FutureTank
Banned Member
Maybe Australia can rent a part of it's territory for people who want to conduct war using scorched earth strategy...we provide scorched earth 
Counter-Insurgency Warfare
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The reason why the al Sadr, why Hizballah, why Hamas have such clout is this: THEY PROVIDE THE SOCIAL SERVICES. They provide some security to the population, administer justice, etc. They are the government. As a civilian, how can you afford to not cooperate with the people on whom you and your family's lives and wellbeing depend? There were russians that opposed stalin, and germans who oppossed hitler. But they had to keep quiet or risk getting executed.
The reason why the al Sadr, why Hizballah, why Hamas have such clout is this: THEY PROVIDE THE SOCIAL SERVICES. They provide some security to the population, administer justice, etc. They are the government. As a civilian, how can you afford to not cooperate with the people on whom you and your family's lives and wellbeing depend? There were russians that opposed stalin, and germans who oppossed hitler. But they had to keep quiet or risk getting executed.
Whats funny about that is much of their funding comes from the West yet we get no credit for that. Now that Hamas is broke maybe they will realize who they should have been thanking.
DragonKing786
New Member
You mean FATAH should be thanking US, cause Hamas was never given anything cause they are considered "terrorist group" according to US.Whats funny about that is much of their funding comes from the West yet we get no credit for that. Now that Hamas is broke maybe they will realize who they should have been thanking.
The money for the PLO was ending up in the hands of Hamas so funding was cut. Fatah isn't getting anything now either until they can clean up their act.You mean FATAH should be thanking US, cause Hamas was never given anything cause they are considered "terrorist group" according to US.
radiosilence
jints
Fatah is still receiving about $50 million in aid from the Bush Adminstration. The original amount allocated for Fatah was $86 million but it was reduce to $50 million due to lack of transparency and fear that some of it might end up with hamas. IIRC, hamas is receiving aid from middle eastern countries. The prime minister of the palestinian govt. (hamas) traveled to middle eastern capitals some time ago and was promised emergency aid worth over a hundred million dollars.The money for the PLO was ending up in the hands of Hamas so funding was cut. Fatah isn't getting anything now either until they can clean up their act.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/world/asia/06afghan.html
good article on dutch counter insurgency tactics in afganistan.
good article on dutch counter insurgency tactics in afganistan.
radiosilence
jints
The Dutch approach will work in less hostile areas where reconstruction projects are able to get off the ground. However in Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah provinces where the insurgency’s current centre of gravity falls will require more of a military solution to establish the writ of the govt.
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A
Aussie Digger
Guest
Funnily enough, despite how MANY times they've been told, they are actually only starting to operate in Baghdad this way NOW. The troops are located in their TAOR's permanently rather than co-located at "super bases", they work hand in hand with indigenous forces, they are conducting aggressive patrolling 24hrs per day in their TAOR's and not providing insurgents with room to move or respite from operations.The day Bush declared the war over, I told a friend that the war for the USA in Iraq is only starting now...The USA tactics are wrong: you cannot win a counter insurgency war by just throwing money, material and men at it - Vietnam!!!. Further, their Intel is poor, and they do not have sufficient first-hand information to stop the bombings etc. Again, money and technology does not provide the complete answer to obtain Intelligence. You have to gather in with covert forward observation agents, physical patrols, and infiltrating the enemy ranks to obtain 1st-hand information; while simulatiuosly earn the respect of the local population.
These lessons were learnt in South Africa more than a century ago, when in the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902), the mighty British Empire attacked the 2 Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, having 450 000! men in the field by war's end, -against about 50 000 Boers. The British also declared the war over at the end of the conventional phase, but despite being outnumbered 10:1, and their farms and houses being burnt down, women and children dying in Concentration Camps; the Boers kept the Empire busy for another 2 years in one of the most costly wars for the Empire. (My grandfather fought in the Boer war and his house was also burned down as part of the policy of "scorched earth".)
