Australian Army Discussions and Updates

Takao

The Bunker Group
Armoured forces able to deploy as a battlegroup or as combat teams as part of a task force make sense for our region. If instead the argument is for multiples of, effectively, armoured brigades, then the questions should be where could we deploy and sustain such a brigade, and where would we want to?
There are excellent reasons that a Brigade is the unit of action for Army, and not a Battlegroup.

Enablers: A BG cannot sustain itself past 14 days at the most. Some will be much less than that. Furthermore, while there will be a mix of infantry and armour, a BG is rather one-dimensional. Because of these, the BG needs to be reinforced with combat support and logistic elements. When you are talking about artillery, Army aviation, RAAF, RAN, engineer, hospital, logistics, communications - very quickly the BG HQ gets overwhelmed. Furthermore the logistics sub-unit just wont have the people to support all of that. And that's just ADF assets. If you have US, UK, NZ or other allies you'll need a presence in the HQ, likewise DFAT, AFP, intelligence orgs, etc for non-ADF support.

Command: Related to above, the command a Bde brings is greater and deeper. A BG HQ will be no more than 20 people, a Bde will be about 100. That means there is sufficient expertise, the interconnections between Bde HQ and supporting/higher HQ are more solid and, critically, the deployed force can think about the next 7 - 10 days. The Plans Cell of a BG will be looking out 96 h at most, the Bde can do out 2 weeks. Means more time for prep and rehearsals. A Bde HQ also brings all the communications links of a Signals Regiment. Sure, a BG can (and does) borrow dets and Tp's from the CSR, but they can't use all of the C4 nodes and networks.

Authority: Intrinsically related to above, a Bde HQ will have a 1 Star running the show, a BG has a LTCOL. Now LTCOL's are magnificent creatures, brave, bold, devastatingly attractive - but they (a) don't necessarily have the ability to look wider (see Bde staffing), not the authority to use certain materiel. For sensitive ADF assets (SF, long range fires, etc - even AAvn) having a 1 Star direct their efforts allows for better use. The 1 Star also brings significant diplomatic weight, meaning they can work with allies and partners, as well as having more Joint experience than a LTCOL, hence working better with the Joint Force. The last point is important - why 1 Star and not BRIG? Because a Bde HQ is set up to provide a Minor JTF HQ capability, reserving DJFHQ for larger operations if needed. A BG just cannot.

Tasks: A BG is, by definition, a task orientated force designed for a specific mission. As soon as that mission is done, the BG structure is obsolete. Yes, we talk about common BG structures (inf-armour, triangle/square), but it really depends on the mission. This means if you send a BG, it can do one mission. A Bde on the other hand, it can reorg on the fly, raising and disbanding BG from a number of subordinate units to match any mission. Modern war is still defined by ideas like the 3 block war - meaning that you might be fighting and aiding at the same time. A BG simply cannot - undermining the overall Australian strategy.

Reserves: A Brigade, at worst, will bring 3x BG with it. Assuming the bare minimum (for BG size's, see How many IFV? and How many Tanks?) that's 14 tanks and 40ish IFV. Which isn't too bad - but what do they do after the first attack? Noting that any modern fight means we do an assault and face a counter attack (two fights) or do an assault and fail - which in turn means losses. So what do you do the next day? Say the BG looses 2 tanks and 4 IFV (and I'll be generous, not K-Kills), the EME peeps (devastatingly handsome, super smart, Gods and Goddesses who walk the world they may be) simply won't be able to repair them in time. So - you just wait? If they are K-Kills, how do you replace them? And the people? A Bde has options, they can rotate BG around. And remember, we'll try and throw a BG at any enemy concentration of ~100 - 120 people. If you've thrown an armoured BG into the mix, chances are you are facing more than 100 people.

