Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[ngatimozart]

First Land-Based Tomahawk And SM-6 Launcher Delivered To Army

The Typhon Weapon System will give the Army its first ground-based medium-range missile strike capability in decades.

www.thedrive.com

Tomahawk should do the job but is a bit long in the tooth. LRASM I believe has been tested with mk 41 but not sure if fully integrated - but would be a better long term solution in my opinion.

LRASM doesn't have anywhere near the range of the Tomahawk.

Could someone detail what long range mobile launcher and strike missile is available now that the army could acquire for long range.. and I mean longe range strike from Australia shores?
I understand HIMARs can go out to 500km and NSM to 250km
But what system is currently available for order that can reach 1000 plus that could strike out to the island chains to our north and coral sea islands?
I feel this is what the army should be focusing on as a new capability that and merging as a marine style force.

Maybe you should research the systems yourself. Mr Google is your friend.

Why would you want to turn the Australian Army into a marine force? Marines by nature are light forces and the ADF requires a heavy force component as well as light forces.

 

[Tbone]

Wow thanks for the expert advice. Very helpful and your experience in answering my question is noted.
My understanding is that the army needs to evolve as a force.. experience in previous wars in the region is that amphibious operations are the key to securing land masses to our north and pacific islands. Securing these strategic locations in our region will be fundamental in our defence of mainland Australia.
This currently is under funded as only 1 battalion dedicated to this task.
A quick agile force that is lean and can pivot such as the US marines would be vital in any conflict.
Not sure the current Australian Army is actually anything but a light force.. if you consider 75 or so ageing Abram tanks and 300 vintage M113 as heavy component.

@Tbone

You ask questions about platforms and weapons where information is available and it is within your ability to do a bit of research. @ngatimozart provided part of the answer to your question with the link to Tomahawk. This has a range of over 900 nm (some blocks have a longer range) and it should be able to be fired from the land based MK41 being devloped for the US Army. Looking at what is posible within the HIMARS platform see below.

Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) Information Update - Naval News

Other posters have a right to be frustrated with your posting style and sarcastic attitude. Please do some research. Additional points have been assigned to you. I would prefer you to change your style and add to the discussion.

alexsa

 

[Massive]

A quick agile force that is lean and can pivot such as the US marines would be vital in any conflict.
Not sure the current Australian Army is actually anything but a light force.. if you consider 75 or so ageing Abram tanks and 300 vintage M113 as heavy component.

I disagree.

I feel that the regular army needs to be comprised of 3 (very) heavy brigade combat teams and a single light littoral brigade combat team (similar to the Spanish marines) to have a truly effective combat force. This would be combined with divisional assets, not least of which would be massed fires, LBASM etc

Then mass needs to be provided by the reserves - I feel this needs to be organised into 2 divisions of 3 protected brigade combat teams, also with appropriate divisional assets.

Land power matters and right now the ADF has very little.

I know that it is unlikely that this will be feasible, but when anyone starts saying light (read, very limited land power) I feel that they haven't really thought through the real utility of the force they are proposing.

Regards,

Massive

 

[OldTex]

Could someone detail what long range mobile launcher and strike missile is available now that the army could acquire for long range.. and I mean longe range strike from Australia shores?
I understand HIMARs can go out to 500km and NSM to 250km
But what system is currently available for order that can reach 1000 plus that could strike out to the island chains to our north and coral sea islands?
I feel this is what the army should be focusing on as a new capability that and merging as a marine style force.

In my opinion what is being suggested does not belong in Army's sphere of influence. Army would be more concerned with the tactical space and the ability to identify, target and prosecute opportunities. Army would not have the ISR assets to go seeking potential targets at 1000kms and beyond. To prosecute targets in the tactical space doesn't need weapon engagement ranges much over 500km. It is also necessary to consider the sensor-to-shooter delay as well as the flight time of the munitions if you are considering prosecuting mobile targets with long range strike weapons. These will add to the complexity of the weapons and add the need for persistent ISR.
Beyond the notional 500km distance it is starting to become more of a strategic targeting exercise and the service which is better placed to conduct this task is the RAAF.

 

[Bob53]

My question is so,we have a lighter Army. Someone somehow gets through our deterrent forces and can land a force. What then? who fights them…it’s a tall question but is the answer build up long range weaponry now …short term and then continue with hardening of the army longer term once we have adequate stocks of long range weapons in inventory or will the army remain hollowed out and with a much lighter armour capability for good? My concern is once/if the combined arms capability is lost or atrophied, how long would it take to build back up? Seems to me that would be a 10-15 year task. It’s a bit like having jumper cables. You rarely need them, hope you don’t but when you need them you need them.

