Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Mikeymike]

a US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team is far removed from what the Australian Army is intending to develop.

Isn't that essentially the point?

The army if there is no budgetary concerns would build as @Takao says "What the army needs" which would look a lot more like a US Brigade Combat Team than not (Not saying Australia would develop an Armoured Brigade). For example, if you go off @Takao's calculations on tanks you get to 70 tanks per brigade. That isn't too far off an US Armored BCT which has ~87 (If i count correctly), bit less but not surprising as Australia wouldn't be going full armoured brigade but more combined arms oriented.

My previous post was probably poorly phrased and sort of halfway between two thoughts but what I meant is if Australia was to develop a brigade based on "What the army needs" it would be structured slightly different compared to how the US structures their brigades but not too different that the IFV counts would be massively different.

As the Army does have budgetary concerns they are developing something very different. If you compare this "Ideal" brigade structure to what the Army is developing you essentially have to keep cutting capability to get down to 450 IFVs, let alone 300.

For example, by cutting a battalion from all 3 brigades (2 in each instead of 3). Then only one of them is mechanized. Then replace some of the variants with less capable but cheaper vehicles etc

 

[Stampede]

Well, we can do the maths, leaning on doctrine and this 'How many tanks?' post for base assumptions. Before we do the maths though, we need to understand the IFV numbers are 'messy'. Simplistic maths like we did for tank (which actually ends up about 15 - 18 short) doesn't cut it when we have multiple IFV variants. Furthermore, not every infantry element has IFVs, nor does every support element. IFVs are for operations in the direct fire zone, so, for example, only about 20% of ambulances on the battlefield would be an IFV version because CRV/PMV variants are fine for most moves.

Minimum unit for Inf will be a Rifle Coy (16x IFVs, 2x EME variants, 1x ambo variant and 4x log variant) or a Spt Coy (same as a rifle Coy + 3x Mor variants and 6x log variants).

On to the maths.

Screen/guard BG. First avoids decisive engagement, second seeks it out. I'm happy to debate if and what infantry strength the screen gets, but I'm going to give the guard 2x Coy. That gives them better flexibility and the ability to break contact easily. Both will also get a Spt Coy.

Three triangle BG of 2x Coy each, with a Spt Coy for each. Each BG will have a Tac HQ of 3x IFV.

Security BG probably doesn't need IFV (less likely to be in direct fire role), but the reserve BG needs to be able to match the main BG. So...2x Coy and another Spt Coy. And a Tac HQ.

So, our fighting Bde has 10x Coy + 5x Spt Coy and 12x HQ cars.

But, it's not just the infantry! All the variants are included except two - the engineers and the others... The engineers first - there are dedicated engineer variants plus the vehicles needed for the C2 nodes of the engineering detachments. I'll treat each CER Sqn as an rifle Coy with 6x of the 16x IFVs as engineer variants. Simply to keep the maths easy enough. Each BG gets a CER Sqn.

Now the others. There are going to be IFV scattered all over the Bde. A Tk Sqn, for example, will have a couple of them for Sqn HQ as well as some log variants for their A1 logistic echelon. Likewise the Arty Regt will have a couple for its extra JTAC/FO and the CSR will probably hold 4 - 6 for Bde Tac. What does this mean? Let's add 4x IFV and 6x variants for each Tk Sqn and another overall 20x IFV to cover the other odds and ends across the Bde.

For those keeping track - That's 15x Coy + 5 Spt Coy + 12 HQ car + 4(x 5 Tk Sqn)x HQ car and 6(x 5)x variants + 20 IFV. That gives us... 342x gun cars and 245x (40x EME, 25x ambo, 15x mor, 135x log, and 30x eng) variants. Oof....

Same attrition planning figure as tank (7%) - 24x gun cars and 17x variants.

But again, that's just the fighting force. We have more vehicles we need!

