F-35 Multirole Joint Strike Fighter

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Grand Danois

Entertainer
And no company or nation other than the US military industrial complex can produce proper system, right?
That was not what I said! Cassidian makes excellent systems and components and the guys working MMPRS are clearly enjoying it. I did no adjudication on which system was better.

What I pointed out was that the premise that the Americans are stupid and do not consider future developments in counter-LO is false.

In this case not only the Americans, but the very same company that produces the JSF, developed and marketed a similar PCL radar ten years ago! And it doesn't stop there: it was cleared for export by LO/CLO ExCom (iirc)!

How long before other states, ones which have access to technologies to negate the many benefit of LO can field numerous enough systems to make such an unaffordable project as JSF passe? My point was the physical features of JSF don't warrant the decades long cost of the program which will far outlast its presumed edge in the field (whenever it actually gets there in numbers sufficient to make a difference). Also, what was given up in terms of other capabilities to fund this pyramid? Software, detection systems and other less expensive denial of capability technologies can be developed faster than a project like JSF can be. My point was: we need to have more affordable projects which get into the field fast enough and then receive frequent upgrades.

RS,
If it was easy and inexpensive we should be awash with CLO systems already. They would be even more cost-effective against legacy combat aircraft! So the few numbers of LO-jets is no excuse not to go there.

To iterate, I don't assume the Yanks to be stupid. :)

Edit: With that implied conclusion that stealth is here to stay, I will add that you may have a more general point that it could be healthy for the US to be slightly less ambitious and instead have shorter development/deployment cycles, e.g. NGB.
 
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ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Now that Cassidian has announced that Stealth aircraft can be detected, well before F35 IOC, should we have spent those dozens of billions on improved, cheaper designs equipped with ECM software and countermeasures (which could have been frequently upgraded?!).

The cash for the two UK carriers would have been a breeze with the savings and legacy aircraft like the early F15s, F16s, Tornadoes would have been fully replaced by now with highly maneuverable aircraft like Typhoon (incl. a naval variant), Rafale for some, Gripen for others.... A few F22s for the US and, for example, a lot of Super Hornets....

Can we continually lengthen the development cycles of weapons like F35? And end up with increasingly aged platforms in service and an IOU on a future aircraft whose big defensive feature is now possibly, already outdated?
Hi RSF, how's tricks?

What is it exactly that makes you think the F-35 doesn't have "ECM gear" and "countermeasures"?

I recall reading the CATBIRD tested the F-35's airborne electronic attack capability in a very robust Red Flag Alaska environment not so long ago where the capabilities praises were sung very highly, yet according to you it doesn't have "ECM gear"?

There's a touch of a disconnect in there somewhere and I'm not sure it's from the F-35 end...
 

jack412

Active Member
I guess they have waisted their time with the 10+ RF sensors on the F-35 then. Perhaps because it doesn't have pretty IR pictures than can be shown, some think it isn't worth talking about.
 

FirstSpear

Banned Member
That was not what I said! Cassidian makes excellent systems and components and the guys working MMPRS are clearly enjoying it. I did no adjudication on which system was better.

What I pointed out was that the premise that the Americans are stupid and do not consider future developments in counter-LO is false.

In this case not only the Americans, but the very same company that produces the JSF, developed and marketed a similar PCL radar ten years ago! And it doesn't stop there: it was cleared for export by LO/CLO ExCom (iirc)!



If it was easy and inexpensive we should be awash with CLO systems already. They would be even more cost-effective against legacy combat aircraft! So the few numbers of LO-jets is no excuse not to go there.

To iterate, I don't assume the Yanks to be stupid. :)

Edit: With that implied conclusion that stealth is here to stay, I will add that you may have a more general point that it could be healthy for the US to be slightly less ambitious and instead have shorter development/deployment cycles, e.g. NGB.
Let's start over. I do not assume the 'Yanks' to be stupid nor anyone else per se. I read your comment as a statement that Cassidian is ten years behind LMT, which I sincerely doubt. If you did not mean that, then I withdraw the reply about the US being put on a pedestal in your comment as my misunderstanding.

Now, back to the main issue. I am saying that to use finite resources in a way that, IMO and that of a few others too, squanders them and leaves the warfighter waiting for a 'hull-ware' issue to what could have in some part have been solved with many electronic and ECM/ECCM means at much lower cost is potentially a strategic blunder depriving the warfighters of machines with enough hours on them to get the job done in large enough numbers to be significant.

