the problem is separating public comprehension about what a failed program is and what a failed platform is.While it has had it's share (if not a bit more) of program management & cost challenges, it has not had any technical failures. Not a single KPP is projected to fail.
You are certainly right on about the publics perception of the military in general, the real shame is that they don't seem to care. I don't know how you feel personally about the F-22, I have followed the ATF program since its inception, with a great deal of interest. I believe a very fine aircraft has been plagued by poor to no management of significant issues, OBOGS, Corrosion, Stress cracking, software anamolies etc,etc. I guess I find it odd that on this thread some would deny the F-22 and the F-35 are a matched set and compliment one another, sort of like the old Colt/Winchester sets with a lever gun and a hog leg in a fancy box. We need both, to buy only the handgun, leaves the box half empty. My point is the F-35 is running into the same type of crisis, in that the program has kicked the can down the road, replacing one of the titanium bulkheads, with a like bulkhead made of aluminum has created stress cracking, where none existed before. So was that a problem solved, or a problem created or a little of both. To be a funtional weapons platform, the F-35 must become a fully mission capable aircraft, thats going to require leadership such as Lochheed had under Kelly Johnson at the old skunkworks. The worst tragedy of all is after losing the Raptor, we allow the same garbage to handicap the F-35. The Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley, made it clear on his visit to Edwards last week, that the Air Force is fully commited to the F-35, and if we really want this bird to excell its going to take a commitment by all the partners, and frankly having the partners stick together and demand that LockMart get their stuff together is a good thing. Getting the public to care is tough, but getting our elected officials to care, well I'm afraid thats where the real trouble lies? IMOH I hope I'm wrong?the problem is separating public comprehension about what a failed program is and what a failed platform is.
unfort the general public comprehension of what the two are is about as deep as a 6 yo understanding the difference between a mandarin and an orange.
the management has been somewhat awful, the procurement model has been somewhat awful, the flow on benefits and tech achievments that JSF is achieving not only within but to other projects indirectly (including F-22) is a far different story.
unfort public understanding being as unsophisticated as it currently is will still result in inaccurate and pre-emptive post mortems that contionue to fail the accuracy and relevance test
hysteria has a quality all of its own.
So which potential buyers has it scared away? The reality is that the jet has been purchased by Israel and Japan, 2 countries that were not even in the original consortium. Surely they are not ignorant of the issues facing the program? And yet they have bought the jet. As for the original partners,orders may be deferred or reduced for some as defense budgets are under pressure , but they remain committed to the program.I think a intelligent nation as the US would realize that their JSF program is a epic fail.
Ever changing costs, delays, wrong info and so on....one disaster after another
Granted the end product will be top of the line no worries there, but i think we all can agree that the program itself leaves ALOT to be desired and will scare potential buyers away.
