Europe and 5th generation aircraft

[Feanor]

That isn't how air defense works. If all it was is just buy x amount of a certain air defense system to cover y amount of sq km then nations would just by x systems and air attacks would be a thing of the past. Obviously a lot of people thought the gaps were covered in all the places where SAMs were and it's been CONSISTENTLY proven not to be the case whether we are talking about Libya in the 1980's, Iraq/Serbia in the 1990's and Iraq in 2003 where a Silkworm penetrated US air defenses. Ask yourself how this happened?

Russian and Chinese air defenses may be more advanced, maybe more dense but they cannot cover the entire battlespace and they are vulnerable to a whole bunch of counter-measures and subject to logistical limits. NOBODY just flies an airplane, not even stealth planes or cruise missiles, and just hopes they make it to the target. A lot goes into negating that type of defense which has some serious vulnerabilities one of which is to advertise for hundreds of km their exact location and RF characteristics. The mere act of trying to search for a target can kill a SAM site. I really recommend you read some of the reports from Libyan SAM crews during Operation Eldorado Canyon or simply look at Iraq/Serbia. SAMs are not and have never been insurmountable. Not even the S-300.

Point taken. None the less a dense IADS like that, in conjunction with the large airforces (be it PLAAF or VVS) is a serious challenge even to the U.S. To use your own example, it took a lot of resources to overcome the Iraqi AD network, and this is despite examples of mismanagement, plus poor ground troop cover, you yourself cited earlier. I think you're misunderstanding my point. My point is that a large and well developed, as well as highly networked, IADS in conjunction with modern AD fighters can greatly limit the effectiveness of the enemy air force, even the USAF.

Every time Russia squirts out a new SAM the internet traffic spikes about how they will sweep the skies of western jets. Context. During the 1980's the Libyan IADs were considered very dangerous as were the Iraqis in the 1990's. I think we would find that in 2000-2010 the advances in western technology and tactics would yield similar results.

Anti Radiation missiles and stand-off munitions combined with ELINT equipment and electronic warfare capabilities pose a considerable threat. There are even EW capabilities that have disruptive/destructive effects. We are light years beyond where we were in the 1980s in terms of EW/SEAD/DEAD. One thing I can't wait to see deployed and used is the MALD and MALD-J although I doubt we would read about them in OSINT for obvious reasons...

Again there are times when SAM's are effective and times when they aren't. I could cite the 6 day war and Vietnam where SAM's proved their effectiveness in helping an inferior air force contest air superiority.

http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/mald/

And of course, stealth aircraft. Russia and China are nowhere near secure from air attack.

Now Stealth and EW are areas where Europe has some serious short comings but that doesn't mean they can't compensate with tactics to mitigate some of the technological limitations.

-DA

Again I did not claim anyone was secure from air attack. To be honest I'm constantly amazed how you assume that I claim things which I do not. I'm not trying to be confrontation, but please read exactly what I write. I'm not implying anything, I'm saying everything I want to say very clearly and precisely. If my english is a limiting factor please tell me so I can improve.

Now I do think it is fairly obvious that no European air forces are capable of penetrating a modern IADS with a modern enemy air force still in the sky.

 

[DarthAmerica]

Point taken. None the less a dense IADS like that, in conjunction with the large airforces (be it PLAAF or VVS) is a serious challenge even to the U.S. To use your own example, it took a lot of resources to overcome the Iraqi AD network, and this is despite examples of mismanagement, plus poor ground troop cover, you yourself cited earlier. I think you're misunderstanding my point. My point is that a large and well developed, as well as highly networked, IADS in conjunction with modern AD fighters can greatly limit the effectiveness of the enemy air force, even the USAF.

I don't disagree that it makes it more challenging. But no IAD exist today that the USAF could not defeat. That's an opinion but I believe history and facts support that conclusion. Now when I say it took a lot of effort for the United Stated to overcome these IADs, you have to put that in context. The United States was only fighting a limited war while the opponent is fighting for life and death. The relative efforts of the USA vs the opponent are nowhere near equal. In other words the USA could hit even harder if pressed enough.

