Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Todjaeger]

I really don't understand this.
It has been stated so often about various ADF acquired platforms that we "thought" that "capability X " was a MOTS defence product in service with other nations when it was in fact still in development. How hard would it have been to simply check that statement about things we were about to order?.
Eg the MU90 LWT ..... who actually has it in service? ....ask them what their experience with it has been........ ask them what the level of support from the manufacturer exists ..... ask them about spares. .................. reliability...........
Surely there was a part of the selection process that addressed these sorts of questions.
MB

If you read the ANAO report, that would suggest otherwise. One of the recommendations (17) is that claims about developmen status of a product require verification. That strongly suggests to me that claims made and/or info provided to evaluators was false.

 

[Milne Bay]

If you read the ANAO report, that would suggest otherwise. One of the recommendations (17) is that claims about developmen status of a product require verification. That strongly suggests to me that claims made and/or info provided to evaluators was false.

Yes, this is the very thing that I don't get. Someone "making claims", or providing information sounds like a car salesman presenting a glossy brochure.
Surely the selection process is a little more sophisticated than simply swallowing that.
Actual checks, with actual operators, who give actual feedback done multiple times for verification............
Sounds like we'd be better off getting "Choice Magazine" to do the checking for us
MB

 

[Volkodav]

Interesting. One of the impressions that I had gotten was that a number of systems across Defence were acquired because their advocates within Defence and/or OzGov were pro-Euro, or that some of the Euro defence companies and/or their Oz subsidiaries hired influential ex-gov't/defence people. One of the recurring outcomes of this situation is that a number of projects across Defence selected kit to meet Defence needs with it turning out that the kit was not ready for service and was in fact still being developed.

I have no issue with Defence selecting developmental kit, provided that it is aware that the kit in question is still being developed. The ANAO reporting on the MU90 LWT highlights some of this, in that JP2070 thought the MU90 was a MOTS defence product in service with other nations when it was in fact still in development.

It's probably more an issue with the procurement processes of the 2000s, together with contract formulation and management, combined with the constriction of defence (both uniform and civilian) expertise at that time.

Basically the selection, contracting and evaluation processes were turned on their heads at the same time as the number of highly experienced and competent people in government, required to make the new systems work, were reduced.

My gut feeling is even had we gone US, Japanese or South Korean options we would have encountered to same issues. The only projects that worked well in that period were those done under FMS, that's the US DOD had already sorted all the details, including support system, and provided it with a bow tied around it.

We are buying Renault's, Alfas and BMWs then expecting the local Holden dealer to look after them.

Oh the other factor, we reduced force size, while skipping a couple, sometimes several generations of equipment. I'm actually surprised more projects javen fallen over. That more than anything shows just how hard various defence professionals and contractors have been working to make things work.

 

[John Fedup]

Interesting article, but I do have to question just how accurate some of the conclusions really are. If the problems with availability for the MRH-90 and Tiger ARH are truly due to software issues involving defence logistics and inventory management, then I would expect those same problems to be occurring across the entire ADF aircraft fleet which utilizes this software.

I have not heard of similar issues impacting other aircraft like the CH-47 Chinook, existing Army Black Hawks, or MH-R Seahawks. The article does note that certain aircraft are not maintained using the specific software in question, but I would seriously doubt that 'just' the two problematic helicopters are the ones using the software in question.

One of the other things I noticed is that the article seemed to be somewhat misinformed as to why the Tiger ARH is being retired so early and replaced with the AH-64 Apache. The impression that I formed based off the article is that the Tiger ARH is being retired early despite having plenty of structural airframe life left is due to problems with maintenance and availability. The impression that I have formed based off a number of other sources is that the Tiger is being retired early due to a confluence of issues.

One of the first is that the Tiger helicopter is out of production and then when Australia purchased them only 22 were ordered when a more realistic requirement was for 29 (the number of Apaches being ordered). The second is that due to the age of some of the Tiger systems, at this point the helicopter would need to get some fairly significant and expensive updates to comms/avionics. The cost being significant enough due to the degree of upgrades required plus the small fleet size which the costs would be shared across, and the fact that Australia has too few Tigers for likely sustainable training and deployment needs and no realistic way to obtain more...

