in-inventory throwaway system costs might be otherwise justified.
THE KEY to the UCAV system specification is not that it proactively engages targets but that it is a pylon-for-rent carrier for munitions which it is -cued- to launch against them. The difference being the psychology inherent to knowing you have VLO assets 'in your midst' and thus being forced to continually blanket scan areas in a fashion which permits a standoff asset (overhead or RC-135) to do 'real time mapping' of the EOB. Without necessarily being scared spitless at the notion of "But what if that SA-17 lights off right under the F-35?" as an outcome to carefree (rapid, without extensive prebattle planning) reduction of the IADS.
At least in the high intensity operating scenario you end up with something like "RJ hears the complex LPI squeal and some operator uses his wide baseline (fuselage long aperture length) and Cray level fast-IFM sorting receiver to isolate a 4X4km 'range known' geocoordinate trace. He then pulls down a list of nearest smart-ARM carriers able to fling a weapon into the basket and 75 seconds later, the Quickbolt conformal MMW array images the radar dish and sends a fuze-confirmation signal up the to satellite for relay...."
For the lower threat 'CAS' mission, the uninhabited is simply designed to fly and fly and fly and fly. So high that none of the trashfire systems can touch it. So cheaply (<$1,200/fh) that a force can literally afford to have 10 up and 5 transiting and 5 cycling through a C-turn such that there are HUGE commited patrol actions always in the field 'shaking hands and showing presence' to keep the locals from thinking we aren't watching. And ultimately (IAM + XTRA) so readily available that you can forget the primitive notion of STOVL-close '15 minute CAS' reloads because the jet is on an offset orbit 2 minutes from the team and it has EIGHT weapons impacts to that can never be weathered out for lase or whatever.
>>
Again, taking a different recidivists view - wouldn't a QF-16 keep the load out issues to a minimum. take out the pilot and with the weight saved you can then start adding weasel packages etc... It's not sexy, but it's short term deliverable. That all hinges on whether you want to make a clear statement about 21st century change.
>>
Money is everything. And the more you play WWII RLM and 'experiment' with types that have no ultimate future but are merely throwaway X-plane 'missing links'; the less resources and time you have to focus on the real winners. The Luftwaffe LOST with 'the best future tech available'. Because by the time they defined a mission need and matched the propulsion and airframe and production technologies to it, the strategic picture had changed and the mission itself was antiquated. If we wait too darn long, we WILL find ourselves introducing an uninhabited bomber at a time when uninhabited intercept is already here (ADM-160, Mirach 600 and Tu-143 all have the potential) and/or a switch back to high energy terrain following just to shorten the sensor horizon line on 'instant kill' DEWS is only a year or so further down the road beyond that.
Which is why I advocated KISSing the initial X-45A config into service rapid-pronto. Because it's very presence would have continued to drive the netcentric C4ISR architecture towards having the tasking to match the shots available. While driving the insane notion of 800-1,200 odd F-16's right down the tubes /before/ the F-35 money hog could attempt to 'replace in kind'.
>>
That's true enough, but this is a quantum leap in change, the only way you will get this pushed through so that you have an ideal and sensible logistics and capability matrix that is universal is if you have someone like Rumsfeld prepared to mix it up with the uniforms - I suspect that this is way out of his league at the moment
>>
IMO, the only way to push this through is for the EU or China to realize they have lost out on 'yet another' (the last) generation of manned fighter platforms and in a fit of spite over our egotistical attempts to rule the world 'in a just cau$e or otherwise', decide to go full tilt towards Neurone or equivalent technologies just to retain a foothold in military aviation.
Destructive Creationism always robs from the living obsolescent corpse of past paradigm the materials and purpose if not /definition/ (by juxtaposed apposition) of 'a new way of doing things'. The question is whether innovation in fact -kills- the current relevance as much as perspective opinions on airpower. For if we wait so long waiting for 'technologic maturity' (can we say risk averse to the point of idiocy?) in a system which is, by definition the 'young turk' (needing to -begin- the process of evolution and refinement) on the block, it may well be that global politics, economics or DEWS will become the Darwinistic meteor of ultimate change BEFORE we can put the savings from reduced manned aerial systems into a redefined ground/naval force structure or indeed society itself sufficient to leverage a reenvisioned landscape of war and peace.
KP
P.S. For those unable to exercise longrange battlespace command of uninhabited systems through secure satellite up/downlink, unwilling to move to U-jets for 'cultural reasons' or simply looking at ONLY the high intensity mission set (20yr war interval etc.) as some kind of strike lead coordination platform (rather than say continual EEZ monitoring for encroachment or pirating etc.) I suppose the all-in-one platform metric makes (Wedgetail) some $en$e. A lot will depend on how much the type is used overland (I believe MESA is already capable of extensive sea search modes) and indeed whether the 'M' in the ESA includes the high PRF exciters and array cooling required to do extensive imaging on a simple 'software change' basis. Again, from the difficulties experienced by JSTARS operating over The Boz wherein low platform ceilings and 'awkward' national airspace problems created multiple terrain shadow zones; I'm afraid I would prefer keeping the apertures forward and cheap rather than trying to exploit high power off an HVA to 'look in' on a 150-250nm slant.
gf0012-aust,
>>
But, there is an attempt to reduce platforms with the new all in one. That is (supposed to) merge Compass, Rivet and other loose platforms into a multi. What's your take on that?
>>
Just to make sure we're on the same page-
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/e-767-mc2a.htm
IMO, the E-10 Multisensor/Mission Command And Control Aircraft has a LOT of problems inherent to it.
1. It comes too soon after the E-8 program and the APY-2/RSIP upgrades for the E-3. Admittedly these are antiquated systems which themselves are desperately in need of a new carrier airframe as well as mission equipment package but the fact remains that we haven't hit what I would call a 'stable' (everybody is on a sequentially spaced development schedule) airpower curve in a long while and programs for similar capabilities seem to overlap each other in the funding conduit way too much to be justified. Mind you, the first artists concept of the MC2A was in fact a 747 with an olympic swimming pool sized 'waterbed overhead' so it has always been hard to treat this platform seriously.
2. The use of heavies in support of OOTW/SSC mission sets is both fiscally foolish and utterly unnecessary as the airframe payload and electrical power generation capability is simply not necessary for most such scenarios. Indeed, it generates bottlenecks of HDLD (High Demand, Low Density) platform taskings around which system capabilities tend to 'cluster'. And thus you end up buying inventory as much as platform size to support ALL the capabilities that might use that ISR/BMC3 platform. Rather than just the few that each needs at a given time. This gets further uglified when you are looking at operating out of primitive or 'embarrassed' nations with a jet that effectively MUST have a 12-15Kft runway.