And it will be a daunting task for the US lobby to sell the JSF because the program has so many flaws.:dance
What does detection matter? An F-35 will be within range of it's weapons well before it's in range of a surface based frigates weapons, unless it's operated stupidly, so even if said frigate can detect the F-35, as so many of the idiotic commentators have stated about the F-35, all this detection will do is allow said frigate to know what type of platform is about to kill it...asking a question how many sdb's could the jsf'c carry internally,plus how capable is jsf's stealth lines how close could it get to say a frigate before it was detected
Concerned you have been asking these same questions on other threads and getting the same answers it is becoming clear that you are having trouble understanding that weapon platforms are part of an intergrated system, Lone Frigates for the most part would not be conducting individual operations in a high threat area, TF Commanders would not dispatch an F35 to take out that said Frigate, you use the right tool for the right job and a Harpoon or Torp would be better than an F35 loaded with SDB.asking a question how many sdb's could the jsf'c carry internally,plus how capable is jsf's stealth lines how close could it get to say a frigate before it was detected
I think what you're looking for is below, the NSM/JSM (Naval Strike Missile/Joint Strike Missile) which is being developed by the KDA in Norway & is designed to fit in the internal weapons bay of the F-35 (not sure about the F-35B?). I haven't heard much on it lately, someone else might be able to provide more information on it.sorry about that just considering whether jsf could be used in its internal stealth configuration for maritime strike thats why i'm trying to consider weapons that its already outfitted to use not ones that it may use in the future if someone was willing to have them used. i cant see the US using harpoons on it as this would compromise its stealth capabilites and they already have the superhornet.It seems to me that the RN isn't considering next generation SSm's at the moment so the jsf would be the spear in its armour aswell as ssn's.thats why iasked on this thread about the jsf,again sorry for reapeating myself
The USN and RAAF will be using the AGM-154 C1 Joint Standoff Weapon for maritime strike in the initial operational Block 3 capability. This weapon can be carried internally by the A and C variants.sorry about that just considering whether jsf could be used in its internal stealth configuration for maritime strike thats why i'm trying to consider weapons that its already outfitted to use not ones that it may use in the future if someone was willing to have them used. i cant see the US using harpoons on it as this would compromise its stealth capabilites and they already have the superhornet.It seems to me that the RN isn't considering next generation SSm's at the moment so the jsf would be the spear in its armour aswell as ssn's.thats why iasked on this thread about the jsf,again sorry for reapeating myself
I think that you do did not understand what i am trying to say. (Or i did say it wrong lol)E not unawares
So which potential buyers has it scared away? The reality is that the jet has been purchased by Israel and Japan, 2 countries that were not even in the original consortium. Surely they are not ignorant of the issues facing the program? And yet they have bought the jet. As for the original partners,orders may be deferred or reduced for some as defense budgets are under pressure , but they remain committed to the program.
Source:The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program has been in serious difficulty for some time, showing all of the textbook symptoms of a failed project. Like all failed projects it will eventually collapse, the question is now simply one of when it will collapse, rather than if it will collapse.
The F-35 has been on political life support for the last four years, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Pentagon acquisition bureaucrats investing much effort in convincing the White House, Congress and participant Allied nations that the project is an icon of virtue in the current pantheon of failed major acquisitions. While former procurement Czar John Young went as far as to criticism the program’s prior management history, he was not prepared to admit the obvious, which is that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter now qualifies in all key respects as what project management professionals term a “non-executable project”
.The recommendation in the OSD 2010 budget proposal to accelerate production of the F-35 flies in the face of mountains of publicly available evidence of project failure, and is contrary in every respect to all substantive risk management protocols and standards
Please who are the potential buyers that have been scared away? and since when have you seen the Classified data that those countries Airforces / Navies have had access too.As we all know the JSF program has some serious drawbacks and the added costs and last minute changes do not make things easier and will scare away potential buyers or at least will slow things down as the potential buyer does not have any clear data.
So whats so different between this bird and the developmental F22, could say the same thing about the A400M having the same problems with poor management which has been fixed now for both aircraft.Selling a bird on paper is one thing, but selling the same bird with ever changing conditions and costs will cause troubles.
And who are these some (APA, Aviation weekly) Saab, EF, Rafael, Boeing?Obviously every program will have its drawbacks and its problems, but due budget cuts in the US, The economic crisis, Ever increasing material costs and simple mismanagement in Washington (and some unforeseen sit-backs) its going to be a serious job to keep the JSF on track.
And some even say that the JSF has all the makings of a failed project.
To back up your argument you have used the laughing stock of Australia have you really bothered to read what APA has written im a soldier but even I can see the major flaws in there argument and dont ask me to point out which one as there are so many to start with.Source:
Says enough i think.
Wheres the Official withdrawal from these back room projects are you part of them because you seem to be talking with some authority.And officially most partners (regardless of level) still supporting the project but most of them have second thoughts about the program and even talk in the back rooms about either redrawing from the project.