The article also does not mention the cpfh for the MRH-90 which IIRC from the ANAO reports on this from 2014, was about 4x - 5x that of Army Black Hawk helicopters. Also whilst the article does appear to suggest that current political and defence leaders are keeping certain elements of the decision to retire the two fleets early under wraps to avoid embarrassment, it also fails to mention the developmental problems both the MRH-90 and Tiger ARH encountered or that it appears what Australia thought was being purchased at the time of their respective selections, namely finished designs ready for production, was actually designs still in development. IIRC there was some of factors in the MRH-90 decision which also failed to materialize, like the MRH-90 production facility then becoming a regional support centre for the Asia-Pacific region for IIRC the EC-145. With negligible orders for the specific Airbus helicopter from the whole Asia-Pacific region, there just was not enough demand.

I do feel that some of the questions raised certainly need to be considered and looked into, but elements of the article also feel like a particular POV or agenda is being advanced

I will input my two cents into this discussion. The NH-90 and its derivatives were further along in their development compared to our CH-148 but neither were truly ready. IMHO, the only viable choice for a medium lift helicopter at the time was the EH101. Not sure if support would have been any better for the EH101 versus the NH-90. Can’t say Sikorsky’s support has been deficient for the CH-148 but they sure fooled Canada wrt its readiness (which wasn’t hard as the Liberal government would have been embarrassed having to restore the naval purchase of EH-101s)!

 

[Maranoa]

Bergmann is still trying to pretend that Tiger ARH and Taipan MRH90 failure is somehow Australia's fault. He's has pushed really hard to keep Australia paying hundreds and hundreds of millions of bucks for choppers that hardly ever fly. He keeps pretending that there is no problem, when the problems with both choppers are overwhelming and extremely well documented in the Houston Report into AAVN and a couple of ANAO audits. What really makes me angry is that he's always laying the blame on all European helicopter problems on Australian Army Aviation, attacking honest soldiers with nasty stuff while being wined and dined around the world by major weapons manufacturers. He never mentions that Norway, Sweden and Belgium are all dumping their NH90s and the Germans are threatening to do so and that all four countries have publicly said this giving exactly the same reasons as the ADF - totally terrible helicopter availability, totally terrible contractor support combined with massive costs for helicopters not flying. How can that be Australia's fault?
Not my cup of tea, I prefer those military writers who go to war not just plush conferences .

 

[Redlands18]

Avalon 2023: Australia cancels special forces light helicopter requirement (janes.com)
Confirmation that Land 2097 Phase 4 (lt SF Helos) has been cancelled. No real surprise, I think everyone wrote this project off when the Blackhawk acquisition was announced.

 

[rand0m]

Avalon 2023: Australia cancels special forces light helicopter requirement (janes.com)
Confirmation that Land 2097 Phase 4 (lt SF Helos) has been cancelled. No real surprise, I think everyone wrote this project off when the Blackhawk acquisition was announced.

Absolutely, probably one of the more logical projects to cancel/scale back.

 

[Takao]

'Feasibility' is folly in armed conflict. Russia just launched an unfeasible ground invasion of Ukraine with 180,000 underequipped poorly led troops with a moronic plan and no ammo, food, fuel or tyres. Logic is for late night whisky fuelled armchair chats. Real war is often madness, driven by stupidity and without any logic what so ever let alone a plan that would pass muster in any military college final year exam. Nobody thought the Japanese would get to the fringes of Port Moresby as everybody was so smugly assured of the infeasibility of the fall of Singapore. The Taliban's 10 year ability to make the Chora Valley contested against the combined might of the Dutch, Australian, US and Afghan National Army's was not feasible. But their it is. The Australian Army needs to fight in a 21st century battlespace, not some feasibility study.