Ironically, given my utter incredulence at the USN's willing abdication of independent strike warfare 'top down' RST/BMC3 capabilities, I find that the notion of an MMA-as-767-400 is /vastly/ more appealing than the shrimp-737-800 remans. Because, with some 12Knm worth of radius and potentially the ability (ala EC-135) to bring refuel it's own escort (or X-47 penetrating BAMS-littoral assets) as an EP-3 type mission replacement the 767 can both fly higher, stay longer and ultimately SEE FURTHER than any rinky dink 737 class system. Whether operating out of Guam or Diego or Sigonella/Akrotiri 'And Parts East'.
3. There isn't a total RIMA system package confirmation yet.
Because we are so afraid to move towards a truly nodeal netcentric architecture.
IMO, the reality is that the 'battle management' portion of the skillset needs to be isolated in much smaller Challenger or GVI or BBJ type airframes wherein an ability to operate at a high line of sight (40-50K) with a MINIMUM necessary console operator set for each of a range of configured plaltforms is combined with a much lower per-hour flight costs. This would then leave the comms relay architecture (ROBE and U-2S etc.) to be replaced with a dedicated UAV along the lines of the MQ-9 turbojet system.
And relegate -ALL- area surveillance and point-target (low level) 'sweeping' ISR to drones and combat aircraft like the RQ-4 and X-45 with XTRA/EOTS combined packages.
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/hfradar.pdf
The above is more or less about RTIP inserts but provides a couple of map illustrations for how much better the RQ-4 AEW/AGS _dual mission_ system is apt to be, without a heavy in the mix at all.
At which point you are left asking 'what does a 767 /do/ as a mission platform, which truly justifies it's existence as a type classified inventory purchase onto which you can lumpsum 20-40 SMA variants? Of course the answer is tanking and intertheater (80-120Klbs for 4-6,000nm between 10Kft concrete runways) airlift. i.e. it is the KC-135/KC-10 replacement which will dictate the economics of any MC2A addon purchase. And we need some because we somehow have deluded ourselves that RoRo transport and airdrop should be allowed to dictate the platform configuration to the extent that fleet size/aging issues and economic operating policies are 'unimportant'. Which is ludicrous when you consider it takes an act of god to activate CRAF (most of whose airframes are also /junk/) and further, if it takes you anywhere from 30 days to 3 years to 'get around' (access denial) to entering the conflict zone any notion of suprise 'forced entry' surprise attack by Barney is a non starter anyway. For the C-17 has been completely compromised by the aerodynamics of STOL, airdrop and outsized loads i.e. the C-5 in a C-141 ramp spot. And as a result it is shortlegged, expensive to operate and STILL has yet to demonstrate payload:range which I would consider competitive with even a late model IL-76.
Given that the entire KC-135R program is one gigantic (CFM engines, Pacer cockpit, wings, fuel system) moneypit of shrinking returns from a platform too old to be efficient at ONE role let alone all the addons apt to be asked of it in an OOTW intensive deployment system. I just don't see the sense in DMS paying for a 1950's platform.
Once you integrate a MUCH SIMPLER set of special mission airframe requirements (basically ELINT and Naval Theater Wide BMC3 only at present) within a probably 2-airframe type variation (long and short fuselage) for BOTH the major BMC3 required services, you can work to isolate the total replacment costs and timeframe for a proper exploitation of the 50Kft ETOPS capabilities inherent to a truly modern (COTS global-depot spares too) airframe.
And yet to get //there// you need to redefine how the ground units are going to operate and how large an individual deployment force structure package you will have for the OOTW/SSC/MRC/MTW intensity scale. After the idiocy of GWOT.
4. IMO, particularly for places like AfG and The Boz, the U.S. army ACS (Aerial Common Sensor) platform-
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/brazil/emb145.htm
Is probably the way forward. Because I can take 1 or 2 mission aperture variations and work them into a single platform buy of 40-60 which then can then be 'sent where configuration needed' to control the whole package of uninhabited 'sanitizing the empty' platforms much further ahead. Wherein on-airframe systems use the same over or under array and perhaps even transmit gear (microwave is the future of CDL high rate datalinking) but are generally dedicated to comms rather than (AGS=ASTOR etc.) LOS-sensor aids. And thus the /value/ of the platform is isolated from it's mission designate which is effectively RST/ABCCC coordinator for other gatherers. Isolating your targeting from your fires platforms is one of the MAJOR rules of firepower which we foolishly ignore when we attempt to make Tacair the be-all-end-all of both hunting and engagement through a mediocre at best tasking/vetting/release allocation system.
And when the USAr start to get Predators and see how very nicely their 'Guardrail Replacement' ERJ-145s also provides airborne command post linkage to (much shorter sightline= cheaper sensor fits for resolution-X) the drones they will probably walk away from the AF on the microtarget set, hunting GWOTbats.
>>
There is the view that with 1000 plus spare F-16's coming up, that it's cheaper to convert them into UCAV's. IIRC the conversion costings were approx 1/10th the value of an X-47. It's not as if the experience isn't there to do the changeover. I would have assumed that QF-16's were already being trialed as the QF-4's were being reduced.
>>
QF NOLOs are designed to be hit.
My assumption has always been that the UCAV, with it's absent empennage and 'simplified' (no cockpit) lifting body shape would isolate the bowtie aspects from which I had to worry about acquisition deep in a threat overlapped defensive belt. _Before_ I added VLO materials and edge treatments 'relative to the home use/export sensitivity of the customer'.
This then letting me accept a takeoff T/Wr on the order of .35-.55 for a platform whose operating/transit height of 40K ft will likely leave very little smash to play with.
As now outlined-
http://www.aeronautics.ru/archive/future/f16-ucav-foas_001.jpg
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/spr00/thompson.htm
The F-16 UCAV will never be able to match that signature threshold for all-round (depthed) penetration, nor, IMO have a reasonable chance to save much on hourly flight costs (3,600-5,000 dollars per hour, depending on who you read) as it was simply never designed to be a 'crated' weapons system and everything which made it work in the 1970's-80's (F-16A through C.25 as first-conversion types) will be in a position of severe DMS for maintenance even if otherwise kid-gloved in peacetime.
I frankly also have a LOT of doubts as to it's ability to fly an aggressive profile with wings that are going to be hitting critical Mach numbers closer in nature to a U-2 than a fighter.
These are NOT the days of BQ-17 Aphrodite type projects and I think that the 'psychologic adjustment period' mentioned in the above brief is too much a sop to saying "If we make it bad enough, everybody will laugh it off...". Such is unforgiveable because the nature of warfare is increasingly such that a single sortie platform may be tasked to hit 3-4 even 5 or more targets /critical/ to the advancement of an initial air campaign prosecution plan. And if said mission aircraft is less capable than required, it may not live to do so, thereby threatening other systems which are in turn unable to protect from area defense systems whose kill vehicles are increasingly autonomous after launch and fully capable of defending a hemisphere of airspace 40-60nm in radius.
i.e. Aphrodite failed in a way that embarrassed no one because it was designed to target specific mission sets for which it was solely at risk. UCAVs /must/ succeed in a way that enables other platforms. Because high intensity warfare planning is much more an integrated affair as a function particularly of hitting Time Critical IADS relocatables.