 

[ADMk2]

In my opinion what is being suggested does not belong in Army's sphere of influence. Army would be more concerned with the tactical space and the ability to identify, target and prosecute opportunities. Army would not have the ISR assets to go seeking potential targets at 1000kms and beyond. To prosecute targets in the tactical space doesn't need weapon engagement ranges much over 500km. It is also necessary to consider the sensor-to-shooter delay as well as the flight time of the munitions if you are considering prosecuting mobile targets with long range strike weapons. These will add to the complexity of the weapons and add the need for persistent ISR.
Beyond the notional 500km distance it is starting to become more of a strategic targeting exercise and the service which is better placed to conduct this task is the RAAF.

Ah, but we are a joint force now, stop being so single service oriented!

The problem with the above idea (and my issue with RAAF operating the MRAD capability for that matter) is that RAAF as a whole is very good at operating in and around a fixed airbase construct. “Some” RAAF elements can deploy and sustain themselves in the field for extended periods but that is the exception, rather than the rule.

What RAAF is not traditionally good at, is operating on the ground in rugged terrain for extended periods of time as tactical units. That’s because that is Army’s job.

In any case as we have joined the Precision Strike Missile Increment 2 program as a development partner with a weapon with an objective range of 1000 kilometres, to be fired from Army’s upcoming HIMARS launchers, it seems as if ADF see this differently too.

As for extended - ranged targetting by Army singularly, I rather suspect we’ve already seen initial steps in that direction, this week at Avalon…

Australia to partner on US-led Precision Strike Missile program | ADBR

The Australian Defence Force will partner with the US on the development of that country’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) program. Being developed by Lockheed Martin and with a designed range…

adbr.com.au

https://www.baesystems.com/en-aus/strix

 

[TheRealist]

My question is so,we have a lighter Army. Someone somehow gets through our deterrent forces and can land a force. What then? who fights them…it’s a tall question but is the answer build up long range weaponry now …short term and then continue with hardening of the army longer term once we have adequate stocks of long range weapons in inventory or will the army remain hollowed out and with a much lighter armour capability for good? My concern is once/if the combined arms capability is lost or atrophied, how long would it take to build back up? Seems to me that would be a 10-15 year task. It’s a bit like having jumper cables. You rarely need them, hope you don’t but when you need them you need them.

Does anyone have an answer for this? I would like to know as well.

 

[Takao]

My question is so,we have a lighter Army. Someone somehow gets through our deterrent forces and can land a force. What then? who fights them…it’s a tall question but is the answer build up long range weaponry now …short term and then continue with hardening of the army longer term once we have adequate stocks of long range weapons in inventory or will the army remain hollowed out and with a much lighter armour capability for good? My concern is once/if the combined arms capability is lost or atrophied, how long would it take to build back up? Seems to me that would be a 10-15 year task. It’s a bit like having jumper cables. You rarely need them, hope you don’t but when you need them you need them.

Does anyone have an answer for this? I would like to know as well.

There are two separate points / questions here.

First off - who is getting through? It's not flippant, but in all seriousness, who is getting through needs to be considered. There is only one country that has a chance of landing a significant force here, and that's the US. There is no feasible plan that would see a Div or more landed on Australian mainland. Even then, where do they land? Anywhere between Perth and Darwin is a joke - I'd let them land then send the RAAF out after a week to drop water. Anywhere else and you can easily intercept SLOC or control narrow points. Plus, ultimately, the key to Australia remains the Brisbane-Adelaide line; the key parts of the nation are south of that. And getting there is hard. Honestly, invasion of Australian mainland is such a low level of feasibility it actually distracts from the serious defence debate.

The second point is skills fade. We already have seen that, this will be the last generation of CO's within RAAC who have experience with a Tank Regt (ie, manoeuvring Tank heavy combat teams). The skill sets behind heavy forces, and that's not just driving and fighting the tanks but also supporting elements, atrophies quickly. Without heavy forces it would take less than a decade to lose and at least 15 to rebuild (you need to build up the WO2s and MAJs from scratch).

 

[DDG38]

Meanwhile new toys on display at Avalon Air Show :
"Chief of Army Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, AO, DSC, stands out of the cupola of a High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) during the Australian International Airshow 2023 at Avalon, Victoria." Image Source : ADF Image Library

 

[Bob53]

There are two separate points / questions here.

