Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[ADMk2]

Could not agree more. And mobile air defence is required in numbers.

An interesting learning from Ukraine is that it is critical for GBAD launchers to be mobile to defend against counter-battery fire.

I feel this raises concerns about the NASAMS launcher and wonder if it is effectively obsolete when considered in its dismounted form.

Regards,

Massive

I don’t feel that NASAMS II is obsolete by any means. But it’s strength even on the “mobile” launcher (which is mobile only in the sense it isn’t a towed system like canister launchers, it certainly can’t fire on the move) is defending a set area, defined by the range of it’s effectors and how widely spread these launchers can be. It is a traditional short-medium ranged AD system (should we acquire the necessary -ER effectors).

The more modern threat observable in Ukraine and elsewhere seem to have caught our capability planning processes somewhat by surprise…

Then of course there is the terrible neglect of ground-based air defence systems in general in the ADF for the past 70 odd years… As an example we are about to be the only ‘major’ Western military that doesn’t have a single MANPAD system in-service…

 

[OldTex]

A large part of this can be laid at the feet of people who wear the same clothes to work I do, the lack of feasible concept from Army is...frustrating.

However...

There are three significant cultural difference between the Army and the other two Services (Groups too actually, noting that the IIP does not just fund the three uniformed Services) that has to be understood.

First is the mission. Conceptually the concept of fighting and likely missions for a Navy or Air Force are easier. Note I am not saying the conduct of missions is less complicated or deadly, this is at the concept level. Both fall into easily definable roles, no matter what you do, there are only a handful of times you will throw am F-35 at a problem. For the platforms that have more multi-role use, their various missions at different levels of war are very similar. A C-17 supporting a hypothetical southern front against REDFOR to the north is pretty similar to a C-17 providing HADR support to Fiji. An LHD likewise.

For Army though, the skill sets are much greater. What a infanteer in 5 RAR does on that southern front v what they do in a HADR mission is dramatically different. Neither the RAN nor the RAAF had to change much between Defence of Australia through the MEAO to regional operations. The Army had to completely revamp three or four times. Neither is wrong, neither is right. It just is. But when you have that flexibility and different needs for different missions, your concept of fighting is harder to tie up neatly. Even tactical stuff like combat teams and battlegroups (the only way to fight) underscores our 'problem' - both are task-defined constructs. BG HEELER will have a 6 RAR HQ on Monday and on Tuesday, but inbetween may lose or gain hundreds of people, depending on the mission.

Secondly is the view of the platform. I have grown to dislike the wording, but the thrust is true: the other services man the platform, we put platforms on the man. The Army is primarily a human focused endeavour, and that's hard to explain. Everyone knows what 3x Sqn of F-35 looks like,* but trying to understand what a BG looks like is harder. When you upgrade 75 Sqn you take away some F/A-18s and deliver some F-35s. When you upgrade 6 RAR, you take away their F88s and deliver some F90s. Or you take away Ninox gen 6 and deliver some Ninox gen 9. Or you take away some RTF-500 and deliver some AN/PRC-152. Or you take away an 84mm Mk II and deliver some 84mm Mk III. Or you take away some Terra boots and.... so on and so forth. gripping all that up into a overall concept is hard work.

Finally, you have the issue of a missing generation. Now let me stress, 'fairness' has no role in force structure. If the threat demands 50x SSN by 2030 which means we have to scrap the RAAF and ARA, then damn, looks like I'm out of a job. So I'm not interested in 'fairness'. But, the RAAF and RAN received major kit upgrades throughout the 70s, 80s, 90s and 00s that was denied to the Army. It's easy to argue you need Hunters when you point at Anzacs that are long in the tooth, or for F-35s when you point at F/A-18s. What would be a challenge is when you try and argue for Hunters to replace Darings. Or F-35s to replace Mirage IIIs. The entire organisation massively screwed up with M777, M113AS4 and less so with M1A1, because we gave the impression that because we could continue going with obsolete kit we don't need new stuff. Even allowing for DoA in the 80s, if we had replaced M113s with Bradleys** and M198s with M109s** in the 90s we'd (a) have a deployable force now and (b) be making a easier conceptual progression to Boxer/M1A2/under armour breeching/IFV. I wonder what would be written about the F-35 purchase if the RAAF was seeking to replace CA-27 or Mirage III today? After all, It's almost exactly the same as what we are trying to do with M113AS4*** and IFV - but we get told we are wrong for any number of reasons. All of which apply to an F-35 v Mirage III.