Again there are times when SAM's are effective and times when they aren't. I could cite the 6 day war and Vietnam where SAM's proved their effectiveness in helping an inferior air force contest air superiority.

Yes very temporarily. Ultimately if you are relying on a defensive posture vs an opponents that is constantly mapping and evaluating your defense, you will lose.

Again I did not claim anyone was secure from air attack. To be honest I'm constantly amazed how you assume that I claim things which I do not. I'm not trying to be confrontation, but please read exactly what I write. I'm not implying anything, I'm saying everything I want to say very clearly and precisely. If my english is a limiting factor please tell me so I can improve.

Now I do think it is fairly obvious that no European air forces are capable of penetrating a modern IADS with a modern enemy air force still in the sky.

When you said the Russian and Chinese IAD had no gaps it seemed so because they certainly do. If not then I apologize. With regard to European air forces, I disagree. I think they could but at much greater cost because at the system level they don't bring the kind of overmatching capability of the U.S. Military. Let me put much greater cost into context. Just like the USA would, a European nation will first roll back the defense to a point where the airspace is more accessible. Because they don't have the same capabilities it may mean a more lengthy campaign, increased use of very expensive standoff weapons and possibly more casualties or a combination of all three. Whether or not it is worth it just depends on the situation.

In the kinds of limited campaigns we see today where the aggressor's national survival is not immediately threatened like in over Serbia in the 1990's tolerance of losses may not allow for the kinds of casualties a well run IAD can inflict. If we are dealing with absolutes then the cost benefit equation changes. This limits the kinds of military actions European nations can take outside the framework of a U.S. led coalition IMV. The kind of overmatch the U.S. military brings to the fight gives the USA options no other nation has but at great financial cost. James Brown said "Paid the Cost to Be the Boss".

-DA

 

[Feanor]

I don't disagree that it makes it more challenging. But no IAD exist today that the USAF could not defeat. That's an opinion but I believe history and facts support that conclusion. Now when I say it took a lot of effort for the United Stated to overcome these IADs, you have to put that in context. The United States was only fighting a limited war while the opponent is fighting for life and death. The relative efforts of the USA vs the opponent are nowhere near equal. In other words the USA could hit even harder if pressed enough.

But could it hit harder quickly enough? The U.S. is currently stretched thin as is. If the US had to quickly back up Taiwan against a Chinese invasion right now, the assets available would be limited. Morever the time scale to do it in would also be limited. We are talking about days, rather then weeks. Within that small time frame the cost (in casualties or money) to overcome a concentrated IADS might become unacceptable if the goal is only to support the RoC, which has a fairly good chance of winning on it's own.

Yes very temporarily. Ultimately if you are relying on a defensive posture vs an opponents that is constantly mapping and evaluating your defense, you will lose.

Everything is temporary. You only need enough time for your ground troops to win (or lose) the battle. The purpose of an AD network is to keep the enemy air away from your ground troops and key installations long enough for them to do their job, not to hold of an indefinetly long air campaign. The Serbian and Iraqi examples are actually abnormal, since essentially the countries had no chances of winning no matter what. This created a situation in which their IADS had to do something is wasn't made for. It had to fight an air war, rather then just buy time and keep the enemy busy.

When you said the Russian and Chinese IAD had no gaps it seemed so because they certainly do. If not then I apologize. With regard to European air forces, I disagree. I think they could but at much greater cost because at the system level they don't bring the kind of overmatching capability of the U.S. Military. Let me put much greater cost into context. Just like the USA would, a European nation will first roll back the defense to a point where the airspace is more accessible. Because they don't have the same capabilities it may mean a more lengthy campaign, increased use of very expensive standoff weapons and possibly more casualties or a combination of all three. Whether or not it is worth it just depends on the situation.

