So 1 Bde's armoured elements aren't important?Like I said it’s not really close to anything, but forgot to add “important” ;-)
So 1 Bde's armoured elements aren't important?Like I said it’s not really close to anything, but forgot to add “important” ;-)
That had crossed my mind. I also wondered whether something like the Donar would be considered if we went for the Lynx.I reckon Defence has got to tread the SPG purchase very carefully. We could make things a whole lot worse on the already tested relationship with the Koreans.
Hanwha expects Defence to go with them as a default as they saw themselves as the winner of the previous bid. If the Army is going to prefer KF-41 Lynx rather than AS-21 Redback for the LAND400Phase3, then it is almost impossible to not award Hanwha with the SPG deal.
Donar is already mated with the Boxer chassis, so it is definitely an option, but would Defence go this option knowing they will definitely piss off the Koreans. This could spark a diplomatic issue at the Foreign Affairs dept.That had crossed my mind. I also wondered whether something like the Donar would be considered if we went for the Lynx.
My POV is that the Reserve is very useful - but only at the individual and small team (section / platoon level). With the current framework the Reserve simply can't sustain anything that requires a lot of collective training (outside of general mobilisation anyway). The utter failure of the reinforcing battlegroup to provide a meaningful capability (rather than just 400 blokes in uniform that happen to be in the same place at the same time) has made that pretty clear. Looking at the future, it is likely that the most useful role the Reserve can play is filling holes in regular units created by manning shortfalls.
For example, being a gun number on a gunline (punching bombs out of an M777) is not difficult. It doesn't take a lot of training to get good (enough) at it. All the difficult stuff in Joint Fires happens in the OPs, JFECC etc where the work out what to drop bombs on and how to do it. So while there is no way the Reserve could sustain something like a full battery at a remotely useful NTM, maintaining enough qualified gun numbers to augment a regular unit would be relatively simple. A battery construct that had all the difficult stuff manned by ARA, and four guns manned by ARA, with Reserves tasked to provide the warm bodies to man the last two guns when needed, would be entirely workable. Such a model could be used to augment all Regular units/capability.
For me the key thing is that the unit would still have to function only with ARA staff, without Reserves. The Reserves are there to take the capability from some acceptable minimum to some better level. Otherwise, your entire capability becomes dependent on whether Johnno can get next week off work or not. For an example of how it doesn't work, you only have to look at the Cavalry. The Cavalry is (or at least should be) a permanent combined arms team, where the recon scouts are fundamental to the capability. However, at the moment the ARA can't fit scouts within the manning cap, so the ARES have to provide scouts instead. While the scouts the ARES provide are generally okay skills wise, they are simply not there often enough or reliably enough to sustain a useful capability. My experience is that you put in more effort trying to get scouts, equip them, train them up, and integrate them into the troops than you actually get out of them in terms of capability. In other words, they are a net drain on capability. I only kept taking them on exercises to avoid rupturing the relationship with the ARES RAAC units.
Of course, as I've mentioned before, the biggest obstacle to any meaningful reform of the Reserve is their own leadership. Who wants to be a CO if all you do is give individual soldiers over to someone else to take to war?
I feel if we maintain three like brigades with both a mechanised and motorised battle group we would want to reflect that across the supporting elements.My sense is that once the SPG are available there won't be a lot of M777 deployment.
Eventually a structure of 2 batteries SPG and 1 of M777 will be the structure - though possibly not straight away.
Would note the this again reinforces what a step change the current ADF modernisation plan is. Comparing todays ADF to that of 20 years ago is startling in a good way.
Regards,
Massive
Thanks Raven for the reply.
Given Army already has its existing brigade structure I don't want to take the conversation too far into fantasy unit structures.
In relation to the reserves, I concur that it appears a bridge too far to expect too much from them as large deployable units for high intensity operations.
As suggested, gap fillers of "warm bodies" for the lesser skilled jobs is certainly possible.
How do we move forward with this.
Do we directly link individual reserve units with regular units so that they culturally fit?
Maybe we condense our six reserve brigades down to three with these having a much greater percentage of regulars to provide for both greater flexibility for expansion and limited deploy-ability.
Certainly some challenges but maybe with some good outcomes
Regards s
That was the catch 22 in the 90s, employers were able to, and did discriminate against reservists. Even today, with additional protections many managers, if not employers, see reserves in an unfavourable light, i.e. people playing soldier.I cant see that working out either as reserves are not just in one location, unless reservist have government jobs they are very limited with the amount of time they can put aside, unless they increase the pay for reservist, would majority of reservist like to put more into their time I think so, but unfortunately reserve pay doesn't pay the bills
Hang on - really? Let’s put things into perspective. Hanwha are not big. Their market cap is around AUD3bn. This is the roughly the same as Corporate Travel Ltd. So if Corp Travel has made an unsolicited offer to outsource travel procurement to a S Korean government department, and that gov department said “Great idea! We really like what you’ve put forward here, but we’re going to put it to tender so our taxpayers are getting value for money” this would be a diplomatic incident too? I think not.Donar is already mated with the Boxer chassis, so it is definitely an option, but would Defence go this option knowing they will definitely piss off the Koreans. This could spark a diplomatic issue at the Foreign Affairs dept.
