Which way do you think that will go, wheeled or tracked? I think there is a pretty good chance it will be wheeled. That'll create another whole series of problems because we'll have tanks that can't be escorted by infantry in some terrain.The real mechanisation will come with the Land400 design which will replace M113 and ASLAV.
What that design will be is another story
Australian Army to increase by 2,600
- Thread starter Whiskyjack
- Start date
FutureTank
Banned Member
If I had it my way it would be both
It seems to me that purchase of the M1 pretty much demands a tracked IFV, but the fuel situation demands wheels.
It seems to me the problem is one of innovative engineering design
A Stronger Army: The First Stage Approved
(Source: Australian Department of Defence; issued Dec. 7, 2006)
Another key step has been taken in the Howard Government’s plan to substantially increase the size of the Australian Army, with the approval to implement Stage 1 of the Enhanced Land Force.
This stage will increase the size of the Army by one additional Battalion with essential supporting battle-group and Joint capabilities. The Battalion will be raised in 2007, have core capabilities in place by 2008 and be deployable by 2010.
Under the Enhanced Land Force Plan, a second battalion will also be raised, bringing the total strength of the Army to 8 Battalions - 2 Mechanized, 5 Light and 1 Commando. Approximately 2600 additional personnel will be recruited.
The implementation of stage 1 of the Enhanced Land Force includes concurrent facility design and development for both stages and the acquisition of over 100 Bushmaster Infantry Mobility Vehicles. This will bring the size of the Bushmaster fleet of vehicles to more than 400 vehicles.
The Bushmaster vehicle is manufactured in Bendigo and is currently on Operational service in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bushmaster IMV has been commended by those soldiers who have experience operating the vehicle in tough conditions.
AUSTRALIA’S INFANTRY BATTALIONS BY 2012
Unit (Type): Location
- 1RAR (Light): Townsville
- 2RAR (Light): Townsville
- 3RAR (Light): Townsville
- 4RAR (Commando): Sydney
- 5RAR (Mechanised): Darwin
- 6RAR (Light/Motorised): Brisbane
- 7RAR (Mechanised): Adelaide
- 8/9 RAR (Light/Motorised): SE Queensland
(Source: Australian Department of Defence; issued Dec. 7, 2006)
Another key step has been taken in the Howard Government’s plan to substantially increase the size of the Australian Army, with the approval to implement Stage 1 of the Enhanced Land Force.
This stage will increase the size of the Army by one additional Battalion with essential supporting battle-group and Joint capabilities. The Battalion will be raised in 2007, have core capabilities in place by 2008 and be deployable by 2010.
Under the Enhanced Land Force Plan, a second battalion will also be raised, bringing the total strength of the Army to 8 Battalions - 2 Mechanized, 5 Light and 1 Commando. Approximately 2600 additional personnel will be recruited.
The implementation of stage 1 of the Enhanced Land Force includes concurrent facility design and development for both stages and the acquisition of over 100 Bushmaster Infantry Mobility Vehicles. This will bring the size of the Bushmaster fleet of vehicles to more than 400 vehicles.
The Bushmaster vehicle is manufactured in Bendigo and is currently on Operational service in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bushmaster IMV has been commended by those soldiers who have experience operating the vehicle in tough conditions.
AUSTRALIA’S INFANTRY BATTALIONS BY 2012
Unit (Type): Location
- 1RAR (Light): Townsville
- 2RAR (Light): Townsville
- 3RAR (Light): Townsville
- 4RAR (Commando): Sydney
- 5RAR (Mechanised): Darwin
- 6RAR (Light/Motorised): Brisbane
- 7RAR (Mechanised): Adelaide
- 8/9 RAR (Light/Motorised): SE Queensland
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
From what I've read Land 400 will be split up into a number of phases. The first phase is to replace the ASLAV vehicles, with a newer generation wheeled recon/surveillance vehicle and variants.
The next phase will acquire a tracked APC/IFV to replace the M113AS3/4's. I cannot imagine Army will be happy to replace the M113 with a tracked vehicle in the APC/IFV role.
I'd imagine the extra 100 Bushmasters will be split between 8/9RAR and 7RAR, rather than 5 and 7 RAR.
You'll notice that both 6RAR and 8/9RAR are now designated as light/motorised, which is a substantial change from the initial anouncement where they were designated as "light" only...