2x BG into the field for the upcoming Bde - that's another 62x gun cars and 49x variants. Prob some more gun cars in all honestly, remember there are all those misc IFV's running around. But, lets be conservative and keep it at this.

Force generating infantry (2x Coy + Spt Coy), armour (1x Tk Sqn), engineers (1x CER Sqn), mortars (3x mor), and log (call it 4x EME, 1x ambo and 12x log variants) gives us another 62x gun cars and 69x variants.

That places us at 466x gun cars and 363x variants (60x EME, 36x ambo, 24x mor, 201x log and 42x eng). Double oof....

Last bit is the 25% needed for maintenance, upgrades etc.... the total becomes 583x gun cars and 454x variants. Or 1037x IFV chassis....

We are talking about cutting from 450 to 300.

Now I grant you, there are some simplifications we can make. Perhaps we can lower the 75x EME variants to 30x or so, leaning on HX77 or CRV variants. After all, combining the individual subunits allows some rationalisation. Perhaps too the number of log can be lowered. But you are, at best, cutting ~150x chassis; so now you only need 880x cars. Still twice what we are buying now.

Now, before someone tells me that my numbers are simply unrealistic, or modern armies are too big, I will draw attention to Question 2398 from the House of Reps, 29 Nov 1985 when Kim Beazley as MINDEF said there was a need for 1133x M113 variants. So we can safely assume that around 1000 cars are needed to deploy a Bde.

TL;DR: We need 1040 to do the job. Right now. So the 450 300 we have isn't enough, and hence we need more. Right now.

Thanks Takao for the very detailed response.

Yep, very big numbers!

I guess it's the conflict of need and reality!

A look at the increase in numbers of personnel and equipment of the ADF in WW1 and WW11 compared to the Army's composition just prior to these two devastating conflicts and you can see the dramatic escalation in numbers.
Unfortunately the reality is that conflict devours equipment and personnel
I guess the need for more platforms was and is always there.
Certainly this has being reinforced with the recent conflict in Europe where the demand for equipment is at a premium.

The problem as you know is money.

Do we increase the defence budget to acquire more kit?
Do we give Army a bigger slice of the defence cake and what does that look like for Navy and the Air force.

I believe that Army needs heavier forces and therefore the equipment to achieve that end.
Just not sure what in reality those numbers look like.
With regards to this discussion re IFV's; how many do we get or for that matter can we afford.
We had 700 plus M113's and modified around 450 of them
The intention was to acquire around 450 IFV's, so I guess Army are familiar with this fleet number and as I understand many of these upgraded M113AS4 are not utilised.
So is the speculated 300 purchase feasible?
As said previously; we are to manufacture these vehicles, so the numbers will probably be increased over time over and above the first order.

So some clarity re our force structure!!!!

Can someone advise if our force structure TODAY is any different to this graphic.......................... "Yes I know it's Wiki!"

Structure of the Australian Army - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Cheers S

 

[Anthony_B_78]

So some clarity re our force structure!!!!

Can someone advise if our force structure TODAY is any different to this graphic.......................... "Yes I know it's Wiki!"

Structure of the Australian Army - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Cheers S

Yes, it is, or largely would be. There's nothing in public domain I'm aware of that suggests any recent changes. Raven would have the most up to date information, I should imagine. There are plans for further reform, as there generally always are, which he outlined quite some time ago now. There's not been anything posted since that suggests those plans have been changed though.

As you can see, three mechanised battalions.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Isn't that essentially the point? The army if there is no budgetary concerns would build as @Takao says "What the army needs" which would look a lot more like a US Brigade Combat Team than not (Not saying Australia would develop an Armoured Brigade). (Snipped)

"If there is no budgetary concerns" takes us out of the world of realism though, doesn't it? But it's also very much arguable as to what the army needs, and whether what Takao outlined is realistic in this sense too. Though, I should add, Takao made a good point too in saying one should step back and look at what the government actually wants from our army.

