Back to the original topic at the start of this thread: the Cocos Islands upgrades.
Perhaps this question puts into context the importance they should hold in Australian defence planning:
What would Australia’s SLOC look like if Cocos/Christmas Islands were held by a foreign power at war with Australia?
They provide a significant opportunity for maritime patrol to extend well into the Indian Ocean by which ever country holds them at the time.
For this reason alone Australia should provide no doubt that they’re ours and we intend to hold them. With this in mind a few upgrades (over 10-20year time frame) should be carried out:
- Cocos Is airport should be rebuilt to have parallel runway and taxiway strong enough for up to 777/747 weights. Political argument for it could be along the lines of P-8 patrols but also allowing its use as an entoute alternate for civil airliners between the ME/India and Australia (there are currently very limited options in that area).
- when the above work is carried out, a reasonable amount of work is conducted to enable extensions to taxiways or dispersal parking stands to be built in the future. This could be as simple as extra land reclamation or transporting additional materials to the island and leaving a stockpile.
- Christmas Island airport should also be upgraded in a similar fashion. A more important requirement for CI would be building a port capable of handling larger ships (or just a protected harbour). Again this is something that has significant defence benefit but can be ‘sold’ as a civilian project.
A few years after these things have happened and Indonesia in particular are comfortable with the idea the following could be done.
- deployments of P-8’s and other maritime patrol capabilities to either island with the intention of exercising with the Indonesians.
- deployment of RAAF fighters to one island and Singapore AF to the other. This exercise could be used for both sides. RAAF to gain experience defending the islands and the SAF to practice defending a small island similar to theirs.
- the RAAF could also use CI or Cocos to carry out an exercise with the Indonesians closer to their territory. This would again depend on our relationship at the time.
Once/if these exercises became semi regular or even repeated 2-3 times the excuse could then be used to upgrade the facilities again to allow extended deployment of forces to the islands. Again these should cover hard to build (long lead time) items like secure fuel storage or hardened ammunition storage. The work should again cover extra space for additional facilities to be built and/or a material stockpile for future construction.
I think there is a threat to Australia if we don’t show an ability or desire to hold these islands. However the primary impediment I can see to further development of these islands in peacetime would be political. Indonesia would be obviously concerned and to a lesser extent China. That’s why the political element and subsequent exercises would be critical to ‘lowering the temperature’ on any military threat from this work.
The DWP includes upgrades to facilities on the Cocos Islands to support P-8 operations. What exactly this includes has not been mentioned, to my knowledge.
"4.66 The Government will similarly upgrade RAAF Bases Edinburgh, Darwin,
Pearce, and Townsville and the airfield at Cocos (Keeling) Island to
support introduction of the new P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance
and response aircraft."
Building infrastructure and deploying fighters to the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island doesn't seem an efficient use of resources, particularly in regards to relations with Indonesia. Fighters, relative to bombers and maritime patrol aircraft, don't possess great range with the primary area of operations to be encountered when operating from CI being Java - the population centre of Indonesia.
Relations may be good with Indonesia currently, but this has not always been the case and situations can change. Having fighters within striking/patrol distance of Java can imply an intention to operate there and may be interpreted poorly. Having fighters forward based to more readily respond to contingencies in the region is maybe a good idea, but the cost of a fully fitted base and the political fallout may not make it an ideal use of resources under current circumstances.
A more economical solution is the use of Indonesian, Malaysian or Singapore airbases - there are many already fitted for fighter operations and it is easier diplomatically to propose joint (international) training on their turf, as it would not create a long-term threat close to their main island.
Creating a deep water harbour/facilities at CI or KI could be of interest - particularly if there is an intention to operate closer to the String of Pearl's and with South Asian partners - but again it also creates a long-term issue for Indonesia, which is a more vital partner to cooperate with. Creating such facilities would be significantly more expensive than a new/upgraded airport. There are also environmental concerns to be noted - people will get upset about a relatively untouched island being modified in such a large way. Again, access to partnered or allied nation naval bases is a more economical use of resources. If there is an intention to avoid them for whatever reason - there is a broad line of major bases stretching from Perth, to Diego Garcia to and to the Middle East region (including Djibouti).
I'd very much like to see maritime patrol and surveillance assets in the area. It demonstrates a willingness to monitor and protect that area of approach whilst also allowing for long ranged assets to reach out to the String of Pearls - noting that any RAN TG operating in the area, without Indian support, may require either the P-8 or MQ-4 to provide wide area surveillance and ASW capability.
For patrol vessels, they do not necessarily need a large port to function with CI already (unsure about KI?) allowing them to monitor that area for incursions by fishermen or refugees. If the Chinese or any other nation wants to threaten the islands for whatever reason, there are frigates and submarines based out of Fleet Base West to potentially oppose this.
Recommending stuff politically and diplomatically only works if both have something to gain and no ill intention is seen through it. Currently there are no exceptional risks to the islands being taken, nor would there be any threat to national security or sovereignty if such an event occurred. Fighters and major bases are not required, imo.