I was using the Cassidian headline as an illustration of the very short horizon which we are heading for, over which the 'hullware' portion of the JSF investment will be negated by assymetric technologies. I believe we are repeating the error of Vietnam where $10 million F4s were sent on mass raids to go look for a dirt trail being travelled by bicycles and $1000 trucks. Yes, the other side paid for the differential in lives, but they wore out the US.

In another instance, the Afghanistan, we have B1s and B2s dropping ordnance on goatherders in caves. Yes, we're killing a large proportion of their very small numbers but we're allowing lack of strategic discipline and acquisition discipline to drive the gap in costs to be wider and wider. Without a corresponding benefit in effectiveness. It took ten years for the US to substantially call it a day in Vietnam and it will have taken twelve or so do that in Afghanistan but the $$$ bill is orders of magnitude larger. That trend can't last and exposes the West to a strategic surprise by an assymetric enemy to strike us in ways we don't expect because our resources are concentrated on technologies that take 20 years to come to squadrons and then won't be replaced for much longer, at even greater cost.

I was also saying if Cassidian can do this, do we doubt that outfits in less friendly parts of the world could achieve these innovations, more cheaply?

Now, what do you think?

RS,
 

FirstSpear

Banned Member
Hi RSF, how's tricks?

What is it exactly that makes you think the F-35 doesn't have "ECM gear" and "countermeasures"?

I recall reading the CATBIRD tested the F-35's airborne electronic attack capability in a very robust Red Flag Alaska environment not so long ago where the capabilities praises were sung very highly, yet according to you it doesn't have "ECM gear"?

There's a touch of a disconnect in there somewhere and I'm not sure it's from the F-35 end...
I'm just saying the opposite: the hull on the JSF is overdesigned for the need, we should have focused on standoff ordnance that is stealthy (a lot cheaper) and then made a cheaper (not cheap, that's no longer possible) platform that could be constantly improved with its EW suite. As for Red Flag Alaska, I heard similar outputs but would another high performance hull with the same electronic warfare pods and software not have produced an outstanding result (ten years ago when it might have been ready for IOC)? At a low enough cost, in the case of the UK, for example, to allow for the funding of both CVs?

R(espectfully) S(ubmitted),
 

Abraham Gubler

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
What’s the big deal about this passive radar being able to detect a stealth aircraft? All radars can detect stealth aircraft. Even the little marine radar you can buy for your pleasure cruiser can detect a B-2. The whole point about LO is it reduces the radar’s detection range by a significant factor compared to similar sized non LO object. Often reductions of over 80% in range. So in the case of your marine radar and the B-2 you might only get a blip at a 100m range in which case of course you would see the thing first.

Passive radars tend to have detection ranges much lower than typical volume search radars. Around 50% of the range of an L Band VSR. LO will still work against an FM passive radar but obviously to a degree depending on the specifics of the design. Even if (total assumption for the sake of argument) the LO of an aircraft like the F-35 would only provide a single significant degree of RCS reduction for an FM passive radar (compared to three degrees against an L Band radar) this would still result in the same detection range.

Passive radar is not a silver bullet to wipe out the advantages of LO in aircraft. This cargo cult mentality to find a reason why the F-35 should not be brought is plain embarrassing for all involved.
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
For a laugh (or at least a smile) you could read the presentation paper 'Cassidian Multiband Mobile Passive Radar System' in IEEE Procedings (2011) and then the recent press release from Cassidian. It has been notched up a bit. ;)
 

SpudmanWP

The Bunker Group
@FirstSpear: No disrespect, but are you high? 10 years ago was 2002 and was just one year after the JSF SDD contract was awarded in Oct 2001. I know you have shown some unreasonable expectations, but even you cannot expect IOC after about a year.

Besides, it's not the hardware, especially not the stealth aspects, that is the major contributor to the JSF's IOC delay. It's the software. It's the massive amount of integration involved. While this will cause delays on the front end, it has several major benefits in the long run; reduced pilot workload, greater ability to share information, and quicker, cheaper, and standardized future upgrades.
 