All up, these three combined make writing a concept for the Land Force a challenge. Add in recent intellectual wankery like hybrid warfare and the like that has sent people chasing windmills and you get a mess. And yes, there are people in uniform who's job it is to write this and do the hard thinking. And there are, but it's bloody hard. I have my view of cutting through to the nub of the issue for a relatively simple concept - but that is (a) risky (as it may be overly simplistic) and (b) a hard sell. Because at the end of the day, ground forces provide the greatest non-nuclear deterrence force - because their use costs lives.



* they don't actually, they always forget the ground crew
** exemplars only
*** a excellent 70s vehicle, designed in the 80s, purchased by us in the 90s for introduction into service in the 00s

From my perspective (accumulated over 35 years of service) Army became the red-headed stepson of the ADF when the GoTD embraced the concept of DoA (Defence of Australia, which is still being propounded in only slightly modified form by Hugh White). The idea that the Navy and RAAF would utterly destroy any invading force well beyond Australian shores meant that Army would only be required to round up and guard the disheveled and demoralized survivors and so did not need anything other than vehicles and rifles.
INTERFET was a wake-up call as Army struggled to place a force in the field. If the TNI-AD and TNI-AU had been approved to make an armed resistance it is highly likely Army would have received a severely bloodied nose. Thankfully it did not happen.
Perhap AHQ need to get the GoTD to clearly state what it needs Army to do (and that does include leaving out the intellectual wankery and trendy fluff). Then Army can then tell the GoTD what is needed in order to deliver what the Government wants. If the GoTD then decides that it doesn't want to spend the money then it needs to say what roles/effects/deliverables Army can ignore. But we all know that the GoTD wants gold plated results but is only prepared to pay peanuts.

 

[Redlands18]

ADF was offered 40x AH-1W from USMC stocks for $150m in the early 90’s. Obviously we turned the offer down.

Army trialled M109A6 extensively in the late 90’s. Clearly we were unable to articulate a compelling enough case for Government to pull the trigger on them. Eventually somewhere between 10-13 years later, we bought a towed gun to replace a fleet of old, shagged towed guns and gave little thought to their usage in the future, let alone survivability.

In many respects, the way Vietnam was fought, was the worst thing that happened to Army over the last 50 years…

And yet another example of @Takao post #9,255 above of the Army having to jump multiple generations is we went from the Mk 1 Eyeball equipped Kiowa and the very basic Gunship capability of the Huey straight to the Tiger ARH. Air 87 would have looked somewhat different if we where replacing the AH-1W instead.

 

[Volkodav]

And yet another example of @Takao post #9,255 above of the Army having to jump multiple generations is we went from the Mk 1 Eyeball equipped Kiowa and the very basic Gunship capability of the Huey straight to the Tiger ARH. Air 87 would have looked somewhat different if we where replacing the AH-1W instead.

Having anything in the role, be it the originally proposed Cobras in the 70s the W in the 90s etc, would have made the Tiger fiasco unnecessary or at least less risky.

 

[Milne Bay]

Then of course there is the terrible neglect of ground-based air defence systems in general in the ADF for the past 70 odd years… As an example we are about to be the only ‘major’ Western military that doesn’t have a single MANPAD system in-service…

Surely there is a programme in place for this.
It is such a vital component that neglect of it should be considered criminal.
MB

 

[Redlands18]

Having anything in the role, be it the originally proposed Cobras in the 70s the W in the 90s etc, would have made the Tiger fiasco unnecessary or at least less risky.

