ADF General discussion thread

[Todjaeger]

Discussion cont'd from the RAN thread, as the topic is more appropriate to the ADF as a whole.

Probably a discussion more suited to the airforces board ... but I am more interested in whether the ADF should have a long range strike capability rather than whether or not the F-111 was adequately replaced with an F-18/F-35/KC-30 combo. I don't think the F-111 was ever allowed to live up to its potential with the RAAF. We never provided aerial refuelling for example. I suspect that was because we didn't want to offend our neighbours.

We are in different times now and frankly a long range strike capability fits in very well with the fully networked nature of the ADF.

A few points first regarding the service capabilities and histories of RAAF strike and supporting assets.

The RAAF did have an aerial refueling capability provided by converted Boeing 707-338C airliners, following an AUD$15 mil. contract awarded to IAI in October, 1987. This provided a hose and drogue AAR capability, enabling the short-legged F/A-18A/B Hornets to be refueled, as that is the type of refueling typically used by US combat aircraft in service with the USN or USMC. Most of the USAF aircraft, or at least the larger ones, require probe-type refueling as opposed to hose and drogue. The F-111C, being largely based off the F-111A in USAF service, I believe could have been refueled in flight, but would have required a refueling probe as opposed to hose and drogue. From my POV, I could see how there might be little appetite to spend coin to develop and field an AAR refueling probe, given that at the time, the most likely targets for an F-111C strike would have been in Indonesia and already within the combat radius of an F-111C operating from Australian air bases or fields. As for concern about "offending the neighbours" I suspect that was not much of a concern, given that a former Indonesian defence minister had advised colleagues who were upset with Australia at a cabinet meeting that Australia had a bomber (the F-111C) able to launch a strike and drop a bomb onto the table the meeting was held around.

With respect to the need or desire for the ADF to have a long-range strike capability, questions need to be answered to really determine what is required, and whether or not if what is required is even feasible.

One of the first questions to answer and get answered is the who/what/where of the potential long-range strike, and relating to that what is the size or scope of the strike. If the primary strike targets are expected to still be in Indonesia, then platforms and weapon systems currently already in service can meet the need. OTOH if for some reason Australia felt it needed to have the capability to launch strikes against Chinese and/or Indian targets, then a combination of both longer-ranged munitions as well as longer-ranged launching platforms would likely be required. With respect to the size or scope of the strike, that is really to determine how much ordnance would be required to achieve the objectives (whatever those might be) of the strike. By way of example, if the objective of a long-range strike was to neutralize an airfield so that it could not support air operations by cratering the runways and taxiways, as well as damaging or destroying the tank farms and fuel distribution systems, then multiple conventional warheads would likely be required to be successful. The ability to deliver multiple warheads would then impose some limitations or requirements on what the launching platforms could or should be.

IMO, the ADF should anticipate and make provision for fitting long-ranged munitions to both RAAF fighter and surveillance aircraft, as well as RAN surface warships and submarines. The fielding of this capability is not for a specific threat, but rather to expand the range of options and potential responses for both the ADF, and AusGov as a whole.

 

[Volkodav]

Discussion cont'd from the RAN thread, as the topic is more appropriate to the ADF as a whole.



A few points first regarding the service capabilities and histories of RAAF strike and supporting assets.

The RAAF did have an aerial refueling capability provided by converted Boeing 707-338C airliners, following an AUD$15 mil. contract awarded to IAI in October, 1987. This provided a hose and drogue AAR capability, enabling the short-legged F/A-18A/B Hornets to be refueled, as that is the type of refueling typically used by US combat aircraft in service with the USN or USMC. Most of the USAF aircraft, or at least the larger ones, require probe-type refueling as opposed to hose and drogue. The F-111C, being largely based off the F-111A in USAF service, I believe could have been refueled in flight, but would have required a refueling probe as opposed to hose and drogue. From my POV, I could see how there might be little appetite to spend coin to develop and field an AAR refueling probe, given that at the time, the most likely targets for an F-111C strike would have been in Indonesia and already within the combat radius of an F-111C operating from Australian air bases or fields. As for concern about "offending the neighbours" I suspect that was not much of a concern, given that a former Indonesian defence minister had advised colleagues who were upset with Australia at a cabinet meeting that Australia had a bomber (the F-111C) able to launch a strike and drop a bomb onto the table the meeting was held around.

With respect to the need or desire for the ADF to have a long-range strike capability, questions need to be answered to really determine what is required, and whether or not if what is required is even feasible.