No, feasibility is at the heart of any strategic planning; especially on a limited budget with no clear threat. When we design the force, it has to be designed against feasible threats. Deliberately going a touch extreme, if we decided to design an ADF that could defeat the PLA by ourselves then the budget demands would be immense, well beyond anything that we could afford. Understanding this feasibility is essential to force design and why I, and many others, tire of kit A versus kit B discussions. The brutal reality is that yes, war is chaotic and scary, but both sides at the start follow (a) internally logical decisions, (b) distance and (c) capability. Germany's mobilisation and war plans in 1914 is the classic example of this. Ironically, the concept of Singapore's fortress you highlighted was because it was seen that Japan had the power, capability and will to reach PNG. It failed because it was the 4th priority of a nation fighting for its survival. For Japan, it's operations in Dec 41 - Jul 42 are feasible via (a), (b) and (c). Even Ukraine makes sense from Putin's point of view - just look at how many Western theorists were highlighting how Ukraine wouldn't survive three weeks....

The fact is, invading the Australian mainland is one of the least feasible scenarios out there. Certainly with conventional military forces. I grant you, Indonesia may have the capability in the next couple of decades, will find the distance to our shore arguably the easiest; but I would argue that it fails on (a) - the internal politics and structure of Indonesia make it unlikely they would make such a decision. Beyond that - what nation has any combination of capability and distance that would make one worry? The US? Maybe. But anyone else? No. Not even close. Even the boogie man that is Beijing fails on all three:

• it fails (a) because it's primary internal focus is Taiwan, to invade Australia would require ignoring that (internally inconsistent) or having completed that in which case it would almost certainly be at war with the US and fighting a significant conflict across the eastern Pacific that demands the PLA-N's focus;
• it fails (b) because it's a long bloody way from Zhanjiang to Broome (4500 km). Supporting multiple naval forces over that distance against the RAN and RAAF with a homeland advantage and traditional allies the whole way and likely under constant ISR? That would be very hard work. Even then, assume that the initial landing force gets through. It is what? A Bde maybe? How do they get resupplied? Those naval TF have to escort logistic convoys back and forth through those waterways? Even an Oberon will have fun then. And what have you captured? Nothing that fundamentally impacts Australia. You still have to go 2000 km to get to a major population centre and ~5000 km to anything of significance. We struggle to do that - and we do it annually;
• it fails (c) because the PLA-N has not yet demonstrated its combat abilities as a blue water force, it has not demonstrated its ability to conduct long range lodgements and it has not demonstrated its ability to support combat operations at range. The RN could do all three, and still struggled to retake the Falklands. The ADF is significant levels better than the Argentinians.

Basically, the invasion of mainland Australia is not just infeasible, it's barely logical. It remains a central task, because of course, but even with a bonkers crazy nutter somewhere, we still have distance on our side.

The Australian Army also does not exist just to defend Australia's mainland, we may need to fight further forward as well, which without heavy armour and a lot of artillery will consign our combatants to the grave. It was never feasible that events in unknown locations like Sarajevo, Konigsberg, Seoul, Saigon, Somalia, Rwanda, Timor Leste, Tarin Kowt et al, would alter Australian destiny and leave over 100,000 dead. But they did.

And this is the key point that most 'strategic commentators' fail to understand and the Army consistently fails to highlight. Australian interests do not end at the 12 nm line. If we want to be part of the global community, we have to be prepared to deploy overseas. Ironically we have an outstanding example within recent history - INTERFET. We just scrapped through that, the logistics was so threadbare that we were close to complete failure. Why? Because Defence of Australia doctrine had stripped that from the RAN and Army. Good thing that the main proponent of that theory, one that had very near catastrophic impacts to Australia's reputation and neighbourhood, has had nothing to do with recent defence planning....

But yes - for the ADF to be a feasible fighting force, capable of meeting all the tasks set by government, it needs a strong RAN, a strong RAAF and a strong Army. And that latter bit means tanks, IFVs, SPH, CRV, logistics, engineering assets - the lot.

 

[ngatimozart]

Bergmann is still trying to pretend that Tiger ARH and Taipan MRH90 failure is somehow Australia's fault. He's has pushed really hard to keep Australia paying hundreds and hundreds of millions of bucks for choppers that hardly ever fly. He keeps pretending that there is no problem, when the problems with both choppers are overwhelming and extremely well documented in the Houston Report into AAVN and a couple of ANAO audits. What really makes me angry is that he's always laying the blame on all European helicopter problems on Australian Army Aviation, attacking honest soldiers with nasty stuff while being wined and dined around the world by major weapons manufacturers. He never mentions that Norway, Sweden and Belgium are all dumping their NH90s and the Germans are threatening to do so and that all four countries have publicly said this giving exactly the same reasons as the ADF - totally terrible helicopter availability, totally terrible contractor support combined with massive costs for helicopters not flying. How can that be Australia's fault?
Not my cup of tea, I prefer those military writers who go to war not just plush conferences .