Someone obviously convinced Government (AGAIN) that light infantry in the Australian context are useless without a vehicle or a helicopter and Bushmasters are somewhat cheaper than MRH-90's...
Why Government was being so parsimonious over ordering more Bushmasters I'll never know. They've proven themselves operationally and in peacetime exercises, Government holds 450 options on more vehicles, (at the same price as the original 299) and they've got plenty of money, with Nick Minchin announcing that Australia is looking at a $10 billion surplus next year.
Completely motorising 7 Brigade, "fleshing out" 1 brigade and equiping B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt is a tremendous boost to the mobility of our army, not to mention the increase in it's ability to "maneuvre" in the battlespace as the head sheds like to waffle on about...
FutureTank
Banned Member
Can you elaborate on this please?
No, not that 'plenty'. The Land400 alone is 1.5bn. The surplus will not go to Defence since its an election year next year.
FutureTank
Banned Member
Yes of course. However we are talking about combat support here. While the combat mech unit does rely on lines of communication using some means of delivering logistic services, these services are not expected to function in the immediate combat zone and present unprotected targets.
A little birdie tells me that 3RAR may keep a cardre of para trained personel. The arrival of the c17,s and the fact that paras are by a long way the fastest way to put troops on the ground,is a capability that shouldnt be given up.
I'd like to see that... maybe 3RAR could establish a parachute company instead of the entire battalion. This would allow both the immediate employment of a para company in an emergency (to secure landing zones for helo-borne infantry, for example) and also the expansion of the para company to qualify the entire battalion as paratroopers once again.
They say the paratrooper capability will be kept on in 4RAR but that's a Commando unit which has a different view of paratrooper operations than conventional infantry ops. I think keeping 3RAR capable of para ops is a wise move.
FutureTank
Banned Member
Australian Infantry Corps capability needs
Essentially Australia has followed US strategy since 1960s, whatever that may be (based generally on the US perception of the role and value of liberal-economic democratic ideology), and deploying troops as part of alliance commitments rather then in any coherent strategic way (i.e. to support national purpose, whatever that is).
Part of the problem is that our only current immediatge threat can only come from Indonesia. However currently Indonesia does not represent a significant threat. Even during East Timor deployment there was not a significant threat of even low level of combat with regular Indonesian troops.
However the issue of ADF planning (or any force planning) is, that it works on several complex cycles.
Firstly there is the personnel cycle.
Defence forces are primarily about having people willing to put their life at risk based on order from Government. Availability of such individuals with the right skills is becoming tighter although maybe not in the infantry given an earlier post on current recruiting.
Recruiting is itself subject to national economic cycles which come in multiples of 7 year business cycles for a total of about 50 years each. Australia is currently in its 3rd business cycle of the 5th long cycle (unadjusted) in its history since 1788. Australian employment being at 95%, or 85% considering those who would like to convert from casual to full time employment, there is not much spare capacity for recruiting.
This brings me to the equipment cycle.
Life of type dictates to a large degree the capability to follow a given strategy. For example, following purchase of amphibious vessels Australia is expected to have a capability to deploy brigade-sized intervention force by sea (in a single lift) for at least 40 years (before refit). This substantially changes the strategic policy. However this strategy is still tied to US strategy because the force can not be deployed without air cover, and the RAN will not have capability to deploy ship based aircraft to protect the amphibious force when deployed despite the availability of AWDs for transit protection.
Even if Australia is to have a brigade for commitment to combat, the best way to use such a force is in relatively short deployments of 3-4 months rotations, and 6 months at most. Vietnam has shown that 12 month deployments take a very severe psychological toll on the personnel.
To maintain annual rotations of a brigade, 3-4 active brigades are required.
The eight battalion listed, if augmented with a tank battalion, only provide for two such brigades (assuming the tank battalions' crews will rotate through same vehicles) since the 4RAR is really a part of the 6 Brigade.
This means that the Reserve brigades would play a full combat deployment role in future combat (as opposed to peacekeeping) commitments.
Keep in mind that IF such a commitment is made in future, the defence of Australia (the other major commitment) would also require concurrent 3-4 brigades at a minimum.