In terms of saved volume, I have read various ideas on flying the (F-16) airframes 'manned' to the combat theater and then yanking the seat and canopy there to avoid NOLO concerns over foreign sovereign territory. As well as permanently replacing the space with a forward mounted fuel tank as an alternative to the original 'big wing' planform. None of which supports the notion of a rapid onset GS Conops or even a FFTS naval one.
In OOTW, IMO, the problem is that much of the high quality (range known on complex signal) 'weasel gear' is both too expensive to take forward 'just for the heck of it' and too atypical for the current mission set (GWOTbat huntin'...) to justify the independent development of a tired airframe as some kind of 'transitional D4' (dull, dumb, dirty, dangerous) mission sets to which the Falcon's high residual performance and in-inventory throwaway system costs might be otherwise justified.
THE KEY to the UCAV system specification is not that it proactively engages targets but that it is a pylon-for-rent carrier for munitions which it is -cued- to launch against them. The difference being the psychology inherent to knowing you have VLO assets 'in your midst' and thus being forced to continually blanket scan areas in a fashion which permits a standoff asset (overhead or RC-135) to do 'real time mapping' of the EOB. Without necessarily being scared spitless at the notion of "But what if that SA-17 lights off right under the F-35?" as an outcome to carefree (rapid, without extensive prebattle planning) reduction of the IADS.
At least in the high intensity operating scenario you end up with something like "RJ hears the complex LPI squeal and some operator uses his wide baseline (fuselage long aperture length) and Cray level fast-IFM sorting receiver to isolate a 4X4km 'range known' geocoordinate trace. He then pulls down a list of nearest smart-ARM carriers able to fling a weapon into the basket and 75 seconds later, the Quickbolt conformal MMW array images the radar dish and sends a fuze-confirmation signal up the to satellite for relay...."
For the lower threat 'CAS' mission, the uninhabited is simply designed to fly and fly and fly and fly. So high that none of the trashfire systems can touch it. So cheaply (<$1,200/fh) that a force can literally afford to have 10 up and 5 transiting and 5 cycling through a C-turn such that there are HUGE commited patrol actions always in the field 'shaking hands and showing presence' to keep the locals from thinking we aren't watching. And ultimately (IAM + XTRA) so readily available that you can forget the primitive notion of STOVL-close '15 minute CAS' reloads because the jet is on an offset orbit 2 minutes from the team and it has EIGHT weapons impacts to that can never be weathered out for lase or whatever.
>>
Again, taking a different recidivists view - wouldn't a QF-16 keep the load out issues to a minimum. take out the pilot and with the weight saved you can then start adding weasel packages etc... It's not sexy, but it's short term deliverable. That all hinges on whether you want to make a clear statement about 21st century change.
>>
Money is everything. And the more you play WWII RLM and 'experiment' with types that have no ultimate future but are merely throwaway X-plane 'missing links'; the less resources and time you have to focus on the real winners. The Luftwaffe LOST with 'the best future tech available'. Because by the time they defined a mission need and matched the propulsion and airframe and production technologies to it, the strategic picture had changed and the mission itself was antiquated. If we wait too darn long, we WILL find ourselves introducing an uninhabited bomber at a time when uninhabited intercept is already here (ADM-160, Mirach 600 and Tu-143 all have the potential) and/or a switch back to high energy terrain following just to shorten the sensor horizon line on 'instant kill' DEWS is only a year or so further down the road beyond that.
Which is why I advocated KISSing the initial X-45A config into service rapid-pronto. Because it's very presence would have continued to drive the netcentric C4ISR architecture towards having the tasking to match the shots available. While driving the insane notion of 800-1,200 odd F-16's right down the tubes /before/ the F-35 money hog could attempt to 'replace in kind'.
>>
That's true enough, but this is a quantum leap in change, the only way you will get this pushed through so that you have an ideal and sensible logistics and capability matrix that is universal is if you have someone like Rumsfeld prepared to mix it up with the uniforms - I suspect that this is way out of his league at the moment
>>
IMO, the only way to push this through is for the EU or China to realize they have lost out on 'yet another' (the last) generation of manned fighter platforms and in a fit of spite over our egotistical attempts to rule the world 'in a just cau$e or otherwise', decide to go full tilt towards Neurone or equivalent technologies just to retain a foothold in military aviation.
Destructive Creationism always robs from the living obsolescent corpse of past paradigm the materials and purpose if not /definition/ (by juxtaposed apposition) of 'a new way of doing things'. The question is whether innovation in fact -kills- the current relevance as much as perspective opinions on airpower. For if we wait so long waiting for 'technologic maturity' (can we say risk averse to the point of idiocy?) in a system which is, by definition the 'young turk' (needing to -begin- the process of evolution and refinement) on the block, it may well be that global politics, economics or DEWS will become the Darwinistic meteor of ultimate change BEFORE we can put the savings from reduced manned aerial systems into a redefined ground/naval force structure or indeed society itself sufficient to leverage a reenvisioned landscape of war and peace.
KP
P.S. For those unable to exercise longrange battlespace command of uninhabited systems through secure satellite up/downlink, unwilling to move to U-jets for 'cultural reasons' or simply looking at ONLY the high intensity mission set (20yr war interval etc.) as some kind of strike lead coordination platform (rather than say continual EEZ monitoring for encroachment or pirating etc.) I suppose the all-in-one platform metric makes (Wedgetail) some $en$e. A lot will depend on how much the type is used overland (I believe MESA is already capable of extensive sea search modes) and indeed whether the 'M' in the ESA includes the high PRF exciters and array cooling required to do extensive imaging on a simple 'software change' basis. Again, from the difficulties experienced by JSTARS operating over The Boz wherein low platform ceilings and 'awkward' national airspace problems created multiple terrain shadow zones; I'm afraid I would prefer keeping the apertures forward and cheap rather than trying to exploit high power off an HVA to 'look in' on a 150-250nm slant.
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
It was approved for LRIP last June (101 Units), did something go wrong in OPEVAL?
http://www.paxriver.org/news/index.cfm?stage=show&news_id=243
Hi Kurt, welcome to DT. When was ICAP III cancelled? I was under the impression that it was alive and well, with the first Prowler ready to deploy.Kurt Plummer said:
It was approved for LRIP last June (101 Units), did something go wrong in OPEVAL?
http://www.paxriver.org/news/index.cfm?stage=show&news_id=243
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Highsea,
>>
July 27, 2004
...