First off - who is getting through? It's not flippant, but in all seriousness, who is getting through needs to be considered. There is only one country that has a chance of landing a significant force here, and that's the US. There is no feasible plan that would see a Div or more landed on Australian mainland. Even then, where do they land? Anywhere between Perth and Darwin is a joke - I'd let them land then send the RAAF out after a week to drop water. Anywhere else and you can easily intercept SLOC or control narrow points. Plus, ultimately, the key to Australia remains the Brisbane-Adelaide line; the key parts of the nation are south of that. And getting there is hard. Honestly, invasion of Australian mainland is such a low level of feasibility it actually distracts from the serious defence debate.

The second point is skills fade. We already have seen that, this will be the last generation of CO's within RAAC who have experience with a Tank Regt (ie, manoeuvring Tank heavy combat teams). The skill sets behind heavy forces, and that's not just driving and fighting the tanks but also supporting elements, atrophies quickly. Without heavy forces it would take less than a decade to lose and at least 15 to rebuild (you need to build up the WO2s and MAJs from scratch).

Thanks Takao…the feasibility of anyone landing is a bit moot I agree. It was more about is this a stop and hold while other priorities get filled or a full reversal and those heavy capabilities will most probably be dropped for good? I guess no one knows at this point but I am hoping it’s the former. We find out in April.

 

[TheRealist]

There are two separate points / questions here.

First off - who is getting through? It's not flippant, but in all seriousness, who is getting through needs to be considered. There is only one country that has a chance of landing a significant force here, and that's the US. There is no feasible plan that would see a Div or more landed on Australian mainland. Even then, where do they land? Anywhere between Perth and Darwin is a joke - I'd let them land then send the RAAF out after a week to drop water. Anywhere else and you can easily intercept SLOC or control narrow points. Plus, ultimately, the key to Australia remains the Brisbane-Adelaide line; the key parts of the nation are south of that. And getting there is hard. Honestly, invasion of Australian mainland is such a low level of feasibility it actually distracts from the serious defence debate.

Thanks Takao. I guess I was just thinking worse case scenario, which these days isn't as unlikely as they once were. Still remote though, I agree.

 

[Maranoa]

'Feasibility' is folly in armed conflict. Russia just launched an unfeasible ground invasion of Ukraine with 180,000 underequipped poorly led troops with a moronic plan and no ammo, food, fuel or tyres. Logic is for late night whisky fuelled armchair chats. Real war is often madness, driven by stupidity and without any logic what so ever let alone a plan that would pass muster in any military college final year exam. Nobody thought the Japanese would get to the fringes of Port Moresby as everybody was so smugly assured of the infeasibility of the fall of Singapore. The Taliban's 10 year ability to make the Chora Valley contested against the combined might of the Dutch, Australian, US and Afghan National Army's was not feasible. But their it is. The Australian Army needs to fight in a 21st century battlespace, not some feasibility study. The Australian Army also does not exist just to defend Australia's mainland, we may need to fight further forward as well, which without heavy armour and a lot of artillery will consign our combatants to the grave. It was never feasible that events in unknown locations like Sarajevo, Konigsberg, Seoul, Saigon, Somalia, Rwanda, Timor Leste, Tarin Kowt et al, would alter Australian destiny and leave over 100,000 dead. But they did.

 

[Bob53]

An Australian article is stating Redback will win the land 400 tender with 290 vehicles to be ordered.

South Korean defence giant Hanwha has emerged as the late favourite to supply the Australian Army’s next-generation infantry fighting vehicles in a contract believed to be worth about $18bn.

The Australian understands the army recommended Hanwha’s Red Back vehicle over its German rival based on its performance during extensive tests, but the decision is still to be signed off by the national security committee of cabinet for inclusion in the upcoming defence strategic review.

The tender was originally for 450 of the tracked vehicles worth up to $27bn, but the need to free up money for advanced new capabilities including guided missiles and unmanned systems has forced the contract to be trimmed to about 290 vehicles.

South Korea Hanwha favourite to supply ADF $18bn in infantry vehicles — The Australian

Defence giant Hanwha is the favourite to supply the Australian Army’s next-generation infantry fighting vehicles in an $18n deal.

apple.news

 

[Rob c]

Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logistics - APDR

This startling conclusion is the culmination of several years of effort to find out why Australia has had disproportionate problems keeping our 22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) […]

asiapacificdefencereporter.com

This is an interesting article in the APDR that blames most of the the problems that Australia has had with Air Bus helicopters on the logistical system that is employed for parts and upgrades. There are some very relevant points made in the article including a comparison with NZ and a yet to be proven idea that the new helicopters on order will likely have the same or even less availability due to the existing short comings of the current system.

