Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Stampede]

The six dismounts are broken into two 3-man fire teams, and will operate the same way the two four-man fire teams used to, obviously with just one less member. The commander will always be with the main effort, so if the main effort is dismounted then the commander will also dismount. In that case the vehicles will generally be commanded by the mech corporal or mech sergeant. The exact ways to go about this are very technical and depend on unit SOPs.



You need to remember what happened before the PMVs were invented. In the good old days (ie, a couple of years ago), the light infantry used to get driven around the place by trucks (generally Unimogs), either from the battalion's transport platoon or from the CSSB. Those trucks would have a single, generally very junior, driver in each, and that's it. If he was lucky the packet commander might have a map and radio, but he usually didn't. He simply got told to drive somewhere, pick up some grunts, then drive somewhere else. Compared to that, the idea of a few Bushmasters, each being armoured, having integral radios, and being driven by an infantryman, being in a zulu muster somewhere is not that big a deal.

To expand, the exact same thing happened in Afghanistan. The PMVs attached to the special operations task group were driven by whatever random diggers could be found spare in a brigade with a driver's ticket, normally under the command of an RAAC officer. They would be told to drive the operators somewhere, who would then jump out and go off to do their mission, and the drivers would sit somewhere in a zulu muster, without any security. When the mission was complete, the PMVs would drive unescorted to where ever they needed to go to pick up the operators, often through unsecured areas and often through harassing fire. It was pretty loose compared to what the conventional diggers over the fence were doing, but it worked well enough.

As an aside, if you are interested in a bit of reading, the Army has declassified a lot of doctrine and put it online - Doctrine: Army Doctrine | Australian Army.

It is all pretty high level, as none of the procedural doctrine has been uploaded, but may still satisfy some curiosity. If they ever upload the mounted minor tactics pam or the brigade concept of employment document, that would be of particular interest to you.

Thanks again

With time I'll do some more homework with what was suggested.
Can relate to moving troops from A to B with Unimog's, as spent some time in the transport Platoon.
As a reservist in the 80's our Zulu muster was more of a tactical BBQ.
I'm sure Pucka was much safer than Afghanistan.

Well done.


Regards s

 

[old faithful]

If you hand the vehicles over to the armoured corps to raise their own dismounts, as you say, all you would then have is the same mech battalion manned by RAAC instead of infantry soldiers. Nothing else would change. Other than the infantry being almost entirely irrelevant.

The 'leave the RAR as it is' attitude is the very attitude the needs to be overcome. It's the attitude that has an army preparing the last war, instead of the next. The world continues to change, and the Army needs to change with it. I think the Australian infantry would do well to look at the British Army, where a fanatical resistance to change (and a fanatical desire to retain cap badges) has lead to brigade after brigade of almost entirely useless light infantry with no support and no role, while the part of the Army that is useful continues to shrink. Thankfully the leaders in Australia are more sensible, as it was infantry commanders that made the decisions to reduce the size of the infantry to fund other capabilities.

As I said earlier though, I expect a vehicle that can fit eight dismounts to have an advantage, as it does leave flexibility to change things in future.

I understand that. We are only talking 3 bns yeah?
What about hand them over to be crewed by armour and the grunts become the veges?
You see 3 well trained infantry mech bns, I see 3 x vehicle maintenance battalions, as 5/7 pretty much became under labor in the 90,s.
The next war you say?
What if China stirred the pot in west Papua? And West Papua became the next war? 40 taipan's and no airmobile trained infantry. A lot of what its.
As an ex paratrooper, I know how long it takes for that maturity to happen. Its about 3 years at least. 2 CDO don't do battalion jumps, in fact they rarely do jumps on land at all. Any way, I work with a lot of ex 5 RAR, 7 RAR , 1 Arms,and 2 Cav blokes. I know there is a bigger problem in today's army than the actual units, and like every other industry in Australia ATM, we have terrible managers!

 

[Takao]

I understand that. We are only talking 3 bns yeah?
What about hand them over to be crewed by armour and the grunts become the veges?
You see 3 well trained infantry mech bns, I see 3 x vehicle maintenance battalions, as 5/7 pretty much became under labor in the 90,s.
The next war you say?
What if China stirred the pot in west Papua? And West Papua became the next war? 40 taipan's and no airmobile trained infantry. A lot of what its.
As an ex paratrooper, I know how long it takes for that maturity to happen. Its about 3 years at least. 2 CDO don't do battalion jumps, in fact they rarely do jumps on land at all. Any way, I work with a lot of ex 5 RAR, 7 RAR , 1 Arms,and 2 Cav blokes. I know there is a bigger problem in today's army than the actual units, and like every other industry in Australia ATM, we have terrible managers!