FirstSpear

Banned Member
@FirstSpear: No disrespect, but are you high? 10 years ago was 2002 and was just one year after the JSF SDD contract was awarded in Oct 2001. I know you have shown some unreasonable expectations, but even you cannot expect IOC after about a year.

Besides, it's not the hardware, especially not the stealth aspects, that is the major contributor to the JSF's IOC delay. It's the software. It's the massive amount of integration involved. While this will cause delays on the front end, it has several major benefits in the long run; reduced pilot workload, greater ability to share information, and quicker, cheaper, and standardized future upgrades.
Yes, no disrespect. I see that. I like the way you use the JSF program start date as the sole reference for the development of any aircraft. Nice circular logic. JSF was the only thing we could develop because that is what we did.

I mean no disrespect either but your O2 may be contaminated. I would check it. Better yet, have someone else check it for you.
 

SpudmanWP

The Bunker Group
So you think that something designed in the 80's, developed in the 90s, and IOCd in 2002 has a chance to survive for the next 50 years?

Now I know you're high ;)

You are aware that 2002 is only 3 years after the Super Hornet went IOC, and that at least has something to start from.

Not only that, but your idea of a 4th gen asset relying on standoff munitions to survive will end up costing more than a 5th gen asset due to the MASSIVE long term cost of fighting battles with just standoff munitions.
 

south

Well-Known Member
Question for firstspear - How do you plan to target stealthy standoff munitions against mobile targets?

As for EA - LO aircraft are inherently far more effective and surviveable with EA (both active i.e. jamming and passive i.e. chaff/flares/decoys etc) than a legacy jet.

Super simple example - with simple noise jamming it is far easier for the small LO return to be hidden than a far larger return from a legacy jet.

Which means you can have any of the following and still be effective:
a) less powerful jammer
b) or with the same amount of power can jam a wider bandwidth
c) less smarts in the jammer
d) greater standoff range with jammer (if a seperate system)
e) LO platform can get far closer to targeting system
f) LO platform further from off axis as jamming system
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I'm just saying the opposite: the hull on the JSF is overdesigned for the need, we should have focused on standoff ordnance that is stealthy (a lot cheaper) and then made a cheaper (not cheap, that's no longer possible) platform that could be constantly improved with its EW suite. As for Red Flag Alaska, I heard similar outputs but would another high performance hull with the same electronic warfare pods and software not have produced an outstanding result (ten years ago when it might have been ready for IOC)? At a low enough cost, in the case of the UK, for example, to allow for the funding of both CVs?

R(espectfully) S(ubmitted),
No. If you are suggesting a non-high performance (and I'm not referring to ANY of the different definitions of such) non-LO solution is going to be adequate over the next 40 years than you are dreaming.

That is what the F-35 is designed to cover. Neither the RAF with it's Typhoon or the USN with it's Super Hornet is planning on operating it's aircraft, that meet the description you provide, much beyond 2030.

For a tactical aircraft to operate post-2040, which is the intended aim of the F-35, it needs low observability, it needs fighter performance, it needs substantially modern sensor systems, software and a modular processing capability that can be easily and regularly updated, it needs a large variety of munitions that can be flexibly configured for the task at hand, it needs secure comms, extensive EW capability and it needs to be well equipped for and even able to enhance the network (as a node but also a relay) it is a part of.

All of the modern 4 gens provide some of that. None of them provide all of it and never will, no matter what upgrades are applied to them. The F-35 does from day one of it's operational service, which separates it on a generational basis, IMHO.

When force planners see a continuing need for that PLUS hypersonic performance (whether from the platform or weapon systems) you start to see the end of the 4th generation of fighter aircraft, as a relevant capability in the face of other options.

When supporters of the legacy options go to increasingly hysterical claims to support their opinions, it becomes blindingly obvious that the F-35 most definitely is a very threatening aircraft...

But what about passive radar? But what about VHF radar? But what about bi-static radar? But what about IRST? But what about those crafty Czechs that promise using networked cell-towers is the way to win a war? But what about those 5 million Klm ranged SAM's that are so scary? But what about the lone F-117 that got shot down (maybe)?

And so on.

It's pathetic. That's what. Best of luck with your 4th Gen's and your cell towers. Maybe one day when SDB's, JDAM's and JSOW's are raining down on the next Country that thinks that Internet chatter about thrust to weight or wing-loading, or the alleged lack of "ECM gear" is what counts in wartime, you can come back here and tell us how well your passive radars went?
 