 

[Todjaeger]

Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logistics - APDR

This startling conclusion is the culmination of several years of effort to find out why Australia has had disproportionate problems keeping our 22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) […]

asiapacificdefencereporter.com

This is an interesting article in the APDR that blames most of the the problems that Australia has had with Air Bus helicopters on the logistical system that is employed for parts and upgrades. There are some very relevant points made in the article including a comparison with NZ and a yet to be proven idea that the new helicopters on order will likely have the same or even less availability due to the existing short comings of the current system.

Interesting article, but I do have to question just how accurate some of the conclusions really are. If the problems with availability for the MRH-90 and Tiger ARH are truly due to software issues involving defence logistics and inventory management, then I would expect those same problems to be occurring across the entire ADF aircraft fleet which utilizes this software.

I have not heard of similar issues impacting other aircraft like the CH-47 Chinook, existing Army Black Hawks, or MH-R Seahawks. The article does note that certain aircraft are not maintained using the specific software in question, but I would seriously doubt that 'just' the two problematic helicopters are the ones using the software in question.

One of the other things I noticed is that the article seemed to be somewhat misinformed as to why the Tiger ARH is being retired so early and replaced with the AH-64 Apache. The impression that I formed based off the article is that the Tiger ARH is being retired early despite having plenty of structural airframe life left is due to problems with maintenance and availability. The impression that I have formed based off a number of other sources is that the Tiger is being retired early due to a confluence of issues.

One of the first is that the Tiger helicopter is out of production and then when Australia purchased them only 22 were ordered when a more realistic requirement was for 29 (the number of Apaches being ordered). The second is that due to the age of some of the Tiger systems, at this point the helicopter would need to get some fairly significant and expensive updates to comms/avionics. The cost being significant enough due to the degree of upgrades required plus the small fleet size which the costs would be shared across, and the fact that Australia has too few Tigers for likely sustainable training and deployment needs and no realistic way to obtain more...

The article also does not mention the cpfh for the MRH-90 which IIRC from the ANAO reports on this from 2014, was about 4x - 5x that of Army Black Hawk helicopters. Also whilst the article does appear to suggest that current political and defence leaders are keeping certain elements of the decision to retire the two fleets early under wraps to avoid embarrassment, it also fails to mention the developmental problems both the MRH-90 and Tiger ARH encountered or that it appears what Australia thought was being purchased at the time of their respective selections, namely finished designs ready for production, was actually designs still in development. IIRC there was some of factors in the MRH-90 decision which also failed to materialize, like the MRH-90 production facility then becoming a regional support centre for the Asia-Pacific region for IIRC the EC-145. With negligible orders for the specific Airbus helicopter from the whole Asia-Pacific region, there just was not enough demand.

I do feel that some of the questions raised certainly need to be considered and looked into, but elements of the article also feel like a particular POV or agenda is being advanced

 

[spoz]

Kym has always been pro the Euro products and opposed to their replacement. The “Alphabet soup” of logistics systems he mentions are not all in use in the sustainment phase of a system’s life - “LSAR” for example, Logistic Support Analysis Record, (which until recently was constructed using a US MILSTD) provides the initial estimate of logistic data during the acquistion phase, which then gets loaded into other (interconnected) systems including the main spares management system which, while old in its original implementation (around 2000) has been regularly updated and which is, in any case, in the process of being replaced under the Defence ERP project. Once there the data gets modified by experience.

CAMM is certainly getting a bit long in the tooth, but it is used across the three services (a version goes to sea with ships’ flights) and has supported most types quite successfully, including both the Navy S-70B-2 fleet before its replacement with Romeo, and the Army Blackhawks. Whether it is still used with Romeo I do not know. But it does depend on getting the initial data load, which is usually done by the acquisition prime (using, amongst other things, the LSAR he generated….) right.

The comparison with NZ is potentially flawed - it cannot be made without having a good understanding of the respective operational profiles (and the expectations for those) of each country, and in the same environmental conditions. NZ may operate its helicopters in the same way and in the same environmental conditions as Aust but the size of NZ and its climate might make that seem unlikely. And, without wanting to whip up an inter service debate, as is the fact that they are operated by the RNZAF, not the Army. There was a reason that was changed 30+ years ago in Australia; you can debate the merits of that but it certainly had some good arguments behind it. But what is undeniable is that Air Forces take a different approach to helicopters (and indeed aircraft in general) compared to Armies.