The U.S. military is now in danger of losing its advantage in SEAD, placing at risk its ability to achieve air dominance. The basic technologies for SEAD are more than three decades old and need to be modernized to deal with modern, mobile SAM systems firing high-speed missiles. However, two of the most promising programs in development, the Improved Capabilities III (ICAP III) upgrade to the venerable EA-6B Prowler and the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM), are about to be eliminated. The Prowler is a Navy/Marine Corps aircraft but it provides EW protection for the joint force. The ICAP III program is a critical bridge until a new system such as the F/A-18 Growler or a follow-on standoff jamming aircraft enter service. The Navy eliminated ICAP III funding in its FY2004 budget and Congress followed suit for the FY2005 budget, effectively killing the program.
...
>>
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/040727b.asp
My date is obviously older than yours so take it with a pinch of whatever condiment or preservative seems appropriate.
My take on particularly this-
>>
ICAP III is an electronics receiver suite that jams or overloads hostile communications, disrupting the enemy's efforts to conduct network centric warfare (NCW). It provides advanced "selective-reactive" jamming and geolocation capabilities for the EA-6B Prowler. The Navy and U.S. Marine Corps use the Prowler to protect strike aircraft, ground troops and ships by jamming enemy radar, electronic data links and communications.
Selective-reactive jamming means the system can focus its jamming power on specific radar frequencies. ICAP III's geolocation capabilities allow it to determine the location of an enemy's radar system and then pass that information on to others on the network.
>>
Is that the geolocation element of SRJ is nothing more than what we have been playing with since the 1986 Eldorada Canyon attacks in terms of using multiple aircraft to share jam allocations via 'datalink'.
SRJ itself is NOT intended to specifically 'disrupt enemy NCW' but rather to /protect/ ours. By using much narrower spot coverage in-band and in-chase on agile/complex signals. So that we don't wipe out half our own use of the spectrum.
Tacair commjam died when they dropped the ALQ-149 program and pulled the USQ-113 (duuuh, acronumbic proximity recall alert) a couple years after its COTS 'service test' replacment. From what I remember the front right seater is now more or less 'observer rated' with an ironbird hole in his panel.
Which is probably okay anyway because you can't softkill FO landline from above (conventionaly anyway) and cell networking or directional microwave links require /vastly/ more pointoint aperture noding coverage from the JX platform than we have Queers available in the entire navy to provide.
EA is a UCAV mission, like it or lump it, it's the only way to get sufficient strobes 'on point' over a broad enough front to support VLO without having to 'support the supporters' with mini-SEAD efforts (give away to penetration corridors) for every fuzzy screen platform.
KP
P.S. Thanks for the LINK btw.
Highsea,
>>
July 27, 2004
...
The U.S. military is now in danger of losing its advantage in SEAD, placing at risk its ability to achieve air dominance. The basic technologies for SEAD are more than three decades old and need to be modernized to deal with modern, mobile SAM systems firing high-speed missiles. However, two of the most promising programs in development, the Improved Capabilities III (ICAP III) upgrade to the venerable EA-6B Prowler and the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM), are about to be eliminated. The Prowler is a Navy/Marine Corps aircraft but it provides EW protection for the joint force. The ICAP III program is a critical bridge until a new system such as the F/A-18 Growler or a follow-on standoff jamming aircraft enter service. The Navy eliminated ICAP III funding in its FY2004 budget and Congress followed suit for the FY2005 budget, effectively killing the program.
...
>>
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/040727b.asp
My date is obviously older than yours so take it with a pinch of whatever condiment or preservative seems appropriate.
My take on particularly this-
>>
ICAP III is an electronics receiver suite that jams or overloads hostile communications, disrupting the enemy's efforts to conduct network centric warfare (NCW). It provides advanced "selective-reactive" jamming and geolocation capabilities for the EA-6B Prowler. The Navy and U.S. Marine Corps use the Prowler to protect strike aircraft, ground troops and ships by jamming enemy radar, electronic data links and communications.
Selective-reactive jamming means the system can focus its jamming power on specific radar frequencies. ICAP III's geolocation capabilities allow it to determine the location of an enemy's radar system and then pass that information on to others on the network.
>>
Is that the geolocation element of SRJ is nothing more than what we have been playing with since the 1986 Eldorada Canyon attacks in terms of using multiple aircraft to share jam allocations via 'datalink'.
SRJ itself is NOT intended to specifically 'disrupt enemy NCW' but rather to /protect/ ours. By using much narrower spot coverage in-band and in-chase on agile/complex signals. So that we don't wipe out half our own use of the spectrum.
Tacair commjam died when they dropped the ALQ-149 program and pulled the USQ-113 (duuuh, acronumbic proximity recall alert) a couple years after its COTS 'service test' replacment. From what I remember the front right seater is now more or less 'observer rated' with an ironbird hole in his panel.
Which is probably okay anyway because you can't softkill FO landline from above (conventionaly anyway) and cell networking or directional microwave links require /vastly/ more point
oint aperture noding coverage from the JX platform than we have Queers available in the entire navy to provide.EA is a UCAV mission, like it or lump it, it's the only way to get sufficient strobes 'on point' over a broad enough front to support VLO without having to 'support the supporters' with mini-SEAD efforts (give away to penetration corridors) for every fuzzy screen platform.
KP
P.S. Thanks for the LINK btw.
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Thanks for the reply Kurt, I will still hope ICAP III is alive.
My concern with an all UCAV EA fleet is that the Pentagon may be reluctant to deploy them when they are really needed. They will be lost at some time, and you know they will end up in Russia or China and get dissected.
So then we need something up there protecting the UCAV's, or at least blowing them to hell when they do go down in someone elses backyard. IIRC, this was one of the stumbling points when we first started working on the Tier III programs. Fear of compromising the technology when something goes wrong or they get knocked down. (F-117 in Yugoslavia)
-CM
Thanks for the reply Kurt, I will still hope ICAP III is alive.
My concern with an all UCAV EA fleet is that the Pentagon may be reluctant to deploy them when they are really needed. They will be lost at some time, and you know they will end up in Russia or China and get dissected.
So then we need something up there protecting the UCAV's, or at least blowing them to hell when they do go down in someone elses backyard. IIRC, this was one of the stumbling points when we first started working on the Tier III programs. Fear of compromising the technology when something goes wrong or they get knocked down. (F-117 in Yugoslavia)
-CM
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
Early iterations of Predator (and this is in the early early early days!) were supposed to either hit a return cycle if they lost contact, or IIRC some were set up to suicide with assistance. Unless you build in triple redundancy into the self immolation stage (and there is no guarantee that this will work either) then at some point you will lose technology.
Witness the rebadged Tomahawks that China has developed due to having access to a "stray"
I've always held the view that blue sky technologie should be milspec'd on redundancy so that if coming home fails upon request, that they have barometrics in place to ensure that they suicide properly (FAE or a thermal strip across sensitive components always made sense to me)
If people aren't on the buyers list, then make sure the technology is useless to them.