In more recent history, the former SADF fought a 23 year Counter Insurgeny war in Namibia and Angola, in what became known as the South African Bushwar (1966-1989). The former SADF managed to win this was as is evident by the number of incidents (mines, bombings, attacks, etc.) as illustrated on the webpage: http://www.geocities.com/sa_bushwar. By war's end the confrontation have taken a much more conventional form, with the SADF up against 45000 Cubans suplied with modern Soviet weaponary, FAPLA (Angolan Army), PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia). By 1989, the end of the Cold War, political moves towards peace from the parties concerned, lead to a peaceful sub-continent.
Back to Iraq: The USA can learn from the British in the south how to win the "hearts and minds" of the people as a 1st step in ending a counter insurgency conflict. Typical American arrogance and ignorance is not going to help!
Furthermore being in place to protect the citizens, whilst simulataneously engaging the leaders of the various factions (except AQ) in dialogue about the issues, is going to go a LONG way towards stabilising and winning or at least ending it satisfactorily for everyone involved...
It has only taken putting the USMC in charge instead of USAF or US Army too...
A good read about these issues can be found here:
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/Iraq After action.pdf
A good read about these issues can be found here:
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/...r action.pdf
Cheers AD, great read,
everything you guys are mentioning are fantastic arguements, but 1 must remember war is fluid and all the best plans are laid to rest once started so in reality you can apply lessons learned although most times not the same way in process. there is no right all wrong in as long as your goals are being acheived.
but providing security that they require to contain the CIW would take 20 times the troops they have and they would also need full cooperation from countries boardering Iraq as well, media control, dmz areas.
I think that the US like Australia made 1 vital mistake, beleive downsizing a military was a good thing, in the belief that you don't need so many men on the ground by replacing them by technology.
but providing security that they require to contain the CIW would take 20 times the troops they have and they would also need full cooperation from countries boardering Iraq as well, media control, dmz areas.
I think that the US like Australia made 1 vital mistake, beleive downsizing a military was a good thing, in the belief that you don't need so many men on the ground by replacing them by technology.
If greater than 5% support for any political movement, then non-military methods are
In general...
During Branch training (pre-1966 US Special Forces course required for all enlisted Special Forces qualified), it was taught and accepted that any political or military movement that had more than 5% support of the general population could not be 'eliminated' soley by military means, including counter-insurgency methods.
However, if the object is simply to occupy and control specific resources, then military action can be used when the support for any opposition movement is 100%.
In Iraq the internal public support of the different opposition factions greatly exceeds 5%, therefore, I do not believe that we will achieve any goals intended to gain widespread support for the United States and our strategic interests and policies in the region by the sole application of military force. However, military force can be used to establish a foot hold in the region and allow the United States to develop effective coalitions that moderate the extreme and destructive behavior of some factions. Again, counter-insurgency actions will continue to be effective in maintaining any needed 'foot holds' and the development of the needed international coalitions.
Counter-insurgency operations are ALWAYS appropriate when military force is applied against another nation...however, the objectives of such operations can not be expected to eliminate the oppostion forces when such forces have more than 5% support of the internal population.
On a personal note...each time I write military force, I think of those wearing the uniform and the price that is paid when we conduct operations that place those individuals in harms way...
RANGER Jerry Conners
In general...
During Branch training (pre-1966 US Special Forces course required for all enlisted Special Forces qualified), it was taught and accepted that any political or military movement that had more than 5% support of the general population could not be 'eliminated' soley by military means, including counter-insurgency methods.
However, if the object is simply to occupy and control specific resources, then military action can be used when the support for any opposition movement is 100%.
In Iraq the internal public support of the different opposition factions greatly exceeds 5%, therefore, I do not believe that we will achieve any goals intended to gain widespread support for the United States and our strategic interests and policies in the region by the sole application of military force. However, military force can be used to establish a foot hold in the region and allow the United States to develop effective coalitions that moderate the extreme and destructive behavior of some factions. Again, counter-insurgency actions will continue to be effective in maintaining any needed 'foot holds' and the development of the needed international coalitions.