As you say, and you're quite right, what Takao outlined looks a lot more like a US Army Brigade Combat Team, but specifically like an Armored Brigade Combat Team. It wouldn't have all that many fewer (apologies, terrible English) tanks or IFVs. And let's remember these brigades in the US Army are, on average, larger than they were in the Cold War. Basically, Takao outlined a brigade - at least in terms of tanks and IFVs - that would be at home in the armoued warfare one could expect in Europe or the Middle East.

The document you linked (remarkable for how much information is put into the public domain really) talks about the limitations of the armored brigade: "The main drawback of armored BCTs is that they lose many of their combat advantages in complex terrain (such as forests, jungles, mountains, or urban areas) as well as in unconventional combat (such as guerrilla warfare). In such conditions, armored vehicles are more vulnerable to attack, have less ability to use their firepower, and cannot benefit from their tactical mobility. Although armored BCTs still have some advantages over lighter forces under those conditions, defense planners generally believe that the high costs of armored BCTs relative to those of lighter forces make them less well suited for such missions. In addition, in areas with poor infrastructure, armored BCTs may be less suitable for some operations because of their logistics demands (such as high fuel consumption) and related issues (such as the need for bridges that can support the weight of armored vehicles)." It also includes some interesting figures on what is required to field one of these brigades - stated at 16,330 military personnel per unit and US$3.16 billion a year. That's enormous.

The US Army has 12 of those, but also has 7 Stryker brigades and 13 infantry brigades. Naturally, our army just can't compare.

In the excellent speech by Brigadier Ian Langford that Redland helpfully shared there is this quote: "These force structures represent the agility of our land force which cannot be singularly described; Army’s capabilities are more like a game of ‘paper, rock, scissors’; you need all three offensive and defensive capabilities in order to be able to meet all threats, each bringing their own strength while depending on the other to cover whatever the adversary chooses to attack you with. If you don’t believe me, try playing it with only two elements against someone who retains all three; I am sure that against an opponent who knows what you are missing, that your odds of success will be greatly minimised."

Langord argues convincingly for the acquisition of up to 450 IFVs. I agree with him entirely. I imagine actually everyone here does (but maybe not?. He's not arguing they should come at the expense of some other capability, or that we need more than that number, or what have you. He's arguing for the plan, which is the army's plan.

If we throw money at buying many more IFVs than we need with our existing and planned force size and structure then it will come at the expense of other capabilities. It will mean we may have a much bigger "rock", but no "paper". It will lead to an unbalanced force. We don't have the luxury of being able to field numbers of different types of brigades. And armoured brigades won't be as suitable for operations in our near-region as lighter ones. We need a mix of capabilities so we can tailor forces to the mission and the AO.

In short, if we go back to the question that sparked this discussion, how many IFVs do we need, then I would suggest the more realistic answer is one that looks at the existing and planned size and structure of our army. In other words, how many do we need for three mechanised battalions and associated supporting arms?

 

[Stampede]

"If there is no budgetary concerns" takes us out of the world of realism though, doesn't it? But it's also very much arguable as to what the army needs, and whether what Takao outlined is realistic in this sense too. Though, I should add, Takao made a good point too in saying one should step back and look at what the government actually wants from our army.

As you say, and you're quite right, what Takao outlined looks a lot more like a US Army Brigade Combat Team, but specifically like an Armored Brigade Combat Team. It wouldn't have all that many fewer (apologies, terrible English) tanks or IFVs. And let's remember these brigades in the US Army are, on average, larger than they were in the Cold War. Basically, Takao outlined a brigade - at least in terms of tanks and IFVs - that would be at home in the armoued warfare one could expect in Europe or the Middle East.