(Editorial note - written at the same time as Tod’s immediately above, with which I agree, so covering some of the some ground)

 

[Volkodav]

There is some hyperbola in the article but CAMM2 is a problem, a problem that was meant to have been solved by being replaced several years ago.

There are also cultural issues revolving around how maintenance is done, issues that were solved on Tiger when the experienced, predominantly ex uniform Airbus people, took over management of the maintenance from the overstretched, often mismanaged uniformed maintainers.

The egos (or perhaps defensive posturing) of some quite junior people explains a lot of the issues seen, and these will continue no matter what the platform is. Maybe getting new gear will result in an influx of new blood and greater enthusiasm that can help fix the cultural problems.

 

[Stampede]

Kym has always been pro the Euro products and opposed to their replacement. The “Alphabet soup” of logistics systems he mentions are not all in use in the sustainment phase of a system’s life - “LSAR” for example, Logistic Support Analysis Record, (which until recently was constructed using a US MILSTD) provides the initial estimate of logistic data during the acquistion phase, which then gets loaded into other (interconnected) systems including the main spares management system which, while old in its original implementation (around 2000) has been regularly updated and which is, in any case, in the process of being replaced under the Defence ERP project. Once there the data gets modified by experience.

CAMM is certainly getting a bit long in the tooth, but it is used across the three services (a version goes to sea with ships’ flights) and has supported most types quite successfully, including both the Navy S-70B-2 fleet before its replacement with Romeo, and the Army Blackhawks. Whether it is still used with Romeo I do not know. But it does depend on getting the initial data load, which is usually done by the acquisition prime (using, amongst other things, the LSAR he generated….) right.

The comparison with NZ is potentially flawed - it cannot be made without having a good understanding of the respective operational profiles (and the expectations for those) of each country, and in the same environmental conditions. NZ may operate its helicopters in the same way and in the same environmental conditions as Aust but the size of NZ and its climate might make that seem unlikely. And, without wanting to whip up an inter service debate, as is the fact that they are operated by the RNZAF, not the Army. There was a reason that was changed 30+ years ago in Australia; you can debate the merits of that but it certainly had some good arguments behind it. But what is undeniable is that Air Forces take a different approach to helicopters (and indeed aircraft in general) compared to Armies.

(Editorial note - written at the same time as Tod’s immediately above, with which I agree, so covering some of the some ground)

Yep read the article the other day and as a layman observer of these this I really just don't know.
APDR have certainly being keen to keep Tiger and the Taipan.
On paper they are good aircraft that still have a lot of life in them.
For what ever reasons a call has been made and we are to moving on to other like platforms resulting in their early retirement.
I think we all wanted them to work, but if they are in fact not fit for purpose them reluctantly a replacement had to be found.

No one wants to spend this money but it appears our hand has been forced by necessity.
If APDR are in fact correct with what is said in the article, then we have a major problem on many levels.
If they are not and are just trying to salvage their view point ,then it doesn't do much for their creditability.
I do like much of what Kym says on a range of defence issues however I'm just not qualified to know fact or fiction on this subject.

Cheers S

 

[Todjaeger]

Kym has always been pro the Euro products and opposed to their replacement.

Interesting. One of the impressions that I had gotten was that a number of systems across Defence were acquired because their advocates within Defence and/or OzGov were pro-Euro, or that some of the Euro defence companies and/or their Oz subsidiaries hired influential ex-gov't/defence people. One of the recurring outcomes of this situation is that a number of projects across Defence selected kit to meet Defence needs with it turning out that the kit was not ready for service and was in fact still being developed.

I have no issue with Defence selecting developmental kit, provided that it is aware that the kit in question is still being developed. The ANAO reporting on the MU90 LWT highlights some of this, in that JP2070 thought the MU90 was a MOTS defence product in service with other nations when it was in fact still in development.

 

[Milne Bay]

I have no issue with Defence selecting developmental kit, provided that it is aware that the kit in question is still being developed. The ANAO reporting on the MU90 LWT highlights some of this, in that JP2070 thought the MU90 was a MOTS defence product in service with other nations when it was in fact still in development.

I really don't understand this.
It has been stated so often about various ADF acquired platforms that we "thought" that "capability X " was a MOTS defence product in service with other nations when it was in fact still in development. How hard would it have been to simply check that statement about things we were about to order?.
Eg the MU90 LWT ..... who actually has it in service? ....ask them what their experience with it has been........ ask them what the level of support from the manufacturer exists ..... ask them about spares......what has it been integrated with .................. reliability........... etc
Surely there was a part of the selection process that addressed these sorts of questions.
MB