Counter-insurgency operations are ALWAYS appropriate when military force is applied against another nation...however, the objectives of such operations can not be expected to eliminate the oppostion forces when such forces have more than 5% support of the internal population.
On a personal note...each time I write military force, I think of those wearing the uniform and the price that is paid when we conduct operations that place those individuals in harms way...
RANGER Jerry Conners
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Thanks for that informative post. It may or may not be true, but it give insight into how they make decisions.In general...
During Branch training (pre-1966 US Special Forces course required for all enlisted Special Forces qualified), it was taught and accepted that any political or military movement that had more than 5% support of the general population could not be 'eliminated' soley by military means, including counter-insurgency methods.
However, if the object is simply to occupy and control specific resources, then military action can be used when the support for any opposition movement is 100%.
In Iraq the internal public support of the different opposition factions greatly exceeds 5%, therefore, I do not believe that we will achieve any goals intended to gain widespread support for the United States and our strategic interests and policies in the region by the sole application of military force. However, military force can be used to establish a foot hold in the region and allow the United States to develop effective coalitions that moderate the extreme and destructive behavior of some factions. Again, counter-insurgency actions will continue to be effective in maintaining any needed 'foot holds' and the development of the needed international coalitions.
Counter-insurgency operations are ALWAYS appropriate when military force is applied against another nation...however, the objectives of such operations can not be expected to eliminate the oppostion forces when such forces have more than 5% support of the internal population.
On a personal note...each time I write military force, I think of those wearing the uniform and the price that is paid when we conduct operations that place those individuals in harms way...
RANGER Jerry Conners
This is a sensitive question, but it needs to be asked.
Every counterinsurgency/ low intesity conflict that I've read of, has some form of human rights abuse on both sides. Not just collateral damage, really sick stuff: torture, collective punishment, etc. As far as I know, for the US for example, every CI it has been in: Phillipines 1900s, Vietnam, now Iraq, was stained by these abuses. I don't think other countries fared better.
I myself know people who fought in these types of conflict. They're pleasant people, normal - until they start talking about the job. They talk about burning villages rather casually. And they exhibit some sort of paranoia which makes them both inappropriately fearfull, and inappropriately angry at times. When these people are home for rnr they can make you nervous. They must be hell for the civillians where they work.
The question: does participating in a CI do something to the brains of the participants? Does it have particularly severe psychological effects? Are human rights abuses inevitable in a CI setting.
Every counterinsurgency/ low intesity conflict that I've read of, has some form of human rights abuse on both sides. Not just collateral damage, really sick stuff: torture, collective punishment, etc. As far as I know, for the US for example, every CI it has been in: Phillipines 1900s, Vietnam, now Iraq, was stained by these abuses. I don't think other countries fared better.
I myself know people who fought in these types of conflict. They're pleasant people, normal - until they start talking about the job. They talk about burning villages rather casually. And they exhibit some sort of paranoia which makes them both inappropriately fearfull, and inappropriately angry at times. When these people are home for rnr they can make you nervous. They must be hell for the civillians where they work.
The question: does participating in a CI do something to the brains of the participants? Does it have particularly severe psychological effects? Are human rights abuses inevitable in a CI setting.
Counterinsurgency and Dignity of Man Issues
My combat experiences are limited to SE Asia 1959-1966 era.
It has been my observation that any person who uses excessive force or directs excessive force against armed or unarmed persons is damaged by the experience.
It does not take courage to kill, but to fight when decisively engaged...if you manuever then you will experience casualties. Simply destroying a 'target' without yourselve being at risk does not constitute a courageous act.
Counterinsurgency operations are not exempt from these 'rules'.
It has also been my observation that many persons use excessive force in their daily dealings with others in a non-combat civilian environment and I believe they are also damaged for doing so. You see this occurring in 'all walks of life'...or at least in most parts of the world.
The expression "ALL IS FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR" speaks to the problem...it is my opinion that love and war require the best conduct and fairness...or both endeavors will fail...yet few think twice when speaking the "ALL IS FAIR..." statement.