The document you linked (remarkable for how much information is put into the public domain really) talks about the limitations of the armored brigade: "The main drawback of armored BCTs is that they lose many of their combat advantages in complex terrain (such as forests, jungles, mountains, or urban areas) as well as in unconventional combat (such as guerrilla warfare). In such conditions, armored vehicles are more vulnerable to attack, have less ability to use their firepower, and cannot benefit from their tactical mobility. Although armored BCTs still have some advantages over lighter forces under those conditions, defense planners generally believe that the high costs of armored BCTs relative to those of lighter forces make them less well suited for such missions. In addition, in areas with poor infrastructure, armored BCTs may be less suitable for some operations because of their logistics demands (such as high fuel consumption) and related issues (such as the need for bridges that can support the weight of armored vehicles)." It also includes some interesting figures on what is required to field one of these brigades - stated at 16,330 military personnel per unit and US$3.16 billion a year. That's enormous.

The US Army has 12 of those, but also has 7 Stryker brigades and 13 infantry brigades. Naturally, our army just can't compare.

In the excellent speech by Brigadier Ian Langford that Redland helpfully shared there is this quote: "These force structures represent the agility of our land force which cannot be singularly described; Army’s capabilities are more like a game of ‘paper, rock, scissors’; you need all three offensive and defensive capabilities in order to be able to meet all threats, each bringing their own strength while depending on the other to cover whatever the adversary chooses to attack you with. If you don’t believe me, try playing it with only two elements against someone who retains all three; I am sure that against an opponent who knows what you are missing, that your odds of success will be greatly minimised."

Langord argues convincingly for the acquisition of up to 450 IFVs. I agree with him entirely. I imagine actually everyone here does (but maybe not?. He's not arguing they should come at the expense of some other capability, or that we need more than that number, or what have you. He's arguing for the plan, which is the army's plan.

If we throw money at buying many more IFVs than we need with our existing and planned force size and structure then it will come at the expense of other capabilities. It will mean we may have a much bigger "rock", but no "paper". It will lead to an unbalanced force. We don't have the luxury of being able to field numbers of different types of brigades. And armoured brigades won't be as suitable for operations in our near-region as lighter ones. We need a mix of capabilities so we can tailor forces to the mission and the AO.

In short, if we go back to the question that sparked this discussion, how many IFVs do we need, then I would suggest the more realistic answer is one that looks at the existing and planned size and structure of our army. In other words, how many do we need for three mechanised battalions and associated supporting arms?

Something to consider when looking at "going heavy" is the logistics tail.
This stuff is not sexy, but is just as important as that MBT on the front page of the glossy magazine cover.
We generally don't want to know about logistics, just the vehicles with the gun thingy's.

In the Australian context, we are either fighting domestically which means vast distances over our great big island, or alternatively fighting on someone else's island which is again over vast distances of ocean.
Preferable it is the later scenario.

So while we many want a large combat Brigade, lets be mindful what three Amphibious ships and Two supply ships can actually transport and resupply.

Cheers S

 

[Redlands18]

Something to consider when looking at "going heavy" is the logistics tail.
This stuff is not sexy, but is just as important as that MBT on the front page of the glossy magazine cover.
We generally don't want to know about logistics, just the vehicles with the gun thingy's.

In the Australian context, we are either fighting domestically which means vast distances over our great big island, or alternatively fighting on someone else's island which is again over vast distances of ocean.
Preferable it is the later scenario.

So while we many want a large combat Brigade, lets be mindful what three Amphibious ships and Two supply ships can actually transport and resupply.

Cheers S

And once you start talking tracked vehicles then you are also talking Tank Transporters for any deployment of any real distance.

 

[Morgo]

Something to consider when looking at "going heavy" is the logistics tail.
This stuff is not sexy, but is just as important as that MBT on the front page of the glossy magazine cover.
We generally don't want to know about logistics, just the vehicles with the gun thingy's.

In the Australian context, we are either fighting domestically which means vast distances over our great big island, or alternatively fighting on someone else's island which is again over vast distances of ocean.
Preferable it is the later scenario.