Response to the unexpected: Surprise and deception work both ways. A Bde allows you flexibility. If the threat axis changes you can throw your reserve BG at it while you reorientate. Or reinforce your main effort with another BG. You can rapidly re-role a BG to conduct HADR because a cyclone just hit your SPOD while maintaining pressure on the threat with another two BG. LTCOL (see above - awesomeness in a single package) can do a heap with a BG, but easier to spread 2000 people over the task v 600.

Geography: You don't plan on really operating beyond your enablers (combined arms rules) meaning a BG can operate as far as an 81 mm mortar, or maybe an M777. That's not very much area, not really. If there is any urban areas in that AO, it's going to get much smaller - cities suck up forces like a sponge. A Bde can operate much further - over 100s or even 1000s of km if needed. A single BG hanging out overseas doesn't really achieve much. Have a look at our efforts in the MEAO which, will argumentative and having many other restrictions, shows a BG doesn't do much.

To summarise all of the above, INTERFET provides the best example. Three (simple) tasks: restore peace and security in East Timor; protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks; and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. All in a small nation (6x smaller than Tasmania) that had negligible threat. We put 8 - 10 BG into that, all gripped up under 2x Bde HQ and 1x Div HQ. It was messy from a C2 point of view for alliance and political reasons, but it shows just how quickly BG get absorbed. And that doesn't include the enablers that were also needed.

Bde HQ are our unit of action for many reasons. And as the loggie who was responsible for a CSR/Bde HQ a few years ago - even most of the Army doesn't fully understand what they bring. They can get bloody big, bloody quick, and as brilliant as LTCOLs are, they just cannot. The question that should be asked is what Bde will explicitly do what missions demanded of Army (and, as an aside, this should be demanded by the public as evidence we can do what y'all pay us for) - and is there a role for Div HQ? (#spoilers - **** yes)
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
There are excellent reasons that a Brigade is the unit of action for Army, and not a Battlegroup. Snipped
I really don't disagree with this, but it doesn't at all go to what I was saying. I was specifically referencing how our armoured forces could deploy a battlegroup or at least combat team(s) as part of a task force, and I did mean a brigade-size task force, which is what is usually inferred by that term. Raven made an excellent post some time ago saying - in small part - that it seemed 9th Brigade would focus on being able to deploy armoured battlegroups and combat teams as part of larger forces.

Edit to add for clarity: If this is the sentence you were responding to - If instead the argument is for multiples of, effectively, armoured brigades, then the questions should be where could we deploy and sustain such a brigade, and where would we want to? - then the key word is "armoured". I wasn't talking about deploying a brigade in general, I was talking about deploying what would amount to an armoured brigade. That would be a rather different force than we have deployed before.
 
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OldTex

Well-Known Member
Command: Related to above, the command a Bde brings is greater and deeper. A BG HQ will be no more than 20 people, a Bde will be about 100. That means there is sufficient expertise, the interconnections between Bde HQ and supporting/higher HQ are more solid and, critically, the deployed force can think about the next 7 - 10 days. The Plans Cell of a BG will be looking out 96 h at most, the Bde can do out 2 weeks. Means more time for prep and rehearsals. A Bde HQ also brings all the communications links of a Signals Regiment. Sure, a BG can (and does) borrow dets and Tp's from the CSR, but they can't use all of the C4 nodes and networks.
So true. A Bde HQ is in some ways a self licking icecream. It does suck in a lot of people from the CSR (RHQ, LSS and at least 1 TP, more if there are RETRANS sites and RR chains employed). But for all of that it has the mass needed to achieve the required C2. The det provided by the CSR to a BG is equipped and manned to provide a HCL, any other role would necessitate a different scale of manning and equipment.
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
You put it together and you can see that in terms of "heavy" forces the Australian Army would be able to sustain a deployment of a squadron of Abrams, an armoured infantry company in the Redback, two squadrons of Boxers, and a Huntsman battery. Add to that the long-range fire capabilities being acquired, such as HIMARS.
I would see this as reinforcing my point:

Even post-DSR it remains very unclear as to what Army is being set up to acheive.

Sadly at the moment it is likely unable to achieve much outside of very permissive environments.