One of the first questions to answer and get answered is the who/what/where of the potential long-range strike, and relating to that what is the size or scope of the strike. If the primary strike targets are expected to still be in Indonesia, then platforms and weapon systems currently already in service can meet the need. OTOH if for some reason Australia felt it needed to have the capability to launch strikes against Chinese and/or Indian targets, then a combination of both longer-ranged munitions as well as longer-ranged launching platforms would likely be required. With respect to the size or scope of the strike, that is really to determine how much ordnance would be required to achieve the objectives (whatever those might be) of the strike. By way of example, if the objective of a long-range strike was to neutralize an airfield so that it could not support air operations by cratering the runways and taxiways, as well as damaging or destroying the tank farms and fuel distribution systems, then multiple conventional warheads would likely be required to be successful. The ability to deliver multiple warheads would then impose some limitations or requirements on what the launching platforms could or should be.

IMO, the ADF should anticipate and make provision for fitting long-ranged munitions to both RAAF fighter and surveillance aircraft, as well as RAN surface warships and submarines. The fielding of this capability is not for a specific threat, but rather to expand the range of options and potential responses for both the ADF, and AusGov as a whole.

There is still the eventual requirement to replace the F/A-18F and G fleets. I know discussion has been around additional F-35A, possibly F-35B, or even unmanned options, but what about the B-21? Unlikely as it is, such a procurement would be a game changer, and the type has been designed with considerable synergies with the F-35.

 

[Todjaeger]

There is still the eventual requirement to replace the F/A-18F and G fleets. I know discussion has been around additional F-35A, possibly F-35B, or even unmanned options, but what about the B-21? Unlikely as it is, such a procurement would be a game changer, and the type has been designed with considerable synergies with the F-35.

A replacement for the strike capabilities the F/A-18F could be possible. An EW replacement for the EA-18G would depend very much on what the options were.

Regarding the potential for the B-21 to be a suitable replacement, IMO it is still far too early to tell. From my POV, having watched US procurement decisions for some time now, I would not be particularly surprised if the programme was halted completely due to cost increases, changes to mission requirements, or a combination thereof. It is also quite possible that the B-21 might manage to stick around as the replacement for the B-1 and B-2 strategic bombers in USAF service, and also retain the projected FY2016 average procurement costs of USD$564 mil. assuming a minimum of 100 are ordered for the USAF. However, cost over runs are certainly possible, as increased per unit costs due a reduction in order numbers, like what drove the per unit price of the B-2 Spirit to ~USD$2 bil. per aircraft. Even if the B-21 Raider is kept to the "affordable" USD$564 mil. per aircraft pricetag, I have a hard time seeing the ADF justify purchasing a fleet of LO intercontinental strategic bomber/strike aircraft.

That is also assuming that B-21 Raiders would even be available for purchase to Australia, or any other country. Given how willing the US was to sell the F-22, I can certainly foresee reluctance on the part of some at the idea of selling a strategic weapon which would have the ability to reach and penetrate US airspace, even if sold to US allies.

 

[Takao]

Discussion cont'd from the RAN thread, as the topic is more appropriate to the ADF as a whole.

IMO, the ADF should anticipate and make provision for fitting long-ranged munitions to both RAAF fighter and surveillance aircraft, as well as RAN surface warships and submarines. The fielding of this capability is not for a specific threat, but rather to expand the range of options and potential responses for both the ADF, and AusGov as a whole.

The need for long-range weapons is already stated in DWP 16 for all the Services. In addition, all of the futures work points to the need for long-range weapons. Range will, as always, be essential. Hence the various projects already in train.

I think the problem the ADF will face lies in three areas:

1. Legality. The problem, especially for land forces, is that missiles with long range can fall into questionable areas. On top of this are, if not questions of legality, questions of politics about unbalancing the regional military balance.

2. Cost. These things are expensive. A basic BGM-109 is what, around AUD$2m? That's quite an investment because of the numbers we would need to make a credible strike force.

3. Capability. Frankly, Western weapons suck. They are fine for hitting Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan (or the USSR in the mid-1980s) - but subsonic, non-stealth weapons stand little chance against most of our neighbour's AD systems (friend or otherwise). A decent long-range strike capability has to have at least one of these two things - but there goes cost again.