The chosen missile and the latest missile already integrated with NASAMs is the AIM-120C-7. The AMRAAM-ER (ESSM w/ AIM-120D seeker) is still under development.Regarding Australian NASAMs, anyone know which missile will be used?
Amraam ER? AIM120D?
Diplomatically speaking there wont be any issues beyond maybe some SK ministers grumbling if Australia goes back to a open tender rather then sole source from SK however there will be a decent diplomatic issue if SK does win or is selected and then the program is once again cancelled or delayed.Hang on - really? Let’s put things into perspective. Hanwha are not big. Their market cap is around AUD3bn. This is the roughly the same as Corporate Travel Ltd. So if Corp Travel has made an unsolicited offer to outsource travel procurement to a S Korean government department, and that gov department said “Great idea! We really like what you’ve put forward here, but we’re going to put it to tender so our taxpayers are getting value for money” this would be a diplomatic incident too? I think not.
By way of comparison, the Japanese got the rug pulled out from them on a contract that is literally 100 times larger. They didn’t like it, but the relationship seems fine now.
I think if Hanwha wants to make a serious impression regarding L400P3 then having an actual, existing production facility in place would be looked at very favourably.A joint build of the K-9, K-10 and AS-21 at Geelong would make some commercial sense as you are looking at as many as 485 Vehicles but the AS-21 has to be selected first and that is 2-3 years away
Agreed. Could’ve chosen my words better, but I think we agree that the Govt shouldn’t feel constrained by diplomatic considerations if they feel the need to cast a wider net.Diplomatically speaking there wont be any issues beyond maybe some SK ministers grumbling if Australia goes back to a open tender rather then sole source from SK however there will be a decent diplomatic issue if SK does win or is selected and then the program is once again cancelled or delayed.
As for Japan I wouldn say they had the rug pulled out from under them. They hadn't won anything prior to the tender with only Abbott (One man does not make a deal) and the US (Which shouldnt matter as the US was only looking at it from the perspective of what best sent a message to China rather then what was best for Australia) and when it was all said and done when it did go to competition against other offers they lost fair and square, No rug pulling of any kind. Japan shouldnt have made the assumption that Abbott alone could pick and choose where everything was acquired and how, Their fault for that assumption not ours.
The uselessness of the M777 in almost any modern war, especially if the enemy has a counter-battery capability, is more than enough. Between the M113 and the M777 we have an excellent 1950s Army.....I don't know of any pressing time constraints with this program other than future federal elections, but I think the in the greater scheme of things, waiting for the ERCA upgrades and then having an open tender would be a good choice to get the best option for the ADF. That's just my humble opinion.
And how long before the US Army fields a new 155 mm SPG? The US Army doesn't exactly have a sterling reputation for fielding acquisitions on time and on budget. Their recent acquisitions history isn't exactly encouraging either. The point that I am making is that Australia doesn't really have the luxury of waiting for the US Army to line all its ducks up and make a decision, let alone get Congressional approval and survive any subsequent appeals and legal action.The issue I can see here is that over the next few years, if the US Army gets its way and the technology works out, they will have an even more capable system than the current K9 is right now - if we get K9, we will have a good system for sure, but not the best system available. If as capable as advertised, ERCA will substantially increase artillery range and capability, the M109A7 will move from a 39 calibre gun with a slow non-automated reload system and a crew of 5 to a 58 calibre gun and an auto-reloader with a need of only 2/3 crew. This will both lower manning requirements even more and increasing artillery range by over twice as much with the current extended range munitions used by the K9.
I don't know of any pressing time constraints with this program other than future federal elections, but I think the in the greater scheme of things, waiting for the ERCA upgrades and then having an open tender would be a good choice to get the best option for the ADF. That's just my humble opinion.
Well said.The uselessness of the M777 in almost any modern war, especially if the enemy has a counter-battery capability, is more than enough. Between the M113 and the M777 we have an excellent 1950s Army.....
I think this is an oversimplification. If you’re talking about a land war in Eurasia against a major power, then sure an SPG is the best answer. But that’s not the only, or even the most likely, contingency we would face.The uselessness of the M777 in almost any modern war, especially if the enemy has a counter-battery capability, is more than enough. Between the M113 and the M777 we have an excellent 1950s Army.....