I said that they were very dense, and they are. IADS in places like central Russia or over Taiwan (in conjunction with the VVS or RoCAF units based there) is in my opinion more then any European nation can overcome right now. A coalition might be able to do it in a lengthy attrition campaign, but no rapid kick the door down campaign would be possible, which again means the actual ground war would likely be decided if not just plain over before the IADS is suppressed enough for air superiority to become possible. Keep in mind also that even once the IADS is down to a non-networked level, with division level tac-SAMs and MANPADS and AAA, you still have the enemy air force to content with, and if it's datalinked to the C2 structures of the tac-SAMs, then a more or less networked AD is still possible, at least temporarily and in small critical areas (for example the spearhead of an armored offensive).

In the kinds of limited campaigns we see today where the aggressor's national survival is not immediately threatened like in over Serbia in the 1990's tolerance of losses may not allow for the kinds of casualties a well run IAD can inflict. If we are dealing with absolutes then the cost benefit equation changes. This limits the kinds of military actions European nations can take outside the framework of a U.S. led coalition IMV. The kind of overmatch the U.S. military brings to the fight gives the USA options no other nation has but at great financial cost. James Brown said "Paid the Cost to Be the Boss".

-DA

My point exactly. When the Coalition of the Willing can take their sweet-ass time to bomb Iraq into sawdust before actually going in on the ground, and when it enjoys complete superiority in almost all (if not completely all) areas, then sure no IADS can change the outcome. But when the two sides are at least within the same order of magnitude in terms of capabilities, things begin to change, and within the time frame of the conflict, the IADS can indeed be effective.

 

[DarthAmerica]

But could it hit harder quickly enough? The U.S. is currently stretched thin as is. If the US had to quickly back up Taiwan against a Chinese invasion right now, the assets available would be limited. Morever the time scale to do it in would also be limited. We are talking about days, rather then weeks. Within that small time frame the cost (in casualties or money) to overcome a concentrated IADS might become unacceptable if the goal is only to support the RoC, which has a fairly good chance of winning on it's own.

Of course it could. Look at what the USA/RoC/Allies objectives are vs the PRC in a Taiwan conflict. The U.S. keeps forward deployed assets for this purpose. Some of them quite discrete and practically invulnerable. Have you looked at the assets the USA publicly announces are in the immediate area? A PRC Blitz across the strait would take horrendous losses and survivors would be hopelessly outnumbered and cut off from logistics facing a modern dug in prepared defense with no means of escape or rapid reinforcement. People who promote the Idea that the PRC is capable of an opposed amphibious assault against Taiwan don't understand logistics or modern attrition. More often than not they are the same people who lose touch with reality everytime the Russians or PRC increment model number of the Flanker or S-300.

I said that they were very dense, and they are. IADS in places like central Russia or over Taiwan (in conjunction with the VVS or RoCAF units based there) is in my opinion more then any European nation can overcome right now. A coalition might be able to do it in a lengthy attrition campaign, but no rapid kick the door down campaign would be possible, which again means the actual ground war would likely be decided if not just plain over before the IADS is suppressed enough for air superiority to become possible. Keep in mind also that even once the IADS is down to a non-networked level, with division level tac-SAMs and MANPADS and AAA, you still have the enemy air force to content with, and if it's datalinked to the C2 structures of the tac-SAMs, then a more or less networked AD is still possible, at least temporarily and in small critical areas (for example the spearhead of an armored offensive).

It's not the technology, its the logistics. European nations can't project significant force beyond their borders into places are far away as Russia or Taiwan Strait except for a handful of light carriers that aren't designed to deal with force of that magnitude. Even if every Rafale Typhoon Gripen and F-teen in the European inventory were immediately replaced with F-35s they still could not support an expeditionary mission on that scale independently. If they boosted their logistic capacity and force multipliers they could do it with the weapon systems they have. Just at greater cost in casualties since it's easier to shoot down jets that are easier to detect armed with fewer PGMs and would have to fly more sorties to get the same results.

It's not just about 5th Gen jets though, its a revamp of the entire system especially the logistics. For anything involving more than one European country you can add in streamlining the C3 as well.

-DA

 

[Fritz]

European nations can't project significant force beyond their borders into places are far away

Perhaps European nations does'nt want to ?