I am not that keen on Bergman's stance, but he's right in one aspect that many of the problems with both the MRH90 and Tiger are Australia's fault. The same sort of issues that occurred with the SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite acquisition were present. Definitely not all of Australia's fault, but well and truly enough to be sheet home.

The comparison with NZ is potentially flawed - it cannot be made without having a good understanding of the respective operational profiles (and the expectations for those) of each country, and in the same environmental conditions. NZ may operate its helicopters in the same way and in the same environmental conditions as Aust but the size of NZ and its climate might make that seem unlikely. And, without wanting to whip up an inter service debate, as is the fact that they are operated by the RNZAF, not the Army. There was a reason that was changed 30+ years ago in Australia; you can debate the merits of that but it certainly had some good arguments behind it. But what is undeniable is that Air Forces take a different approach to helicopters (and indeed aircraft in general) compared to Armies.

I agree that the climates are different, however I think that a comparison between the RNZAF & ADF Nh90 variants is still valid. The biggest difference was the procurement processes with the NZG acquiring an airframe as a source of spares. Whilst that has worked out well, I am given to understand that one NH90 is a hangar queen at the moment because the spare(s) required to repair it had been used from the kit airframe on another NH90. So like Australia we are awaiting two sets of the required spares now. I am sure that Airbus Helicopters ship them via Uranus and the Delta Quadrant.

My question is so,we have a lighter Army. Someone somehow gets through our deterrent forces and can land a force. What then? who fights them…it’s a tall question but is the answer build up long range weaponry now …short term and then continue with hardening of the army longer term once we have adequate stocks of long range weapons in inventory or will the army remain hollowed out and with a much lighter armour capability for good? My concern is once/if the combined arms capability is lost or atrophied, how long would it take to build back up? Seems to me that would be a 10-15 year task. It’s a bit like having jumper cables. You rarely need them, hope you don’t but when you need them you need them.

Who is going to invade Australia? Well the CCP / PRC might think about it but think about it; do they have the capability and capacity to do so? Where would they land? As @Takao points out anywhere north and west of the Brisbane - Adelaide Line is just asking for trouble; not the fighting kind but the environmental and sustainment kind. Below the Brisbane - Adelaide Line then they face strategic and tactical problems.

'Feasibility' is folly in armed conflict. Russia just launched an unfeasible ground invasion of Ukraine with 180,000 underequipped poorly led troops with a moronic plan and no ammo, food, fuel or tyres. Logic is for late night whisky fuelled armchair chats. Real war is often madness, driven by stupidity and without any logic what so ever let alone a plan that would pass muster in any military college final year exam. Nobody thought the Japanese would get to the fringes of Port Moresby as everybody was so smugly assured of the infeasibility of the fall of Singapore. The Taliban's 10 year ability to make the Chora Valley contested against the combined might of the Dutch, Australian, US and Afghan National Army's was not feasible. But their it is. The Australian Army needs to fight in a 21st century battlespace, not some feasibility study. The Australian Army also does not exist just to defend Australia's mainland, we may need to fight further forward as well, which without heavy armour and a lot of artillery will consign our combatants to the grave. It was never feasible that events in unknown locations like Sarajevo, Konigsberg, Seoul, Saigon, Somalia, Rwanda, Timor Leste, Tarin Kowt et al, would alter Australian destiny and leave over 100,000 dead. But they did.

I disagree with your comments because there is far more to fighting a war than just boots on the ground, artillery, ships, aircraft etc. You use the 2nd Russian invasion of Ukraine as an example, and most of us here agree that it's very poorly planned, lead, and executed attack. However Ukraine is most definitely 21st Century war because of the new technologies being used. Yes at present it is an artillery war, but artillery has always featured strongly in Soviet and Russian planning and fighting. Unfortunately for the Russians, the Ukrainians have the same history. This war is teaching a lot of lessons. The PLA also loves its artillery, missiles and rockets and they are a great believer of using those weapons systems.