Using Takao's analogy it would have been like going straight from Cannon Armed Sabres to Missile armed post HUD Hornets.

 

[Redlands18]

Surely there is a programme in place for this.
It is such a vital component that neglect of it should be considered criminal.
MB

Saab Mobile Short Range Air Defence System (MSHORAD), Sweden (army-technology.com)
Are they that good? They are still a Vehicle based system. A RBS-70 weighs 87kg with one Missile, so you are still tied to either a Boxer/IFV/Bushmaster or Hawkeii, the crew is out in the open, so vulnerable to enemy fire. Maybe something like the SAAB MSHORAD with the RBS-70 would be a better option then a pure MANPAD. Carries 3 ready to fire RBS-70, has its own Radar, set it up on a Bushmaster and you have room for reloads.

 

[Milne Bay]

Saab Mobile Short Range Air Defence System (MSHORAD), Sweden (army-technology.com)
Are they that good? They are still a Vehicle based system. A RBS-70 weighs 87kg with one Missile, so you are still tied to either a Boxer/IFV/Bushmaster or Hawkeii, the crew is out in the open, so vulnerable to enemy fire. Maybe something like the SAAB MSHORAD with the RBS-70 would be a better option then a pure MANPAD. Carries 3 ready to fire RBS-70, has its own Radar, set it up on a Bushmaster and you have room for reloads.

Thanks for that.
So if I read it correctly we have no man portable MANPADS
I was thinking of something like Starstreak which can also be multiple mounted on a vehicle if desired
This would appear to be a gaping hole in our air defence network
MB

 

[ADMk2]

Surely there is a programme in place for this.
It is such a vital component that neglect of it should be considered criminal.
MB

NASAMS II is replacing RBS-70 and there is no publicly known project to add the capability back to Army that I have come across…

Army’s ground based air defence capability at present to the best of my understanding is planned to comprise 1x training battery and 1x operational battery of NASAMS II attached to 16th Regiment, RAA at Woodside, South Australia and ‘all arms fire’ from any other unit…

 

[ADMk2]

ASPI getting a slapping…

https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/australias-army-future-ready-land-force

 

[Massive]

I don’t feel that NASAMS II is obsolete by any means.

That was not my point. My point was that the static launcher needs to be loaded onto a truck to move it.

Once it has fired it would be more vulnerable than a launcher that can relocate quickly to a new firing position.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Takao]

Having anything in the role, be it the originally proposed Cobras in the 70s the W in the 90s etc, would have made the Tiger fiasco unnecessary or at least less risky.

Absolutely.

Tiger was 100% the correct decision for AIR87. Where our failing was was in defining what AIR87 needed. Even five years after delivery the Corps was arguing if it was an attack helo or a recce helo - not understanding it is both.

I use the analogy that it was like going from a 1967 VW Beetle to a 2008 Porsche 911. Such a jump. The scary thing is that we are facing 1917 Model T -> 2022 Porsche 911 and 1958 VW Beetle to 2024 Porsche 911 across two major systems. It should never have been this way. The mistakes made in Protected Mobile Fires and IFV will be down to us just not knowing what we don't know - likewise the under armour breeching and MRLS. There is going to be growing pains; it's now up to Army to minimise while simultaneously explaining why and what is happening. Oh dear....

 

[Takao]

So how many do we need.
What do we have now?
About 9 mechanised infantry company's plus APC's / IFV's for Tank Sqns and Engineers.

My rough numbers are that about a third of a fleets numbers are for training / maintenance and some for attrition / reserve with the rest [ Two thirds ] for the active units.

So what number does that give you?
Would 300 suffice?