 

[swerve]

It's not the technology, its the logistics. European nations can't project significant force beyond their borders into places are far away as Russia ...

-DA

European nations can project most of their land forces into Russia. It has a fairly long land border with the EU . . . .

 

[Feanor]

Of course it could. Look at what the USA/RoC/Allies objectives are vs the PRC in a Taiwan conflict. The U.S. keeps forward deployed assets for this purpose. Some of them quite discrete and practically invulnerable. Have you looked at the assets the USA publicly announces are in the immediate area? A PRC Blitz across the strait would take horrendous losses and survivors would be hopelessly outnumbered and cut off from logistics facing a modern dug in prepared defense with no means of escape or rapid reinforcement. People who promote the Idea that the PRC is capable of an opposed amphibious assault against Taiwan don't understand logistics or modern attrition. More often than not they are the same people who lose touch with reality everytime the Russians or PRC increment model number of the Flanker or S-300.

I actually agree with you there. The PLAN isn't nearly capable enough to supply the troops. However the question remains, could the USA roll back the Chinese AD network over Taiwan in a matter of days? And again, even if this is a rather poor example, none the less it doesn't invalidate my points, which you kindly ignored . An IADS doesn't need to stand up to an indefinetly long air campaign of superior forces. That's not it's purpose. It's purpose is to keep enemy air away from your ground forces long enough for them to do their job. It also needs to be supported by your own air force. If your own air force is incompetent, and ground forces are a mess with no chances of victory, then the IADS is already use less and will be rolled back just like you describe.

It's not the technology, its the logistics. European nations can't project significant force beyond their borders into places are far away as Russia or Taiwan Strait except for a handful of light carriers that aren't designed to deal with force of that magnitude. Even if every Rafale Typhoon Gripen and F-teen in the European inventory were immediately replaced with F-35s they still could not support an expeditionary mission on that scale independently. If they boosted their logistic capacity and force multipliers they could do it with the weapon systems they have. Just at greater cost in casualties since it's easier to shoot down jets that are easier to detect armed with fewer PGMs and would have to fly more sorties to get the same results.

It's not just about 5th Gen jets though, its a revamp of the entire system especially the logistics. For anything involving more than one European country you can add in streamlining the C3 as well.

-DA

There we will disagree. I don't think the current European systems can roll back the Russian IADS in a rapid manner. If both sides act decisively on the ground, then the war will be over long before the Europeans achieve those results. Swerve made a valid point, Russia would not stretch the EU's force projection capacity at all. We're neighbors.

EDIT: Just as an after thought, after doing a little more reading on the S-300 variants I came to this conclusion. This comes late at night when I should be sleeping instead of doing weapon research, so please excuse the fact that I didn't check my guess with any sources. Now I imagine that a complex AD network would work like this: large numbers of S-300P/PM would be networked between themselves, and Tor M1/Buk M1 batteries, to control the air space constantly, while large numbers of Shilkas, Strela-10's, Tunguskas, and S-300V/VM would be cold, only going hot when hostile air craft are near (as detected by the over all AD). This would allow the full utilization of both the air space control and the mobility capabilities of the complex. Given that both variants were created it would make sense that this was the case.

 

[DarthAmerica]

European nations can project most of their land forces into Russia. It has a fairly long land border with the EU . . . .

No way! The Russians have the strategic depth, manpower, logistics, firepower and nuclear power to stop any European nation from such a misadventure. It would be Operation Barbarosa combined with a nuclear winter. Not even the United States maintains the kinds of forces necessary for this in Europe. The United States and Russia have worked for half a century to ensure "Europe" would never be capable of an independent action like this again. Only NATO led by the United States is organized to do this and even then it would need considerable time to build up the strength and would have to be prepared for nuclear weapons use. The Russians would not sit idly by and watch while an invasion force gathers.