Honestly, all three are able to be overcome. And like I said, range is everything. We need a variety of long-range strike options; some ground-based, some air-based and others sea-based. Like @Todjaeger said - provide options to the government. I'm loathe to buy current equipment though, I'd rather take a gamble on what's coming. Simply because I don't think what is out there cuts it anymore, the West has slipped too much here (I blame an over-reliance on America, an over-reliance on stealth and no real AD envelopes in 30-odd years). I would actually delete the extra F-35 planned purchase (I think there are valuable questions over manned platform survivability by that stage + we have 72 already) and roll that money into long-range projects (some for now, some for next, some for research - and as much as possible able to be fired from multiple platforms).

 

[t68]

Also, the purchase of KC-30A aircraft can be used to extend the strike range of the F-18Fs which effectively replaced the F-111s.

Which effectively doubles your costs to provide the same capability, that not to say that we don't need a AAR capability they are a force multiplier in context.

While I love the F111 its most likely should have been replaced by the B-1 Lancer(cost implications aside) in a similar time frame as the USAF to retain the capability whilst being able to peg improvements with a known user instead of becoming an orphan fleet,. In today context a B1 puts the SCS within strike distance from Darwin (also Beijing with AGM-158 JASSM-ER (bad idea))

 

[John Fedup]

A replacement for the strike capabilities the F/A-18F could be possible. An EW replacement for the EA-18G would depend very much on what the options were.

Regarding the potential for the B-21 to be a suitable replacement, IMO it is still far too early to tell. From my POV, having watched US procurement decisions for some time now, I would not be particularly surprised if the programme was halted completely due to cost increases, changes to mission requirements, or a combination thereof. It is also quite possible that the B-21 might manage to stick around as the replacement for the B-1 and B-2 strategic bombers in USAF service, and also retain the projected FY2016 average procurement costs of USD$564 mil. assuming a minimum of 100 are ordered for the USAF. However, cost over runs are certainly possible, as increased per unit costs due a reduction in order numbers, like what drove the per unit price of the B-2 Spirit to ~USD$2 bil. per aircraft. Even if the B-21 Raider is kept to the "affordable" USD$564 mil. per aircraft pricetag, I have a hard time seeing the ADF justify purchasing a fleet of LO intercontinental strategic bomber/strike aircraft.

That is also assuming that B-21 Raiders would even be available for purchase to Australia, or any other country. Given how willing the US was to sell the F-22, I can certainly foresee reluctance on the part of some at the idea of selling a strategic weapon which would have the ability to reach and penetrate US airspace, even if sold to US allies.

Your points on the tough road the B-21 has to travel are certainly a possibility. That being said, there are some positives. The USAF has a critical need to move beyond the B-1 and B-2 (and the even the durable B-52). Congress knows this is important. NG screwed up the B-2 with excessive cost overruns and of course Congressional pressure to reduce the number built didn’t help. If NG repeats this, their future as a defence contractor will be toast IMO thus they have incentive to get it right. Also, all stake holders know the F-22 build reduction was a mistake. Thus, all parties will try to make the B-21 a success. As for export orders, again a tough call but the economics would help just as F-22 orders to Australia and Japan would have for the Raptor program. I will leave it to others to evaluate if B-21s make sense for Australia.

 

[Todjaeger]

Again, cont'd from the RAN thread.

What would be the target of a long range strike?

Long range strikes, unless you use nukes or vast fleets of bombers, tend to be a pitter-patter compared to the amount of Ordnance fast combat jets can deliver if able to base close enough to their target. This lack of mass of conventional precision long range strike doesn’t matter if the targets are ships, as ships are juicy unitary targets.

So we need to identify the nature of the target, other than ships, that would require the sort of limited mass, long range strike capability the ADF might develop.

Long ranged targets would IMO be targets that are of strategic, as opposed to just tactical importance. If one looks at how IADS rollbacks have been conducted by the US, one would note that not only have radar installations been targets, but so too have communications hubs, and of course a command centre would certainly be of value. Other potential targets would be transportation and utility choke points like bridges, power generation and/or distribution facilities, fuel depots or refineries, and of course military/naval bases.

This could also lead to Australia needing to increase or expand the current intelligence gathering capabilities, to both detect and determine new/more strategic targets, but to also be able to conduct damage assessments to determine whether a long-ranged strike was a success or failure, and possibly make recommendations on whether or not the target should be hit again and if so, what with.

 

[FoxtrotRomeo999]

... let's not forget the need for adequate defence against such capabilities, though not at the expense of our offensive capabilities. We may not always be fighting in coalition against some lesser entity that lacks such offensive capability.