Why are we using air mobile or light infantry in West Papua for? Especially against the Chinese?

Combined arms teams, please. With armour, long range weapons and mobility. We don't need to fight the Kokoda Track again.

 

[Stampede]

The Plan KEOGH structure loses a lot of flexibility, but is very efficient. I think the move to dedicated mech/armoured battalions is a good thing, although I’m ambivalent about the second battalion having PMVs.

Raven just some clarity with the above.
Are you suggesting that the second battalion should also be mechanised, or left as light infantry?
Leave PMV's with CSSB?

Not judging, just unsure of intent.

Thanks S

 

[old faithful]

Why are we using air mobile or light infantry in West Papua for? Especially against the Chinese?

Combined arms teams, please. With armour, long range weapons and mobility. We don't need to fight the Kokoda Track again.

Didn't explain myself very well.
I'm not suggesting we would be up against the Chinese in West Papua, rather that it would be easy for China to stir the pot, and create instability in that region. Not militarily. It could be as easy as swamping face book with "free west Papua" propaganda to sway public opinion, and financially support rebels, in order to get their way with Indonesia. Have a look at the way the Chinese are investing in the that region ATM, Timor leste for example.
I am suggesting that we could very easily be involves in low to medium intensity operations in our region , and if you have ever been to Papua, it would be very easy to understand how mechanized infantry would not be your best option. Takao, I hope you understand what I'm getting at, I'm not the idiot you seem to take me for, I have real world experience, and I can see a bigger picture.

Free Papua Movement - Wikipedia

Indonesian influence in the Pacific grows, despite Papua disquiet

Ben Bohane: China? No, let’s face the elephant in the Pacific room | Asia Pacific Report

 

[MickB]

I think you will see the infantry split into two streams, armoured and light, with careers progressing in one or the other. That is the only way to maintain enough mounted skills in the battalions to operate the IFV.

Agree. To fight as a combined arms team in a complex environment is a skill that will take time to mature, and will need to be maintained to grow leaders who can obtain the maximum benefit of all elements.

 

[Joe Black]

An interesting read on the LAND 19 Phase 7B (NASAMS) options
ENGAGEMENT ZONE! The ADF’s ground-based air defence capabilities are about to get serious! | ADBR

Will be most interesting to see if ADF would go with both the HML (lightweight launcher option on Hawkeis) and the canisters launchers on Rheinmetall HX77 trucks. I think both options if adopted will truly give ADF a real flexible and mobile AD option. It would be sad to see the RBS-70 go, because I believe having a 3rd layer Manpad will provide even greater flexibility, especially if they are used as mobile air-defence platform to protect the mechanised/motorised troops.

 

[Raven22]

Agree. To fight as a combined arms team in a complex environment is a skill that will take time to mature, and will need to be maintained to grow leaders who can obtain the maximum benefit of all elements.

I don’t think it’s so much that, it’s mainly just the technical skills needed to operate, maintain and sustain the mechanised capability. The infantry just don’t have anything in their career structure to develop that. For example, to get promoted to sergeant, every RAAC corporal has to complete a course that makes them a technical expert in either gunnery, driving and servicing, or communications for their respective vehicle. That means every SNCO and WO in a Regiment can run courses, run ranges, provide SME advice etc. The whole RAAC career structure is organised to provide the individual and collective competencies required to sustain the armoured capability. It takes a lot of resources and effort to do so.

The infantry just don’t have that, as their career structure is designed to develop the equivalent dismounted skills. Obviously. Until something similar is developed for the mechanised capability, the infantry just won’t be able to generate and sustain the technical skills necessary to operate the IFV. The current process, where individuals go on a course, maybe use the skill for a year or two and then get promoted/post out and the skillset is lost, isn’t going to cut it. It never did cut it, really.

I should also point out, the infantry fought to get this capability back. There was a lot of advice provided by the armoured corps pointing out the complexity and what the opportunity cost would be, but they still wanted it. I think now it’s just starting to sink in exactly what has to change to make this viable.

 

[Volkodav]

I think now it’s just starting to sink in exactly what has to change to make this viable.

Sounds like the situation aviation had digesting Tiger and Taipan, the complexity of those platforms verses Kiowa, Iroquois and even Blackhawk was far beyond what was anticipated. The difference is at least the infantry have a model to follow in the RAAC, should they choose to do so.

 

[Redlands18]

https://www.adbr.com
A good article on Land 19 ph 7B(NASAMS), including a picture of a prototype CEATAC Radar(CEA land based Radar) on the back of a Hawkei.

Sorry link doesn't appear to be working, but if you go to adbr.com.au its on the home page.

 

[toryu]

adbr article

Joe Black beat you to this three posts above yours.