It's damn good thing that the F-117's days are "numbered" then. The problem also is that the fail safe technology doesn't always work as it should.highsea said:Thanks for the reply Kurt, I will still hope ICAP III is alive.
My concern with an all UCAV EA fleet is that the Pentagon may be reluctant to deploy them when they are really needed. They will be lost at some time, and you know they will end up in Russia or China and get dissected.
So then we need something up there protecting the UCAV's, or at least blowing them to hell when they do go down in someone elses backyard. IIRC, this was one of the stumbling points when we first started working on the Tier III programs. Fear of compromising the technology when something goes wrong or they get knocked down. (F-117 in Yugoslavia)
-CM
Early iterations of Predator (and this is in the early early early days!) were supposed to either hit a return cycle if they lost contact, or IIRC some were set up to suicide with assistance
. Unless you build in triple redundancy into the self immolation stage (and there is no guarantee that this will work either) then at some point you will lose technology.Witness the rebadged Tomahawks that China has developed due to having access to a "stray"
I've always held the view that blue sky technologie should be milspec'd on redundancy so that if coming home fails upon request, that they have barometrics in place to ensure that they suicide properly (FAE or a thermal strip across sensitive components always made sense to me)
If people aren't on the buyers list, then make sure the technology is useless to them.
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
CM,
>>
My concern with an all UCAV EA fleet is that the Pentagon may be reluctant to deploy them when they are really needed. They will be lost at some time, and you know they will end up in Russia or China and get dissected.
>>
My understanding is that the U.S. investment in deep RF signal analysis and secondary/tertiary harmonic isolation of 'tricky signal events' (reflective terrain bounce and back/sidelobes etc.) against a highly dynamic (noisy) ambient has paid off with continual ability to geolocate sites _from range_ using the various U-2, RF-4 and RC-135 assets as well as things like Army Guardrail and Quick Fix etc.
Yet even from the mid 80's when you started to see reports of artillery and rocket deployed parajammer jammer packages, it was becoming clear that even Eastern level electronics were becoming increasingly hardened against interference from all but 'terminal close' jam levels required to penetrate the antenna nulls and guard circuits etc..
OTOH, today half the world's cell phones are made in China and/or Taiwan and virtually ALL the electronics for them come out of Malaysia or Korea. Electronics which are based around high density MMIC chips using architectures developed during Pave Pillar and similar efforts and now commercially exploited to the extent that there is really not much to hide in terms of sophisticated /front end/ active-RF works.
Now admittedly most of this is comms not radar related (though the operative bandwidth in the 2-4GHz region should be similar) but I think, from events like the ski-tram idiocy in Italy, that you would be surprised on how much stand forward and popup type 'sudden onset' jamming is required, even of nominally HVA plaltforms like the EA-6B.
And for a choice, I would, BY FAR, rather have a flying wing/deltoid UCAV with a VLO 'trim strip' edge coating than 4 men in a 1950's attack platform with the thrust to weight ratio 'roughly equal to an M1 Abrahms' and ALL the software package (techniques and firmware objective code interfaces between the drivers and the radiators) inside.
CDL, as it expands into X and Ka/M regions, will most likely drive the datarates up to well in excess of the current 240MByte/second total through put. And if the spreading and data security goes with it, we should be able to 'LIVE, it's Satttturday Night!' send active jam plans to a fairly primitive onboard RFM which is more or less simply copycatting the _enemy_ signal use (i.e. they already know their own spectrum operation so what's to steal?) with flash over microspot jamming.
The difference being that the drones are again: VERY CLOSE IN.
While the database of enemy SIGINT held countermeasures is still mucho miles away and possibly even sightline depressed over the effective local horizon (if you are facing 'ballistic' SAM like the S-300/400 with a potential 300km lofted range like the RIM-156/161).
In terms of VLO, I'm afraid that losing that edge is a done deal if we proceed with JSF as planned. You simply cannot control 'unintended proliferation' of a technology through things like edge treatments that (supposedly) break down when mishandled if you supply samples over such a wide range of users that any technical intelligence effort is able to 'sample' perhaps thousands of _weakest link_ human vulnenrabilities in obtaining specimens or access.
Furthermore, the basics are already known in terms of planform control and shaping such that if you have a complex radio interferometry test range and a pole model constructed from a photogrammetric composite (say 5 year access to AvLeak back issues); it is only a function of time before you can integrate even commercial level (TV etc.) absorbers with the data from your RF testing to come up with an 'equivalent' configuration expectation.
Either for counter exploitation as a function of defensive engagement strategies (look for it at X-aspect) or as a precursor to rolling your own.
Now of course all of this 'presumes' that the little blue ribbon band around the F/A-22 or the B-2 is not 'active' in some (snicker) plasma-stealth or flippolarized cancellation system. But even that is likely not invisible to acoustic cued optics or perhaps a PCLS type system.
>>
So then we need something up there protecting the UCAV's, or at least blowing them to hell when they do go down in someone elses backyard. IIRC, this was one of the stumbling points when we first started working on the Tier III programs. Fear of compromising the technology when something goes wrong or they get knocked down. (F-117 in Yugoslavia)
>>
Think Chess. What's the most valuable piece class on the board?
Yep, it's the pawns. Because by advancing forward '1 man, 1 move' at a time they FORCE the enemy to react lest they become invested and trapped by their own pieces in multiple low value/high value trades to open up the board again.
It's the same with UCAV (configured) jammers. _So Long As I Use A System of Layered Valueing_. Wherein the enemy never knows whether he is looking at an ADM-160, an EA-45/47 jammer. Or an ASARM/AARGM class weapon /lofted/ by a 'dumb weasel' escort. Or if indeed, these are the 'real deal' F/A-22/F-35 assets.
Because they must engage based on the proximal value of **their own** BMC3, IADS or infrastructure target proximity associations with the inbound track. Since they know that our overhead will have actively plotted at least some of these as a function of optical and EOB mapping before the war.
And frankly, I'd rather they shoot my robot than my manned platform.
Because there is nothing worse than flying over a dumb launch box and having it spit 4-6-10 _autonomous_ (ARH or EO) seekered weapons at you based on some longwave system looking at you from the far horizon having sent them a landline trackfile snapshot message (the equivalent of an A2A skate fire).
Except perhaps stepping on a DEW with a 10-15nm clear-air lethal radius using the same 'offboard' remote cue.
While, even within a conventional system of (shortwave) mobile, sectored and blinking radars using flash-on/flash-off _LOOKBACK TRACK_ for SARH weapons I expect to be well within the defensive grid before they let me know I've been had. At which point my only hope is that, again, they know that even the UCAV pawns can be equipped with heavy weight hardkill and thus MUST be engaged 'like any other bomber'.