So while we many want a large combat Brigade, lets be mindful what three Amphibious ships and Two supply ships can actually transport and resupply.

Cheers S

Not forgetting the capacity that will be added by LAND 8710 and any new LST/LSHs we may acquire.

 

[old faithful]

I'm looking at 1000 vehicles and shaking my head.
A brigade has a strength of less than 5000 in the Australian Army.
So this looks like an armoured vehicle for every 4 or 5 men.......I doubt it!
An Infantry Bn , with 3 rifle companies and a support company, as well as admin company, is around about 600 men, but hey, let's say 800.
2 Bns =1600 men. Cav Regt, let's say 500. Arty Regt, 500. SF contingent, say 350. Logistics, 500, sigs 500. Let's add another 1000 misc, = 5000.
You reckon we need 1000 armoured vehicles to support 5000 personel?

 

[ADMk2]

I'm looking at 1000 vehicles and shaking my head.
A brigade has a strength of less than 5000 in the Australian Army.
So this looks like an armoured vehicle for every 4 or 5 men.......I doubt it!
An Infantry Bn , with 3 rifle companies and a support company, as well as admin company, is around about 600 men, but hey, let's say 800.
2 Bns =1600 men. Cav Regt, let's say 500. Arty Regt, 500. SF contingent, say 350. Logistics, 500, sigs 500. Let's add another 1000 misc, = 5000.
You reckon we need 1000 armoured vehicles to support 5000 personel?

Pretty sure he is suggesting you need a fleet of 1000 vehicles to sustain a deployable armoured brigade, not 1000 vehicles allocated to said brigade.

 

[Volkodav]

I understand that. I don't disagree more would be better. I just know the mods here like to keep things realistic. And there's always going to be a finite budget. They're talking about $27 billion for 450 IFVs under Land 400 Phase 3, so, yeah, that's not small change in the context of our budget, unfortunately.

I won't get into all the nitty-gritty here but to just respond to this first part: If doctrine says to put a brigade in the field and fight you need 800-1000 IFVs then I think it'd be a little unrealistic - even if we assume you actually mean all armoured vehicles, not just IFVs. It also seems a little fixed, and we know that deployments will be mission-orientated. Brigades, of course, come in all shapes and sizes.

If we look at real-world examples from other countries then that could be instructive. The British 7th Armoured Brigade in Operation Telic, for example, was much reinforced from its normal peacetime structure. It had five battlegroups, with something like 112 Challenger 2s, 140-odd Warriors and 32 AS-90s. No doubt there were other sundry armoured vehicles in support, including armoured engineering, and so forth. That's an armoured brigade. Then you have other examples, obviously, of brigades with substantially fewer armoured vehicles, such as 3 Commando Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade. They were given different missions and still played their part. Edit to add: Little tidbit, the Brits only built 789 Warriors of all variants.

Back in the 80s when we had one regular tank regiment, no reserve component and an original 90 leopards gun tanks, the army manuals specifically stated the army had and would use two regiments, in support of our multiple mechanised infantry battalions we didn't have either.

I know this because when I read it I asked the question of how this could be and the answer I received was it was assumed we would get the extra tanks and personnel from somewhere if we needed to. Maybe this is where PM got the idea we had an armoured brigade to offer GW Bush for the war on terror.

There are many assumptions made on force structures and scales of equipment that have been severely trimmed from what was planned, let alone delivered, when the strategy underpinning them was formulated.

The late 1940s strategy was formulated with a planned structure to achieve it including one regular and two reserve tank brigades of five regiments each. The equipment planned was Centurions with the regular army and Comets with the reserves, the reality was Churchill's in one regular regiment and M-3 Grants and Matilda's in a couple of reserve units, most only squadron strength. What was deployed to Korea, nothing.

These numbers may seem excessive but on the pre war British army scales it was assumed a corps would be supported by a tank brigade, more specifically each infantry division with nine infantry battalions supported by one tank regiment.