In fact this means that Australia needs two very different forces, with very different capabilities, for a combined total of (comfortable) 6-8 combat brigades and 2 theatre support brigades (one domestic and one overseas). This does not include the 6th Special Operations brigade (partial; internal security role), the 16th Aviation brigade, or the (10th ?) Command brigade units (CLF). The 8 (ideal) combat brigades (assuming one recon squadron, three manoeuvre battalions and one artillery battalion as major units) would require 24 infantry battalions (half Reserve), 8 recce squadrons (half Reserve), 8 artillery battalions (half Reserve), and two 3-squadron (18 tank each) battalions (half Reserve to allow vehicle rotation at least once every 6 months; would require purchase of additional tanks).
The above is a ‘dream land’ thinking since the ADF just doesn’t have the capability to expand recruiting to this level on current posture policy and with current budget!
And there is more.
While many nations in our region of interest employ Bushmaster-like vehicles, they are mostly used for internal security duties! Few have wheeled combat vehicles, and most now have IFVs as part of their combat infantry corps, even if they are 3rd-hand BMP-1s.
However I will have a BMP-1 manufactured in the 60s over a Bushmaster when it comes to combat any time. Given it is maintained, aside from added mobility provided by the tracks, it mounts a 73mm weapon with an effective range to do in any Bushmaster that mounts only a 7.62mm MG. Many countries in the region MANUFACTURE their own AFVs, including Iran, India (or trying to), Malaysia (early attempts), China, Taiwan (trying to), South Korea, Singapore, and of course Japan (though not yet exporting). Russian AFVs are readily available, as are Ukranian and Belarus, never mind other former Warsaw Pact countries.
Western European designed AFVs are still a bit pricey for most regional economies, but it is only a matter of time before second-hand AMXs and Marders become available as France and Germany re-equip. A 40-year-old Marder’s cannon will still make Swiss cheese out of a Bushmaster, never mind the use of old Milans. ADF will not be able to rely on the few Tigers for all its intermediate to long range anti-armour needs in a region that doesn’t in general allow for desert-like gunnery ranges to the tank crews.
The Land 400 design will be a major capability upgrade to the Australian Infantry Corps. It will influence Australian strategic policy for at least 40 years from 2015, affecting three generations of servicemen.
The strategic planning view for the Land 400 is therefore quite complex. Not only are we likely to see a less interventionist USA over the next 20 years (based on Vietnam experience 1972-1991), but quite possibly a significant change in regional politico-economic structure that is likely to include regional conflicts, and a major conflict over the next 40 years (the life cycle of many of the incoming ADF equipment systems).
Then there is the impact of integrating the design with other ADF projects, and into the “hardened networked” ADF (not just the Army). Aside from this, it also has to reduce impact of increasing fuel costs, integrating new fuel technologies likely to appear in the next 40 years, and serve both domestic and overseas deployments in all-terrain all-environment high-intensity combat…and do it for 1.5bn with substantial participation of the Australian Industry not attempted since WW2.
It seems to me the Bushmaster is very much a stopgap solution, as is the recruitment of extra 2600 personnel.
Comments welcome
One of the problems we have is that we don't have a strategy.
Essentially Australia has followed US strategy since 1960s, whatever that may be (based generally on the US perception of the role and value of liberal-economic democratic ideology), and deploying troops as part of alliance commitments rather then in any coherent strategic way (i.e. to support national purpose, whatever that is).
Part of the problem is that our only current immediatge threat can only come from Indonesia. However currently Indonesia does not represent a significant threat. Even during East Timor deployment there was not a significant threat of even low level of combat with regular Indonesian troops.
However the issue of ADF planning (or any force planning) is, that it works on several complex cycles.
Firstly there is the personnel cycle.
Defence forces are primarily about having people willing to put their life at risk based on order from Government. Availability of such individuals with the right skills is becoming tighter although maybe not in the infantry given an earlier post on current recruiting.
Recruiting is itself subject to national economic cycles which come in multiples of 7 year business cycles for a total of about 50 years each. Australia is currently in its 3rd business cycle of the 5th long cycle (unadjusted) in its history since 1788. Australian employment being at 95%, or 85% considering those who would like to convert from casual to full time employment, there is not much spare capacity for recruiting.
This brings me to the equipment cycle.
Life of type dictates to a large degree the capability to follow a given strategy. For example, following purchase of amphibious vessels Australia is expected to have a capability to deploy brigade-sized intervention force by sea (in a single lift) for at least 40 years (before refit). This substantially changes the strategic policy. However this strategy is still tied to US strategy because the force can not be deployed without air cover, and the RAN will not have capability to deploy ship based aircraft to protect the amphibious force when deployed despite the availability of AWDs for transit protection.
Even if Australia is to have a brigade for commitment to combat, the best way to use such a force is in relatively short deployments of 3-4 months rotations, and 6 months at most. Vietnam has shown that 12 month deployments take a very severe psychological toll on the personnel.
To maintain annual rotations of a brigade, 3-4 active brigades are required.
The eight battalion listed, if augmented with a tank battalion, only provide for two such brigades (assuming the tank battalions' crews will rotate through same vehicles) since the 4RAR is really a part of the 6 Brigade.
This means that the Reserve brigades would play a full combat deployment role in future combat (as opposed to peacekeeping) commitments.
Keep in mind that IF such a commitment is made in future, the defence of Australia (the other major commitment) would also require concurrent 3-4 brigades at a minimum.
In fact this means that Australia needs two very different forces, with very different capabilities, for a combined total of (comfortable) 6-8 combat brigades and 2 theatre support brigades (one domestic and one overseas). This does not include the 6th Special Operations brigade (partial; internal security role), the 16th Aviation brigade, or the (10th ?) Command brigade units (CLF). The 8 (ideal) combat brigades (assuming one recon squadron, three manoeuvre battalions and one artillery battalion as major units) would require 24 infantry battalions (half Reserve), 8 recce squadrons (half Reserve), 8 artillery battalions (half Reserve), and two 3-squadron (18 tank each) battalions (half Reserve to allow vehicle rotation at least once every 6 months; would require purchase of additional tanks).
The above is a ‘dream land’ thinking since the ADF just doesn’t have the capability to expand recruiting to this level on current posture policy and with current budget!
And there is more.
While many nations in our region of interest employ Bushmaster-like vehicles, they are mostly used for internal security duties! Few have wheeled combat vehicles, and most now have IFVs as part of their combat infantry corps, even if they are 3rd-hand BMP-1s.
However I will have a BMP-1 manufactured in the 60s over a Bushmaster when it comes to combat any time. Given it is maintained, aside from added mobility provided by the tracks, it mounts a 73mm weapon with an effective range to do in any Bushmaster that mounts only a 7.62mm MG. Many countries in the region MANUFACTURE their own AFVs, including Iran, India (or trying to), Malaysia (early attempts), China, Taiwan (trying to), South Korea, Singapore, and of course Japan (though not yet exporting). Russian AFVs are readily available, as are Ukranian and Belarus, never mind other former Warsaw Pact countries.
Western European designed AFVs are still a bit pricey for most regional economies, but it is only a matter of time before second-hand AMXs and Marders become available as France and Germany re-equip. A 40-year-old Marder’s cannon will still make Swiss cheese out of a Bushmaster, never mind the use of old Milans. ADF will not be able to rely on the few Tigers for all its intermediate to long range anti-armour needs in a region that doesn’t in general allow for desert-like gunnery ranges to the tank crews.
The Land 400 design will be a major capability upgrade to the Australian Infantry Corps. It will influence Australian strategic policy for at least 40 years from 2015, affecting three generations of servicemen.
The strategic planning view for the Land 400 is therefore quite complex. Not only are we likely to see a less interventionist USA over the next 20 years (based on Vietnam experience 1972-1991), but quite possibly a significant change in regional politico-economic structure that is likely to include regional conflicts, and a major conflict over the next 40 years (the life cycle of many of the incoming ADF equipment systems).
Then there is the impact of integrating the design with other ADF projects, and into the “hardened networked” ADF (not just the Army). Aside from this, it also has to reduce impact of increasing fuel costs, integrating new fuel technologies likely to appear in the next 40 years, and serve both domestic and overseas deployments in all-terrain all-environment high-intensity combat…and do it for 1.5bn with substantial participation of the Australian Industry not attempted since WW2.
It seems to me the Bushmaster is very much a stopgap solution, as is the recruitment of extra 2600 personnel.
Comments welcome
FutureTank
Banned Member
In November 2006, it was revealed that the UK MoD has put 600 paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment, and 6 C-130 transporters on stand-by to respond to any sudden increase in fighting over the winter, as has been promised by Taleban leadership. The force would be ready to take off and be deployed in the country within 24 hours, in what would be the largest parachute landing of british soldiers since the Suez Crisis.
Cootamundra
New Member
They didn't jump from the Herc's though! They landed and exited just like any other light infantry force. Personally I do not see a need for us to keep a single Battalion capable of para insertion, this method has not been needed for years. With the new Amphibs helo insertion against key targets (airfields or ports) will be possible. For anything larger ship deployment or lots of C-17 flights or even more herc flights will be the way.
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
We DO have 3 "active" Brigades; 1st, 3rd and 7th Brigades, plus SOCOMD (in effect a "4th" Brigade). I don't see that the addition of 2600 extra troops (plus the 1500 announced last year PRIOR to this announcement) and the raising of 2 more battalions as a stop gap measure. The force that will be created will be bigger than it has been since Vietnam where we managed 9 battalions at one point, and then only through the use of National Service. As an all "volunteer" force, our HNA Army is going to be the biggest we've ever had in peace time.Even if Australia is to have a brigade for commitment to combat, the best way to use such a force is in relatively short deployments of 3-4 months rotations, and 6 months at most. Vietnam has shown that 12 month deployments take a very severe psychological toll on the personnel.
To maintain annual rotations of a brigade, 3-4 active brigades are required.
The eight battalion listed, if augmented with a tank battalion, only provide for two such brigades (assuming the tank battalions' crews will rotate through same vehicles) since the 4RAR is really a part of the 6 Brigade.
It seems to me the Bushmaster is very much a stopgap solution, as is the recruitment of extra 2600 personnel.
Comments welcome
4RAR (Cmdo) is part of SOCOMD. Yes it is part of the RAR, but it is NOT attached to ANY Brigade, particularly 6 Brigade, which of course no longer even exists.
Bushmaster IS the solution. Perentie's were the "stop gap" solution. I'm wondering if you truly understand what the Army uses Bushmaster for?
It is NOT an APC or IFV. That's what the ASLAV-PC is and M113AS3/4 will be used for, as will whatever vehicle is chosen under LAND 400.
The Bushmaster is designed to transport LIGHT infantry to a TAOR, to reduce the strain on "higher level" transport assets by providing mobility for them. It is not supposed to fight other armoured vehicles.
Nor is it designed to engage in combat, but merely to provide an otherwise light force acceptable mobility around the battlefield. This is why it is only equipped with defensive weapons such as an F-89 Minimi or 7.62mm MAG-58 and why the direct fire support and mortar versions, are actually only vehicles designed to convey the existing DFSW and Mortar platoons to their respective area of operations, as opposed to being a "self propelled mortar" or armoured vehicle with a mounted direct fire gun.
Even calling it an armoured vehicle is a misnomer. IF anything Bushmaster's sit somewhere in the middle of "A" and "B" vehicles under the Army's designation of such things.
Army is rapidly moving away from a brigade/battalion structure, in all but the "on paper structure". "Combat teams" are becoming the norm and what our existing force allows us to form is something like 9x combat teams.
The additional battalions (and any supporting assets ie: the 2 "new" artillery batteries that are to be formed to support them) will create additional capabilities to generate combat teams, most likely an additional 3-4 teams.
Most of the particulars of the new structures can be found here:
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/HNA/docs/Impacts_by_Unit.pdf
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"this method has not been needed for years" that is hardly an arguement to lose a very flexible insertion method! When was the last time an Australian fighter plane shot down an enemy fighter? might as well lose the air to air capability too! When did one of our subs last sink a ship?...scap them too! While it is not likely that a para insertion is needed in the imediate future,it may well be needed at some time.We have the resourses and training,the commando,s have other roles to fill. It would be easy to maintain the para capibility with 3RAR.
FutureTank
Banned Member
The item I posted specifically said "parachute", not walk out.
I agree that in general there have been very few successfull parachute operations in history. However I also think that there are situations when parachute deployed unit can do what no other Army unit can. Mark my words that we will need this capability just when we loose it. This is particularly true now when we will have the capability to drop the battalion over a meaningfull distance with C-17s. I would hate to have to send an amphibious task force somewhere, and have nowhere for it to tie up when it gets there.
FutureTank
Banned Member
SOCOMD, 6 Brigade...just signs on the doors.
I'm not arguing with you over 1, 3 and 7 Brigades. It just seems to me that while this may be sufficient for now, the future may be more demanding on the Regulars.
I just think we are in for a lot more strife then Cold War ever had, and this is why I think ADF needs to really look ahead at least a decade in its force planning. National Service was not planning but an expediency.
I think this is what I was saying, that Bushmaster is not an APC and can not be regarded as a vehicle which qualifies a unit as mechanised. I think I mentioned covoy duties and internal security.
Not sure why we need to 'ape' Americans with their 'units of action'. What is a combat team? It sounds to me like the time Soviets did away with ranks
Seems to me traditional unit designations are quite adequate for role and function descriptions. Just semantics, as if a battalion is not a 'combat team'. Its always been about teamwork, whatever the Arm or Service.
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
It's a bit more than a "sign" on the door. 4RAR was never in 6 brigade. Not in the last 15 years anyway. it was 2/4RAR as part of 3 Brigade, then de-linked and they were BOTH part of 3 Brigade, then it became part of SOCOMD.SOCOMD, 6 Brigade...just signs on the doors.
I'm not arguing with you over 1, 3 and 7 Brigades. It just seems to me that while this may be sufficient for now, the future may be more demanding on the Regulars.
I just think we are in for a lot more strife then Cold War ever had, and this is why I think ADF needs to really look ahead at least a decade in its force planning. National Service was not planning but an expediency.
I think this is what I was saying, that Bushmaster is not an APC and can not be regarded as a vehicle which qualifies a unit as mechanised. I think I mentioned covoy duties and internal security.
Not sure why we need to 'ape' Americans with their 'units of action'. What is a combat team? It sounds to me like the time Soviets did away with ranks
Seems to me traditional unit designations are quite adequate for role and function descriptions. Just semantics, as if a battalion is not a 'combat team'. Its always been about teamwork, whatever the Arm or Service.
The combat team idea is not aping the American's. It's a realisation of the way we operate on operations. Not since WW2 have we deployed formed brigades on operations.
We deploy "taskforces". A group of units and sub-units put together to provide specific capabilities required for a particular task.
Look at our current deployments. Elements of 5/7, 6 RAR, 2nd Cav Regt and 1 CER are in Afghanistan, 2 RAR and 2/14LHR are providing forces in Iraq as part of "Overwatch Battlegroup". 3RAR and 2nd Cav Regt are providing SECDET in Baghdad. 1RAR was in Tonga and Solomans. A "choc" sub-unit was in the Solomans recently and 3RAR and 6RAR are in Timor, with 1RAR sitting off the coast of Fiji...
4RAR and SASR have just come home from Afghanistan and now elements of each are sitting with 1RAR off the coast of Fiji...
Elements of EVERY battalion and unit of SOCOMD deployed simulataneously...
While agree with your thoughts on an even greater expansion of army, it IS in the pipeline, it's just not going to happen quickly.
Army has a plan for it's objective force 2025 to move beyond an Army of 2's to become and Army of "3's", ie: 3x mech battalions, 3x motorised battalions, 3x motorised inf battalions, 3x Cav Regt's and support elements and 3x SOCOMD "maneuvre" units...
Just don't expect it in a hurry. Like everything else it needs money and time for ADF to "gear up"...
FutureTank
Banned Member
Interesting....for some reason in my file its part of SOCOMD, but I couldn't remember which brigade it was with beforehand so assumed it was 6 Brigade, obviously wrongly.
Taskforces are due to inadequate deployments. Even now we should be able to deploy to Afghanistan probably 3-4 times more troops then we have (maybe even more). In truth ADF should deploy at least in battalion groups to give expereince of that level of deployment. Yes we haven't deployed in large numbers since WW2, and that is a problem because brigade staffs are not getting the expereince even in Regulars, never mind Reserves. It seems to me Afghanistan offers such an opportunity for deployment given it is far less controversial (comp. to Iraq), and there is real need for combat troops as well as humanitarian assistance.
Yes, it seems to me that is what I said by saying that what I proposed is not currently realistic. Army's Infantry force is its primary Arm, and Land400 will not begin until 2015 IF everything goes right, so give another 5 years for doctrine, integration and training shakedown. This is about right for 2025, but I wonder if the region is going to 'wait' for us.
I wonder why diggers are sitting off Fiji. Nothing is going to happen to the tourists, and we are not going to go in and restore democracy. Its just not how Commonwealth works
By the way, do you happen to know doctrine for SOCOMD? Are they independent administratively but integrated tactically, or are they independent either way, reporting directly to Commander Land Forces?
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
I'd imagine SOCOMD actually prides itself on a LACK of Doctrine...Interesting....for some reason in my file its part of SOCOMD, but I couldn't remember which brigade it was with beforehand so assumed it was 6 Brigade, obviously wrongly.
Taskforces are due to inadequate deployments. Even now we should be able to deploy to Afghanistan probably 3-4 times more troops then we have (maybe even more). In truth ADF should deploy at least in battalion groups to give expereince of that level of deployment. Yes we haven't deployed in large numbers since WW2, and that is a problem because brigade staffs are not getting the expereince even in Regulars, never mind Reserves. It seems to me Afghanistan offers such an opportunity for deployment given it is far less controversial (comp. to Iraq), and there is real need for combat troops as well as humanitarian assistance.
Yes, it seems to me that is what I said by saying that what I proposed is not currently realistic. Army's Infantry force is its primary Arm, and Land400 will not begin until 2015 IF everything goes right, so give another 5 years for doctrine, integration and training shakedown. This is about right for 2025, but I wonder if the region is going to 'wait' for us.
I wonder why diggers are sitting off Fiji. Nothing is going to happen to the tourists, and we are not going to go in and restore democracy. Its just not how Commonwealth works
By the way, do you happen to know doctrine for SOCOMD? Are they independent administratively but integrated tactically, or are they independent either way, reporting directly to Commander Land Forces?
In terms of administrative status the former special operations group was made INTO a Command of it's own, ie: equal to Land Command, Training Command, what used to be called Support Command (don't know what it's called now) etc, from a rank perspective and renamed as the Special Operations Command. It reports directly to Chief of Army, meaning it has excellent connections right to the top of ADF and priority access to higher level ADF assets (ie: C-130's, C-17's etc)...
In terms of tactical operations, it is an entity in of itself, with it's own logistical support assets, planning cells, Headquarters staff etc. I know from a good mate of mine that ON operations, the "Men in Black" separate themselves from the "Green Army" and are quite fastidious about maintaining the separation. From what I understand they usually receive taskings directly from the operational commander...
As to taskforces, they are formed because it is the way we have always operated since WW2. 1 ATF in Vietnam ring any bells??? Brigade staff fill positions within the Deployable joint force headquarters, which is virtually the first unit to deploy on ANY gig, by Army, RAAF OR RAN, so I don't quite know what you're so worried about. The stories of Brigade staff deploying for 31 day's so as to qualify for ASM's is WELL known and I think you'd be surprised just how many regular AND reserve personnel have "campaign" medals nowadays. Simon9 for instance, probably has a VERY shiny chest...
I agree that our committment to Afghanistan is weak, but in light of the extent of our operational commitments at present, is perhaps understandable. Perhaps if our forces are withdrawn from Iraq, that action may free up forces that can be deployed to "the Ghan".
Timor is also winding down, our forces have come back from Tonga, and I doubt the taskforce will sit off Fiji for very long. Maybe another month at most.
With most of these deployments winding down it's an excellent opportunity to re-constitute our forces and perhaps consider a larger force for "the Ghan".
As to LAND 400, I'm thinking it will kick off in or around 2008/9. The first Phase will be the ASLAV replacement and with The ASLAV probably not being upgraded under the original Phase IV of the ASLAV program, I bet Army will want to replace the capability as soon as possible. Army wants much heavier armour for it's Cav/Recon vehicles AND the ability to retain it's "wet crossing" capability. These 2 requirements are incompatible in the LAV II chassis and it's considered a matter of some urgency I believe.
I'd imagine the M113 replacement program would probably kick off in 2010-2012 time frame with in-service dates being around 2014/2015, if they choose a MOTS vehicle. Longer if Army yet again feels the need to "modify" a vehicle...
With the M113AS3/4 only entering service in 2007/8 it's SUCH a value for money project. They stuffed around with it so long, Army will barely get 8 years out of the vehicle, before they look at replacing it... :lul
Its a bit fluid, but initially they were possibly going to be part of an extraction effort. There was some muttering that they might be running assistance as part of a snatch.I wonder why diggers are sitting off Fiji. Nothing is going to happen to the tourists, and we are not going to go in and restore democracy. Its just not how Commonwealth works