These are all known faults everyone acknowledges that what your not acknowledging is the core changes to project management etc that have got this project back on track.There has been a lot of saber rattling by the partners about costs and such, but they are all very willing to make this work, however the program itself has one enemy and thats the US Government itself, as they took the wrong road from the start (Which is public knowledge)
Again have a look at the developmental history of the F22 or more recent how about the A400M.And imo for such a ambitious and high cost project is kinda a epic mistake by the US to have this program run, or nearly run a ground.
So which one is it one hand your running the programme down and the next you think it will be a evil bird.?So lets recoup here for a sec, personally i think the JSF will one evil bird ones its ready for final use, so no worries there.
naturally as there is a big difference between a 4 gen fighter and a 5 gen like F35/F22.But as we all know is that Eurofighter, Gripen, Rafale and others have been put aside in favor of the JSF as the JSF program would bring everything that the " others" could not.
I have yet to see any of those countries Air Forces or Navies come out and say STOP this is not the right aircraft for us lets stay with our 4 gen aircraft.Fact is however that the bulk of the nations have second thoughts and one might say that the other " consortium's" do not (Or lesser degree) offer what the JSF is suppose to offer but fact is that those programs are running relative sound.
Really So the RAAF,RAF,USAF,USMC,USN, JASDF, IDF, just to name a few are going to stay with a legacy platform and Saab, Rafael, & EF are going to get another crack at it Beat your true colours have shone thru ive heard alot of Politician’s trying to point score but not one of the subject matter authorities in all those countries has come out to endorse what you are saying and to be honest I think ill believe what they have to say over you.And this is purely to blame on Washington and i would not be surprised if the JSF is going to fail that Saab, and EF are going to have another crack at the potential buyers as their product just did become a lot more attractive.
Aha, so with 25% of the 7000+ flight tests in the program done, 80% of the software completed and flying today, with the static load testing completed, the radar cross section testing completed and all the sensor and EW systems in testing on production aircraft now (radar, EOTS, DAS, EW etc) and weapons testing in it's esrly stages, not to mention fixed price contracts being signed there is no "clear data" for this aircraft available to customers eh?I think that you do did not understand what i am trying to say. (Or i did say it wrong lol)
As we all know the JSF program has some serious drawbacks and the added costs and last minute changes do not make things easier and will scare away potential buyers or at least will slow things down as the potential buyer does not have any clear data. Thats what i mean.
That's how EVERY platform is sold. Are the Indian Rafales the exact same standard as French air force Rafales? Of course they aren't.Selling a bird on paper is one thing, but selling the same bird with ever changing conditions and costs will cause troubles.
Perhaps that's why they appointed a serious person to that job, Adm Venlet, under whom the project has stabilised enormously and is delivering real results in testing and production at an increasing rate.Obviously every program will have its drawbacks and its problems, but due budget cuts in the US, The economic crisis, Ever increasing material costs and simple mismanagement in Washington (and some unforeseen sit-backs) its going to be a serious job to keep the JSF on track.
Some might say those people are counting chickens before they've hatched too. Given the near daily update of new testing, new airframes getting into the air for the first time, new bases and squadrons turning up and so on, it looks like the project is proceeding full steam ahead to me.And some even say that the JSF has all the makings of a failed project.
More than enough. More than enough rubbish that is. A text book example of attempting to achieve something by the "i think I can, I think I can" method, ie: if something is said often enough hopefully it will become a self-fulfilling prophecy?Source:
Says enough i think.
Honestly this is the biggest load of crap I've read on this site for some time. If the US government didn't want JSF it would not exist. Period.And officially most partners (regardless of level) still supporting the project but most of them have second thoughts about the program and even talk in the back rooms about either redrawing from the project. There has been a lot of saber rattling by the partners about costs and such, but they are all very willing to make this work, however the program itself has one enemy and thats the US Government itself, as they took the wrong road from the start (Which is public knowledge)
And imo for such a ambitious and high cost project is kinda a epic mistake by the US to have this program run, or nearly run a ground.