Logic shouldn't be dismissed as a late night whiskey supping thing; it's used on the battlefield as well, very much so. Logic is the foundation of military planning, unless you're the current Russian leadership. The PLA is very logical in its planning and it will be taking lots of notes from the Russo - Ukrainian War. It's also very technically minded and all of its branches are more modern than all militaries in the west. The PLAN is the largest navy in the world and its substantially out building the USN. Both the PLAAF and PLANAF are very powerful and like the PLAN are building capabilities far quicker than the US and the west. The trouble with the west is that it took its foot off the throttle and now is languishing behind. The likes of the US don't have the military - industrial capabilities that they had during Cold War 1.0 and it is well and truly illustrated with the NATO nations suddenly having to increase ammo manufacturing because the Ukrainians are chewing through it and other disposable stores far quicker than its supporting nations can provide. The real problem is that in liberal democracies, the civilian leadership has the final say on defence, and those politicians know very little about defence as a whole.

 

[Takao]

Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logistics - APDR

This startling conclusion is the culmination of several years of effort to find out why Australia has had disproportionate problems keeping our 22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) […]

asiapacificdefencereporter.com

This is an interesting article in the APDR that blames most of the the problems that Australia has had with Air Bus helicopters on the logistical system that is employed for parts and upgrades. There are some very relevant points made in the article including a comparison with NZ and a yet to be proven idea that the new helicopters on order will likely have the same or even less availability due to the existing short comings of the current system.

There are many errors of fact in there. I would suggest there is more accuracy in yesterdays horoscopes than in that article. Quickly...

- the individual fleets are not scattered across 5 bases. Tiger spares, for instance, go to two places, Oakey and Darwin. Because Darwin holds the Regt and majority of the fleet, it's the main warehouse.

- CAMM2 is not a one stop solves all system, we deleted that requirement pre-2007. CAMM2 is the maintenance database - RAEME own it, it tracks parts on and off, servicing's conducted, life of parts, basically ensures the aircraft is technically airworthy. It's the ADF standard, used on almost all our aircraft, and has matured into a pretty neat system.

- Because CAMM2 is for technical airworthiness, it doesn't do anything else. MILIS is the logistics program, the ADF standard.

- Those are the only two systems you need to run a fleet (oh, and whatever the aircrew use to plan their missions). That's it. All those other systems? They are nice to haves for external organisations. They do not contribute to safely flying the aircraft at all.

- Did I mention that CAMM2 and MILIS are ADF standard? I can't speak to F-35, but everyone else uses them both....

- Spreadsheets are the devil if trying to achieve airworthiness.....

- Apache wasn't fourth, it was second. Easy to see, when you quickly search as to what happened to Bell's entry. When it failed to reach the last two, they sued, hence delaying AIR87.

- "APDR’s research" - they don't appear to have conducted anything I would call research

There are people the mods have banned from here who would have written a better article....

 

[Takao]

I really don't understand this.
It has been stated so often about various ADF acquired platforms that we "thought" that "capability X " was a MOTS defence product in service with other nations when it was in fact still in development. How hard would it have been to simply check that statement about things we were about to order?.
Eg the MU90 LWT ..... who actually has it in service? ....ask them what their experience with it has been........ ask them what the level of support from the manufacturer exists ..... ask them about spares......what has it been integrated with .................. reliability........... etc
Surely there was a part of the selection process that addressed these sorts of questions.
MB

Two issues appear here.

One is what are we told v reality. Who's fault is that? Probably both Commonwealth and Contractor. But... many, many times we have been told something can do X but it just, can't. I think looking at the F-35 can give some examples here.

Two is what do we need to remain 'fightable'. Walking the line between the latest tech to keep us relevant v buying what is proven is a hard one to walk. It's not an Australian thing, it impacts us all (M247 Sgt York for the US Army, F-111 for the RAAF are two good examples). Sometimes our gamble goes....wrong.