 

[ASSAIL]

There was a very interesting article in the Proceedings (USNI) Magazine last issue regarding the proposed joint Naval base (and possible air base) on Manus Island in the latest issue. I don’t have access to copy, anyone?

It discusses the advantages of the islands geography, it provides strategic options for the Aus/US allies and in fact poses problems for the PLA N to counter those options, and it greatly assists in the ability to protect our SLOC.
Further, it poses the advantages of a possible joint airbase at Lombrom.

We have been discussing many of these issues on the forum for some time so the piece is an intelligent summary summary of many of those discussions.

I note that Sam Bateman is listed in the bibliography, he is a one time Commander of the HMAS TARANGAU, the previous RAN base there, also a nice quote from Sir Arthur Tang, former head of both Defence and Foreign Affairs IIRC, “there’s no point in discussing strategy without referring to geography” germaine to the discussion.

 

[ngatimozart]

There was a very interesting article in the Proceedings (USNI) Magazine last issue regarding the proposed joint Naval base (and possible air base) on Manus Island in the latest issue. I don’t have access to copy, anyone?

Link to article: The Strategic Significance of Manus Island for the U.S. Navy - By Ben Wan Beng Ho | U.S. Naval Institute

 

[ngatimozart]

A reminder, any talk of the ADF acquiring the B-21 is pure fantasy because, as far as we are aware, it hasn't migrated from the CAD program to physical form yet. The B-2 would also most likely would be out of contention purely on cost basis alone and the US may not be willing to sell such a sensitive strategic platform anyway. Let's keep things in the realm of reasonable possibilities please.

 

[Takao]

Again, cont'd from the RAN thread.



Long ranged targets would IMO be targets that are of strategic, as opposed to just tactical importance. If one looks at how IADS rollbacks have been conducted by the US, one would note that not only have radar installations been targets, but so too have communications hubs, and of course a command centre would certainly be of value. Other potential targets would be transportation and utility choke points like bridges, power generation and/or distribution facilities, fuel depots or refineries, and of course military/naval bases.

This could also lead to Australia needing to increase or expand the current intelligence gathering capabilities, to both detect and determine new/more strategic targets, but to also be able to conduct damage assessments to determine whether a long-ranged strike was a success or failure, and possibly make recommendations on whether or not the target should be hit again and if so, what with.

Yes to all the above. Targets are key nodes.

But long range strike also provides commanders flexibility with placing forces on the ground. A long-range fires platform doesn't have to be as close to the enemy as a normal fires platform. So it can provide tactical support while being further back (and potentially) safer. Now, it's unlikely that a MLRS Bty is going to be unmasked to support a Pl or CT in contact - but if they are the main effort it may be. Either way, the commander and their fires cell have options.

One amendment to the above @Todjaeger . While new capabilities are always fun, the key problem with ISR isn't sensors, it's data analysis. I know the party line is AI and Big Data Analytics, but until that's actually introduced they don't do anything. ISR fusion, analysis and pushing a useful int product out needs to be sorted quickly.

 

[Takao]

There was a very interesting article in the Proceedings (USNI) Magazine last issue regarding the proposed joint Naval base (and possible air base) on Manus Island in the latest issue. I don’t have access to copy, anyone?

It discusses the advantages of the islands geography, it provides strategic options for the Aus/US allies and in fact poses problems for the PLA N to counter those options, and it greatly assists in the ability to protect our SLOC.
Further, it poses the advantages of a possible joint airbase at Lombrom.

We have been discussing many of these issues on the forum for some time so the piece is an intelligent summary summary of many of those discussions.

I note that Sam Bateman is listed in the bibliography, he is a one time Commander of the HMAS TARANGAU, the previous RAN base there, also a nice quote from Sir Arthur Tang, former head of both Defence and Foreign Affairs IIRC, “there’s no point in discussing strategy without referring to geography” germaine to the discussion.

What does Manus actually give us though? It was perfect in WW2, but sensor / platform / weapon ranges have all increased, as have platform requirements. Just how are we going to deliver enough fuel to Manus? Munitions? And it achieves what? Forward deployment? Cool - it's going to get crumped by long-range fires. And what SLOC is it supporting? US - Philippines? Hawaii - Australia? There is nothing that Australia needs to protect that comes that way, and SLOC control is temporal, not permanent.

Also, noting the dramatic increase in Chinese survey ships operating to the north of Manus, I'm not sure it'll pose as many issues to the PLA-N as it did to the IJN. The submarines will have excellent charts of the bottom and water, there will be precise "GPS" and other navigational fixes of the base and clear understanding of choke points for mines or the like. Yes - I get that the N approaches are probably too deep and broad for mines, but there are other options - especially interdicting local SLOC between mainland and Manus.