Counterinsurgency operations need not be conducted, should not be conducted in a manner that involves excessive use of force nor directed toward non-combatants. There are many counterinsurgency operations that can be conducted to achieve honorable objectives and minimize unnecessary death and destruction.
RANGER Jerry Conners
My combat experiences are limited to SE Asia 1959-1966 era.
It has been my observation that any person who uses excessive force or directs excessive force against armed or unarmed persons is damaged by the experience.
It does not take courage to kill, but to fight when decisively engaged...if you manuever then you will experience casualties. Simply destroying a 'target' without yourselve being at risk does not constitute a courageous act.
Counterinsurgency operations are not exempt from these 'rules'.
It has also been my observation that many persons use excessive force in their daily dealings with others in a non-combat civilian environment and I believe they are also damaged for doing so. You see this occurring in 'all walks of life'...or at least in most parts of the world.
The expression "ALL IS FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR" speaks to the problem...it is my opinion that love and war require the best conduct and fairness...or both endeavors will fail...yet few think twice when speaking the "ALL IS FAIR..." statement.
Counterinsurgency operations need not be conducted, should not be conducted in a manner that involves excessive use of force nor directed toward non-combatants. There are many counterinsurgency operations that can be conducted to achieve honorable objectives and minimize unnecessary death and destruction.
RANGER Jerry Conners
radiosilence
jints
My combat experiences are limited to SE Asia 1959-1966 era.
It has been my observation that any person who uses excessive force or directs excessive force against armed or unarmed persons is damaged by the experience.
It does not take courage to kill, but to fight when decisively engaged...if you manuever then you will experience casualties. Simply destroying a 'target' without yourselve being at risk does not constitute a courageous act.
Counterinsurgency operations are not exempt from these 'rules'.
It has also been my observation that many persons use excessive force in their daily dealings with others in a non-combat civilian environment and I believe they are also damaged for doing so. You see this occurring in 'all walks of life'...or at least in most parts of the world.
The expression "ALL IS FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR" speaks to the problem...it is my opinion that love and war require the best conduct and fairness...or both endeavors will fail...yet few think twice when speaking the "ALL IS FAIR..." statement.
Counterinsurgency operations need not be conducted, should not be conducted in a manner that involves excessive use of force nor directed toward non-combatants. There are many counterinsurgency operations that can be conducted to achieve honorable objectives and minimize unnecessary death and destruction.
RANGER Jerry Conners
Thanks for your insights. I am interested in your views on the situation in Afghanistan? How do we quell the Insurgency? Is it too late?
Or if it's even possible, given the amount of Heroin growing there. The interests of the country's biggest source of income and the interests of NATO collide. Perhaps the real goal of NATO is containment, like the way they treat HIV - they can't get rid of the bug yet but the drugs help keep patients from dying.Thanks for your insights. I am interested in your views on the situation in Afghanistan? How do we quell the Insurgency? Is it too late?
Appropriate Military Action
Gentlemen:
Per your request...I am prepared to provide more specific recommendations however, the following captures the concept:
"Field" military action primarily in the form of foreign area intelligence, including foreign language, qualified teams 1) conducting covert operations to identify targets of opportunity and once located, coordination for appropriate action AND 2) providing (and participating) non-covert public assistance...long term aid in the form of medical, education, building/transportation/sanitation system, support of local religious beliefs and activities...anything that the people of the country need.
Essential element to be achieved...our actions to be respected by the people of the region...AND a percentage (50%) of the foreign area qualified military force MUST be either a member of the religious faith of the indigenous population or at a minimum...'highly sympathetic and sensitive and respectful of that religion' AND other national values.
Mission objectives of field foreign area qualified (including language) forces:
1. Locate targets of opportunity and destroy or otherwise 'managed' if warranted...via hi-tech or otherwise;
2. Long-term aid provided to develop trust and confidence and build a in-depth and permanent mutually benefiting relationship with the people and countries of the region.
Note: This is a permanent long-term foreign affairs approach...and applies to most conflict scenarios when the public support for the 'insurgents...who are most often respected as national heroes' exceeds 5%. Sophisticated leadership and judgment must be exercised in the decision to destroy discovered 'targets of opportunity'...