Regards,

Massive
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
I would see this as reinforcing my point:

Even post-DSR it remains very unclear as to what Army is being set up to acheive.
I appreciate that you would like to see more emphasis on the Army, more clarity, more investment, and so forth, and I am sure most of us would agree with you.

Yet I have to disagree with this comment:

Sadly at the moment it is likely unable to achieve much outside of very permissive environments.
The Australian Army is arguably more capable today than at any point since World War II, and its current acquisition programs will make it more so.

We can all agree that more armour would be preferred, but it's a matter of degrees. Any thinking that we should have multiples of armoured brigades is not focused on our region - it's thinking about invading Iraq or facing the Russians in Europe.

I mean, I am sure the USMC would disagree with the notion it is "unable to achieve much outside of very permissive environments" due to the removal of its tanks. Should the same be said of the US Army's 13 active infantry brigades?
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
We can all agree that more armour would be preferred, I mean, I am sure the USMC would disagree with the notion it is "unable to achieve much outside of very permissive environments" due to the removal of its tanks. Should the same be said of the US Army's 13 active infantry brigades?
With all due respect this makes no sense at all.

My strongly held, carefully thought through, opinion (and that is all it is) is that anything less than 3 heavy brigades and a single light-ish littoral brigade does not deliver sufficient land power to enable independent operations that would achieve much outside of very permissive environments.

Regards,

Massive

ps. I think you mean 31
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
With all due respect this makes no sense at all.

My strongly held, carefully thought through, opinion (and that is all it is) is that anything less than 3 heavy brigades and a single light-ish littoral brigade does not deliver sufficient land power to enable independent operations that would achieve much outside of very permissive environments.

Regards,

Massive

ps. I think you mean 31
The point being that you seem to be saying - well, actually, you are because you say it later - that anything less than "heavy" brigades does not allow one to "operate outside of very permissive environments". That's just not true. What a few seem to be confusing is that its different horses for different courses. And in our region, "heavy" - that is, combined arms armoured formations - are not overly suitable outside limited potential AOs for a range of reasons.

You're basically suggesting that we'd have a greater proportion of "heavy" brigades than the US Army, which classifies slightly more than a third of its 31 active brigades as "armored". I meant 13 - that's the number of infantry brigades. Then you have the stryker brigades, which are not "heavy" either. Outside potentially South Korea, the US Army does not expect to send armored brigades to the Asia-Pacific. Let's remember it did not send a single armored division to the theatre in World War II. There are good reasons for that, which have not changed.

The considered opinion of the Australian Army was to have multirole brigade - Plan Beersheba, which was more mindful of operations in the Middle East. Then we saw that superseded by further changes, which have effected the 1st and 9th brigades. Except for 9th Brigade, you cannot really make an argument that the Army has any intention of establishing "heavy" brigades.

None of this is to say that armour is not important - it absolutely is, and that's why the investment in the Boxer, the Abrams, the Redback, the Huntsman are all needed to strengthen the Australian Army. I've said before that I expect most of us would agree it would be good to see more of the last three, at least. And having a brigade or even two that are ostensibly "heavy" makes some sense, but that does not change how we would likely operate in our own region. Nor does having somewhat less than we would like of certain capabilities mean we cannot "operate outside of very permissive environments".
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
I disagree - and think you are confusing kit for capability. Yes, we have new A vehicles coming in; but in insufficient numbers. There are not enough IFV/SPH especially for a Bde, and that doesn't take into account the need for follow-on forces, reinforcements and replacements. Simply having 129 IFV means you can only really plan on deploying 40ish if you want to have a sustainable force. Again, how many IFVs do we need doctrinally?