US, UK, Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, Israel and Australia have already signed contracts for the JSF. That is 7 out of the 11 current nations committed to JSF. The rest have committed to it in favour of other types.So lets recoup here for a sec, personally i think the JSF will one evil bird ones its ready for final use, so no worries there.
But as we all know is that Eurofighter, Gripen, Rafale and others have been put aside in favor of the JSF as the JSF program would bring everything that the " others" could not.
Fact is however that the bulk of the nations have second thoughts and one might say that the other " consortium's" do not (Or lesser degree) offer what the JSF is suppose to offer but fact is that those programs are running relative sound.
And this is purely to blame on Washington and i would not be surprised if the JSF is going to fail that Saab, and EF are going to have another crack at the potential buyers as their product just did become a lot more attractive.
So does it scares buyers away? hell yes.
Thanks for linking to Air Power Australia! Now we know how informed you are, and where you have been getting your information.I think that you do did not understand what i am trying to say. (Or i did say it wrong lol)...<snip>...And some even say that the JSF has all the makings of a failed project.
Source: Says enough i think...<snip>...And imo for such a ambitious and high cost project is kinda a epic mistake by the US to have this program run, or nearly run a ground...<snip>...So does it scares buyers away? hell yes.
nice post, you have given reasons why you feel this way :smilieYou are certainly right on about the publics perception of the military in general, the real shame is that they don't seem to care. I don't know how you feel personally about the F-22, I have followed the ATF program since its inception, with a great deal of interest. I believe a very fine aircraft has been plagued by poor to no management of significant issues, OBOGS, Corrosion, Stress cracking, software anamolies etc,etc. I guess I find it odd that on this thread some would deny the F-22 and the F-35 are a matched set and compliment one another, sort of like the old Colt/Winchester sets with a lever gun and a hog leg in a fancy box. We need both, to buy only the handgun, leaves the box half empty. My point is the F-35 is running into the same type of crisis, in that the program has kicked the can down the road, replacing one of the titanium bulkheads, with a like bulkhead made of aluminum has created stress cracking, where none existed before. So was that a problem solved, or a problem created or a little of both. To be a funtional weapons platform, the F-35 must become a fully mission capable aircraft, thats going to require leadership such as Lochheed had under Kelly Johnson at the old skunkworks. The worst tragedy of all is after losing the Raptor, we allow the same garbage to handicap the F-35. The Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley, made it clear on his visit to Edwards last week, that the Air Force is fully commited to the F-35, and if we really want this bird to excell its going to take a commitment by all the partners, and frankly having the partners stick together and demand that LockMart get their stuff together is a good thing. Getting the public to care is tough, but getting our elected officials to care, well I'm afraid thats where the real trouble lies? IMOH I hope I'm wrong?
View attachment 5320Aircraft Survivability Journal - Spring 2012 Issue
Published by the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office
JSF FULL UP SYSTEM LEVEL TESTING
F35 Flight Critical Systems Test
By Chuck Frankenberger
To fulfill the congressionally mandated Live Fire Test (LFT) activity, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is conducting Full Up System Level (FUSL) testing on one JSF variant, and will conduct variant unique testing on production representative structural test articles. Aircraft 2AA:0001, (AA-1), a Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) Air Force variant, was selected as the FUSL test article and was used in conjunction with pilot in the loop simulator testing to obtain an overall assessment of the pilot/aircraft’s ability to maintain safe flight after ballistic damage. The test program was designed to evaluate the aircraft systems for synergistic effects.