Curious S

Well, we can do the maths, leaning on doctrine and this 'How many tanks?' post for base assumptions. Before we do the maths though, we need to understand the IFV numbers are 'messy'. Simplistic maths like we did for tank (which actually ends up about 15 - 18 short) doesn't cut it when we have multiple IFV variants. Furthermore, not every infantry element has IFVs, nor does every support element. IFVs are for operations in the direct fire zone, so, for example, only about 20% of ambulances on the battlefield would be an IFV version because CRV/PMV variants are fine for most moves.

Minimum unit for Inf will be a Rifle Coy (16x IFVs, 2x EME variants, 1x ambo variant and 4x log variant) or a Spt Coy (same as a rifle Coy + 3x Mor variants and 6x log variants).

On to the maths.

Screen/guard BG. First avoids decisive engagement, second seeks it out. I'm happy to debate if and what infantry strength the screen gets, but I'm going to give the guard 2x Coy. That gives them better flexibility and the ability to break contact easily. Both will also get a Spt Coy.

Three triangle BG of 2x Coy each, with a Spt Coy for each. Each BG will have a Tac HQ of 3x IFV.

Security BG probably doesn't need IFV (less likely to be in direct fire role), but the reserve BG needs to be able to match the main BG. So...2x Coy and another Spt Coy. And a Tac HQ.

So, our fighting Bde has 10x Coy + 5x Spt Coy and 12x HQ cars.

But, it's not just the infantry! All the variants are included except two - the engineers and the others... The engineers first - there are dedicated engineer variants plus the vehicles needed for the C2 nodes of the engineering detachments. I'll treat each CER Sqn as an rifle Coy with 6x of the 16x IFVs as engineer variants. Simply to keep the maths easy enough. Each BG gets a CER Sqn.

Now the others. There are going to be IFV scattered all over the Bde. A Tk Sqn, for example, will have a couple of them for Sqn HQ as well as some log variants for their A1 logistic echelon. Likewise the Arty Regt will have a couple for its extra JTAC/FO and the CSR will probably hold 4 - 6 for Bde Tac. What does this mean? Let's add 4x IFV and 6x variants for each Tk Sqn and another overall 20x IFV to cover the other odds and ends across the Bde.

For those keeping track - That's 15x Coy + 5 Spt Coy + 12 HQ car + 4(x 5 Tk Sqn)x HQ car and 6(x 5)x variants + 20 IFV. That gives us... 342x gun cars and 245x (40x EME, 25x ambo, 15x mor, 135x log, and 30x eng) variants. Oof....

Same attrition planning figure as tank (7%) - 24x gun cars and 17x variants.

But again, that's just the fighting force. We have more vehicles we need!

2x BG into the field for the upcoming Bde - that's another 62x gun cars and 49x variants. Prob some more gun cars in all honestly, remember there are all those misc IFV's running around. But, lets be conservative and keep it at this.

Force generating infantry (2x Coy + Spt Coy), armour (1x Tk Sqn), engineers (1x CER Sqn), mortars (3x mor), and log (call it 4x EME, 1x ambo and 12x log variants) gives us another 62x gun cars and 69x variants.

That places us at 466x gun cars and 363x variants (60x EME, 36x ambo, 24x mor, 201x log and 42x eng). Double oof....

Last bit is the 25% needed for maintenance, upgrades etc.... the total becomes 583x gun cars and 454x variants. Or 1037x IFV chassis....

We are talking about cutting from 450 to 300.

Now I grant you, there are some simplifications we can make. Perhaps we can lower the 75x EME variants to 30x or so, leaning on HX77 or CRV variants. After all, combining the individual subunits allows some rationalisation. Perhaps too the number of log can be lowered. But you are, at best, cutting ~150x chassis; so now you only need 880x cars. Still twice what we are buying now.