Comparing us to the USMC is pointless, their missions are significantly smaller and more constrained than ours, plus they have the full backing of the US Army if needed - we don't. Comments about Armoured Divisions are likewise irrelevant, I don't think anyone is saying Australia needs an Armoured Division. In fact, a US Infantry Division (from the 2000s) sounds an ideal construct for 1 (Australian) Division. Even just looking at the proposed Light Division you can see glaring issues within the Australian Army - we will have one Regt (-) of guns, a Light Division has three Regt. Don't forget, we use armour differently to the US - our tanks have always been infantry support vehicles. We ditched our Armoured Div because we didn't fight like that - our AFVs work in Regt or Sqn sizes. Unlike many 'strategic experts', all our kit can fight in the region and we would expect it to. There is nothing special about it - and a Regt of M1A2 will be as useful here as they would be in the Middle East.

Beyond sheer numbers, you are also ignoring all of the combat enablers that we simply don't have - even on paper. We have 4 manoeuvre and 4 support Brigades; but 3x Signals Regt (one Signals Regt provides comms to one Bde). We have questionable numbers of EME vehicles (especially noting you cannot change a tyre on a Hawkei or HX77 or CRV yourself). Our EW and air defence capabilities are barely there. Our UAS is a joke, our CUAS even worse. We have insufficient numbers of engineers and we have a whole 30 decent guns + a Bty of rockets. On top of all that are the recruitment and retention numbers.

While comments about only being able to operate in permissive environments are hyperbole, they are closer to the truth than many (including in uniform) will accept. An Army is not just pure numbers of certain kit - its the combination of capabilities. And partially due to their own actions, partially due to others, the Australian Army has failed to keep up with most of those capability needs.
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
I disagree - and think you are confusing kit for capability. Yes, we have new A vehicles coming in; but in insufficient numbers. There are not enough IFV/SPH especially for a Bde, and that doesn't take into account the need for follow-on forces, reinforcements and replacements. Simply having 129 IFV means you can only really plan on deploying 40ish if you want to have a sustainable force. Again, how many IFVs do we need doctrinally?

Comparing us to the USMC is pointless, their missions are significantly smaller and more constrained than ours, plus they have the full backing of the US Army if needed - we don't. Comments about Armoured Divisions are likewise irrelevant, I don't think anyone is saying Australia needs an Armoured Division. In fact, a US Infantry Division (from the 2000s) sounds an ideal construct for 1 (Australian) Division. Even just looking at the proposed Light Division you can see glaring issues within the Australian Army - we will have one Regt (-) of guns, a Light Division has three Regt. Don't forget, we use armour differently to the US - our tanks have always been infantry support vehicles. We ditched our Armoured Div because we didn't fight like that - our AFVs work in Regt or Sqn sizes. Unlike many 'strategic experts', all our kit can fight in the region and we would expect it to. There is nothing special about it - and a Regt of M1A2 will be as useful here as they would be in the Middle East.

Beyond sheer numbers, you are also ignoring all of the combat enablers that we simply don't have - even on paper. We have 4 manoeuvre and 4 support Brigades; but 3x Signals Regt (one Signals Regt provides comms to one Bde). We have questionable numbers of EME vehicles (especially noting you cannot change a tyre on a Hawkei or HX77 or CRV yourself). Our EW and air defence capabilities are barely there. Our UAS is a joke, our CUAS even worse. We have insufficient numbers of engineers and we have a whole 30 decent guns + a Bty of rockets. On top of all that are the recruitment and retention numbers.

While comments about only being able to operate in permissive environments are hyperbole, they are closer to the truth than many (including in uniform) will accept. An Army is not just pure numbers of certain kit - its the combination of capabilities. And partially due to their own actions, partially due to others, the Australian Army has failed to keep up with most of those capability needs.
Assuming you're responding to me, I don't think we're actually that far apart. You say at the end that "comments about only being able to operate in permissive environments are hyperbole", which is largely really the point I was trying to make (maybe not expressed too well). I agree there are capabilities that have been neglected. I would also give some credit though to progress where it has been achieved, or is being achieved. I have a lot of respect for those in the services (I am sure we all do) who are trying within the constraints of governments and budgets to ensure we have the defence capabilities we need.