There are much better things to spend money on than a Manus base IMHO.

 

[ASSAIL]

What does Manus actually give us though? It was perfect in WW2, but sensor / platform / weapon ranges have all increased, as have platform requirements. Just how are we going to deliver enough fuel to Manus? Munitions? And it achieves what? Forward deployment? Cool - it's going to get crumped by long-range fires. And what SLOC is it supporting? US - Philippines? Hawaii - Australia? There is nothing that Australia needs to protect that comes that way, and SLOC control is temporal, not permanent.

Also, noting the dramatic increase in Chinese survey ships operating to the north of Manus, I'm not sure it'll pose as many issues to the PLA-N as it did to the IJN. The submarines will have excellent charts of the bottom and water, there will be precise "GPS" and other navigational fixes of the base and clear understanding of choke points for mines or the like. Yes - I get that the N approaches are probably too deep and broad for mines, but there are other options - especially interdicting local SLOC between mainland and Manus.

There are much better things to spend money on than a Manus base IMHO.

Manus in no way is a perfect solution to Australia’s security. What a joint base will do is present another obstacle to the expanding Chinese influence in the region and cement the Australian interest in PNG. It sits well with the Pacific PBs and the air Maritime surveillance programme.
The US perspective is different and I think the Proceedings article is predjudiced to that strategic view (safer than Guam).
I take your point about susceptibility to long range fire but that’s a problem everyone suffers from, the fort islands in the SCS for example.

There has been much hyperbole about the future joint base but I think in reality ausgov will upgrade the wharf and make it suitable for OPVs and that’s about it. In my day we used Manus to refuel with FFO in transit to Subic Bay but I have no idea what happened to the wharf and tank farm, probably under the jungle by now.
Further development would be something that would be funded by the US in negotiations with PNG, my opinion naturally.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Manus is probably going to be important for:
* Patrol boats - With Australia operating Patrol boats in the region, joint patrols with Indonesia, PNG, Timor and Malaysia and even the Philippines look entirely believable and credible. High frequency patrols, flying crews straight into Manus and going back out to sea. For the US the base actually may make sense for a LCS type ship as well.
* Aircraft. Wedgetail and P8's (and maybe G550) could operate from its airfield, providing coverage, high frequency and surveillance over larger area of SEA and the South Pacific.
* Submarine - Possible as a point for submarine operations. Flying crews in, resupply. Being a point quite far away for other nations to observe, yet thousands and thousands of miles closer for Australia. It would give Australia a base some 5,000 km closer as the crow flies, maybe 7000km by sea. Which for a submarine transiting at 10 kts is huge, that is cutting 28 days of transit time. While a base on the east coast of Australia is expected, making some arrangement for some capability at Manus, even if it isn't used very often, is money well spent.

It also clearly asserts Australia's commitment to the region. A defence deal with Indonesia or Timor looks very real and useful. Ships from other SEA nations could easily schedule visits and exercises could be conducted.

Some is discussed here in the ASPI peice
Going forward to Manus | The Strategist

We are actually in the middle of a bidding war between China for bases in the Pacific.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-outbids-china-fund-fiji-military-base

Remember, the context, China literally kicked in PNG foreign ministers door with four of its officials and wanted to make clear its thoughts on the final wording of the summit statement.
https://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2018...diplomatic-storm-at-apec/10508812?pfmredir=sm

So the fact the US Vice president looked pretty dazed about the announcement, and the government wasn't exactly forth coming with details should be surprising. However, Lombrum is certainly going to be useful. We have already spent half a billion on a hospital there, we might as well fully commit now and build a proper presence there.

I actually expect the port upgrade to be quite extensive eventually, currently only $5m is being spent on the port upgrade. I believe the communications centre might be further upgraded, they have so far spent $2m on that as well. Which is really not a lot of money.

https://navaltoday.com/2018/09/24/a...rade-of-papua-new-guineas-lombrum-naval-base/

But like anything I would expect it to evolve over time.

 

[Takao]

@ASSAIL - I agree, there has been a lot of hyperbole about Manus. And the last point about limiting to OPV, sure.