But, as an addition, here's the view from the back where you can see more clearly how the radome will fold down:

http://images.defence.gov.au/20180905adf 8630742_004.jpg

 

[40 deg south]

Australian audit report raises procedural and reliability concerns over Hawkei procurement | Jane's 360

Has there been any previous talk about reliability concerns for Hawkei?

 

[t68]

Australian audit report raises procedural and reliability concerns over Hawkei procurement | Jane's 360

Has there been any previous talk about reliability concerns for Hawkei?

Sounds like the BAE monopoly in the UK. They jumped up and down when they weren't ready in the first place Thales knows its all about JOBS and milk it for everything.

 

[SteveR]

Sounds like the BAE monopoly in the UK. They jumped up and down when they weren't ready in the first place Thales knows its all about JOBS and milk it for everything.

I would like to place an Australian defence industry perspective. Australian DoD and services up until quite recently seemed to want to buy fully developed products - by definition those whose development was paid for by other countries rather than 'Made - and developed - in Australia;; as though defence force personnel would always prefer overseas posting to companies chosen to sell products to the ADF. For example both CEA and Austal had sold products overseas before the ADF chose to purchase from them. A cultural 'cringe' if I may put it.

 

[camo_jnr_jnr]

Australian audit report raises procedural and reliability concerns over Hawkei procurement | Jane's 360

Has there been any previous talk about reliability concerns for Hawkei?

Given the foxhound is blasted in the British media for being unreliable whilst using the same(?) engine and transmission it looked like the writing was on the wall for reliability concerns. Was crossing fingers that it wouldn't appear but it looks like it has.

Army’s Protected Mobility Vehicle — Light | Australian National Audit Office
If you go to section 5.28 on this there is some interesting reading including multiple reliability test failures.

5.33 ....The first series was conducted between July and December 2016, and the second began in November 2016. In January 2017, after less than half the distance required had been completed, the target for the number of critical failures had been exceeded, and the trial was halted.

5.72 The Reliability Demonstration Test recommenced in March 2018, following the conduct of a Development Activity to identify and implement fixes. In previous reliability testing (see paragraph 5.31), a specific number of critical failures (seven) was set as a pass/fail criterion. In the Reliability Demonstration Test, only a critical engine failure (regardless of any other critical failures) would prevent entry into the Production Reliability Acceptance Test. The Reliability Demonstration Test ended in July 2018, with two vehicles each completing 12 000 kilometres, without the occurrence of a critical engine failure. On this basis, the test was successful. Thales is required to rectify all existing critical failures, identified during the various reliability testing cycles, before the start of the Production Reliability Acceptance Test.

5.75 Due to the extended Reliability Demonstration Test, the Production Reliability Acceptance Test has been further delayed. It is now planned to be conducted over eight (rather than eleven) months, from August 2018 to March 2019, fourteen months later than originally scheduled (see paragraph 5.38). The test will use eight vehicles instead of four, so that the test can be completed in the shorter timeframe required by the revised schedule. This testing is to present a greater challenge for the vehicles, six of them having to complete 32 000 kilometres, with trailers attached for half of that distance, and two other vehicles completing other testing.

5.76...Defence advised the review board that: Testing in both Stage 1 and recently under Stage 2 has confirmed significant progress in the past 18–24 months in a number of key areas of vehicle performance. […] While these issues [a number of performance non-compliances] continue to be progressed, the Project considers that the fundamental architecture of the vehicle platform is sound and remains confident in the vehicle’s ability to ultimately achieve design and manufacturing maturity.

The vehicles are now in their sixth cycle of reliability failure–redesign–retest but the results to date remain well below the requirement. Despite more than seven years of development the vehicle has not yet achieved the required level of reliability which has been significantly reduced during the period.

On the positive side at least it hasn't been rushed into service like the Foxhound and is making progress.

 

[vonnoobie]

Always the smart thing, Yep you will have to build a few to actually test them but long as you don't go to FRP before everything is sorted then its all good unlike say the LCS which while I do like it they did seriously rush that program wasting big bucks before they found the faults of realized the crew compliment was too small.

As we are doing with 2RAR.. Crawl, Walk then Run. Same should apply to defence acquisitions.

 

[Redlands18]

Sorry Couldn't a Link to work, post waste of time without it

 

[Stampede]

Two questons regarding the Army reserve

First Question - just wondering as to the rationale of the current Brigade structure.
A couple of years ago it looked quite balanced across the brigades with each of the six brigades having a very similar structure to each other and not too different to their regular counter parts. While I appreciate their are big differences in roles and equipment between the reserves and regulars particularly in armour and artillery there was at least some similarity to structure.
This seemed to mirror the fact Two reserve Brigades were to be as I understand linked to each regular Brigade re the Ready / Reading and Reset phase across the Army. The idea the reserves would provide a Battalion sized group to assist on the ready cycle.
I'm wondering how this is going.
Particularly as one of the Brigades is now a dedicated Training Brigade, leaving 5 Brigades to support the Regular Brigades. Also confused about 5th Brigade having so many Inf Battalions . I would of thought that if they wanted to move the University Regiments out of the old structure and give them their own training Brigade, the easiest way would have been just to add a new Brigade and leave the existing structure of six as is.
Or is this just a bit to even rows and columns to make sense.