As engineers, we do our best to incorporate lessons learned from past projects into design of the next program. However, there remain many unknowns even when leveraging this knowledge base. As the trend continues toward highly integrated aircraft systems compared to the aircraft they are replacing, the unknown reaction of these integrated systems to ballistic damage is not well understood. What are the interactions between systems given ballistic damage? Does damage to one system affect the performance of other systems? The primary benefit of FUSL testing is the ability to monitor each of the aircraft systems simultaneously to capture transient behaviors and interactions across systems. During aircraft development, components are tested individually, then as individual systems, then as integrated systems. The JSF LFT program has followed this developmental test approach, testing components early on in the program and system level testing on AA-1. Live Fire testing is required at the system level to take into consideration the non graceful degradation of components/systems as a result of ballistic damage. Damage to one system should not adversely affect other systems. For systems with redundant or backup capabilities, damage should remain isolated and should not affect the ability to transition into backup configurations.
AA-1 was the first produced JSF CTOL aircraft. AA-1 flew to China Lake on 17 December 2009, its 91st flight, and had accumulated 125.9 flight hours. AA-1 had started production prior to the program going through a significant weight reduction effort in 2004 – 2005. This weight reduction activity resulted in major changes in the airframe structure, which made most of the AA-1 structure non-production representative. The flight critical systems tested in AA-1 are functionally representative of F35 production aircraft. In some cases, there are slight variations in component location and configuration. These variations were taken into consideration during the test program to provide production representative testing. The objective of this test series was to evaluate flight critical systems response to ballistic damage. Flight critical systems include the Flight Control System (FCS), Vehicle System Network (VSN), Electrical Power System (EPS), and the Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS). A secondary objective was to verify component failure modes used previously in controlled damage test scenarios. In these tests, Lockheed’s pilot-in-the-loop Vehicle Integration Facility (VIF) and Vehicle System Integration Facility were used to evaluate pilot response and aircraft handling qualities after simulated aircraft damage.
Test participants include China Lake Weapons Survivability Lab (WSL) test personnel, Lockheed Martin (LM) LFT team members, LM IPT Subsystem experts, Wright Patterson JSF LFT team members, OSd/LFT&E, and IdA representatives.
TEST APPROACH
This test series was conducted in a way to best represent a combat mission. Test procedures from battery on, engine start, throttle to MIL, gear up…to gear down, engine off, were defined in each run plan. Aircraft systems were in a flight configuration. A critical part of the test program was the ability to move the flight controls and to appropriately load the electrical power system. To do this, surface positions were recorded in the VIF during pilot in the loop testing and used as a flight control script to move the control surfaces at rate during AA-1 ballistic testing. The aircraft was operated remotely using its internal systems. Pilot interfaces were controlled remotely through a Compact Remote Input/Output (RIO) control system developed by China Lake Weapons Survivability engineers. This includes pilot functions such as the battery switch, engine start switch and gear handle. Cockpit displays were provided through a software package developed by Lockheed Martin. This included displaying Integrated Cautions and Warnings (ICAWs). System monitoring was also provided through software packages used in the design and test of the aircraft during initial flight qualifying check outs. This provided test engineers with a very good view of the aircraft system performance during test events.
Systems monitored during test included EPS, PTMS, and FCS. Test sequencing was defined to balance the need to keep the aircraft in a FUSL configuration as long as possible to acquire system level results, and the need to address high priority tests that would take the aircraft out of a FUSL configuration. Early low risk tests were conducted on wire harnesses and cooling ducts that were easily repaired. These early tests verified that the response of the EPS and PTMS systems compared favorably to the response seen in the pilot-in-the-loop simulator tests. Testing progressed to shooting various line replaceable units as part of the FCS and EPS. Spares components were used to reconstitute the test article. High priority tests were conducted after the replaceable component shots were completed. These tests include a Man Portable Air defense System (MANPAD) shot, an HEI shot into a fuel tank, a fragment shot into the integrated power package (IPP) rotating machinery, and a polyalphaolefin (PAO) (avionics cooling fluid) fire test. Close attention was given to the sequence in which the aircraft systems were degraded. Test sequencing was based on system dependencies and facility integration requirements. As an example, to conduct fire detection testing on the aircraft, the three Vehicle Mission Computers (VMC) and all RIO’s needed to be operational to evaluate fire detection capability. The fire detector inputs are spread across the RIOs and the RIOs spread across the VMC bus channels, and the detection software housed in the VMCs. These systems were required to be operational until the fire detection capability was no longer needed.