 

[Takao]

My gut feeling is even had we gone US, Japanese or South Korean options we would have encountered to same issues. The only projects that worked well in that period were those done under FMS, that's the US DOD had already sorted all the details, including support system, and provided it with a bow tied around it.

We are buying Renault's, Alfas and BMWs then expecting the local Holden dealer to look after them.

Oh the other factor, we reduced force size, while skipping a couple, sometimes several generations of equipment. I'm actually surprised more projects javen fallen over. That more than anything shows just how hard various defence professionals and contractors have been working to make things work.

My favourite comparison with Tiger is we went from a 1968 Volkswagen Bug to a 2008 Porsche 911 overnight - with no real change. In fact, we actually got rid of some stuff like teaching troubleshooting on our promotion courses and certain avionics skills because we believed the onboard test system would tell us everything. Now, after use we realised that was....optimistic, but there is a cohort of soldiers who didn't learn how to troubleshoot failures. When the CAPT knows tricks the CPLs don't (and let me be the first to say, these aren't real tricks) that's not a good sign. I still remember olds and bolds getting frustrated we didn't just roll the Tigers under the trees like we did with Kiowa's - ignoring the size and (4x!) weight difference

The skipping hurts. Imagine being the CO of 3 Sqn and trading in your Mirage III for an F-35? Its another reason why we should be seeking to roll our equipment over, and not doing silly stuff like M113AS4.

 

[Bob53]

I probably used a poor example with my question above…thanks for the responses… it was really asking in a very convoluted way with an example that 100% distracted from the question itself ….

Is the answer build up long range weaponry now …short term and then continue with hardening of the army longer term once we have adequate stocks of long range weapons in inventory or will the army remain hollowed out and with a much lighter armour capability for good/ foreseeable future?

 

[Shanesworld]

I am not that keen on Bergman's stance, but he's right in one aspect that many of the problems with both the MRH90 and Tiger are Australia's fault. The same sort of issues that occurred with the SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite acquisition were present. Definitely not all of Australia's fault, but well and truly enough to be sheet home.

I agree that the climates are different, however I think that a comparison between the RNZAF & ADF Nh90 variants is still valid. The biggest difference was the procurement processes with the NZG acquiring an airframe as a source of spares. Whilst that has worked out well, I am given to understand that one NH90 is a hangar queen at the moment because the spare(s) required to repair it had been used from the kit airframe on another NH90. So like Australia we are awaiting two sets of the required spares now. I am sure that Airbus Helicopters ship them via Uranus and the Delta Quadrant.

Who is going to invade Australia? Well the CCP / PRC might think about it but think about it; do they have the capability and capacity to do so? Where would they land? As @Takao points out anywhere north and west of the Brisbane - Adelaide Line is just asking for trouble; not the fighting kind but the environmental and sustainment kind. Below the Brisbane - Adelaide Line then they face strategic and tactical problems.

I disagree with your comments because there is far more to fighting a war than just boots on the ground, artillery, ships, aircraft etc. You use the 2nd Russian invasion of Ukraine as an example, and most of us here agree that it's very poorly planned, lead, and executed attack. However Ukraine is most definitely 21st Century war because of the new technologies being used. Yes at present it is an artillery war, but artillery has always featured strongly in Soviet and Russian planning and fighting. Unfortunately for the Russians, the Ukrainians have the same history. This war is teaching a lot of lessons. The PLA also loves its artillery, missiles and rockets and they are a great believer of using those weapons systems.

Logic shouldn't be dismissed as a late night whiskey supping thing; it's used on the battlefield as well, very much so. Logic is the foundation of military planning, unless you're the current Russian leadership. The PLA is very logical in its planning and it will be taking lots of notes from the Russo - Ukrainian War. It's also very technically minded and all of its branches are more modern than all militaries in the west. The PLAN is the largest navy in the world and its substantially out building the USN. Both the PLAAF and PLANAF are very powerful and like the PLAN are building capabilities far quicker than the US and the west. The trouble with the west is that it took its foot off the throttle and now is languishing behind. The likes of the US don't have the military - industrial capabilities that they had during Cold War 1.0 and it is well and truly illustrated with the NATO nations suddenly having to increase ammo manufacturing because the Ukrainians are chewing through it and other disposable stores far quicker than its supporting nations can provide. The real problem is that in liberal democracies, the civilian leadership has the final say on defence, and those politicians know very little about defence as a whole.