Grand Danois

Entertainer
Let's start over. I do not assume the 'Yanks' to be stupid nor anyone else per se. I read your comment as a statement that Cassidian is ten years behind LMT, which I sincerely doubt. If you did not mean that, then I withdraw the reply about the US being put on a pedestal in your comment as my misunderstanding.

Now, back to the main issue. I am saying that to use finite resources in a way that, IMO and that of a few others too, squanders them and leaves the warfighter waiting for a 'hull-ware' issue to what could have in some part have been solved with many electronic and ECM/ECCM means at much lower cost is potentially a strategic blunder depriving the warfighters of machines with enough hours on them to get the job done in large enough numbers to be significant.

I was using the Cassidian headline as an illustration of the very short horizon which we are heading for, over which the 'hullware' portion of the JSF investment will be negated by assymetric technologies. I believe we are repeating the error of Vietnam where $10 million F4s were sent on mass raids to go look for a dirt trail being travelled by bicycles and $1000 trucks. Yes, the other side paid for the differential in lives, but they wore out the US.

In another instance, the Afghanistan, we have B1s and B2s dropping ordnance on goatherders in caves. Yes, we're killing a large proportion of their very small numbers but we're allowing lack of strategic discipline and acquisition discipline to drive the gap in costs to be wider and wider. Without a corresponding benefit in effectiveness. It took ten years for the US to substantially call it a day in Vietnam and it will have taken twelve or so do that in Afghanistan but the $$$ bill is orders of magnitude larger. That trend can't last and exposes the West to a strategic surprise by an assymetric enemy to strike us in ways we don't expect because our resources are concentrated on technologies that take 20 years to come to squadrons and then won't be replaced for much longer, at even greater cost.

I was also saying if Cassidian can do this, do we doubt that outfits in less friendly parts of the world could achieve these innovations, more cheaply?

Now, what do you think?

RS,
Well, the Cassidian system is s single receiver using multiple transmitters. It can track airliner sized targets at 160km and has the potential to track low-rcs targets in the near field. At the current stage, the stealth-killer capability of Cassidian, Silent Sentry and the Thales system is virtually zero.

I refer you to this document for the definitions and cases I will use subsequently:
http://www.google.dk/url?sa=t&rct=j...sg=AFQjCNGXYRdtWTdG4IqMYRRlsqXnHLLMoA&cad=rja

Take a look at table 1. I suggest the current systems could be placed as a "case 1.5" since there is only one receiver. Anyhow, the complexity in time-tagging, relaying, and fusing the raw data are tremendous. It can be done. AEGIS/CEC shares the raw data, albeit using monostatic radars, but it does not (afaik) have to deal with the coherency problem, which is significant. It could be considered a "case 6" with monostatics. AEGIS/CEC with its bells and whistles was an $60B (then-year?) R&D effort. Then there is the cost of deployment. In general the most sophisticated IADS which have been deployed could be considered "case 2-3" with monostatics.

Now, when all the issues of the clocks/time-tagging, data transmissions through fibres or wireless, the assuredness of non-military transmitters, etc.etc.etc., are solved, you will have a system which will be significantly inferior to how VSR can detect legacy jets. This passive system will also be able to track legacy jets far easier than LO jets, since it still has to deal with the stealth properties of the jet (transient spikes, etc.).

Thus, at great expense it is possible to develop and deploy a passive system with degraded properties and exploitable vulnerabilities (with existing technologies). Further, at this point only one point in the kill-chain has been partially adressed. Next is how to actually engage the target and after that the other links, where the stealth also disrupts.

Is it possible to erode the advantage stealth gives an attacker? Sure, but it is not cheap and cheerful.

IIRC the B2 was only used in the opening days of the Afghan campaign. A single B1 can support/cover large tracts of afg using its dash speed, loiter and flexible munitions load. It does so from secure bases outside of theatre and with established logistics. Consider that this might be an economically superior solution to using scores of Broncos or Super Tucs from dozens of dispersed bases in afg, each vulnerable to attacks and demanding vulnerable and complex logistics.