Economic justification/objectives...convert 'enemies' into consumers and producers of products needed by the world marketplace...the ideal solution is to not destroy/eliminate but to steadily increase the numbers of consumers and those competitively seeking to produce.
Note: This is an old post WWII concept...that was actually finding root and expanding in some US circles, but fell apart during the Vietnam era.
If you would like my comments on the non-field military endeavors, then I will provide on request. Our actions at the embassy and within other government programs must be conducted and coordinated in a manner that is better orchestrated and committed to helping not dominating...except in extreme situations that require destruction of 'targets of opportunity. Again...these endeavors require excellent leadership and judgment...something that is in 'short supply'.
RANGER Jerry Conners
Chinese Bandit 13
Gentlemen:
Per your request...I am prepared to provide more specific recommendations however, the following captures the concept:
"Field" military action primarily in the form of foreign area intelligence, including foreign language, qualified teams 1) conducting covert operations to identify targets of opportunity and once located, coordination for appropriate action AND 2) providing (and participating) non-covert public assistance...long term aid in the form of medical, education, building/transportation/sanitation system, support of local religious beliefs and activities...anything that the people of the country need.
Essential element to be achieved...our actions to be respected by the people of the region...AND a percentage (50%) of the foreign area qualified military force MUST be either a member of the religious faith of the indigenous population or at a minimum...'highly sympathetic and sensitive and respectful of that religion' AND other national values.
Mission objectives of field foreign area qualified (including language) forces:
1. Locate targets of opportunity and destroy or otherwise 'managed' if warranted...via hi-tech or otherwise;
2. Long-term aid provided to develop trust and confidence and build a in-depth and permanent mutually benefiting relationship with the people and countries of the region.
Note: This is a permanent long-term foreign affairs approach...and applies to most conflict scenarios when the public support for the 'insurgents...who are most often respected as national heroes' exceeds 5%. Sophisticated leadership and judgment must be exercised in the decision to destroy discovered 'targets of opportunity'...
Economic justification/objectives...convert 'enemies' into consumers and producers of products needed by the world marketplace...the ideal solution is to not destroy/eliminate but to steadily increase the numbers of consumers and those competitively seeking to produce.
Note: This is an old post WWII concept...that was actually finding root and expanding in some US circles, but fell apart during the Vietnam era.
If you would like my comments on the non-field military endeavors, then I will provide on request. Our actions at the embassy and within other government programs must be conducted and coordinated in a manner that is better orchestrated and committed to helping not dominating...except in extreme situations that require destruction of 'targets of opportunity. Again...these endeavors require excellent leadership and judgment...something that is in 'short supply'.
RANGER Jerry Conners
Chinese Bandit 13
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This threads been dead a while but I guess this article highlights some of the problems of counter insurgency.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2125142,00.html
its a 3 parter
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2125142,00.html
its a 3 parter
FutureTank
Banned Member
problems of counter insurgency
It seems like the higher echelons of command have no idea in terms of strategy and tactics appropriate for the situation, and the troops are not under much command and control, or reflect the society they come from.
Not that I'm saying all US troops behave in the ways described, but even if 10% or 50% do so, its bad enough.
Of course the US forces operate in a culture strange to them. However, can that be an excuse?
Seems to me the operations in Iraq failed at a level no FM covers.
Greg
This is not a problem of counter-insurgency tactics, but of the culture of the US forces. What the article describes, sounds a lot like behaviour of the Nazi SS and Gestapo!This threads been dead a while but I guess this article highlights some of the problems of counter insurgency.
It seems like the higher echelons of command have no idea in terms of strategy and tactics appropriate for the situation, and the troops are not under much command and control, or reflect the society they come from.
Not that I'm saying all US troops behave in the ways described, but even if 10% or 50% do so, its bad enough.
Of course the US forces operate in a culture strange to them. However, can that be an excuse?
Seems to me the operations in Iraq failed at a level no FM covers.
Greg
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