NH90 Tail rotor gearbox and a sub assembly close to it were ordered in I believe 2018. As of middish last year neither had arrived.

We have had well buried secrets relating to NH90 aswell from what I'm told.

Its a sacred cow and will never be risked.

 

[Rob c]

NH90 Tail rotor gearbox and a sub assembly close to it were ordered in I believe 2018. As of middish last year neither had arrived.

We have had well buried secrets relating to NH90 aswell from what I'm told.

Its a sacred cow and will never be risked.

The unit may well have ordered the Items in 2018 but how long did it take for it to reach Air Bus. these would have been expensive items and may have required monetary authorization from above, how long did this take? I don't know the Australian system and what is required in this regard, but most systems usually have expenditure limits and the more money involved, the higher up the system you have to go and the more time this can take. However it has been noted else were that Air Bus can be sluggish in the supply of some parts, but 4 to 5 years does seem excessive.

 

[Maranoa]

The Swede's Belgians, Norwegians and Germans have publicly stated they cannot get acceptable availability out of NHIndustries NH/MRH-90 helicopters and have either already retired them or are actively working on a replacement helicopter. One nation is even demanding compensation. A little research goes a long way.

 

[Maranoa]

The unit may well have ordered the Items in 2018 but how long did it take for it to reach Air Bus. these would have been expensive items and may have required monetary authorization from above, how long did this take? I don't know the Australian system and what is required in this regard, but most systems usually have expenditure limits and the more money involved, the higher up the system you have to go and the more time this can take. However it has been noted else were that Air Bus can be sluggish in the supply of some parts, but 4 to 5 years does seem excessive.

It would not have been material as money was never the problem AAAvn has been awash with funds in comparison to other Corps. Simply put Airbus Australia is not capable of meeting the spares demand as the production of spares by the parent prime consortium of the NATO Frigate Helicopter industrial program is the issue at hand. Australian DoD has long banged its head against Airbus Australia's door but the problem resides offshore. No operators have been successful extracting the required support including the RNZAF (which is already quietly grounding airframes for lack of certified spares). Defence spent ten years pretending before it had to get honest about the sustainment disaster that NHIndustries presides over. Buying and flying the new Black Hawks will be significantly cheaper than just retaining and not flying the MRH90 fleet. As to Tiger, it's inability to designate a target beyond 60 percent of the AGM-114M's publicly stated range and more importantly network within the ADF's digital framework made it obsolete before it entered service. Tiger looked great on paper, but the reality didn't live up to the paradise brochure.

 

[Takao]

As to Tiger, ... more importantly network within the ADF's digital framework made it obsolete before it entered service. Tiger looked great on paper, but the reality didn't live up to the paradise brochure.

This offers an excellent example of the importance of lessons being actually identified and of the point I raised elsewhere about something available now but obsolete soon v something that will be suitable soon, but comes with risk.

First off - what digital framework? The first two Tigers land in Oakey on 08 Dec 04. LAND 75, the Army's first attempt at a battlefield management system, kicks off Nov 09. Even if you assume Blue Force Tracker as the default option because of Abrams, the FMS agreement with the US was signed in Jun 04 - by which time Tiger's 001 - 004 were all in various stages of final construction/testing. Link 16 was an option - it was in use by RAAF to some extent - but it was determined that the extra expense was probably not worth it because the Tiger's main operating area was not part of the battlespace that the RAAF controlled.

