Takao
The Bunker Group
It's pretty rough, but including DVA, DHA, and all the things above, we calculated it was 2.9 - 3.2%.
Lots of assumptions and non-economist thinking in there, but a reasonable assessment.
Lots of assumptions and non-economist thinking in there, but a reasonable assessment.
Looks like preparations for Talisman Sabre are ramping up.
Saw two Chinooks, two Blackhawks and a Romeo exercising over Sydney Harbour yesterday. Given the Chinooks and Blackhawks were all black presumably it was SOAS. Some impressive low level flying.
Good luck to all involved.
Saw two Chinooks, two Blackhawks and a Romeo exercising over Sydney Harbour yesterday. Given the Chinooks and Blackhawks were all black presumably it was SOAS. Some impressive low level flying.
Good luck to all involved.
No injuries, happily. Just a 'hard landing'.
www.abc.net.au
Australian Army helicopter damaged in 'hard landing' during war drills
An Australian Army helicopter participating in the multinational Talisman Sabre exercise in the Northern Territory has been damaged in a "hard landing".
www.abc.net.au
Why on earth did the ABC report that? I suppose Defence had to release it or that guardian of anti Military ideology would have called it a cover up - but reallly. Aircraft have heavy landings every other day. Depends how hard the landing was I guess; it could be a euphemism for “aircraft written off”. But if not, it is going to happen from time to time.
Not only did they report that but they also failed to mention that they’re being replaced by Apaches - which will be a world class capability and are due for delivery later this year. Pretty relevant and interesting fact for the readers?
The general level of curiousity or lack thereof in our journalists is quite astonishing.
The general level of curiousity or lack thereof in our journalists is quite astonishing.
Rudd ‘confident’ on AUKUS review, rejects defence spending claims
Just to come back to this theme for moment. The above article is unfortunately paywalled, however it is a speach from Kevin Rudd (who seems to have remarkably remade his relations throughout the Trump administration team).
His speech covers some interesting points with a few relevent exerpts as follows:
- Australia has been the crazy guy in the foxhole next to the Americans for every war of the 20th and 21st centuries
- Rudd meets regularly with Colby, has a good relationship with him, known him for a long time, has him around to his house, and calls him by his nickname "Bridge". This is a surprisingly robust connection that I would not have expected. Maybe Rudd embellishes a bit.
- He argues that Australia has been spending at its current levels (2%) for a lot longer than most other countries, so is not as hollowed out as others.
- Australia uses a narrower definition of defence spending, and current expenditure would be in the order of 2.5% if the American definition is applied.
The last point is the first time I think I have seen a government communicated number on what we spend on defence based on international metrics. So we can add an additional 0.5%, meaning that over the 10 year period we get close to the 3% number.
On this basis we are not that different to the Europeans and there is perhaps at most another half percent in it.
I should note that our defence adjacent spending is probably more than the 1.5% as well.
Last edited:
NATO members all report defence spending to NATO according to a standard definition. Some of them use different definitions internally, & have been known to play little accounting tricks, funding parts of their military spending via non-defence budgets for internal political reasons, but not in their declarations to NATO.
IIRC Japanese spending has been massaged down for political reasons, with non-core things being switched to other budgets to keep official spending just below 1% of GDP. That may have changed since the 1% ceiling was dropped.
Re hollowing out: some countries have cut spending that can be relatively quickly made good, such as spares stocks & ammunition, or by mothballing kit rather than operating it. Others not so much, e.g. I think that the UK has actually spent money scrapping equipment rather than storing it, because of the pernicious Treasury "capital charges" on stocks, an entirely inappropriate thing for the armed forces.
IIRC Japanese spending has been massaged down for political reasons, with non-core things being switched to other budgets to keep official spending just below 1% of GDP. That may have changed since the 1% ceiling was dropped.
Re hollowing out: some countries have cut spending that can be relatively quickly made good, such as spares stocks & ammunition, or by mothballing kit rather than operating it. Others not so much, e.g. I think that the UK has actually spent money scrapping equipment rather than storing it, because of the pernicious Treasury "capital charges" on stocks, an entirely inappropriate thing for the armed forces.