I consider the competence (the most sophisticated opponent the US can take on) of the US to be more important than the capacity (the largest opponent), with the caveat that these tend to correlate and there is a balance somewhere, obviously.
 

rip

New Member
Well, the Cassidian system is s single receiver using multiple transmitters. It can track airliner sized targets at 160km and has the potential to track low-rcs targets in the near field. At the current stage, the stealth-killer capability of Cassidian, Silent Sentry and the Thales system is virtually zero.

I refer you to this document for the definitions and cases I will use subsequently:
http://www.google.dk/url?sa=t&rct=j...sg=AFQjCNGXYRdtWTdG4IqMYRRlsqXnHLLMoA&cad=rja

Take a look at table 1. I suggest the current systems could be placed as a "case 1.5" since there is only one receiver. Anyhow, the complexity in time-tagging, relaying, and fusing the raw data are tremendous. It can be done. AEGIS/CEC shares the raw data, albeit using monostatic radars, but it does not (afaik) have to deal with the coherency problem, which is significant. It could be considered a "case 6" with monostatics. AEGIS/CEC with its bells and whistles was an $60B (then-year?) R&D effort. Then there is the cost of deployment. In general the most sophisticated IADS which have been deployed could be considered "case 2-3" with monostatics.

Now, when all the issues of the clocks/time-tagging, data transmissions through fibres or wireless, the assuredness of non-military transmitters, etc.etc.etc., are solved, you will have a system which will be significantly inferior to how VSR can detect legacy jets. This passive system will also be able to track legacy jets far easier than LO jets, since it still has to deal with the stealth properties of the jet (transient spikes, etc.).

Thus, at great expense it is possible to develop and deploy a passive system with degraded properties and exploitable vulnerabilities (with existing technologies). Further, at this point only one point in the kill-chain has been partially adressed. Next is how to actually engage the target and after that the other links, where the stealth also disrupts.

Is it possible to erode the advantage stealth gives an attacker? Sure, but it is not cheap and cheerful.

IIRC the B2 was only used in the opening days of the Afghan campaign. A single B1 can support/cover large tracts of afg using its dash speed, loiter and flexible munitions load. It does so from secure bases outside of theatre and with established logistics. Consider that this might be an economically superior solution to using scores of Broncos or Super Tucs from dozens of dispersed bases in afg, each vulnerable to attacks and demanding vulnerable and complex logistics.

I consider the competence (the most sophisticated opponent the US can take on) of the US to be more important than the capacity (the largest opponent), with the caveat that these tend to correlate and there is a balance somewhere, obviously.
Though the technology is very possible and may be developed for other reasons I think that there are several very important real world considerations which have not been considered as to make this approach practical for use in a real world air defense tactical situations.

The very fact that this system depends upon many various civilian RF sources for it to work and in fact can only work in a dense RF environment means that those sources must continue to radiate normally for the system to function. That is not very likely to happen in a war or near war situation with the Exception of first strike surprise attack. And would all most never to be true in most border areas or over the vast oceans.

However, this technology may find a home for civilian air traffic control in dense urban arrears where RF spectrum is already highly used and in short supply and where military grade radars often causes interference to normal civilian RF spectrum use.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
However, this technology may find a home for civilian air traffic control in dense urban arrears where RF spectrum is already highly used and in short supply and where military grade radars often causes interference to normal civilian RF spectrum use.
Possible, but IMO unlikely. Much of the ATC information coming into ground control centres is actually coming in from transponders aboard the civilian aircraft. This is predominantly what ATC utilizes to manage flight paths for most aircraft, excepting some small civilian aircraft (props, ultralights, etc). Normally primary radar returns are used if there is some sort of malfunction with the transponder (or it/they get turned off like on 9/11).

The part of the issue is that while there could certainly be plenty of RF backscatter from various broadcast sources (cell towers, tv/radio station transmitters, repeaters, etc) all of the radio sources need to be mapped out, and their respective broadcasts need to be accounted for to determine when & where specific broadcasts should be received. The more sources involved, the greater the potential coverage and precious, but also the more which need to be accounted for and calculated.

I cannot a civilian or commercial application, given the infrastructure and development required. Not when other, less expensive options are available which have the same or better performance.

-Cheers
 

Haavarla

Active Member
Best of luck with your 4th Gen's and your cell towers. Maybe one day when SDB's, JDAM's and JSOW's are raining down on the next Country that thinks that Internet chatter about thrust to weight or wing-loading, or the alleged lack of "ECM gear" is what counts in wartime, you can come back here and tell us how well your passive radars went?
Why are people over stating the terms 4th and 5th Gen all the time when debating systems.. its annoying.

