For all my disdain of Hugh White, his questions about alliances are solid. Much of his underlying assessment is good - it's when he start proposing solutions and making "logic" links between his data he is proving to be increasingly redundant.
United States
with respect to the US, the Pacific is clearly their lake from their point of view. Even the pre-1941 operations and exercises (especially pre-1930) had an element of reminding the Brit's that the US wanted to be the force in the Pacific. So there is the temptation to assume that will continue to occur forever and that Australia can leverage off it. And that's not a horrible temptation.
But... All the recent (say, last 5 years) press promoting the US shift to the Indo-Pacific has been pure words. In every respect, it hasn't happen. Diplomatically (ambassadors not being posted, SecState not visiting key nations), aid (the has been a real and a % of budget decrease in aid from the US to the Pacific), military (Atlantic and CENTCOM still have priority) and intelligence work has been all focused elsewhere. The actions of the US (including pre-Trump) do not match the words they are saying. Now, that is concerning because the reality is that if something happens in the Pacific than the US will rapidly pivot back. But while they ignore it, those elements in the Pacific will take a more brutal cost in the opening attacks. Which will mean a higher proportion of losses on Japanese and Australian forces.
Add this to Trumps comments about allies having to pay - and there are serious questions about the US's laxity about how they view the Pacific and the consequences for Australia. We may have to act as the BEF did in 1939/40 or 1914 to support a crumbling US front...
Others
I think White undermines his own argument here.
History—the only guide we have—suggests that shared values count for little in decisions for war. Shared fears of a common enemy are what count. Military alliances work and endure only when the parties are convinced that their own security depends directly on the security of an ally, and the more direct the dependence, the stronger the alliance will be.
Indonesia
Yes. 100%. And the reality is, if you want to play silly buggers with Australia you have to play with Indonesia or PNG. If we can finally get over our view of Indonesia as a threat, that will be an enormous bounty. We should be doing everything we can to boost our relationship with Indonesia and bring them into a much more respected and key position among our friends. Any external threat to Indonesia will become one to us - better to fight north of Jakarta than north of Darwin. I understand that there will be frustrations - especially in trade and domestic policies - but point to an alliance that doesn't have those issues. Britain and France? In fact, Britain and most of NATO? US and NZ? Better security relationships will help with all of this. And there are real things that the ADF can do that will help this that doesn't need any wider Government approvals.
Malaysia and Singapore
Not the same country, nor the same as Indonesia, with their own issues. But FPDA still actually means something. And with our economy intertwined so much, Singapore and Australia are already reliant on each other. Can you imagine something threatening Singapore that Australia ignores? Even putting FPDA aside - our trade and petroleum will suffer should Singapore go to war. Likewise, as arguably the most technologically advanced nation in SE Asia, Singapore will also hurt if we get attacked. And even more so than us and Indonesia, you want to play silly buggers with Singapore demands dealing with Malaysia. Which means that for all intents and purposes, Malaysia and Singapore have the same relationship to Australia in terms of share security concerns
New Zealand
On one hand White is correct, NZ and Australia's security is intertwined. And I really like
@Wombat000 comments in the
NZDF General thread. I think he asks excellent questions. I'll never question the NZ population or military's will to aid Australia - but I'm beginning to ask what use they can be beyond low-level stuff. Anything from INTERFET down the NZDF provides an invaluable ally (for starters, the NZ relationship with SW Pacific nations is generally much better than Australia's and they understand the cultures and populous better) but after that? It seems that the political will is missing - and that undermines their value. Which is a shame; of all the nations and cultures out there, there few others and none better you'd rather beside you against a no-shit threat than a Kiwi.
That's just what I see as the top five players in the SE Asia region that highlights White is, again, wrong and right. There is massive value in asking how we fight the first half of the war without the US playing much (or do a large INTERFET+ operation without them), but in our rush to do that lets not forget about our other neighbours. White is correct about shared threats mean more than fancy alliances; and there are three powerful and potential nations to our north that we already share threats with.
Oops - didn't mean to be so long - sorry