Damn interesting question.
1. First, it must be remembered that Taiwan is not an American ally and they have no duty to defend Taiwan. Secondly, this question was also asked and answered in Tanner Greer’s poorly researched Sept 2019 article in the Foreign Affairs, ‘
Taiwan’s Defense Strategy Doesn’t Make Military Sense: But It Does Make Political Sense.’
(i) While I agree that Taiwan needs to up its game for defence procurement (against a PLA invasion scenario), Greer’s article demonstrates his ignorance of real and valid Taiwanese concerns — with his objection to Taiwan refreshing their submarine force — including their fear of their SLOCs being choked and thereafter restricted in their ability to trade by the PLA(N), from distant seas.
(ii) The PLA(N) is on the verge of or has acquired a blue water capability. This question on attacking across the Taiwan Straits was also asked past threads, like the
Moderated taiwan invasion war game (that we agreed will never be reopened).
(iii) By
choosing to end conscription in Taiwan, without a successful transition to an all professional force, the Taiwanese have said they do not believe in defending their island — therefore it is only logical to ask, why should we fight for them?
I'd like to think it wont happen.
But if id did, how should we / could we respond?
2. It will not happen in round 2: 2017 to 2021 as the 7th Fleet by itself presents an over match and it is
very unlikely to happen in round 3: 2022 to 2026, if you factor in American allies, including the JMSDF. Beyond 2032 (round 5), it becomes harder to predict at this stage. The only other country with troops and bases in Taiwan is not Australia. Your country does not have to get involved — but a small country that is upgrading its ties with Australia and the US gets a vote, which vote might be a vote of neutrality (in 2032 onwards)— depending on:
(i) who is in power in the US and how much of the illogical ‘America First’ policies have been dismantled by 2032 (or does it remain just as toxic under Trump at that time);
(ii) who is at fault in any China-Taiwan dispute, especially the behaviour of the two faced politicians in Taiwan in the lead up to conflict and the untested fighting ability of the Taiwanese armed forces;
(iii) whether the JMSDF has decided to fight on the side of the American Navy, and if the Americans find the political will to declare war and decide that such attack should be resisted; and
(iv) support by ASEAN (or lack there of) — by Donal Trump’s rejection of the TPP, the Americans automatically reduced support by some in the ASEAN region.
3. But the question is, how much can you rely on the US, if Trump remains in charge (after the coming election). President Trump has
balked at upholding the country’s NATO commitments, demanded massive
increases in defense spending from such long-standing allies as Japan and South Korea, and suggested that underpaying allies should be left to
fight their own wars with shared adversaries. Trump’s ire has been so relentless and damaging that U.S. allies in Asia and Europe now question American ability to restore itself as a credible security guarantor, even after a different president is in the White House.
Trust we don't have to answer this question anytime soon.
4. The more interesting question is the possibility of Taiwanese election to surrender of its security interests to the Chinese so as to avoid a fight. The Taiwanese will not be unique as the Philippines very nearly surrendered its core interests in the hopes of gaining Belt and Road benefits. Their foreign secretary, Locsin wrote on social media that the suspension of the termination of the VFA was made upon President Duterte's "instruction". "It has been received by Washington and well at that," he added.
"The suspension shall start on even date and shall continue for six months, which period is extendible by the Philippines for another six months," after which the countdown to termination "shall resume", read a June 1 letter by Locsis to the embassy of the US in Manila.
5. In a statement, the US embassy said it welcomed the Philippine government's decision. Having observed their prior poor performance at ADMM Plus Maritime exercises, other navies are certain that the Pinoys do not train like they need to fight.
6. In India’s case, it’s Prime Minister has backed down even after 20 of their soldiers were killed. This will save more lives as India was not prepared. Resolve is not easy to find, in the weak. Indian BJP politicians are capable of calculating their own self interest and it may be in a manner that is directly against their country’s security interests.
7. India is only belatedly seeking reciprocal military logistics pacts with like-minded countries, like Japan, to extend its strategic and naval operational reach, with an eye firmly on China’s expansionist behavior in the Indo-Pacific. India has already entered into mutual logistics support arrangement (MLSA) with Australia, US, France, South Korea and Singapore.
8. In contrast to politicians in India or the Philippines who are keen to surrender, a Singapore leader will show more spine. This is thanks to the fact that the SAF is more prepared for war (in part due to tensions caused by Malaysian hostility in 2018 and 1991), with the
Singapore Air Force setting up a training detachment in Guam and the Singapore Navy’s frigates have been training in Guam, to fight as a combined task unit, in
Exercise Pacific Griffin 2017 and in 2019. For the Americans, Singapore is a partner that behaves like an ally.
(i) These realistic bi-annual bilateral exercises simulate the defence and protection by frigates and destroyers of high value units (like a LPD), going into harm’s way, should the need arise. In the 2017 edition of the exercise, RSN’s 2 frigates, RSS Stalwart and RSS Supreme, protected the LPD, RSS Endurance (acting as the high value unit in the exercise).
(ii) The deployment of a surface action group of 3 ships (SAG) may not seem to be much; but it is more naval combat power than Philippines (an American ally) or NZ (a former ally under the ANZUS Treaty) can muster. Keeping in mind that the troops in both these countries fought with distinction in the Korean War against China.
9. For an idea of the complexity of
Exercise Pacific Griffin 2019, participating:
(i) naval assets included the littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10), the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Momsen (DDG 92), Los Angeles-class submarine USS Key West (SSN 722), Military Sealift Command dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Amelia Earhart (T-AKE 6), and Singapore’s frigates RSS Formidable (FFS 68) and RSS Intrepid (FFS 69); and
(ii) air assets included MH-60S helicopters from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 23 and 25, MH-60R helicopters from Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, maritime patrol aircraft from Patrol Squadrons (VP) 1, 5 and 47, and B-52s Stratofortress bombers from U.S. Air Forces' Expeditionary 69th Bomb Squadron.
10. Additionally, both navies successfully executed a sinking exercise (SINKEX) of former USS Ford. “Our planners have worked very closely with one another and established very strong working relationship, and more importantly trust between us,” said Republic of Singapore Navy Commander First Flotilla and Commanding Officer of 185 Squadron, Colonel Lim Yu Chuan.
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