Australian Army Discussions and Updates

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Under LAND 907 Army will receive up to 75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, 29 M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicles, 17 M1074 Joint Assault Bridge Vehicles , plus an additional six M88A2 Armoured Recovery Vehicles.

I'm comfortable with additional vehicles but are now questioning the mix.
The breacher and bridging vehicles are a welcomed addition to the ADF , but there numbers appear generous compared to MBT numbers.
I was of the understanding that was attributed to the need in supporting armour in three different locations.
Now armour is to be consolidated in Townsville, could we up the numbers of MBTs as a percentage of the 122 Abram's we are purchasing.

Thoughts


Regards S
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
Under LAND 907 Army will receive up to 75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, 29 M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicles, 17 M1074 Joint Assault Bridge Vehicles , plus an additional six M88A2 Armoured Recovery Vehicles.

I'm comfortable with additional vehicles but are now questioning the mix.
The breacher and bridging vehicles are a welcomed addition to the ADF , but there numbers appear generous compared to MBT numbers.
I was of the understanding that was attributed to the need in supporting armour in three different locations.
Now armour is to be consolidated in Townsville, could we up the numbers of MBTs as a percentage of the 122 Abram's we are purchasing.

Thoughts


Regards S
In all likelihood a lot of them of each type are just going to sit in sheds (I hope in sheds and not the open?).

There is still no clarity about what 3rd Brigade will look like, but with 1st Armoured Regiment staying where it is, I think we will be lucky to see three tank and three cavalry squadrons fielded.

I do agree that the 29 M1150s now seems excessive.
 

FoxtrotRomeo999

Active Member
I would consider the support vehicles enough for a Division, just that someone else else needs to supply at least half the MBTs (or we buy the rest including more SPHs). Do we need an Armoured Division? I suspect so, even if the Anzac myth says "All ya need is love ... and light infantry". The Army has been too focussed on delivering 1x Expeditionary Brigade overseas, not building a capability to deter potential attackers. In fact, i would be using Reserves to build up this mythical Division, and do the same with the other Combat Brigades. Yes, they may be hollow but start recruiting .... I was in the US when Desert Storm was on and
knew a number of local families where their weekend warriors were pulled into the conflict (ie, they filled the gaps with Reservists/National Guards.
 

OldTex

Well-Known Member
i would be using Reserves to build up this mythical Division, and do the same with the other Combat Brigades. Yes, they may be hollow but start recruiting .... I was in the US when Desert Storm was on and
knew a number of local families where their weekend warriors were pulled into the conflict (ie, they filled the gaps with Reservists/National Guards.
Don't confuse the US Army Reserve (and National Guard) with the Reserves in Australia. They are completely different beasts plus the is actual legislative protection for US Reservists' civilian employment which does not exist in Australia.
 

OldTex

Well-Known Member
In all likelihood a lot of them of each type are just going to sit in sheds (I hope in sheds and not the open?).

There is still no clarity about what 3rd Brigade will look like, but with 1st Armoured Regiment staying where it is, I think we will be lucky to see three tank and three cavalry squadrons fielded.

I do agree that the 29 M1150s now seems excessive.
Perhaps the number of ABVs, JABVs and ARVs is not just to support the tanks but also to support the manoeuvre of the CRVs, IFVs and SPGs as well.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Perhaps the number of ABVs, JABVs and ARVs is not just to support the tanks but also to support the manoeuvre of the CRVs, IFVs and SPGs as well.
No doubt there is something in that.
I think there was talk early days for land 400 at looking at a wide range of variants for phase two and three.
The module arrangement of boxer is very flexible where as for for the redneck , I think we are purely getting a IFV and nothing else.
So yes a heavy bridging and breacher vehicle based on the Abram's has merit.

Still no so sure of these numbers if all heavy armour is consolidated in the one location.
Probably need some more clarity of the various battalions and regiments and there composition going forward
Just a thought and happy to be corrected.