@StingrayOZ - That all seems very optimistic. I get the ISR advantages, but you are still a long way from anywhere important. And you still have to deal with fuel and weapons resupply. Note that China can seed their own ISR assets there easier than mainland Australia too. You don't think G-55 or Collins activity will be harder to hide there? I'm also not sold that it commits us to the region. While I firmly believe in that, and DWP 16 makes it clear that's a strategic aim, building a base in Manus v paying attention to individual countries - what does Manus actually buy. Does Fiji care? Vanuatu?

Mike Scrafton makes many of the points that I agree with. And sure, some minor upgrades are already done for OPVs and mickey mouse stuff. There is more value in challenging China in Port Moresby than Manus Island if we want PNG in our sphere of influence. But as Ben Wan Beng Ho makes clear in his conclusion to the USNI article:

At this stage, it is inconceivable that the dilapidated Lombrum Naval Base will develop into anything close to its World War II predecessor. A more likely prognosis is that it will become a “minor” base, “built to provide shelter for only a few ships . . . [with] limited capacity for ship repairs and other support functions.”[\quote]

That minor? Who cares?

$5m isn't much in the overall Defence budget I agree. But that should be it. The strategic use falls away too quickly - and I'd rather spend that money elsewhere. And that includes on co-operation programs / foreign aid to PNG.

 

[Volkodav]

A reminder, any talk of the ADF acquiring the B-21 is pure fantasy because, as far as we are aware, it hasn't migrated from the CAD program to physical form yet. The B-2 would also most likely would be out of contention purely on cost basis alone and the US may not be willing to sell such a sensitive strategic platform anyway. Let's keep things in the realm of reasonable possibilities please.

My bad.

Just a thought bubble looking at timelines and capabilities / potentially required capabilities. Also the assumption (truly the realm of fantasy) that the USAF gets their wish and the B-21 goes into series production to replace the entire B-52, B-1, and B-2 legacy fleets, is able to benefit from associated efficiencies and synergies.

Another thought, the B-21, in the right circumstances could also replace some F-15Es and has even been mentioned as an ultra long endurance interceptor. For this to happen the unit costs would have to be manageable and it is only if the USAF is able to get the type adapted for this mission that it would likely to become affordable for close allies.

Lots and lots of ifs, so definitely the realm of fantasy. But like I said, a thought bubble in the same ilk of RAAF B-58s, B-1s, C-141, C-5, F-22 and/or F-23, the capability would have been great but reality intruded.

 

[Todjaeger]

My bad.

Just a thought bubble looking at timelines and capabilities / potentially required capabilities. Also the assumption (truly the realm of fantasy) that the USAF gets their wish and the B-21 goes into series production to replace the entire B-52, B-1, and B-2 legacy fleets, is able to benefit from associated efficiencies and synergies.

Another thought, the B-21, in the right circumstances could also replace some F-15Es and has even been mentioned as an ultra long endurance interceptor. For this to happen the unit costs would have to be manageable and it is only if the USAF is able to get the type adapted for this mission that it would likely to become affordable for close allies.

Lots and lots of ifs, so definitely the realm of fantasy. But like I said, a thought bubble in the same ilk of RAAF B-58s, B-1s, C-141, C-5, F-22 and/or F-23, the capability would have been great but reality intruded.

Not to further derail the ADF thread, but my understanding is that the B-21 Raider (if it ever actually gets off the ground, not something I am willing to assume will happen just yet) is a B-1 and B-2 replacement, but the B-52's would remain in service after the two newer bombers are decommissioned.

 

[Wombat000]

Just how are we going to deliver enough fuel to Manus? Munitions?

We can not be assured of continued fuel supply to home island of Australia, Manus would be the last of our worries.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I've been rereading some of the stuff from late last year.
Why we need a radically new defence policy | The Strategist
http://www.anu.edu.au/events/why-australia-needs-a-radically-new-defence-policy

I think the direction they are pointing is right. We are running out of time to look at new types of equipment that aren't already in the pipeline.

We should be looking at maximizing what we already have in that pipeline.

• Future subs - Vertical launch tubes like the virginia's new block. Able to launch 7 tomahawks, NSM or perhaps 3 larger strike missiles, or UAV's etc, from each hatch, and 4 hatches.
• Future frigates - Maximizing sensors, weapons and capabilities. More vls, better and more capable missiles, JSM/NSM, LRASM, Sm-6, etc.
• F-35 - 4th squadron, LRASM, JSM, other enablers, maybe more p8, maybe a small fleet of g550 aew or more wedgetails, refuelers, etc.
• Army - Land 400, additional tanks, tigers, chinooks, Taipans etc.

Any thing that is further than 10 years out might as well be on the otherside of the moon.