Moreover, Russia has the economic and political influence to fragment a European coalition through energy policies and Russia has the military strength to deter any nation on it's border from supporting this as a point of entry. Russia can strike conventionally throughout the entire depth of Europe and interdict SLOC while Europe would be pressed to even make limited attacks more than 100-200km beyond the front. Russia has nothing to fear in terms of conventional attack from European nations or any combination thereof as a coalition. This is one of the primary reasons why Russia is so opposed to Ukrainian integration into NATO or EU. "Key Terrain".

-DA

 

[swerve]

No way! The Russians have the strategic depth, manpower, logistics, firepower and nuclear power to stop any European nation from such a misadventure. It would be Operation Barbarosa combined with a nuclear winter. Not even the United States maintains the kinds of forces necessary for this in Europe. ...
-DA

There's a difference between being able to project forces into a space, & the ability to defeat the armed forces you might encounter there. W. Europe can easily project the forces. What would follow if politicians & the military were crazy enough to do it is a separate matter. On that, I agree with you. A disaster. But what you said originally was that Europe couldn't project significant force there, which is obviously untrue. Also, you are now saying "any European nation", which is not the same as "Europe", the latter implying a collective effort.

BTW, the USA maintains far fewer forces in Europe than W. European countries, and that includes logistics capability.

 

[kato]

The Western European Union (member states) currently operates a fleet of over 1800 fighter and strike aircraft as well as 900 lighter attack aircraft. Add to that some 400 transports and tankers, and (nominally) around 30 AWACS aircraft.
For the strategic level, around 500 SLBM-launched nukes, plus nuclear-tipped ALCMs, and conventional SLCMs.

Zero Problem in projection.

Comparing US forces in Western Europe to that is ridiculous btw.

 

[Grand Danois]

In generalized terms, Europe can deploy 200 fighters within a radius of 6000km of Brussels inside a week (high readiness), with further 200 inside a month. Including the logistics.

This was one of the Helsinki Goals (iirc) that were easy to meet.

 

[DarthAmerica]

There's a difference between being able to project forces into a space, & the ability to defeat the armed forces you might encounter there. W. Europe can easily project the forces. What would follow if politicians & the military were crazy enough to do it is a separate matter. On that, I agree with you. A disaster. But what you said originally was that Europe couldn't project significant force there, which is obviously untrue. Also, you are now saying "any European nation", which is not the same as "Europe", the latter implying a collective effort.

BTW, the USA maintains far fewer forces in Europe than W. European countries, and that includes logistics capability.

Strawman in addition to being untrue. "W. Europe" is not a country nor does it have a common foreign policy. Outside of NATO it couldn't project a single soul. Individual European countries can send a few thousand to tens of thousands of troops at best. And they would be slaughtered if they tried to enter Russia proper.

And of course the US footprint in Europe is smaller than the people who live there. We maintain hubs so that if necessary we could rapidly reinforce or redirect troops to combat zones as needed.

-DA

 

[DarthAmerica]

In generalized terms, Europe can deploy 200 fighters within a radius of 6000km of Brussels inside a week (high readiness), with further 200 inside a month. Including the logistics.

This was one of the Helsinki Goals (iirc) that were easy to meet.

Sure to a permissive environment and with very little in terms of force protection and almost no ground combat power to speak of(off of European soil). So if some nation decided to host this European air force we could have a force capable of conducting fairly intense strikes against a lesser regional power for limited duration so long as that power was isolated and incapable of meaningful response and non-nuclear. Something like Operation Allied Force, Operation Eldorado Canyon, Falklands and things of that scale.

Anything larger is a bit beyond their scope outside a coalition supported by the United States.

-DA

 

[kato]

almost no ground combat power to speak of(off of European soil).

Four to five paratrooper divisions specialized for capturing airfields and creating a defense pocket around that.

Problem would be mostly that mobile close air/missile defence for such pockets has been largely removed in the Peace Dividend; it's - to the necessary extent - still possible though, in particular using British and French systems.