The discussion, however, or at least as I perceived it, had largely been about armour, and I think some of the outcry over recent decisions - the Land 400 Phase 3 cut - have been a little over the top. Regarding comparisons with others and commentary about armoured brigades / divisions, I somewhat disagree because actually Massive said they want to see the Army field three "heavy" brigades. Now maybe there's disagreement here more about definitions but I take "heavy" to mean an armoured brigade, as are fielded by the US Army (and others obviously). I am more agreeable with what you said about how we should be more akin to the US Army's infantry division of the 2000s era.

Interestingly, just on the historical nature of how the Australian Army has used armour, I would argue it has been very much situation dependent, not necessarily cultural or doctrinal. You said we ditched our armoured division because we didn't fight like the US Army. Well, no, the 1st Armoured Division was formed along then British lines with the intent it be sent to join the Second AIF in fighting against Germany and Italy. By the time it was in any way ready, we were at war with Japan and thus it was later broken up and its components used, tanks supporting infantry, as you say, in amphibious operations and fighting through jungles and so forth. We did the same as the US in the Asia-Pacific in this regard, just as we would have done the same as the Brits, the Canadians, the US if we had continued to fight in the European theatre in having an armoured division alongside infantry divisions.
 

OldTex

Well-Known Member
We have 4 manoeuvre and 4 support Brigades; but 3x Signals Regt (one Signals Regt provides comms to one Bde).
The simple solution to the comms support for the manoeuvre Brigades would be to transfer part of 1 CSR to Adelaide to expand 144 Sig Sqn to a full CSR. The reduced span of command in 1 Bde does not justify the full manning of 1 CSR (it should retain the RHQ to provide S6 role within the Bde HQ).
The issue of where the comms for the enablers attached to a manoeuvre Bde should be sourced has existed since the creation of the CSRs. 17 CSS Bde having a Sig Sqn to support the HQ and deployed elements makes some sense. Whether 6 CS Bde and 16 AAvn Bde attachments should be provided with comms from their own organic Sig Sqns (which would need to be raised and equipped) or from the CSR of the gaining Bde depends many different POVs. If the DJFHQ were deployed then the CV, AAvn and CSS attachments would be under DJFHQ command and then the question is whether 1 Sig Regt has the ability to provide them with the comms.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I think people need to step back and realise that there is no one perfect model.

It will come down to what we are doing and where we are doing it, perhaps more to the point, who we are fighting, where we are fighting, what do we know about their capabilities and how much time do we have.

An enemy will likely be doing the same, and what ever structure we gave, they will attempt to counter or even nullify what we have and how they think we use it.
 

old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Of course there is perfect model, however a model for logistics needs to be in place.
If that's at a brigade level, then no worries. But it can't keep changing. It needs to be in place and like breathing, no thinking about it, like muscle memory.
As for combat , units can be cherry picked from brigades to deal with what ever scenario arises, and logistics can get what they need when and to where it's needed.
 

MickB

Well-Known Member
I also very much like the idea of a Bv410, BvS10 or Bronco style of amphibious all-terrain vehicle for Australia. Personally I lean towards the Bronco but I suspect both families are suitable with very similar capabilities (much like the Redback vs Lynx were for the IFV).

The Royal Marines currently operate the BAE Systems BvS10 vehicles (named in UK service as "Viking") replacing the earlier Bv206, and have on order the more recent Bv410 as a further expansion. The Royal Armoured Corps also operated over 100 of the very similar ST Kinetics Bronco (named in UK service as "Warthog") to supplement the Vikings in Afghanistan; these were purchased in 2008 as an Urgent Operational Requirements package and retained in service until the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2015. Thales were responsible for the UK mission systems on the Warthogs and were also the UK point of contact for warranty support matters. The UK have used the same four variants of both families of vehicles, being: Troop Carrier, Ambulance, Command, and Repair & Recovery.

According to the UK ministry of defense, "the primary role of the Viking is in protected mobility for the Royal Marines, it is also often used in battlefield reconnaissance, fire support and as a command platform."