Secondly - look at what the Land Force is in 1997. There is nothing digital. The main radios are RT-F200 and RT-F500 for the V/UHF side and RT-F100 for HF. All analogue, all rely on additional elements for crypto. Frankly, the Army doesn't know enough about incoming technology like BMS or digital radios. When CA defines Hardened Networked Army in 2004 (arguably the most important call for Army since 1975) it comes from (a) the clear need to be one and (b) what Tiger and Apache showed. Tiger is the first platform in Army with digital radios (in fact, the AN/ARC-210s Army ordered included ones to upgrade some of the RAAF ones - to bring them up to Tiger's standard...), SATCOM capability and with a BMS. Now, Eurogrid becomes an orphan - but at the time of delivery that wasn't known

Thirdly - there were two main Australianisations made to ARH, one of which was the HF system. Unlike Europe, our expected battlefield in 1997 (remember - Defence of Australia time) is here. The Army relies of HF significantly, because nothing else can have the range. Look at how 161 Recce Sqn and 2 Cav Regt operate through the 90s and 00s with Divisional reconnaissance screens, it's bloody impressive. None of the AIR87 aircraft have it; we added it to fit within our doctrine and planning.

Fourthly - look at the competitors. If your view is that Tiger is obsolete because it cannot communicate within the ADFs non-existent digital network, then none of the competitors do. In fact, if you compare the last three, each come with digital radios, but neither Apache nor Cobra come with Blue Force Tracker (and in fact, it isn't until 2010 that the US Services agree to make a BFT that integrates across their own services - a hypothetical Australian Cobra with BFT cannot communicate with the actual Australian Army Abrams BFT...).

With this in mind, what were the people in charge of AIR87 to do? Buy a platform for delivery in 2004 noting the idea for HNA hasn't happened, and LAND 75 isn't even a glimmer, or wait until those are known? In which case, we would be taking delivery of our first attack helicopters...in 2014. Except, even then we would have a problem, because the ARH delivery in 2014 would come with the Elbit BMS, which means it is not compatible with the ADF digital network in 2023. So, we push AIR87 to the right again, and treat LAND 4503 as the new ARH purchase. Which means our Kiowa and Huey replacement will be finally delivered in 2028. I don't know about you, but I cannot see Huey's and Kiowa's lasting until 2028. I love my Kenny's, but they weren't a serious battlefield helicopter after 2000. Now look at what this does to Army and ADF capability, retention for aircrew, the feasibility of 1 Avn Regt (with flow on effects to AAvn), the degraded battlefield effects, a whole host of flow on effects.

Finally, as an aside. One of the key selling points of ARH was it was a digital aircraft. Which means adding systems is theoretically easy, because it all conforms to the same MILSTD 1553 requirement. Ironically, exactly what we are pushing on the ground force now with Generic Architectures. And it was that that allowed the relative ease in successfully adding BMS to it. So while it did not deliver with the Army's digital network, until external influences changed which way Army would go, Tiger could, and did, integrate.

 

[seaspear]

There had been discussion on the need for cheap drones for the A.D.F. This news article states a Melbourne company has built cardboard ones which it is exporting to Ukraine demonstrating it is possible to make cheap drones ,it would be interesting for Ukrainian feedback on this
Australian cardboard drones ‘in operation’ in Ukraine | The Australian
Australian drones helping Ukraine against Russia | The Courier Mail

 

[ADMk2]

Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logistics - APDR

This startling conclusion is the culmination of several years of effort to find out why Australia has had disproportionate problems keeping our 22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) […]

asiapacificdefencereporter.com

This is an interesting article in the APDR that blames most of the the problems that Australia has had with Air Bus helicopters on the logistical system that is employed for parts and upgrades. There are some very relevant points made in the article including a comparison with NZ and a yet to be proven idea that the new helicopters on order will likely have the same or even less availability due to the existing short comings of the current system.

Funny how CASG doesn’t appear to struggle to sustain MH-60R, CH-47F Chinook, S-70A9 Blackhawk (over the same period) nor even the Airbus supplied EC-135…

But with Taipan and Tiger it does?

Then of course you have the litany of factual errors in this article (CAMM2 does not manage logistical support for these helos as an example of this…) and then perhaps ponder how NZ might fare if it had to sustain a fleet of Airbus helicopters 6x larger than it presently does and then of course I for one considered the plethora of advertisements in his magazine paid for by Airbus and I started to wonder whether he was actually being intellectually honest on this one…

But then I realised that Blackhawk and Apache are both signed off by Govt, with the first 3 actual Blackhawks arriving in May 2023 and stopped caring about Mr Bergmann’s apparent opinion on this, really...