TEST RESULT
Ballistic testing was conducted on AA-1 from October 2010 to September 2011. A total of 25 ballistic tests were completed. During 16 of these tests the aircraft was in a FUSL configuration: engine on, aircraft operating on internal power. Threats in the test program included surface to air warhead fragments, armor piercing projectiles, high explosive projectiles, and a MANPAD.
Table 1
System Tested.....................Number of Tests
Electrical Power System..........7
Power and Thermal Management System............4
Flight Control System...........8
Vehicle System Network..........6
Propulsion...........................1 (shared with FLCS)
EPS DESIGN: ROBUST
EPS components are well distributed around the aircraft, providing separation, reducing the effect from larger threats. EPS components are electrically protected as well. Seven shots were conducted across various parts of the EPS system. These tests ranged from simple wiring shots to shots into power conversion and distribution components. The EPS testing was conducted to ensure that damage to one part of the system did not propagate to components upstream of the damaged component, or propagate across redundant paths, ensuring backup power modes were sufficient to provide power for continued safe flight. The 270VdC power generation and distribution system successfully demonstrated the ability to quickly detect ground faults and isolate damage. The system automatically transitioned to battery fill power, then reconfigured to backup power modes to allow continued safe flight.
VSN DESIGN: NO CASCADING EFFECTS
VSN architecture successfully detects a damaged component or wire harness and reconfigures to continue communication with other components. Ballistic damage to flight control electronics and wiring was successfully handled by the VSN software error-handling and functional redundancy capability. Due to the nature of the 1394 bus loop, severing a wire or loss of a component resulted in the bus reconfiguring to reestablish communication with the components on either side of the damaged area. Flight control electronic controllers have a further level of redundancy as they pass information on a separate network in the event of bus failures. When components were damaged, the failures seen were benign, with only minor interruption of bus traffic as the bus reconfigured. Ballistic damage to components did not result in the generation of errant signals, the component typically dropped off line. The VMCs flagged the component as failed and reconfigured the bus.
FCS ARCHITECTURE: NO CHEAP KILLS
One of the newer technologies in the F35 is the Electrohydrostatic Actuators. These actuators contain a self-contained hydraulic system. There are two types of actuators on the aircraft: simplex and dual tandem. The dual actuators have redundancies built in, including dual communication and power paths. The dual actuators were ballistically tested and showed good tolerance to damage. The redundant systems are isolated, and damage on one side did not propagate to the other side.
FIRE: SIGNIFICANT THREAT
As with most aircraft, fire is the primary vulnerability to the F35. Fire extinguishing is limited to the IPP bay. This system was installed primarily for ground safety reasons. Fuel, hydraulic, and PAO fluids are the primary sources of fire on the aircraft and are distributed throughout the aircraft. As one would expect, fire is a threat to Flight Critical Systems. Ullage protection is provided by an On board Inert Gas Generating System (ObIGGS). Fuel tank inerting proved successful in this test series preventing fuel tank ullage explosions.
CONCLUSIONS
The FUSL testing conducted on AA-1 was very successful meeting all defined test objectives and success criteria. Addressing synergistic effects, the electrical power and flight control systems successfully isolated failures and protected the redundancies built into these systems, allowing continued safe flight. The VSN architecture is robust, providing multiple paths to transfer data. Testing highlighted that fire is a significant threat to flight critical systems. The test team was able to verify that the actual ballistic damage response correlated very well to previous pilot in the loop simulator testing. Over the course of the test program, the LFT team witnessed firsthand the robustness of the F35 flight critical systems, no cheap system kills.
Visit us online at Joint Aircraft Survivability