In 2009, Thales and ST Kinetics also offered the French government Broncos, and while their bid lost to the BvS10, it shows that Thales and ST Kinetics would likely be very open to local assembly or production of the Bronco at the Thales protected vehicles manufacturing plant in Bendigo. Thales and ST Kinetics already have agreements in place for manufacturing and marketing of 40mm ammunition here in Australia.

Given this, I think it is an interesting idea for Australia to order local assembly or production of the Bronco 3 by Thales in partnership with ST Kinetics and field them in the role of Protected Mobility Vehicle, Amphibious All Terrain (PMV-AAT). This would keep production of all three protected mobility platforms unified under Thales using common fit-out, vehicle electronics, mission systems and weapons stations in order to simplify operator training and maintenance across the three PMV platforms.

As for CONOPS, I don't know how to formally describe this, but I see the Australian Army using them with essentially the same doctrine as the Bushmaster (as a protected mobility vehicle) but in situations where their extra mobility and amphibious capabilities can be used to advantage. This would certainly be the case with amphibious landings (no, I know they are not armored amphibious assault vehicles) and across many littoral, riverine and flooded environments. We would certainly do well to look at the ways the royal marines use their BvS10s.

As to numbers and how they would be fielded in the Australian Army, there are a multitude of approaches.
  1. Using them to establishing for amphibious operations within the new littoral brigade being formed, perhaps representing IOC for the platform.
  2. Issued across the armor focused brigade replacing Bushmasters (and M113s in roles where the Redback would be overkill)—this is similar to the way Sweden organises their armored brigades with the Bv410 complementing the CV90 IFVs.
  3. As a high mobility light cavalry company in selected brigades.
  4. Fielding one company of vehicles for each Bushmaster equipped infantry battalion to be used in place of Bushmasters when desired and for familiarizing motorized infantry on their use during training.
  5. As a platform for various specialty weapon systems, e.g. NASAMS (like Sweden with the IRIS-T), mortar carrier, electronic warfare, UAS carrier.
  6. As a battalion-size reserve stockpile for large scale conflict.
  7. As a potential Antarctic operations vehicle (should conflict arise over the Antarctic treaty or violations of it)

Here is a BvS10 in an amphibious assault ship well dock demonstrating direct landing and return between the ship's well dock to shore. No landing craft required.


UK Viking and HMS Bulwark

UK MoD, OGL v1.0OGL v1.0, via Wikimedia Commons


Here Royal Marines are swimming to shore from a landing craft in BvS10 Vikings during an amphibious landing.


Vikings Float Ashore During Amphibious Assault Phase of Exercise Auriga MOD 45154387

Photo: Petty Officer Husbands/MOD, OGL v1.0OGL v1.0, via Wikimedia Commons


Here is a Royal Thai Army Bronco during the 2010 Thai floods. Looks kinda useful.


Armoured vehicle in Thailand

Government of Thailand, CC BY 2.0 <Creative Commons — Attribution 2.0 Generic — CC BY 2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
In a continuation of the discussion of "light forces that can operate from small amphibs"
I suggest that the proposed Broncos be supported by versions of the German Wiesel 2 Armoured Weapons Carrier.

These could provide lightweight highly mobile direct (20 or 30mm cannon) and indirect (light 120mm mortar) fire support, from a vehicle that can deploy via small landing craft or be sling loaded beneath a Helo.

Its small size and high cross country performance make it a great recon platform.

I am aware that Germany is looking towards replacing their Wiesels but updated versions produced in Australia would be a great addition to a Amphib/Littoral Brigade.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
In a continuation of the discussion of "light forces that can operate from small amphibs"
I suggest that the proposed Broncos be supported by versions of the German Wiesel 2 Armoured Weapons Carrier.

These could provide lightweight highly mobile direct (20 or 30mm cannon) and indirect (light 120mm mortar) fire support, from a vehicle that can deploy via small landing craft or be sling loaded beneath a Helo.