The R.N,s nuclear submarines disposal costs are a case in point
navalinstitute.com.au
Costly recycling of nuclear submarine | The Australian Naval Institute
navalinstitute.com.au
downunderblue
Active Member
I think that's up for debate. Many European leaders can get a meeting with Trump, yet our PM can't. Carney gets a meeting even though Trump bickers about taking his country over as a state.
I'd argue that strategically, Australia remains one of the US' most important allies (and visa versa)
Yes Kevin can easily facilitate a meeting with anyone in Congress, and many in the administration, but if the PM can't even get a call through, then we have an issue. Kevin is the man on point so I'd question his influence and effectiveness.
Trump is all about personal relationships. We need someone who he personally knows and likes to be the face of AU in Washington. I don't want to get bipartisan and acknowledge Kevin's mind and effort, but that's not enough.
It would cause a lot of political constination and heartburn domestically but I do note there is a former AU PM who has time on his hands, attended Trump's inauguration, spent NYE with him in Mar-a-Lago, and last night just appeared before the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. I'm sure he could facilitate a meeting. Does Albo play Golf?
Team Australia needs a refresh in Washington IMO. We need to get the PM a meeting.
Sometimes a negotiation strategy is to pause and wait until the timing is right. I would view rushing to meet with Trump at this point would potentially devalue the hand we currently hold (which is a reasonably decent one).
There is no current crisis, no embargo, no cancellations on anything. Our export trade remains unaffected, even with the active tariffs (no reductions in exports recently). Our military procurements all remain in progress, and we just paid the next installment for AUKUS.
Australia is for all intensive purposes out of the spotlight and and carrying on as usual. While that is the case, I don't see a need to meet Trump, particularly as any meeting with Trump seems to be high risk these days. A meeting at the moment is unlikely to gain anything other than a photo op (and possibly a bad one).
From what I'm seeing, the usual behind the scenes discussions seem to be doing just fine.
This would be a game of patience.
There is no current crisis, no embargo, no cancellations on anything. Our export trade remains unaffected, even with the active tariffs (no reductions in exports recently). Our military procurements all remain in progress, and we just paid the next installment for AUKUS.
Australia is for all intensive purposes out of the spotlight and and carrying on as usual. While that is the case, I don't see a need to meet Trump, particularly as any meeting with Trump seems to be high risk these days. A meeting at the moment is unlikely to gain anything other than a photo op (and possibly a bad one).
From what I'm seeing, the usual behind the scenes discussions seem to be doing just fine.
This would be a game of patience.
Bluey 006
Active Member
I think you are missing the core message here; there is no falling to the allure of the short victorious war. Merely discussion. While it's true that wars between near-peer states risk turning into drawn-out battles of attrition (as we have seen in Ukraine), recent history shows that not all conflicts between peers inevitably become long wars, and that short successful campaigns are still common, especially when combined with superior technology, surprise or intelligence-led tactical advantage, and/or decisive strategic strikes or operational momentum.
• The Six-Day War (1967)
• The Indo-Pakistani War (1971)
• The Yom Kippur War (1973)
• The Sino-Vietnamese War (1979)
• The Falklands War (1982)
• The Invasion of Kuwait (1990)
• The First Gulf War (1990–1991)
• The Russia–Georgia War (2008)
I’m sure you have a sound knowledge of military history, and don’t need to hear it from me.
However, you reference the 20-year GWOT in Afghanistan, against the Taliban and AQ etc. This was not really a single, unified conflict, but rather a series of evolving counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, with Afghanistan at the centre. It was characterised by asymmetry, insurgency, and efforts at nation-building, a conflict that lacked consistent strategic objectives. Over time, the mission shifted from targeting al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban, to stabilising the country and building a functioning Afghan state. All of this resulted in a prolonged, complex engagement with no clear endpoint. Like Vietnam before it, the Afghanistan conflict was not fought against a true nation-state peer adversary, as much of the fighting was against insurgents and irregulars and the lines between combatant and non-combatant were blurred. It was a war shaped by asymmetric warfare, where a technologically superior force confronted a decentralised and ideologically driven, motivated enemy using guerrilla tactics and local networks.