Second question - is the number and location of Reserve Infantry Battalions representative of Australia's current population geographically.
Surely some thought must be considered from the practicality of aligning the balance of the Battalions as reflecting our current population centres.
Army as both a Full time and part time employer needs to be smart as to providing geographical answers to recruitment.
Example is Melbourne ( 5 Million Pop ) one Battalion and Perth ( 2 Million Pop ) Two Battalions.
It appears some regions could do better, and some thought needs to be put into making that happen.
5/6 RVR may be a big battalion by reserve standards, but if we accept it takes 5000000 people per Battalion, then Australia would have only Five Reserve battalions so the current Maths does not seem to work.

Appreciate any thoughts and feed make for the above.


Regards S

 

[FoxtrotRomeo999]

Not sure if this is of interest

WFEL completes deliveries of rapidly deployable military bridges to Australian Army | Jane's 360

Some associated articles and pictures:
LAND 155 - ENHANCED GAP CROSSING CAPABILITY FACILITIES PROJECT : Department of Defence
First tranche of Army bridges delivered under Land 155 - Australian Defence Magazine
ADF takes deliver of first new bridges and launchers - CONTACT magazine
Army's new ribbon bridges tested in Sydney - CONTACT magazine
New facilities to house mobile bridges - CONTACT magazine
ADF buys more bridges - CONTACT magazine
Australia buys Improved Ribbon Bridge - CONTACT magazine

 

[Raven22]

Two questons regarding the Army reserve

First Question - just wondering as to the rationale of the current Brigade structure.
A couple of years ago it looked quite balanced across the brigades with each of the six brigades having a very similar structure to each other and not too different to their regular counter parts. While I appreciate their are big differences in roles and equipment between the reserves and regulars particularly in armour and artillery there was at least some similarity to structure.
This seemed to mirror the fact Two reserve Brigades were to be as I understand linked to each regular Brigade re the Ready / Reading and Reset phase across the Army. The idea the reserves would provide a Battalion sized group to assist on the ready cycle.
I'm wondering how this is going.
Particularly as one of the Brigades is now a dedicated Training Brigade, leaving 5 Brigades to support the Regular Brigades. Also confused about 5th Brigade having so many Inf Battalions . I would of thought that if they wanted to move the University Regiments out of the old structure and give them their own training Brigade, the easiest way would have been just to add a new Brigade and leave the existing structure of six as is.
Or is this just a bit to even rows and columns to make sense.

Second question - is the number and location of Reserve Infantry Battalions representative of Australia's current population geographically.
Surely some thought must be considered from the practicality of aligning the balance of the Battalions as reflecting our current population centres.
Army as both a Full time and part time employer needs to be smart as to providing geographical answers to recruitment.
Example is Melbourne ( 5 Million Pop ) one Battalion and Perth ( 2 Million Pop ) Two Battalions.
It appears some regions could do better, and some thought needs to be put into making that happen.
5/6 RVR may be a big battalion by reserve standards, but if we accept it takes 5000000 people per Battalion, then Australia would have only Five Reserve battalions so the current Maths does not seem to work.

Appreciate any thoughts and feed make for the above.


Regards S

I wouldn’t go looking for too much logic in the organisation of the 2nd division. There are that many vested interests and sacred cows in the reserve that any meaningful change has proven impossible. The greatest example of this is that both SUR and UNSWR still exist. The units are only about five km apart and are entirely redundant, yet the olds and bolds won’t let their unit be disbanded, hence they both still exist. Meanwhile, there is not a single reserve depot in Western Sydney, where so much of the population now lies.

This is where, in my opinion, the leadership of the reserve is letting the rank and file down. The leadership still sees the 2nd division as the 3rd AIF in waiting, and resist anything that would risk that viewpoint. There is such tremendous potential in the reserve, but because that potential only involves the reserve supplementing the regulars, rather than providing formed units in their own right, the leadership won’t allow it to be realised.

Of course, by resisting any meaningful change it simply means they get ignored. The ARA leadership don’t want to invest the emotional energy in trying to force through change, so they simply deny the reserves resources, and invest in areas that are proven to be useful instead.

The best thing that could happen to the 2nd division would be to sack everyone above the rank of major.