Cheers S
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
No doubt there is something in that.
I think there was talk early days for land 400 at looking at a wide range of variants for phase two and three.
The module arrangement of boxer is very flexible where as for for the redneck , I think we are purely getting a IFV and nothing else.
So yes a heavy bridging and breacher vehicle based on the Abram's has merit.

Still no so sure of these numbers if all heavy armour is consolidated in the one location.
Probably need some more clarity of the various battalions and regiments and there composition going forward
Just a thought and happy to be corrected.


Cheers S
It's going to be very interesting to see the composition of 3rd Brigade.

There are changes they could make that would be somewhat revolutionary for our army but which are seen elsewhere.

For example, the US Army has combined arms battalions, which are designated either "(infantry)" or "(armored)". The difference being that the former has two rifle companies (in Bradleys) and one armored company (Abrams), while in the latter the ratio is reversed. The armored brigade combat team has two such armored battalions, one infantry one, and also a cavalry squadron (battalion/regiment size in our language), which has three cavalry troops (squadrons by our standard) in Bradleys and its own armored company. In total, it fields 87 tanks. Particularly relevant to this discussion is that it also has a brigade engineer battalion with two combat engineer companies, fielding a total of six M1150s and four AVLBs.

At most, you would think 3rd Brigade would have available three squadrons of tanks, three of Boxers, and sufficient Redbacks for three to four rifle companies. With the 1st Armoured Regiment HQ not going to Townsville, you can see why I fear that we will actually field fewer RAAC squadrons.

Still, in terms of possibilities, could we see 1RAR and 3RAR becoming armoured battalions - each with a squadron of tanks and two rifle companies in Redbacks? Half of the infantry made redundant could be moved to 2nd Cavalry Regiment to become dismounts, something I understand they lack? Thus, you could form three identical battle groups if need be - with two tank-infantry combat teams (a troop of tanks, two rifle platoons in Redbacks) and a cavalry squadron each. In support, 4th Field Regiment will gain the Huntsman and no doubt field three batteries, and you would expect 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment will gain the armoured engineering capabilities. The negatives include fewer tanks in service (only two squadrons, not three) and less infantry than 3rd Brigade currently fields.

Incidentally, Raven22 said back in post 7865 in this thread that the planning had been for three each AEV, ABV and AVLB per brigade (based then on three brigades), but then added - funnily enough - "... if all the tanks were in a single armoured brigade you would arguably only need a single troop of engineering vehicles in the army, rather than three". On this basis, you would particularly question the 29 M1150s.

Here's a nice little article I found on Cove, meanwhile, that suggests an interesting change that would impact 2RAR and 2nd Cavalry - perhaps freeing the latter to become more a tank regiment than a cavalry one: https://cove.army.gov.au/article/say-do-gap-integrated-combat-force
 

Bluey 006

Active Member
As focused as many are on major war, the reality is that the ADF has many missions outside that, fairly narrow, area. Australia also spends more time at peace than war. Meaning said tasks occur much more frequently.



One key task is the non-warlike, diplomatic and constabulary tasks of the RAN. Navies carry so much more peacetime tasks than the other two Services and always have.

Agreed on the fact ADF spends more time at peace than at War. This is why it needs adaptable, scalable and modular yet balanced force design. This allows for the unexpected. Note: balance doesn't have to mean equal.

The RAN may currently carry more non-warlike, diplomatic and constabulary tasks but it could be asked, should they? We have ABF.
Currently to the nature of Operation Sovereign Borders naturally the RAN has a large role to play. But the RAAF plays an equally demanding role.

I do think for now RAN needs to maintain responsibility for patrol and control of current and future assets but one day this may need to change.

I think you might be understating the non-warlike tasks of the other services. Peacetime engagements such as overseas training and capacity building, humanitarian and disaster relief (at home and abroad), and cooperative activities with other agencies are generally the role of the Army. But in line with the join forces concept, they generally (especially OS) need the Navy or Air Force to get there. Service rivalry aside we need to be a joint force. We do not want to head down the US path of services competing for funds. This has led to some colossal economic blunders and runs the danger of the military influencing politics, a slippery slope for a liberal democracy.

Port visits are great for as a token diplomacy. But an overseas Army presence in the country is deeply engaged politically, and usually are more closely involved with local populations over long periods in a way in which sailors and air personnel are generally not. This sends signals to the host nation, other states and non-state actors. A highly visible and clearly understood presence. This gives a high level of reassurance and offers a level of diplomatic commitment that a ship stationed offshore, simply cannot. The same could be said for disaster relief and Army operations in Australia, the presence of Army personnel rallies, engages and reassures the community in a way that other agencies cannot. During national emergencies its usually (but not always) Army helicopters that typically called to assist. That said, I am sure the sight of Navy ships during the black summer 2019 fires was a sigh of relief to the people of Mallacoota.

A carrier or ship 100 kms off the coast sends a powerful signal to an adversary and to the nation you are supporting, but it is a mixed signal. To the adversary there is significant firepower sitting off our coast, but they don’t care enough to get up close and personal and risk standing between us and our objective. To the nation you are supporting it is yes, we will support you, but not stand shoulder to shoulder with you and face the threat in the mud, suffering in the same way you do.

Ukraine shows how quickly ground equipment can be delivered and new units raised, not ideal by any means, but doable.

With the RAN however MFUs take years.
Does Ukraine really show that? All Western powers have been unable to keep up.

During the current conflict, both Ukraine and Russia have suffered huge losses and used ammunition at an unsustainable rate. The pace of combat has forced Russia to pull decades old equipment out of storage and seek supplies from Belarus, North Korea, and Iran. Ukraine in contrast has been forced to beg for equipment and ammunition from the West, much of which has already been heavily used and is breaking down from wear and tear rather than from combat. Further to this NATO militaries have discovered their stockpiles short on the ammunition and equipment needed to fight a high-intensity war, and they are now struggling to keep up with Ukraine’s needs. A high percentage of the global north has gifted Ukraine equipment, and it still isn’t enough.

See here

The West has been pulling obsolete equipment out of storage to gift. What if there isn’t equipment in storage? Ukraine is a localised conflict. Between middle powers. What if it is a global conflict, and every nation needs equipment for their own security? Self-preservation means nations will act in their own national and self-interest.


Certainly, appreciate that RAN MFUs (yes, we need more) take years to build, longer than political cycles. This is part of the problem, and why we should stick to a long term and sustainable growth plan for RAN, unless there is a significant change in circumstances no need to change - improve and adapt if needed but don't throw it out and start again every four years for political purposes.

The thing people misunderstood with Beersheba Bde's were that they were not war fighting Bde's. The Army's mission is not to fight wars - it's to prepare land power. What this means is that when time comes to deploy a JTF, we would assemble the land component from various Bde's. Because every level of command was already familiar with all the capabilities of a Bde, it didn't matter where you grabbed them - a Coy from 1 RAR, 5 RAR or 6 RAR could just as easily pair with a Tp from 2 Cav to build a combat team. That no longer exists. If you want a Mech CT you need to use 1 or 3 RAR. That's okay for a one-shot (assuming you only have the one task), but where are the follow-on/replacement forces coming from? Previously, any of the Bn could. Now?
100% on this and why I am quite critical of the decision to change the MRB structure and centralize all of the armour in Townville and other capabilities elsewhere.

a - a robust and rehearsed mobilisation plan. We need 1100 odd IFVs but bout 150-ish? Ok, how do we make up the numbers? Where do extra SM-2 come from? Spare parts for the E-7s? Fuel to Tindal? etc etc etc. That helps identify what's next



b - list of tasks. From this, what capabilities do we 100% need all the time (say, DDG, E-7, CDT, LHD, some special RAE units). This honestly won't be a long list....

c - a prioritisation of kit based on (b), with workforce matching in (a). This is the stuff that we buy in peace. Rule of thumb, long build or highly technical. So FFG/DDG/F-35/E-7/tank/helo for each Service. Then what is the minimal viable level (based on delivery time) and ensure the delta is covered in (a).

In principle, this would see maritime forces prioritised, then airlift, then air strike, then mech forces.

While I do agree, we need a robust and rehearsed mobilisation plan. Does mobilisation work in the same way it did in times gone by?

National mobilisation is not whole-of-government but rather whole-of-society response, including accessing resources from the wider global domain.

Active duty and reserve troops are obligated to go where they are ordered too. Mobilisation relies on the population agreeing to the cause. In the divisive world we live today, people would disagree on whether water is wet or not. Sure, the government can order people and companies to do things, make its case for mobilisation but that doesn’t mean they will. What is the government going to do if people refuse or object, lock everyone up? Then you’ll have a civil war on your hands as well, further exacerbating the situation. Not very becoming of a democracy to be worse than whatever threat it is mobilising against. We also need to consider that nations alone no longer hold a monopoly on power, non-state actors may not see mobilisation in their interest.

This is where those IO (soft power: propaganda, persuasion, counter IWIO) may come into play.

Mobilisation also relies on your national ability to acquire, produce or generate the all the necessary elements to fight and sustain the war. In the globalised world we live today supply chains are international, few nations can produce everything they need, look how quickly COVID-19 disrupted these supply chains, turned people against each other and generally sent the world FUBAR. If the world is engaged in biological or nuclear warfare, or there is a major world changing climate event. How effective is a call to arms mobilisation going to be?

The world is also a much more multi-cultural and multi-polar place than it was. As much as many would like to believe it, the world is not split down two lines of good verses bad anymore. The contemporary population has access to information and education that it did not have in the past.
The patriotism that existed during the two world wars which was very much an enabler to mobilisation isn't the same. Unblinded trust in the government no longer exists, people have become global citizens with their own views. They form communities with those that they share values, similarities or interests. For many, those values may be at odds with said mobilisation. There of course will also be an effort by your adversary to prevent, complicate and delay mobilisation through - active and passive means. Those IO raise their head again.

Our alliance structures are generally steadfast and solid, but support can be never 100% be guaranteed, if faced with extinction or supporting their ally, fairly safe bet most nations would act in a way that ensures their survival. This is human nature.

We hear people talk about risk regularly here on defencetalk. With only a small fraction of the risks of relying on mobilisation articulated here. Are you prepared to rest your survival on it?
 
Last edited:

Armchair

Well-Known Member
It's going to be very interesting to see the composition of 3rd Brigade.

There are changes they could make that would be somewhat revolutionary for our army but which are seen elsewhere.

At most, you would think 3rd Brigade would have available three squadrons of tanks, three of Boxers, and sufficient Redbacks for three to four rifle companies. With the 1st Armoured Regiment HQ not going to Townsville, you can see why I fear that we will actually field fewer RAAC squadrons.


Incidentally, Raven22 said back in post 7865 in this thread that the planning had been for three each AEV, ABV and AVLB per brigade (based then on three brigades), but then added - funnily enough - "... if all the tanks were in a single armoured brigade you would arguably only need a single troop of engineering vehicles in the army, rather than three". On this basis, you would particularly question the 29 M1150s.
Wouldn’t the littoral brigade in Darwin at least have quite different engineering manouevre support requirements?

Also don’t the battalions provide the HQs for generated battle groups (I think that is in another Raven22 post)? If 3rd Brigade has a (big) ACR, Mech inf, and motorised inf then it only has three HQs. If four are required then tank and cavalry battalions (for force generation) would (I think) be less revolutionary than combined arms battalions (not suggesting you were advocating that).
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
It's going to be very interesting to see the composition of 3rd Brigade.

There are changes they could make that would be somewhat revolutionary for our army but which are seen elsewhere.

For example, the US Army has combined arms battalions, which are designated either "(infantry)" or "(armored)". The difference being that the former has two rifle companies (in Bradleys) and one armored company (Abrams), while in the latter the ratio is reversed. The armored brigade combat team has two such armored battalions, one infantry one, and also a cavalry squadron (battalion/regiment size in our language), which has three cavalry troops (squadrons by our standard) in Bradleys and its own armored company. In total, it fields 87 tanks. Particularly relevant to this discussion is that it also has a brigade engineer battalion with two combat engineer companies, fielding a total of six M1150s and four AVLBs.

At most, you would think 3rd Brigade would have available three squadrons of tanks, three of Boxers, and sufficient Redbacks for three to four rifle companies. With the 1st Armoured Regiment HQ not going to Townsville, you can see why I fear that we will actually field fewer RAAC squadrons.

Still, in terms of possibilities, could we see 1RAR and 3RAR becoming armoured battalions - each with a squadron of tanks and two rifle companies in Redbacks? Half of the infantry made redundant could be moved to 2nd Cavalry Regiment to become dismounts, something I understand they lack? Thus, you could form three identical battle groups if need be - with two tank-infantry combat teams (a troop of tanks, two rifle platoons in Redbacks) and a cavalry squadron each. In support, 4th Field Regiment will gain the Huntsman and no doubt field three batteries, and you would expect 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment will gain the armoured engineering capabilities. The negatives include fewer tanks in service (only two squadrons, not three) and less infantry than 3rd Brigade currently fields.

Incidentally, Raven22 said back in post 7865 in this thread that the planning had been for three each AEV, ABV and AVLB per brigade (based then on three brigades), but then added - funnily enough - "... if all the tanks were in a single armoured brigade you would arguably only need a single troop of engineering vehicles in the army, rather than three". On this basis, you would particularly question the 29 M1150s.

Here's a nice little article I found on Cove, meanwhile, that suggests an interesting change that would impact 2RAR and 2nd Cavalry - perhaps freeing the latter to become more a tank regiment than a cavalry one: https://cove.army.gov.au/article/say-do-gap-integrated-combat-force
A good post
No idea as to army's structure today or going forward.
Just working on the premise and numbers of Plan Beersheba /Keogh.
Three like Brigades and the total number of Sqns / Coys of tanks , Cav , Motorised Inf, etc.

Are we just juggling the existing numbers of Sqns /Coys of the past, or will there be a change in numbers and how they are utilised?

I have thought a mix of capabilities within a Battalion / Regt is worth exploring.

As you mentioned some examples already in US service.
I feel it is particularly a good fit for smaller army's like our own.
As to the breakdown; our aspirations are somewhat guided by vehicle /platform numbers.
Working on the assumption that about a third of any given number of vehicles will be for maintenance, refit and reserve stock.
The numbers of tanks, IFVs, Boxer's does suggest enough to continue being a fleet of threes.
If we want a two to one ratio of Sqns within a battalion then the above numbers may become problematic without some additional vehicle purchases.
I somehow do not see that happening.

Some confusing times for Army.
Some confusing times for Navy

Need some clarity to give confidence I say.

Cheers S
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Perhaps the number of ABVs, JABVs and ARVs is not just to support the tanks but also to support the manoeuvre of the CRVs, IFVs and SPGs as well.
Exactly. AS-9, AS-10, Boxer, AS-21 - they all need the same kit. Plus, this stuff is harder to make than gun variants (due to numbers), so it's easier to build up regular vehicles in a short time. Finally, its more likely these platforms will take losses - so at least we have some redundancy.

It's going to be very interesting to see the composition of 3rd Brigade.

There are changes they could make that would be somewhat revolutionary for our army but which are seen elsewhere.
I have thought a mix of capabilities within a Battalion / Regt is worth exploring.

As you mentioned some examples already in US service.
I feel it is particularly a good fit for smaller army's like our own.
As to the breakdown; our aspirations are somewhat guided by vehicle /platform numbers.
Nope, not revolutionary. We tried in the 90s, and it doesn't work.

Battlegrouping is for combat, not peacetime. Specifically, battlegroups and combat teams are raised depending on the task. We commonly group infantry and armour as they really do cover each other well, but it doesn't mean you always will. Even looking at numbers can mix things up. We generally throw out a triangular BG of two Inf Coy and one Armd Sqn. But what if the task demands 2:1? Or 3:1? Think of a rapid Bde advance against thinly held positions - you very much may want 1AR with 60-odd tanks with a smattering of infantry to pin; while the follow up BG are heavy on infantry to consolidate. The phrase "task orientated" is the key to understanding combined arms.

What is better is developing genuine experts within trade in peacetime, so when they combine you get a combination of expertise. Exercises within a Bde or Div give the exposure to other elements. It also aids logistics, if all the CRV is in one Regt I can use (say) 4 Fitter Armourers. If I spread them across three units, I now need 6 or 8. Likewise test kit and the like.

While I do agree, we need a robust and rehearsed mobilisation plan. Does mobilisation work in the same way it did in times gone by?
Quite simply, no. But that relates to entire changes within society and the economy. We can look at previous mobilisations for ideas, but we need a modern one. And the rehearsals (even if they are only tabletop ones) will continue to allow for societal and economic shifts.

National mobilisation is not whole-of-government but rather whole-of-society response, including accessing resources from the wider global domain.

Active duty and reserve troops are obligated to go where they are ordered too. Mobilisation relies on the population agreeing to the cause. In the divisive world we live today, people would disagree on whether water is wet or not. Sure, the government can order people and companies to do things, make its case for mobilisation but that doesn’t mean they will. What is the government going to do if people refuse or object, lock everyone up? Then you’ll have a civil war on your hands as well, further exacerbating the situation. Not very becoming of a democracy to be worse than whatever threat it is mobilising against. We also need to consider that nations alone no longer hold a monopoly on power, non-state actors may not see mobilisation in their interest.
Yes.......to a point. Not every mobilisation is like you describe, a WW2 type effort. We have mobilised at least twice in my career - because just like our response, the mobilisation effort needs to be scalable.

The point about being larger than Defence is 100% correct. But that is the way with any national strategy/plan. It's why I raise my eyebrow when people tell me war is likely in the next 5 - 8 years. If that were the case, and any government believed that, then why have the policies of other Departments not fundamentally changed towards any potential threat? You cannot cry the strategic sky is falling and only fund the ADF/Defence...

We hear people talk about risk regularly here on defencetalk. With only a small fraction of the risks of relying on mobilisation articulated here. Are you prepared to rest your survival on it?
Yes, because we have no other choice. We cannot sustain the ADF required for a small conflict, let alone a war of national survival. Nor should we. The alternative is to have all that risk, and no mobilisation plan. Which I'd argue is one of the single largest failures a government could commit.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Exactly. AS-9, AS-10, Boxer, AS-21 - they all need the same kit. Plus, this stuff is harder to make than gun variants (due to numbers), so it's easier to build up regular vehicles in a short time. Finally, its more likely these platforms will take losses - so at least we have some redundancy.




Nope, not revolutionary. We tried in the 90s, and it doesn't work.

Battlegrouping is for combat, not peacetime. Specifically, battlegroups and combat teams are raised depending on the task. We commonly group infantry and armour as they really do cover each other well, but it doesn't mean you always will. Even looking at numbers can mix things up. We generally throw out a triangular BG of two Inf Coy and one Armd Sqn. But what if the task demands 2:1? Or 3:1? Think of a rapid Bde advance against thinly held positions - you very much may want 1AR with 60-odd tanks with a smattering of infantry to pin; while the follow up BG are heavy on infantry to consolidate. The phrase "task orientated" is the key to understanding combined arms.

What is better is developing genuine experts within trade in peacetime, so when they combine you get a combination of expertise. Exercises within a Bde or Div give the exposure to other elements. It also aids logistics, if all the CRV is in one Regt I can use (say) 4 Fitter Armourers. If I spread them across three units, I now need 6 or 8. Likewise test kit and the like.



Quite simply, no. But that relates to entire changes within society and the economy. We can look at previous mobilisations for ideas, but we need a modern one. And the rehearsals (even if they are only tabletop ones) will continue to allow for societal and economic shifts.



Yes.......to a point. Not every mobilisation is like you describe, a WW2 type effort. We have mobilised at least twice in my career - because just like our response, the mobilisation effort needs to be scalable.

The point about being larger than Defence is 100% correct. But that is the way with any national strategy/plan. It's why I raise my eyebrow when people tell me war is likely in the next 5 - 8 years. If that were the case, and any government believed that, then why have the policies of other Departments not fundamentally changed towards any potential threat? You cannot cry the strategic sky is falling and only fund the ADF/Defence...



Yes, because we have no other choice. We cannot sustain the ADF required for a small conflict, let alone a war of national survival. Nor should we. The alternative is to have all that risk, and no mobilisation plan. Which I'd argue is one of the single largest failures a government could commit.
Takao

Within the limits of a public forum, is there actually a detailed future brigade structure / structures filtering down to the ranks?
Or
Are we still at the we have a concept and lets see how it evolves stage!


I appreciate this sounds like a silly question, but I get the vibe that there is a lot of "military speak" and no real substance.
A thought bubble that probably wont realistically go anywhere.

Whatever the merits and limitations of Plan Beersheba and Keogh they were clear a statement of intent, shared in the broad terms with the public.

Maybe I'm expecting to much detail.

Defence does appear to be a closed media shop of recent years.


Cheers S
 

OldTex

Well-Known Member
Here's a nice little article I found on Cove, meanwhile, that suggests an interesting change that would impact 2RAR and 2nd Cavalry - perhaps freeing the latter to become more a tank regiment than a cavalry one: https://cove.army.gov.au/article/say-do-gap-integrated-combat-force
If such a structure (and I admit that is a very big if) was implemented, there would be significant impacts on not only all of the various LMVs (LMV-P, LMV-M and LMV-H) as to numbers, capabilities, CONOPS etc but also within the wider Joint Forces arena for the amphibious warfare vessels.

It would also be potentially a structure that could be applied not just for 2RAR but perhaps also 1 Bde (in its littoral manoeuvre role). But would it be a running jump too far????
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
If such a structure (and I admit that is a very big if) was implemented, there would be significant impacts on not only all of the various LMVs (LMV-P, LMV-M and LMV-H) as to numbers, capabilities, CONOPS etc but also within the wider Joint Forces arena for the amphibious warfare vessels.

It would also be potentially a structure that could be applied not just for 2RAR but perhaps also 1 Bde (in its littoral manoeuvre role). But would it be a running jump too far????
I think it is a jump too far but I posted it because I found it interesting due to some of the points made about why reform is necessary and also attitudes towards potential change. The latter includes a dismissal of the idea that units must be corps-specific. This going to the discussion about battle groups and so forth. There was also some points about the need to be conservative of resources, particularly around battalion-level HQs, which relates to what I've been saying about the unknowns regarding 3rd Brigade.

Realistically, such a structure would be a one-off, with that unit being the lead amphibious capability provider, which 2RAR already is, of course. I wonder if the unit would be better served being two smaller battalion-level units, but then that doesn't give you a "spare" battalion HQ. I think there is still a lot of work to do, and change ahead, in working out what our littoral units should look like.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
If such a structure (and I admit that is a very big if) was implemented, there would be significant impacts on not only all of the various LMVs (LMV-P, LMV-M and LMV-H) as to numbers, capabilities, CONOPS etc but also within the wider Joint Forces arena for the amphibious warfare vessels.

It would also be potentially a structure that could be applied not just for 2RAR but perhaps also 1 Bde (in its littoral manoeuvre role). But would it be a running jump too far????
At risk of cutting across the discussion of the new concept.
If 2RAR became part of 1st Brigade then there are 2 HQs and both have access to the engineers, signallers and logistics units all geared for littoral including supporting possible new concepts.

Maybe that is the plan and was too messy to fit on the army reorg infographic.

That leaves 1st Brigade artillery. I was guessing that will incorporate land based anti ship missiles (unusual organizational level to place it but cheaper than raising a new corps level regiment) and it is a lot of howitzers to support one battalion.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
At risk of cutting across the discussion of the new concept.
If 2RAR became part of 1st Brigade then there are 2 HQs and both have access to the engineers, signallers and logistics units all geared for littoral including supporting possible new concepts.

Maybe that is the plan and was too messy to fit on the army reorg infographic.

That leaves 1st Brigade artillery. I was guessing that will incorporate land based anti ship missiles (unusual organizational level to place it but cheaper than raising a new corps level regiment) and it is a lot of howitzers to support one battalion.
2x battalions - 2RAR and 5/7RAR…

I think long term 1 Brigade will also need a Cavalry Regiment capability as well. Either 1 Armoured or something else.

Everything is in a bit of a muddle at the moment with half explained (publicly) plans and so forth.
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
2x battalions - 2RAR and 5/7RAR…

I think long term 1 Brigade will also need a Cavalry Regiment capability as well. Either 1 Armoured or something else.

Everything is in a bit of a muddle at the moment with half explained (publicly) plans and so forth.
Thanks.
I had wondered if 1 Brigade was intended to gain battalions (or at least elements) from regional allies who might not have their own brigade level supports.
If that brigade goes places where they are expecting to be driving lots of PMVs and wheeled logistics, engineering, artillery and command vehicles I can only imagine they would also need some CRV Boxers.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Thanks.
I had wondered if 1 Brigade was intended to gain battalions (or at least elements) from regional allies who might not have their own brigade level supports.
If that brigade goes places where they are expecting to be driving lots of PMVs and wheeled logistics, engineering, artillery and command vehicles I can only imagine they would also need some CRV Boxers.
Well luckily we will have a few.

BoP for Boxer CRV was for 3x Armoured Cav Regiments - 1 Armoured Regt, 2nd Cav Regt and 2/14LHR, plus training elements etc. Around 55-60 odd vehicles per Regiment.

Then DSR came along slashed some parts of future Army capability and now we know 1 Armoured Regt is to become a trials and development unit for advanced technologies.

No idea if ‘the plan’ is it is still gaining it’s planned cars, but if not we have around 55-60 Boxer CRV’s on order that no longer have a home…

Along of course with several squadrons of tanks + ARV’s, armoured bridges, armoured engineering vehicles etc that no longer need to be issued, but which we are still apparently buying?
 

Armchair

Well-Known Member
Well luckily we will have a few.

BoP for Boxer CRV was for 3x Armoured Cav Regiments - 1 Armoured Regt, 2nd Cav Regt and 2/14LHR, plus training elements etc. Around 55-60 odd vehicles per Regiment.

Then DSR came along slashed some parts of future Army capability and now we know 1 Armoured Regt is to become a trials and development unit for advanced technologies.

No idea if ‘the plan’ is it is still gaining it’s planned cars, but if not we have around 55-60 Boxer CRV’s on order that no longer have a home…

Along of course with several squadrons of tanks + ARV’s, armoured bridges, armoured engineering vehicles etc that no longer need to be issued, but which we are still apparently buying?
Looked at it another way, tanks and CRVs are capabilities that Army has had for decades. They are not being cut , so far as we know, and programs are advanced to replace them with updated deployable equipment continue. Plans to organise them are vague but in some other armies tanks and cav vehicles would be used to train reserves or equip deployable national guard units (admittedly those reserves would also have IFVs and/or deployable APCs).

On the other hand, the factory for IFVs is still being built Hanwha announces location of $170m manufacturing facility - Geelong Manufacturing Council

The cut to IFV number 130+ is most likely a signal to ADF. Acquire MOTS-specced equipment fast. In this case the factory building IFVs is in the defence minister’s electorate. It has a good chance of further local orders before 2030, I reckon.
 
Top