The US post Vietnam structure was similar, a tank btn per infantry division, four to a mechanised division and five to an armoured division. The logic being one tank coy to support each light infantry btn, each mech brigade having one tank and two mech infantry btns, and each armoured BDE having two tank and one mech/armoured btn.

 

[old faithful]

Pretty sure he is suggesting you need a fleet of 1000 vehicles to sustain a deployable armoured brigade, not 1000 vehicles allocated to said brigade.

Realistically, we would need a minimum of two mech brigades to sustain a deployment of 1 brigade anyway, and that would most definitely require 1000 vehicles. But as always, they will only have enough, just enough equipment for 1 brigade, which will mean we could only really sustain 1 Mech Bn Group on deployment.
So that's where a brigade will be most likely, 1 Cav Regt, 1 Mech Bn, 1 motorised Bn, and supporting units, like aviation, arty etc.
So in reality, nothing much will change if the order is for 300 vehicles. Just the same as it is now with newer cars.

 

[Stampede]

Not forgetting the capacity that will be added by LAND 8710 and any new LST/LSHs we may acquire.

True

Long over due programs for replacing the LCM8 and LCH.

Regards S

 

[Stampede]

Realistically, we would need a minimum of two mech brigades to sustain a deployment of 1 brigade anyway, and that would most definitely require 1000 vehicles. But as always, they will only have enough, just enough equipment for 1 brigade, which will mean we could only really sustain 1 Mech Bn Group on deployment.
So that's where a brigade will be most likely, 1 Cav Regt, 1 Mech Bn, 1 motorised Bn, and supporting units, like aviation, arty etc.
So in reality, nothing much will change if the order is for 300 vehicles. Just the same as it is now with newer cars.

Your correct
Realistically that's about our level of expectation.
As you say with newer cars.
On a positive note we will finally do justice to the variants required across the various vehicle fleets.
Tanks will have appropriate numbers, bridging,recovery and engineering support.
Same with IFV and Cav.
We will not have capability gaps.
Add in a range of impressive artillery capability's plus a revamp of aviation assets and our "small" Brigade starts to look very potent.

Sure it's not a US ABCT but it's still a well balance force to kick in the door for many scenario's.
As Old Faithful mentions you need a multiple of something in order to sustain one capability.
Currently we have a three like Brigade structure.

What ever Army's future structure looks like, I doubt it will collectively have fewer Coy's / Sqns than are currently on the books.

Our challenge now is time.

This new kit is still coming, but in many cases it's still just ink on a purchase order pending physical reality.

ASLAV , M1a1 , M113AS4,Tiger,Taipan, M777 is our reality for some time to come.

Hmmmmmmm

Regards S

 

[Volkodav]

I read an article a while ago comparing a US battle group to a Russian equivalent, the US in most cases had much more direct fire and heavy armour and the Russians more scout / cav and indirect fire.

The US doctrine basically is find and smash with shock effect, while the Russian is find, fix and destroy with massed indirect fire.

I get the impression we are neither. We don't have an over match of either heavy direct or indirect fire, nor do we have large reserves of manpower.

You can trade tanks for soldiers lives in a tank heavy, heavily armoured force, you can have a balanced combined arms force, or you can have a holding force that relies on massed fires to grind to he enemy into the ground. We seem to be going balanced combined arms but I'm not sure if the balance is right yet.

 

[MickB]

I like to think that the numbers ordered will be part of a crawl/walk/run cycle and future orders will be ongoing as the capability is fully understood.
Also once the production line is set up additional numbers are sometimes ordered for political reasons.

As to deployment of a brigade combat group, this would only be part of a peer/near peer conflict and in these we would not be going alone.
So in the short term any shortfalls could be made up by an ally.
Darwin based USMC comes first to mind.