 

[DarthAmerica]

The Western European Union (member states) currently operates a fleet of over 1800 fighter and strike aircraft as well as 900 lighter attack aircraft. Add to that some 400 transports and tankers, and (nominally) around 30 AWACS aircraft.
For the strategic level, around 500 SLBM-launched nukes, plus nuclear-tipped ALCMs, and conventional SLCMs.

Zero Problem in projection.

Comparing US forces in Western Europe to that is ridiculous btw.

Thats not power projection. Thats a tactical fighter force supported by AWACS designed and organized for defense of home countries and integration into U.S. led coalitions. The nuclear arms are also not under a consolidated command and represent the sum total of the owner nations minimal deterrent. You can't just add up how many nukes these countries have together and treat it like a force equivalent to the USAFs 500 ICBMs and free fall bombs that operate under a defined chain of command or the USNs SSBNs that can keep hundreds of warheads on multiple boats at sea continuously. It's really not the same.

Similarly, European airforces don't fly their takers or transports in some combined common pool of assets. They belong to individual countries which means Spain could decide it didn't want to share what it has for example. And as far as tanking goes the European nations fly only a fraction of the tanker capacity of the USAF.

We have got to be careful in these discussions not to let "Europe" become something it's not even if the sum of all the individual assets seem impressive.

-DA

 

[DarthAmerica]

Four to five paratrooper divisions specialized for capturing airfields and creating a defense pocket around that.

Problem would be mostly that mobile close air/missile defence for such pockets has been largely removed in the Peace Dividend; it's - to the necessary extent - still possible though, in particular using British and French systems.

You mean France OR England. The two are under entirely different control and outside of NATO have no obligation for cooperation on that scale. Moreover, any regional opponent like Iraq(circa 1991) would be more than capable of decimating a force like this off of EU proper. It would lack air cover, missile defense and it would be completely vulnerable to a mechanized/artillery force. It would not be able to force an entry into denied airspace and nor would it arrive in that size 4 to 5 divisions. They would be jumping into certain death without a host nation outside the conflict area that could hold off a mechanized force and had the strategic depth to trade for time.

-DA

 

[Fritz]

Admin: Please read the Forum Rules about posting behaviour. We do not want to see cut and pastes without meaningful commentary. We all know how to get stats, we're interested in peoples opinions and analysis - not slabs of data.

And this has what to do with my post ?

Forum rules: quote: We encourage detailed comparison of weapon systems /end quote

http://defencetalk.com/forums/rules.php

 

[kato]

You mean France OR England.

I mean both. In an attack on multiple pockets, with the insertion assigned to these separately of course.

European Airforces should be able to maintain fighter coverage out to 300-400 miles from base. Hostile airfields interfering can be taken out in semi-suicidal strike missions, as was always planned during the Cold War. The necessary means are still available, in the same numbers even. Hostile mechanized and artillery forces are easy prey to concentrated strike missions utilizing remaining anti-armour air assets under fighter cover. Hostile regional C3 is handled by ECM and precision strikes. The paratroopers wouldn't move in before that all is at least for the most part handled.

At some point this becomes a leapfrogging exercise. Until nukes get involved of course.

Btw, i think you're mistaken in the USAF role in Cold War defense of Western Europe. This defense was a rather elaborated scheme of interlocking force packages, and the USAF's role in this was providing primarily SEAD and about 25% of the dedicated fighters on the first line (and scarcely any reinforcing that from behind).

 

[DarthAmerica]

I mean both. In an attack on multiple pockets, with the insertion assigned to these separately of course.

European Airforces should be able to maintain fighter coverage out to 300-400 miles from base. Hostile airfields interfering can be taken out in semi-suicidal strike missions, as was always planned during the Cold War. The necessary means are still available, in the same numbers even. Hostile mechanized and artillery forces are easy prey to concentrated strike missions utilizing remaining anti-armour air assets under fighter cover. Hostile regional C3 is handled by ECM and precision strikes. The paratroopers wouldn't move in before that all is at least for the most part handled.

At some point this becomes a leapfrogging exercise. Until nukes get involved of course.