Its small size and high cross country performance make it a great recon platform.

I am aware that Germany is looking towards replacing their Wiesels but updated versions produced in Australia would be a great addition to a Amphib/Littoral Brigade.
Broncos are not proposed as far as I am aware. It’s someone here’s thought bubble. If another vehicle is to be introduced then wait another 5-8 years to go through a selection process.

I’d suggest something like Hanwha is developing or BAEs AAV would be a more likely choice.
South Korea advances plan for next-generation amphibious assault vehicle

…..would be more likely as can be deployed from small amhibs, can self deploy moderate distances across water and carrys a gun so no need for a second support vehicle. In addition is a modern and armoured design with more protection than a Bronco. And might make up on some of the shortfall of IFVs …politics and all that you know….

But that said I can’t see anything this vehicle happening for the ADF, if at all, in less than a 5-8 year window.
 

MickB

Well-Known Member
Broncos are not proposed as far as I am aware. It’s someone here’s thought bubble. If another vehicle is to be introduced then wait another 5-8 years to go through a selection process.

I’d suggest something like Hanwha is developing or BAEs AAV would be a more likely choice.
South Korea advances plan for next-generation amphibious assault vehicle

…..would be more likely as can be deployed from small amhibs, can self deploy moderate distances across water and carrys a gun so no need for a second support vehicle. In addition is a modern and armoured design with more protection than a Bronco. And might make up on some of the shortfall of IFVs …politics and all that you know….

But that said I can’t see anything this vehicle happening for the ADF, if at all, in less than a 5-8 year window.
Seems it will be a capable vehicle, but it looks like we are coming at potential Amphib/Littoral vehicles in different ways.
You seem to be looking from a size, armour and firepower direction with the KAAV-2 a full sized IFV.

Others are looking at cross country capability in a littoral setting of jungle, swamp, mud with some water crossings useing tracked PMVs and light support vehicles.
 

Anthony_B_78

Active Member
I misread. You are correct.

For completeness, in my view Army would be composed of:

Regular: 3 ”Heavy” BCT, 1 ”Light” littoral BCT

Reserves: 6 “Protected” BCT

Regards,

Massive
Thank you. Well, I guess for my part I would look at it two ways, with an emphasis on keeping it realistic (that is, not engaging in the equivalent of a fantasy fleet).

First, just looking at existing units and sub-units, existing and planned equipment. I would see advantages in genuinely forming an armoured brigade. So 9th Brigade could have 1st Armoured Regiment, which would revert to a tank regiment with all three tank squadrons; 2nd Cavalry Regiment, having moved to South Australia and fielding three squadrons of Boxers; and then 7RAR, which will become armoured infantry with the Redback. Add the artillery with the Huntsman, and CS and CSS units. Then 7th Brigade would be a medium-ish brigade - 2nd/14th Light Horse would lose its tanks but field three squadrons of Boxers, while 6RAR and 8/RAR would both be motorised. Finally, 1st and 3rd brigades would focus on amphibious / air mobile roles, with the former losing her own armoured cavalry regiment but still having some Bushmasters.

Second, the more significant changes that would require more investment, but not necessarily too radical. Effectively, two "heavy" and two "light" brigades. I'd have 7th and 9th brigades each with an armoured regiment, a cavalry regiment, an armoured infantry battalion, a motorised infantry battalion, a SPH regiment, and combat engineer, signals and service support regiments. Generally, 1st and 3rd brigades would be light, infantry-based, largely as planned. This structure would demand more Abrams, Redbacks and Huntsman - among others - but smaller unit sizes could be adopted to keep this within reason.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Seems it will be a capable vehicle, but it looks like we are coming at potential Amphib/Littoral vehicles in different ways.
You seem to be looking from a size, armour and firepower direction with the KAAV-2 a full sized IFV.

Others are looking at cross country capability in a littoral setting of jungle, swamp, mud with some water crossings useing tracked PMVs and light support vehicles.
The important thing to understand is there is no proposed vehicle.
 
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