The difference being that, given I have 80-100nm reach-forward Air Dominance (with AIM-120D or Meteor class weapons from a supercruiser) to protect against the 'continual pursuit' threat of a manned interceptor. I can mix in imaging/hypervelocity (QBolt HARM on a ramjet backend) DEAD weapons on a sacrificial weasel and either fire directly at the MAWS cue of the rising missile plume.
Or take the 10-20 seconds of a BVR engagement midcourse to accept counter targeting from an RQ-4 that is look-down tracking the fast-rise missile doppler with it's RTIP enhanced radar.
Or the ABL/E-3AIRST/DSP equivalent which is further cuing a STARS imaging based on launch flash (and an S-300 signature 'blasting off' is HUGE). Either way, once I've got the point source as a terrain-corridor, the suppression weapon of the next century will care less about the ARM element of it's design than it will the I2R or MMW based ability to track the physical signature.
That's both the beach and the great surf promise of active/autonomous weapons in tomorrows wars. They will be so lethal, in such volley-fire numbers that entire formations could potentially be put at risk. But this very threat, combined with their cost, will also make the requirement to netcentrically exterminate the individual launch boxes as to make the overall effort of DEAD-not-SEAD much more able to provide surety on the overall IADS reduction effort. No more STARM 'prebrief' piss in wind efforts based on 3hr or 3day old intel.
KP
gfaust12,
>>
It's damn good thing that the F-117's days are "numbered" then. The problem also is that the fail safe technology doesn't always work as it should.
>>
Knowing what we did in the wake of DS in terms of target servicings vs. weatherouts and the questionable utility of 'too early, too late, we still bombed below 12K too often' jamplan effects on AAA as much as SAMs (i.e. practically every pilot was -quoted- as saying 'it was just a matter of time, given what we were flying thru').
And further given, amidst the idiocy of the 117B/X etc. new-plane daydreams we didn't even make an /attempt/ to integrate an allweather radar and IAM (GAM) on the Cockroach. IMO, the type should have been removed from inventory no later than 1993; if only to spike the development contiguity of the Raptor as a strike biased followon.
Whatever you believe of the 'special circumstances' over Belgrade that brought the jet down (EA-6B forced off station, pilot 'silouhetted himself below clouds', Tamara/PCLS operating out of Chinese embassy bagged him on background trace, French Officer gave target and time data on a repeat route) the fact remains that the Bomber Roadmap HOGGING of the IAM integration funding, along with the absolutely moronic inability to follow thru with a thru-cloud sensor (originally intended as far back as 1983 btw., as a precursor to the work done on the A-12/APG-76 precision ISAR). Is what generated the principle, conditional, vulnerabilities that caused the BJet to go down.
That said, the /way/ it crashed reminds me of a Delta Dart that once 'lost complete control' when it's hydraulics bled down and yet, as soon as the pilot ejected, changed CG and aeros sufficiently to come down in a near perfect pancake in some farmer's field.
Such will likely never happen in a small, radically unstable (it will have to be to land on a carrier with a delta planform), jet that takes even a DCF hit from any missile sufficient to reach it's 40K operating height.
At which point, the biggest insurance policy is going to be those 12,000lbs of fuel 'sloshing about' in the centertank. Now I admit that safing gear is still going to be necessary (and has been pyro or electronic present on every tacjet since at least the Vietnam war) but IMO, the reality is that 'quantity has a quality all it's own'. And if you make no individual nation can match your quantity and no -group of nations- can so endanger your /quality/ as to void a Win:Hold:Win strategy of shifted forces. Then the UCAV's only responsibility is to ensure that the enemy takes the highest possible shot price at the lowest possible target value. For a pyrhhic victory.
>>
Early iterations of Predator (and this is in the early early early days!) were supposed to either hit a return cycle if they lost contact, or IIRC some were set up to suicide with assistance. Unless you build in triple redundancy into the self immolation stage (and there is no guarantee that this will work either) then at some point you will lose technology.
Witness the rebadged Tomahawks that China has developed due to having access to a "stray"
>>
IMO, DEWS will completely change the nature of aerial warfare. Forcing us to move almost entirely to mini-MIRVing aeroballistic hypervelocity weapons for Tier-1 threats. And according to this article-
http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020708/aw32.htm
We will be seeing 'fighter class' solidstate weapons ready for service test by 2010.
i.e. within a year of USAF service entry and as much as 3 years /before/ USN/USMC/RN and certainly 'foreign export' standup.
If we can put a 6 mile ranged weapon on a 50ft long fighter, 'they' (being any inspired threat nation jealous enough to try using Russian Sary Shagan optics work within a more primitive DP chemical system) can develop a fixed or semimobile MIRACL equivalent ground capability with a 10-15nm range 5 years after that.
The perspective by which we look at the process/purpose/outcome integration of RIMA with both social, economic and strategic viewpoints is changing people. Much as we may want to treat pilots as some kind of annointed technoknights on their ghost grey chargers; the fact remains that the musket ball which will knock both pegasi and rider completely off their winged feet is _really, really_ close to fruition.
At which point Western Martial Dominance of world affiars by virtue of expeditionary action will be severely tested if not outright disproved.
If we foolishly invest 245 billion dollars in a program whose end product is obsolescent before it even enters service -based on the very weapons technology it will carry-.
Then all the talk about tech vulnerabilities inherent to any single loss of VLO or electronics safeties is ignoring the bear before you in jealousy of the man who robs your dead corpse once it's done eating.
>>
I've always held the view that blue sky technologie should be milspec'd on redundancy so that if coming home fails upon request, that they have barometrics in place to ensure that they suicide properly (FAE or a thermal strip across sensitive components always made sense to me)
If people aren't on the buyers list, then make sure the technology is useless to them.
>>
Agreed. I just don't see the difference between 'blue sky' safing gear on a drone which is in fact /harder/ (by shaping) to see from multiple aspects
and the equivalent on a JSF which has a different level of materials protection and yes, a vastly better performance envelope. Yet which still remains subsonic vulnerable to pass-thru attacks (not high/fast enough to exit the envelope before flanking or tailshot aspected signature vulnerabilities lead to a hard track engagement as a Raptor can).
And which is just as (subsonic again= short standoffs) vulnerable to 'terminal or random' DE threats.
It's never been about the size of the man in the fight before. But only because the size of the fight hasn't made man the weak link in terms of both coverage, endurance and risk:gain target servicing interval over a global battlespace.
KP
CM,
>>
My concern with an all UCAV EA fleet is that the Pentagon may be reluctant to deploy them when they are really needed. They will be lost at some time, and you know they will end up in Russia or China and get dissected.
>>
My understanding is that the U.S. investment in deep RF signal analysis and secondary/tertiary harmonic isolation of 'tricky signal events' (reflective terrain bounce and back/sidelobes etc.) against a highly dynamic (noisy) ambient has paid off with continual ability to geolocate sites _from range_ using the various U-2, RF-4 and RC-135 assets as well as things like Army Guardrail and Quick Fix etc.