As for ECM gear, some Air Forces continue the ECM developing road map.
Well, here is an brand new 4th gen if you like.. with a brand new ECM suite.
The L265 Khibiny-M electronic-warfare self-defense system. Mounted on the wing tip stations.
 
Why are people over stating the terms 4th and 5th Gen all the time when debating systems.. its annoying.

As for ECM gear, some Air Forces continue the ECM developing road map.
Well, here is an brand new 4th gen if you like.. with a brand new ECM suite.
The L265 Khibiny-M electronic-warfare self-defense system. Mounted on the wing tip stations.
Well we tend to think in absolutes, those four gens didn't just become scrap because there are 202 operational "fifth" gens in the world. They will continue to have a long and productive life. If that were not so the US, Aus, Can, and others would abandon their SLE programs post haste. The bar for calling an aircraft fifth gen has been lowered from the aspect of aerodynamic performance, and LO, and raised from the electronic aspect, and let there be no doubt that sensor fusion, LO, and integration into the "system" with increased information and situational awareness is a game changer. The threat to fouth gen aircraft being operated in a hot combat zone is going up as well, and the "value" of LO properties will go up with that threat. So while the cost of "fifth gen tech, is high, it will be "advantageous" in the near term, and may well be "critical" in the future, so those who "look into the crystal ball" will be carefully weighing their options, and counting their change carefully in order to get the most "bang for their buck"
 

Haavarla

Active Member
while still having the RCS of a barn door :)
Thank you for that informative one-liner.
I know you well SW so know hard feelings, but such post belong on F-16.net among other Aviation Forums.
Now perhaps you could enlighten us with some actuall figures on Su-35S RCS?

Well we tend to think in absolutes, those four gens didn't just become scrap because there are 202 operational "fifth" gens in the world. They will continue to have a long and productive life. If that were not so the US, Aus, Can, and others would abandon their SLE programs post haste. The bar for calling an aircraft fifth gen has been lowered from the aspect of aerodynamic performance, and LO, and raised from the electronic aspect, and let there be no doubt that sensor fusion, LO, and integration into the "system" with increased information and situational awareness is a game changer. The threat to fouth gen aircraft being operated in a hot combat zone is going up as well, and the "value" of LO properties will go up with that threat. So while the cost of "fifth gen tech, is high, it will be "advantageous" in the near term, and may well be "critical" in the future, so those who "look into the crystal ball" will be carefully weighing their options, and counting their change carefully in order to get the most "bang for their buck"
Thx, and a completly agree.
My point is people use the 4th, 5th Gen term in everything, even when one are debating different systems.
Too often the "5th Gen" term are invented by some Advertising press people working for different Aviation company without it has much substance, like its throw around for good measures..
And of course get picked up by people in the Aviation comunity like its suddenly 'carwed into stone' the holy truth.
 

SpudmanWP

The Bunker Group
Thin-skinned, me? Never ;)

How about Entry-Way door RCS, it is an SU-35 after all?

I would not call using fighter generations as purely marketing as they serve a real purpose. There is a reason why people use simple terms like 4th/5th Generation when talking about fighters. If there were not a simple descriptor, then we would be here all day describing every detail of the fighter. While there will always be exceptions to the rule, using Generations serves it's purpose well.

As far as "5th" generation, that clearly involves a VLO airframe. Anything else and you will have to use too much other gear (read jammers) in an attempt just to get parity while ignoring the fact that if the 5th gen asset used jammers then you will never get parity (all things being equal). In addition to that, by using jammers to mask your RCS you are always on the defensive and are being reactionary.

You also pose the significant risk of alerting the enemy of your intentions by setting off passive sensors before they might have even seen you on radar. AESA jammers alleviate this to an extent, but your risk is still higher.

Then there is the issue of external weapons and their affect on your RCS.

The bottom line is that a fighter/bomber with a VLO airframe has a much better chance of getting within weapon's range before being detected by the enemy's radar. 5th gen planes give you the flexibility to stay VLO with a smaller internal weapon's load and lets you sneak in for the attack against denied targets, or to go external with a full load of weapons. 4th gen Fighters do not have that flexibility.
 
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