Now, before someone tells me that my numbers are simply unrealistic, or modern armies are too big, I will draw attention to Question 2398 from the House of Reps, 29 Nov 1985 when Kim Beazley as MINDEF said there was a need for 1133x M113 variants. So we can safely assume that around 1000 cars are needed to deploy a Bde.

TL;DR: We need 1040 to do the job. Right now. So the 450 300 we have isn't enough, and hence we need more. Right now.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Well, we can do the maths ... Snipped ...

Now, before someone tells me that my numbers are simply unrealistic, or modern armies are too big, I will draw attention to Question 2398 from the House of Reps, 29 Nov 1985 when Kim Beazley as MINDEF said there was a need for 1133x M113 variants. So we can safely assume that around 1000 cars are needed to deploy a Bde.

TL;DR: We need 1040 to do the job. Right now. So the 450 300 we have isn't enough, and hence we need more. Right now.

Interesting post. I do think though that you're blurring what you'd like the Australian Army to have (force structure and the IFVs to match) with what it does have and is planned to have.

What we know is the Army has three mechanised infantry battalions. That's nine rifle coys. The plan Raven outlined some time ago for an extra brigade does not involve standing up additional mechanised units. Further, we had about 450 upgraded M113s (fewer now), which, of course, is what the IFV will replace. It's questionable we would ever expect to deploy more than one or two mechanised battalions at a time. This helps the argument that we could make do with fewer than 450.

Just on your statement regarding the M113 variants in 1985, which is quite true, the difference though is back then we had these in cavalry and reserve regiments too.

I'm not arguing you're wrong that we should have a bigger, more capable army; just being clear on what we do have and are planned to have.

 

[Takao]

Interesting post. I do think though that you're blurring what you'd like the Australian Army to have (force structure and the IFVs to match) with what it does have and is planned to have.

What we know is the Army has three mechanised infantry battalions. That's nine rifle coys. The plan Raven outlined some time ago for an extra brigade does not involve standing up additional mechanised units. Further, we had about 450 upgraded M113s (fewer now), which, of course, is what the IFV will replace. It's questionable we would ever expect to deploy more than one or two mechanised battalions at a time. This helps the argument that we could make do with fewer than 450.

Just on your statement regarding the M113 variants in 1985, which is quite true, the difference though is back then we had these in cavalry and reserve regiments too.

I'm not arguing you're wrong that we should have a bigger, more capable army; just being clear on what we do have and are planned to have.

No, I'm not blurring anything. I'm simply pointing out what Army needs, not what it can get. It is based on two 'factual' things, direction from government (that sees the Brigade as the smallest unit of action) and doctrine (that defines where IFVs go and in what numbers). To put a Bde in the field and fight, you need 800 - 1000 IFVs.

The blurring comes in with assuming what Army has is what Army needs. We have 3x Mech Bn because we couldn't afford any more M113AS4 because the powers that be weighted other projects higher. Note that the 5x BG Bde is built of only 3x Mech Bn anyhow (actually a touch more, there are two more Spt Coy that would be drawn from the other Bn). Remember the fundamental basis of the current force structure in Australia - it is raise-train-sustain only. If 7 Bde gets deployed tomorrow, it will not only take Enoggera-based units. We will take equipment and units from anywhere to get the force structure we need. Just like the RBG is not just the on line infantry battalion, but also has on-call cav, arty, sig and log elements. INTERFET offers an excellent example, we took a light infantry Brigade, added a Mech Bn, stripped out the artillery, added additional engineer and aviation assets.

Remember - units in Australia are not war fighting units.

The point about armoured reserves is true, but the 800-1000 above is the fighting force. At no point did I say it was ARA, ARes or a combo. Remember that we only had one Mech Bde back then, and most of the M-113s would have been absorbed into it when it went and fought. In other words, about 800 - 1000 M-113s would have been needed to make 1 Bde a feasible fighting Bde.