Yet even from the mid 80's when you started to see reports of artillery and rocket deployed parajammer jammer packages, it was becoming clear that even Eastern level electronics were becoming increasingly hardened against interference from all but 'terminal close' jam levels required to penetrate the antenna nulls and guard circuits etc..
OTOH, today half the world's cell phones are made in China and/or Taiwan and virtually ALL the electronics for them come out of Malaysia or Korea. Electronics which are based around high density MMIC chips using architectures developed during Pave Pillar and similar efforts and now commercially exploited to the extent that there is really not much to hide in terms of sophisticated /front end/ active-RF works.
Now admittedly most of this is comms not radar related (though the operative bandwidth in the 2-4GHz region should be similar) but I think, from events like the ski-tram idiocy in Italy, that you would be surprised on how much stand forward and popup type 'sudden onset' jamming is required, even of nominally HVA plaltforms like the EA-6B.
And for a choice, I would, BY FAR, rather have a flying wing/deltoid UCAV with a VLO 'trim strip' edge coating than 4 men in a 1950's attack platform with the thrust to weight ratio 'roughly equal to an M1 Abrahms' and ALL the software package (techniques and firmware objective code interfaces between the drivers and the radiators) inside.
CDL, as it expands into X and Ka/M regions, will most likely drive the datarates up to well in excess of the current 240MByte/second total through put. And if the spreading and data security goes with it, we should be able to 'LIVE, it's Satttturday Night!' send active jam plans to a fairly primitive onboard RFM which is more or less simply copycatting the _enemy_ signal use (i.e. they already know their own spectrum operation so what's to steal?) with flash over microspot jamming.
The difference being that the drones are again: VERY CLOSE IN.
While the database of enemy SIGINT held countermeasures is still mucho miles away and possibly even sightline depressed over the effective local horizon (if you are facing 'ballistic' SAM like the S-300/400 with a potential 300km lofted range like the RIM-156/161).
In terms of VLO, I'm afraid that losing that edge is a done deal if we proceed with JSF as planned. You simply cannot control 'unintended proliferation' of a technology through things like edge treatments that (supposedly) break down when mishandled if you supply samples over such a wide range of users that any technical intelligence effort is able to 'sample' perhaps thousands of _weakest link_ human vulnenrabilities in obtaining specimens or access.
Furthermore, the basics are already known in terms of planform control and shaping such that if you have a complex radio interferometry test range and a pole model constructed from a photogrammetric composite (say 5 year access to AvLeak back issues); it is only a function of time before you can integrate even commercial level (TV etc.) absorbers with the data from your RF testing to come up with an 'equivalent' configuration expectation.
Either for counter exploitation as a function of defensive engagement strategies (look for it at X-aspect) or as a precursor to rolling your own.
Now of course all of this 'presumes' that the little blue ribbon band around the F/A-22 or the B-2 is not 'active' in some (snicker) plasma-stealth or flippolarized cancellation system. But even that is likely not invisible to acoustic cued optics or perhaps a PCLS type system.
>>
So then we need something up there protecting the UCAV's, or at least blowing them to hell when they do go down in someone elses backyard. IIRC, this was one of the stumbling points when we first started working on the Tier III programs. Fear of compromising the technology when something goes wrong or they get knocked down. (F-117 in Yugoslavia)
>>
Think Chess. What's the most valuable piece class on the board?
Yep, it's the pawns. Because by advancing forward '1 man, 1 move' at a time they FORCE the enemy to react lest they become invested and trapped by their own pieces in multiple low value/high value trades to open up the board again.
It's the same with UCAV (configured) jammers. _So Long As I Use A System of Layered Valueing_. Wherein the enemy never knows whether he is looking at an ADM-160, an EA-45/47 jammer. Or an ASARM/AARGM class weapon /lofted/ by a 'dumb weasel' escort. Or if indeed, these are the 'real deal' F/A-22/F-35 assets.
Because they must engage based on the proximal value of **their own** BMC3, IADS or infrastructure target proximity associations with the inbound track. Since they know that our overhead will have actively plotted at least some of these as a function of optical and EOB mapping before the war.
And frankly, I'd rather they shoot my robot than my manned platform.
Because there is nothing worse than flying over a dumb launch box and having it spit 4-6-10 _autonomous_ (ARH or EO) seekered weapons at you based on some longwave system looking at you from the far horizon having sent them a landline trackfile snapshot message (the equivalent of an A2A skate fire).
Except perhaps stepping on a DEW with a 10-15nm clear-air lethal radius using the same 'offboard' remote cue.
While, even within a conventional system of (shortwave) mobile, sectored and blinking radars using flash-on/flash-off _LOOKBACK TRACK_ for SARH weapons I expect to be well within the defensive grid before they let me know I've been had. At which point my only hope is that, again, they know that even the UCAV pawns can be equipped with heavy weight hardkill and thus MUST be engaged 'like any other bomber'.
The difference being that, given I have 80-100nm reach-forward Air Dominance (with AIM-120D or Meteor class weapons from a supercruiser) to protect against the 'continual pursuit' threat of a manned interceptor. I can mix in imaging/hypervelocity (QBolt HARM on a ramjet backend) DEAD weapons on a sacrificial weasel and either fire directly at the MAWS cue of the rising missile plume.
Or take the 10-20 seconds of a BVR engagement midcourse to accept counter targeting from an RQ-4 that is look-down tracking the fast-rise missile doppler with it's RTIP enhanced radar.
Or the ABL/E-3AIRST/DSP equivalent which is further cuing a STARS imaging based on launch flash (and an S-300 signature 'blasting off' is HUGE). Either way, once I've got the point source as a terrain-corridor, the suppression weapon of the next century will care less about the ARM element of it's design than it will the I2R or MMW based ability to track the physical signature.
That's both the beach and the great surf promise of active/autonomous weapons in tomorrows wars. They will be so lethal, in such volley-fire numbers that entire formations could potentially be put at risk. But this very threat, combined with their cost, will also make the requirement to netcentrically exterminate the individual launch boxes as to make the overall effort of DEAD-not-SEAD much more able to provide surety on the overall IADS reduction effort. No more STARM 'prebrief' piss in wind efforts based on 3hr or 3day old intel.
KP
gfaust12,
>>
It's damn good thing that the F-117's days are "numbered" then. The problem also is that the fail safe technology doesn't always work as it should.
>>
Knowing what we did in the wake of DS in terms of target servicings vs. weatherouts and the questionable utility of 'too early, too late, we still bombed below 12K too often' jamplan effects on AAA as much as SAMs (i.e. practically every pilot was -quoted- as saying 'it was just a matter of time, given what we were flying thru').