 

[Stampede]

I like to think that the numbers ordered will be part of a crawl/walk/run cycle and future orders will be ongoing as the capability is fully understood.
Also once the production line is set up additional numbers are sometimes ordered for political reasons.

As to deployment of a brigade combat group, this would only be part of a peer/near peer conflict and in these we would not be going alone.
So in the short term any shortfalls could be made up by an ally.
Darwin based USMC comes first to mind.

One point I have trouble with is our acceptance / reliance that we will always be in company with an ally.
Our military commitments over the years do generally support such a proposition, however I'm not sure it is a healthy mindset.
This is not to be anti alliance.
Just recognition that a sovereign military capability gives government sovereign options.

This has particular relevance to Army who have been lacking many capability's with the view they are either not needed or will be provided by an accompanying partner.

Our shopping list will rectify much of this shortfall.

A good thing for both independent operations and also as a contributor to like minded partners.

Cheers S

 

[Morgo]

One point I have trouble with is our acceptance / reliance that we will always be in company with an ally.
Our military commitments over the years do generally support such a proposition, however I'm not sure it is a healthy mindset.
This is not to be anti alliance.
Just recognition that a sovereign military capability gives government sovereign options.

This has particular relevance to Army who have been lacking many capability's with the view they are either not needed or will be provided by an accompanying partner.

Our shopping list will rectify much of this shortfall.

A good thing for both independent operations and also as a contributor to like minded partners.

Cheers S

Absolutely. People too quickly forget (or have never known) that Churchill was ready to throw northern Australia (at the very least) to the wolves in WW2 to achieve his aims in first North Africa, and then in Burma.

Being able to be a significant contributor to a larger effort is highly desirable. But we need to be able to act alone if it comes to it. Even the most stalwart allies might have different priorities to us in times of crisis.

 

[Volkodav]

One thing with local production of the AIFV and SPG, along with the Boxer, is we can like the ASLAV and Bushmaster, order more as required. By all means order enough to train on and equip a single brigade so long as the means remain to order more as required and potentially maintain production trickling along as a strategic capability. Maybe we should replace vehicles instead of refurbishing and life extending them.

 

[vonnoobie]

One thing with local production of the AIFV and SPG, along with the Boxer, is we can like the ASLAV and Bushmaster, order more as required. By all means order enough to train on and equip a single brigade so long as the means remain to order more as required and potentially maintain production trickling along as a strategic capability. Maybe we should replace vehicles instead of refurbishing and life extending them.

I have noticed quite a few times with armoured vehicles of various types that the upgrades etc arent that much less then just building an entire new vehicle so when you factor in jobs, tax revenue and just the retaining of a strategic capability probably be cheaper or no more costly just to keep buying new vehicles which as a bonus flip side would allow us to shift the vehicles being replaced into reserve war stocks. Only need to look a the Ukrainian Russian conflict to see how badly needed a nation requires reserve war stocks if it is a peer on peer conflict.

 

[Mikeymike]

I feel this raises concerns about the NASAMS launcher and wonder if it is effectively obsolete when considered in its dismounted form.

Looks like we might find out just how survivable NASAMs is as apparently the US is planning on purchasing and sending a NASAMs set to Ukraine, at least according to CNN.

US to announce purchase of medium- to long-range surface-to-air missile defense system for Ukraine | CNN Politics

The US plans to announce as soon as this week that it has purchased an advanced, medium-to-long range surface-to-air missile defense system for Ukraine, a source familiar with the announcement tells CNN.

edition.cnn.com

In more Australian focused news, it seems the NASAMs project for Australia is progressing quite well with the launchers recently being painted in Australian Camo.

Defence Coating Systems (DCS) on LinkedIn: #defenceindustry #manufacturing #southaustralia | 14 comments

Defence Coating Systems (DCS) is pleased to announce a partnership with Kongsberg Defence Australia, to paint their NASAMS Mk 2 Canister Launchers, which will… | 14 comments on LinkedIn

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