My post provides what Army needs to do the job. LAND4 00-3 provides what Army can get within the budget. The difference is quite clear, one assumes minimal risk, the other assumes as much risk as you can. That people look at 800 IFV and say 'no, too much' (looking at you ASPI and The Australian....) highlights that these people have not done the basic maths required to actually do force design. There is a whole bunch more that goes after that post above, but when having discussions about what Army needs v wants v can get, it's helpful to have some basis in reality. In the IFV case that's 800 v ?? v 300-450.

This is a good exemplar as to why I dislike the focus on kit so much. And why I sneer at ASPI's kit focus. The Gov has given us a task. There are literally no others in Australia who can design an Army to meet a task than the men and women in uniform in R2. We are the leading experts in how to make an Army. Academics, commentators, internet peeps all have opinions, but we are the people who know the doctrine inside and out, who know what is needed, who manage the fleets.

Where the value in debate and the like lies is the strategy bit - the S in ASPI for instance. Instead of bullshit about Company A or Company B, 350 or 450, the debate should be higher. What are the tasks of the ADF? What are the expectations of government. Debate those. Build those. Give those refined tasks to Army. Then the SMEs can make the answer. Don't want 1000 IFV? Sure. Change our strategy so we will never need to deploy a Bde to fight. Same for the RAN and RAAF threads. Who gives a shit about upgunned Arafuras? What are Navy's tasks? If those tasks need 16x FFG (and I'd suggest currently they do....), then guess what - have that argument.

If inside Army all boils down to culture, all the force design and arguments boil down to one simple thing - what is the Government's strategy?

 

[Anthony_B_78]

No, I'm not blurring anything. I'm simply pointing out what Army needs, not what it can get. It is based on two 'factual' things, direction from government (that sees the Brigade as the smallest unit of action) and doctrine (that defines where IFVs go and in what numbers). To put a Bde in the field and fight, you need 800 - 1000 IFVs.

I understand that. I don't disagree more would be better. I just know the mods here like to keep things realistic. And there's always going to be a finite budget. They're talking about $27 billion for 450 IFVs under Land 400 Phase 3, so, yeah, that's not small change in the context of our budget, unfortunately.

I won't get into all the nitty-gritty here but to just respond to this first part: If doctrine says to put a brigade in the field and fight you need 800-1000 IFVs then I think it'd be a little unrealistic - even if we assume you actually mean all armoured vehicles, not just IFVs. It also seems a little fixed, and we know that deployments will be mission-orientated. Brigades, of course, come in all shapes and sizes.

If we look at real-world examples from other countries then that could be instructive. The British 7th Armoured Brigade in Operation Telic, for example, was much reinforced from its normal peacetime structure. It had five battlegroups, with something like 112 Challenger 2s, 140-odd Warriors and 32 AS-90s. No doubt there were other sundry armoured vehicles in support, including armoured engineering, and so forth. That's an armoured brigade. Then you have other examples, obviously, of brigades with substantially fewer armoured vehicles, such as 3 Commando Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade. They were given different missions and still played their part. Edit to add: Little tidbit, the Brits only built 789 Warriors of all variants.

 

[OldTex]

The British 7th Armoured Brigade in Operation Telic, for example, was much reinforced from its normal peacetime structure. It had five battlegroups, with something like 112 Challenger 2s, 140-odd Warriors and 32 AS-90s. No doubt there were other sundry armoured vehicles in support, including armoured engineering, and so forth. That's an armoured brigade.

Your example is really comparing apples with oranges. The UK armoured brigade (at the time) whilst a triangular brigade structure consisted of 2 armoured regiments and 1 mechanised infantry battalion. You also don't mention how many FV430 series variants (equivalent to the M113) were part of the brigade.
The Australian brigade, again a triangular structure, is more of a mechanised brigade with 2 (hopefully) mechanised infantry battalions and 1 armoured cavalry regiment.
There have been many different plans and supporting structures over the years, with 7 Bde going from a light infantry brigade (1 x Cav + 2 x Inf bns) to a partially mechanised infantry brigade (1 x Cav + 1 x Mech Inf bn + 1 x Motorized Inf bn) to a Motorised Inf brigade ( 1 x ACR + 2 x Mot Inf bns). I have no doubt that the structures will continue to change if not for good reasons then purely for political window dressing (thankfully I am out of all that).