300-400 miles from what base? Over Russia? I'm assuming so because you mentioned nukes. You have to be kidding me right? Poland is 400 miles from Russia after you overfly Belarus. The only place that could even be remotely possible is Georgia or one of the Baltic states and which of them is going to choose to be nuclear target practice for Russia? Even if they did, with how many fighters? The tanking requirement makes that immediately impossible. Also once the Russians spot the build up all bets are off. Do you realize how many concurrent sorties would have to be in the air? SEAD, Strike in addition to CAP and fighter sweep? The Russians would shoot down European jets by the dozens on day one. If you are suggesting some kind of OOTB attack then thats pure fantasy. If its a brewing conflict the Russians would reinforce and then forget it.

Russian armor and artillery would hardly be easy prey when Europe has a very limited all weather or high altitude precision weapons capability. It doesn't get much better for other scenarios either. You would be sending troops into a meat grinder where they would be slaughtered by armor and mech forces. YOU HAVE to have heavy armor support. LeClercs, Challengers following right behind any airborne attack. Otherwise even T-55s would overwhelm the infantry. Even Algeria is far enough away to make this a logistical impossibility.

Nukes takes care of the remote chance of Europe succeeding by some miracle. Europe is not an expeditionary power. It takes more than a few hundred fighters where only a low number of them can be in the air at a time due to logistics and espirit de corps to pull this off. Especially against the kinds of opponents you are talking about.

-DA

EDIT: FYI in 1999 Coalition forces were "slow" getting to an airport in Kosovo only to have the Russians in BTRs arrive first and block access. I bring that up because in an airborne assault to seize an enemy airfields thats what the enemy will do to the paratroopers if you can't properly support them. If there isn't armor rushing in to relieve them, if you are trying to proving air cover from 300-400 miles away then you aren't properly supporting them. A typical armored vehicle like a BTR can easily travel 200 to 300 miles in a day. Most military airfields are in very close proximity to land forces so planners have to choose wisely before inserting troops this way or it's certain death.

Even the USA didn't start offensive action in Iraq in 1991 or 2003 until serious heavy armor was in place and ready to close with and destroy the enemy. When the 82nd Airborne went into Saudi Arabia in 1990 the USA was very nervous about what would happen to them if Saddam pressed his attacks south.

The suggestion that paratroopers could do this violates the principles of mass, objective, security and the new principle of mass media which will show the corpses of your dead paratroops and those who were captured because they were dropped into a suicide mission.

 

[Feanor]

No way! The Russians have the strategic depth, manpower, logistics, firepower and nuclear power to stop any European nation from such a misadventure. It would be Operation Barbarosa combined with a nuclear winter. Not even the United States maintains the kinds of forces necessary for this in Europe. The United States and Russia have worked for half a century to ensure "Europe" would never be capable of an independent action like this again. Only NATO led by the United States is organized to do this and even then it would need considerable time to build up the strength and would have to be prepared for nuclear weapons use. The Russians would not sit idly by and watch while an invasion force gathers.

The key elements are the political pressure and nuclear weapons. Everything else is seconday. Keep in mind that Russia's military doctrine emphasizes nuclear weapon use, even preventively.

Moreover, Russia has the economic and political influence to fragment a European coalition through energy policies and Russia has the military strength to deter any nation on it's border from supporting this as a point of entry. Russia can strike conventionally throughout the entire depth of Europe and interdict SLOC while Europe would be pressed to even make limited attacks more than 100-200km beyond the front. Russia has nothing to fear in terms of conventional attack from European nations or any combination thereof as a coalition. This is one of the primary reasons why Russia is so opposed to Ukrainian integration into NATO or EU. "Key Terrain".

-DA

Russia has to fear a limited war in which it's pitted against a proxy of European and American forces with NATO providing air support to their allies. For example if Russia were to have to occupy Georgia (please don't tell me it's not going to happen, I know that, I'm just giving an example of a nightmare scenario for the Russian Army).

EDIT: Darth I would appreciate a reply to my earlier statement in regards to AD network capabilities. Your opinions have been very interesting so far, and I would like to continue the discussion.