And further given, amidst the idiocy of the 117B/X etc. new-plane daydreams we didn't even make an /attempt/ to integrate an allweather radar and IAM (GAM) on the Cockroach. IMO, the type should have been removed from inventory no later than 1993; if only to spike the development contiguity of the Raptor as a strike biased followon.
Whatever you believe of the 'special circumstances' over Belgrade that brought the jet down (EA-6B forced off station, pilot 'silouhetted himself below clouds', Tamara/PCLS operating out of Chinese embassy bagged him on background trace, French Officer gave target and time data on a repeat route) the fact remains that the Bomber Roadmap HOGGING of the IAM integration funding, along with the absolutely moronic inability to follow thru with a thru-cloud sensor (originally intended as far back as 1983 btw., as a precursor to the work done on the A-12/APG-76 precision ISAR). Is what generated the principle, conditional, vulnerabilities that caused the BJet to go down.
That said, the /way/ it crashed reminds me of a Delta Dart that once 'lost complete control' when it's hydraulics bled down and yet, as soon as the pilot ejected, changed CG and aeros sufficiently to come down in a near perfect pancake in some farmer's field.
Such will likely never happen in a small, radically unstable (it will have to be to land on a carrier with a delta planform), jet that takes even a DCF hit from any missile sufficient to reach it's 40K operating height.
At which point, the biggest insurance policy is going to be those 12,000lbs of fuel 'sloshing about' in the centertank. Now I admit that safing gear is still going to be necessary (and has been pyro or electronic present on every tacjet since at least the Vietnam war) but IMO, the reality is that 'quantity has a quality all it's own'. And if you make no individual nation can match your quantity and no -group of nations- can so endanger your /quality/ as to void a Win:Hold:Win strategy of shifted forces. Then the UCAV's only responsibility is to ensure that the enemy takes the highest possible shot price at the lowest possible target value. For a pyrhhic victory.
>>
Early iterations of Predator (and this is in the early early early days!) were supposed to either hit a return cycle if they lost contact, or IIRC some were set up to suicide with assistance
. Unless you build in triple redundancy into the self immolation stage (and there is no guarantee that this will work either) then at some point you will lose technology.Witness the rebadged Tomahawks that China has developed due to having access to a "stray"
>>
IMO, DEWS will completely change the nature of aerial warfare. Forcing us to move almost entirely to mini-MIRVing aeroballistic hypervelocity weapons for Tier-1 threats. And according to this article-
http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020708/aw32.htm
We will be seeing 'fighter class' solidstate weapons ready for service test by 2010.
i.e. within a year of USAF service entry and as much as 3 years /before/ USN/USMC/RN and certainly 'foreign export' standup.
If we can put a 6 mile ranged weapon on a 50ft long fighter, 'they' (being any inspired threat nation jealous enough to try using Russian Sary Shagan optics work within a more primitive DP chemical system) can develop a fixed or semimobile MIRACL equivalent ground capability with a 10-15nm range 5 years after that.
The perspective by which we look at the process/purpose/outcome integration of RIMA with both social, economic and strategic viewpoints is changing people. Much as we may want to treat pilots as some kind of annointed technoknights on their ghost grey chargers; the fact remains that the musket ball which will knock both pegasi and rider completely off their winged feet is _really, really_ close to fruition.
At which point Western Martial Dominance of world affiars by virtue of expeditionary action will be severely tested if not outright disproved.
If we foolishly invest 245 billion dollars in a program whose end product is obsolescent before it even enters service -based on the very weapons technology it will carry-.
Then all the talk about tech vulnerabilities inherent to any single loss of VLO or electronics safeties is ignoring the bear before you in jealousy of the man who robs your dead corpse once it's done eating.
>>
I've always held the view that blue sky technologie should be milspec'd on redundancy so that if coming home fails upon request, that they have barometrics in place to ensure that they suicide properly (FAE or a thermal strip across sensitive components always made sense to me)
If people aren't on the buyers list, then make sure the technology is useless to them.
>>
Agreed. I just don't see the difference between 'blue sky' safing gear on a drone which is in fact /harder/ (by shaping) to see from multiple aspects
and the equivalent on a JSF which has a different level of materials protection and yes, a vastly better performance envelope. Yet which still remains subsonic vulnerable to pass-thru attacks (not high/fast enough to exit the envelope before flanking or tailshot aspected signature vulnerabilities lead to a hard track engagement as a Raptor can).
And which is just as (subsonic again= short standoffs) vulnerable to 'terminal or random' DE threats.
It's never been about the size of the man in the fight before. But only because the size of the fight hasn't made man the weak link in terms of both coverage, endurance and risk:gain target servicing interval over a global battlespace.
KP
nz enthusiast
New Member
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
You guys dont seem to know what you are talking about in some areas....
New Zealand had 17 skyhawks and 17 airmachi air trainers. The 17skyhawks have not been sold they are currently in a warehouse being rented by the NZ government until a buyer can be found. Its correct that an American company is interested in them but there are two problems the first being the skyhawks radar, this radar is the same used on the top F16s and said to be on some F15, the US government apparently doesn't want that avionics technology to be sold to a private company. Secondly helen clark is a very strong pacifist, people clai mthat when the Skyhawks arrived in early 1970 she was down at the port waving a communist flag.
The airmachi were going to be sold to Signapore but they had a change in plan and are more interested in getting aricraft to replace there A4s etc and they can't afford to do both.
Australia wants the F22 but the US government has crealy stated that it doesn't want to see it to anyone no matter how close of an ally they are, simple reason they dont trust anyone with the F22 and have regreted ever selling the F15.
You guys dont seem to know what you are talking about in some areas....
New Zealand had 17 skyhawks and 17 airmachi air trainers. The 17skyhawks have not been sold they are currently in a warehouse being rented by the NZ government until a buyer can be found. Its correct that an American company is interested in them but there are two problems the first being the skyhawks radar, this radar is the same used on the top F16s and said to be on some F15, the US government apparently doesn't want that avionics technology to be sold to a private company. Secondly helen clark is a very strong pacifist, people clai mthat when the Skyhawks arrived in early 1970 she was down at the port waving a communist flag.
The airmachi were going to be sold to Signapore but they had a change in plan and are more interested in getting aricraft to replace there A4s etc and they can't afford to do both.
Australia wants the F22 but the US government has crealy stated that it doesn't want to see it to anyone no matter how close of an ally they are, simple reason they dont trust anyone with the F22 and have regreted ever selling the F15.
Re: F-35 Multirole Joint Fighter
F-15's use APG-63 or APG-70's, and are quite a bit larger than the APG-66.
The upgrade program (Project Kahu) for the A-4K used the AN/APG-66 radar. These were developed for the early F-16A/B's, and were never used on F-15's. The F-16C/D's (Block 25 and on) use the APG-68, which is a derivative of the APG-66. E/F's use the APG-80 AESA.nz enthusiast said:
F-15's use APG-63 or APG-70's, and are quite a bit larger than the APG-66.
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