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Your example is really comparing apples with oranges. The UK armoured brigade (at the time) whilst a triangular brigade structure consisted of 2 armoured regiments and 1 mechanised infantry battalion. You also don't mention how many FV430 series variants (equivalent to the M113) were part of the brigade.
The Australian brigade, again a triangular structure, is more of a mechanised brigade with 2 (hopefully) mechanised infantry battalions and 1 armoured cavalry regiment.
There have been many different plans and supporting structures over the years, with 7 Bde going from a light infantry brigade (1 x Cav + 2 x Inf bns) to a partially mechanised infantry brigade (1 x Cav + 1 x Mech Inf bn + 1 x Motorized Inf bn) to a Motorised Inf brigade ( 1 x ACR + 2 x Mot Inf bns). I have no doubt that the structures will continue to change if not for good reasons then purely for political window dressing (thankfully I am out of all that).

That was just one example and more about showing numbers of IFVs in an armoured brigade. The 7th Brigade in Telic actually had five battlegroups. I'm sure you're right that there were FV430 series variants along in support roles. I don't have a source with numbers on those. No doubt they wouldn't have been insignificant. I think it is telling to the discussion the fact the Brits built fewer than 800 Warriors of all variants.

As for the Australian brigade, all the information that is out there (and reliably brought to us by Raven posting in this very thread) says we're not getting more than three mechanised battalions, which are divided among three brigades. I agree structures will likely change again and again over time. And then there's the reality, like Takao said, that if/when you deploy a brigade it will be structured for the mission at hand.

If the question is how many IFVs do we need, then I suggest we need to be realistic to the size and structure of the army as it is, competing priorities, and the ever-present reality of budgets, along with likely employment of capabilities. We've learned the previous government instructed the contenders for Land 400 Phase 3 to resubmit their bids with a lower buy a possibility, so we know 450 is now looking a more hopeful than certain outcome. (I'm sure we're all on the same side here in wanting more.)

 

[Mikeymike]

Now, before someone tells me that my numbers are simply unrealistic, or modern armies are too big, I will draw attention to Question 2398 from the House of Reps, 29 Nov 1985 when Kim Beazley as MINDEF said there was a need for 1133x M113 variants. So we can safely assume that around 1000 cars are needed to deploy a Bde.

Just to provide some additional support that the maths for ~1000 is probably about right to be able to properly deploy a brigade you can look up how many the US uses for their Armoured Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in this Force structure primer (Page 24). Obviously an Australian Brigade will be structured differently in quite a few ways, for example some IFVs in the American structure being done by Boxer, only have 2 battalions compared to 3 etc but once you add in training, attrition and maintenance vehicles you end up getting nearish 1000+ IFV variants.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Just to provide some additional support that the maths for ~1000 is probably about right to be able to properly deploy a brigade you can look up how many the US uses for their Armoured Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in this Force structure primer (Page 24). Obviously an Australian Brigade will be structured differently in quite a few ways, for example some IFVs in the American structure being done by Boxer, only have 2 battalions compared to 3 etc but once you add in training, attrition and maintenance vehicles you end up getting nearish 1000+ IFV variants.

Like OldTex said about apples and oranges, that's a case here. So, yeah, a US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team is far removed from what the Australian Army is intending to develop. Looking at that chart, you have four rifle companies plus the equivalent of another three in the cavalry "squadron" (battalion-size). That's more than two-thirds what our army will field in total in terms of mechanised infantry. (This is without mentioning the six companies of tanks - twice what we'll have.)

Edit to add: Thanks for sharing that document. Really interesting to see the information they present.