In fact, many of the long, drawn-out conflicts in recent times have involved significant participation from irregulars or non-professional citizen armies rather than direct peer-on-peer military confrontations. This is also true in Ukraine, where citizen-soldiers, armed with drones, and asymmetric tactics have proved highly effective.
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ukraine share a common thread. They are not clean, conventional peer-on-peer wars but rather asymmetric conflicts driven by peoples defending their homeland. These wars are shaped by irregular tactics, ideology, and geopolitics, with both sides utilising new or unconventional strategies. In each case, the stronger, more technologically advanced power faces a determined, resourceful opponent using guerrilla tactics, terrain, and local support networks to level the playing field. All of these conflicts also involve extensive use of information warfare and proxy intervention, further complicating traditional military strategies. Ultimately, they highlight the evolving nature of warfare, where political motives, new technologies, and unconventional tactics redefine the boundaries of traditional conflict.
But back on track, it’s the threat of decisive strategic strikes that should concern Australia most. The challenge isn’t just deterring such strikes, but surviving them: ensuring we possess the strategic depth, resilience, and, importantly, the national will to remain in the fight. Only then can we mobilise the full weight of our national resources, professional and civilian alike, to hold out, adapt, and ultimately frustrate a larger, more powerful adversary. Said strikes may come in the form of missiles, from within, or they may be non-kinetic. In the case of the latter, shots have already been fired.
If the bulk of the Air Force, fleet, and key infrastructure is wiped out in the first hundred hours, it is a very long road back. This, I suspect, is why we’re now seeing greater focus on national resilience: on hardening infrastructure, securing supply chains, industrial capacity, and civil defence, and rightly so. But without sufficient force volume and depth to absorb those initial losses, we are left dangerously exposed. After that, it becomes like shooting ducks in a barrel until we can regenerate our forces. This is one of the reasons why the DSR decision to concentrate our modest mechanised forces and bulk of the helicopter fleet in Townsville, within missile range, was a bit perplexing to me.
The solution isn’t merely more tanks, ships, air defence systems, or fighters, nor just a mobilisation plan, though these are necessary. What’s required is a reimagining of defence as a layered, redundant, deeply embedded, and dispersed national defence enterprise, one that brings together society, defence, the economy, infrastructure, industry, and technology into a balanced and resilient cohesive whole.
While wars can become long and attritional, particularly those involving insurgencies like Afghanistan or Vietnam, history shows that peer or near-peer conventional conflicts, when driven by clear objectives, superior technology, sound planning, and precise execution, can end quickly and decisively. All that said, the risk of ignoring all the warning signs and underinvesting in defence before tensions boil over is clear. We could find ourselves on the losing side of a short, sharp war where the outcome is decided in days, not years. Incapacitated, isolated, and unable to fully mobilise or to hold out long enough for reinforcements or allied support to arrive. With the way the world is going, there is no solid guarantee that support would ever arrive, especially if things kick off elsewhere at the same time.
With our small population, limited industrial capacity, and modest defence force, if we are caught in a long war of attrition against a more powerful adversary and our high-end assets have already been destroyed, our prospects aren’t great. Australia is a wealthy nation with abundant natural resources, but without the industrial depth to turn those resources into military power quickly. A small, highly professional force backed by a determined population can be effective, but only if it survives the opening blow. And in a high-intensity Pacific conflict, we may not get the luxury of time to rally, rebuild, and then mobilise. History has repeatedly warned of the cost of underinvestment, strategic complacency, and being too slow to act.
So, the question is, can Australia survive the first strikes, stay in the fight, and respond decisively and with enough force, speed, and combat power to turn the tide before it’s over?
If the answer is no, then we must ask the only question that matters. What can we do now to make sure the answer becomes yes?
Last edited: