I work with a bloke who was an RBS 70 operator in 16AD. He tells me it is very difficult to hit a manoeuvring target.......a hit is a bit like a lotto win. A straight flying target much easier, a fighter aircraft? Not so much.
Todjaeger
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I would respectfully disagree on much of the above, particularly in an Australian context.
Even with RGM-109E's, once they are in the inventory, the ADF would still not have what I consider to be a land attack capability until possibly as soon as the 2032-2034 timeframe and realistically it could be a fair bit later. At best, the RAN and ADF might be able to conduct a land attack strike if needed, OTOH, it might not be able to either.
Depending on what the fitout for the yet to be selected design of 11 GP frigates mentioned in the Naval review, they might or might not have the capability to carry and launch Tomahawks. This in turn might mean that starting in 2032, assuming (big assumption IMO) the lead ship does enter RAN service according to the proposed timeline, then the number of hulls the RAN has which might be able to be kitted with Tomahawk would increase. Alternatively, if the selected design lacks strike length Mk 41 VLS cells or the planned in-service date gets delayed, it might not be until 2034 when the first Hunter-class frigate is now supposed to enter service before the RAN has additional platforms available to LACM strikes.
IMO having more platforms available than just the three Hobart-class DDG's is needed in order for Australia to really have a ship-based Tomahawk LACM capability for the simple reality that for long stretches over the next few years Australia will only have at most two destroyers available for operations. The third vessel will be going through the planned upgrades and therefore unavailable. Now I have not been able to get a firm timeframe on how long it is expected to take for all three destroyers to get their respective upgrades, but I would imagine that it would be several years before all three are back in service. With only effectively only two DDG's in service, there will likely be periods where one is unavailable due to being in a maintenance, repair or training cycle or doing workups to prep for a planned deployment or just returning back from one. This could leave just a single destroyer available for deployment and honestly this might already tasked with something and/or away on a deployment. If one of the DDG's is available to deploy, then decisions would need to get made about the DDG's planned role and loadout and depending on circumstances, I could easily foresee the loadout and deployment tasking being area air defence given the limitations of other RAN vessels in such a capacity. Also worth noting, that the ability to launch the Tomahawk is one of the planned upgrades included in SEA 4000 Phase 6. This could also mean that the RAN has no ability to launch Tomahawks until the first Hobart-class destroyer is finished with the upgrades, which means that the number of hulls potentially available for a LACM strike would be even less until the upgrade programme is completed.
Now once the new classes of vessels begin entering service, the issues of having enough potential launch platforms (never mind VLS cells) should start to ease, but as already covered this will not be until the 2032-2034 timeframe under plans. However, this is not for another eight to ten years during which it is likely that the detection and engagement capabilities for the probable adversary will most likely have improved. Now yes, the RGM-109E in Block IV and V have been improved from the original, with improved guidance, more options in terms of ordnance effect, and longer range. AFAIK though, there has not been work done to reduce the signature of the missiles or make it otherwise more difficult to detect or intercept. Against some adversaries this might not be so important, but should Australia end up in a conflict with a peer, near peer or Great Power then it could result in a strike mission which has little to no impact. IMO it is also worth noting that some of the Tomahawk strikes carried out by the US in recent years, against significantly less capable adversaries, have been largely ineffective at times already. Given that the US already has a ISR capability largely greater than Australia as well as larger LACM warstocks and launch capability, and has conducted strikes on a larger scale than Australia would be capable of until at least 2032, I have to question the future of surface-launched Tomahawks in Australian services.
As an offshoot to that, sorry if I have missed, but where do we stand with regards to the Riverine Patrol Craft capability ? or has that been overtaken by the LMV ? Would have thought a deployable Riverine Patrol Craft would be very handy in the context of SEA and the islands and how army looks to be moving forward.
Cheers
You can disagree that is fine, but you insist on viewing this capability through a USN lens, as demonstrated by your reposting of USN operations.
But there are other examples, of LACM strike operations.
The RN bought 65x Tomahawks and integrated them on one platform type. They have conducted numerous land strike operations and made piecemeal top up purchases, all of theirs combined is less than we are acquiring initially and on barely more numbers of platforms than we will have at entry to service. Is this not then a ”capability”?
The French navy utilises the MDcN (Naval Cruise Missile) in a land attack role analogous to the USN and RN use of Tomahawk and employ same from subs and it’s FREMM frigates. With this weapon they have successfully conducted operational long ranged land attack strikes on targets in Syria with a 9 missile salvo. All targets were successfully destroyed, despite some technical problems with the launch. Subsequent testing has shown these problems have been resolved. So, a capability, or not?
Russia perceives a capability benefit is derived from it’s use of LACM armed corvettes that due to size alone can carry no more than 6x missiles...
The AWD upgrade is a point, but I think you have mistaken the length of time the AWD upgrade will take. It is primarily software upgrades, with only some processor, cabinet and EW upgrades. It is being fast-tracked with the NSR confirming the upgrade of all 3 is to be completed by the end of 2025 (p.10).
The capability will be limited to 3x ships plus RAAF and Army strike operations, until the Hunters / Virginia’s commence arriving, but arguing it is ‘not’ a capability is futile.
It plainly is.
Todjaeger
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Yes, it does indeed look like we will have to continue to disagree. However, there are a few things I wish to specifically point out since brought up a few apples to oranges comparisons in LACM usage.
In reference to the RN using Tomahawks for land attack, what was different is that the launching platforms for the RN were all SSN's and would have been using the UGM-109 Tomahawk. In the future, the Type 26 and Type 31 frigates it is believed will be fitted with at least some strike length Mk 41 VLS cells. To date, the RN has had three classes of SSN kitted out to fire Tomahawk. Given that subs have a very different role from surface warships, as well as a different capability set, then one is not forgoing the same capabilities by swapping the onboard armament from heavyweight torpedoes to LACM. If the RN's Daring-class or Type 45 destroyers, themselves primarily intended to provide area air defence, had been fitted for and used in LACM strikes using Tomahawks, that would be a more relevant
The LACM usage by the French Navy is similarly a bit of a different comparison though this might be more like an apples to peaches comparison. Firstly the missiles used by the French Navy was not the Tomahawk, but as you mentioned the MdCN, which came about following a French MoD requirement for a naval cruise missile to complement the air-launched SCALP/Storm Shadow, with the MdCN becoming operational from FREMM surface vessels in 2017. This difference in missile and particularly the significantly later date at which is entered service is IMO significant because the MdCN, being developed from the SCALP has LO features designed into it, which the much older Tomahawks do not.
Unfort I am in a bit of a rush, but I still think that Australia getting so many Tomahawks will most likely prove to be an expensive and wasteful mistake.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
product-sheet-landing-ship-transport-100.pdf (cloudinary.com)
Not sure what is happening with the Riverine capability, but I thought it was given the designation LMV-P last year. The fact sheet from Damen above gives an idea of how they could be deployed from the LMV-H fleet.
Takao
The Bunker Group
I'm with @Todjaeger - I don't believe we actually have a strike capability, despite all the words and dollars.
To me, you have to use the USN model, because the stated target is a PRC target. It's fine to throw a handful of RN Tomahawk or MDcN at Houthi, Syrian or Libyan targets. They barely have an air defence network and the targets have little passive defence. Even then, some of those targets needed 30 -50% of Australian stock to hit, partially for redundancy and partially due to the demands of the target - 61 for an airfield and 105 for three targets.
With all that in mind, how many will we need against a PRC target? They have hardening, passive and active defences and much longer detection range. We didn't buy them to hit rebels in Pacific islands, we bought them explicitly to deter Beijing. Which means we have to hit PRC targets... And if you need 100 missiles to kill a single target, what deterrence does killing a whole two PRC targets achieve?
In it's purest definition, we have a strike capability in that we (when delivered) have missiles, platforms, (assumed) targeting, pre- and post-strike ISR, and all the logistics and other FIC needed. But, can I as a professional say, with a straight face, we have a strike capability (let alone one that deters)? Nope.
(And, while searching for the Syrian links.... deja vu! With @Todjaeger featuring too!)
How effective is a 1000 pound warhead?
On its own what does it achieve?
How do you deliver it?
Cruise missile or dumb bomb dropped from a plane. Something else?
Is it for effect or deterrence.
How does it fit within the calculus of what you want to achieve..
If recall a comment which, I think was attributed to a salvo of tomahawks in Afghanistan in 1998. "all we did was blow up a tent"
What was the outcome.
The sceptic would say the result was pointless , someone else may suggest benefits un seen.
The ADF sees benefits in acquiring this capability.
I'm guessing it gives us additional long range punch ( Deterrence ) achieved within a relatively short time frame..
Do we need other capability's and additions across the ADF.
For sure.
However I'd speculate in the swings and roundabouts that is defence, this was a prudent choice.
For all the limitations of Tomahawk and I claim no expertise's in this area. The thought for an adversary of a inbound1000 pound warhead from a considerable distance would somewhat challenge ill intent.
The default is how would an adversary be they peer, near peer or rabble militia conduct operations with the ADF with and without a cruise missile capability.
Difference or no difference?
I can see arguments on both sides but I'd still side at the end of the day with the purchase.
Cheers S
On its own what does it achieve?
How do you deliver it?
Cruise missile or dumb bomb dropped from a plane. Something else?
Is it for effect or deterrence.
How does it fit within the calculus of what you want to achieve..
If recall a comment which, I think was attributed to a salvo of tomahawks in Afghanistan in 1998. "all we did was blow up a tent"
What was the outcome.
The sceptic would say the result was pointless , someone else may suggest benefits un seen.
The ADF sees benefits in acquiring this capability.
I'm guessing it gives us additional long range punch ( Deterrence ) achieved within a relatively short time frame..
Do we need other capability's and additions across the ADF.
For sure.
However I'd speculate in the swings and roundabouts that is defence, this was a prudent choice.
For all the limitations of Tomahawk and I claim no expertise's in this area. The thought for an adversary of a inbound1000 pound warhead from a considerable distance would somewhat challenge ill intent.
The default is how would an adversary be they peer, near peer or rabble militia conduct operations with the ADF with and without a cruise missile capability.
Difference or no difference?
I can see arguments on both sides but I'd still side at the end of the day with the purchase.
Cheers S
Tomahawk is simply the available weapon for the strike mission for one side in a potential conflict. There will be some other better system in the future, but Tomahawk will allow the RAN to incrementally augment the strike capability of the USN (just as it would augment air defence and ASW with different munitions). In a range of other scenarios Tomahawk also provides sovereign options for Australia but these are probably less important than signalling to US political leaders that Australia would stand in the firing line.
Indeed. If you were to set, in a war game, the RAN the task of invading Australia and the RAAF of defending it then the task of the RAAF commander would seem vastly more difficult if the RAN has Tomahawks (the equation likely changes with LRASM and Block IV F-35).
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
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Not sure that is really accurate since there would be targeting and BDA issues encountered by the RAN and there would still be the limitations in terms of volumes of fire and number of potential launch platforms.
One significant question would be who/which side, the RAN, the RAAF, or neither, would be receiving some of the more interesting land-based surveillance and SA systems. If JORN data was being fed to the RAAF, it is quite possible that the RAAF would be aware of any inbound LACM strike well before any such missiles could reach their likely targets. This in turn would give the RAAF time to divert or disperse assets and aircraft, minimizing potential damage. Also, JORN could provide contact data informing the RAAF approximately where RAN surface vessels are. This would likely need to be followed up with surveillance data from something like a P-8A Poseidon, of which the RAAF has a dozen in service currently, or even the E-7A Wedgetail.
Now given that there are only three potential Tomahawk launch platforms that will be in RAN service for the next 8-10 years it would be quite possible for maritime strikes or counterstrikes to be launched by the RAAF using F/A-18F SHornets and/or the P-8A Poseidons, all armed with AGM-158C LRASM. Between the 24 SHornets and dozen Poseidons, such a potential strike could be up to 144 LRASM, fired from ranges well outside the engagement envelop of any of the RAN's air defence missiles. Given that the LRASM has LO features, it should also be more difficult for any targeted ships to detect and engage these inbounds.
Now I could go on, but I suspect that the RAN in such a hypothetical situation, would be forced to rely upon a 'Hail Mary' type strike, whilst hoping for the best possible outcome. Once the F-35 enters service with LRASM and/or JSM integrated, then the situation would likely tilt even further in favour of the RAAF.
Me being me, I think it might be better if people could define what Australia wished to possess long-ranged strike capabilities to hit (the targets), where they are, and what potential/likely defences would be. From there, then discussion could be had in terms of what ordnance might be appropriate as well as what launch platform or platforms would be viable. If gov't is OTOH going to spend some USD$895 mil. to virtue signal to the US that Australia is willing to stand in the firing line, well that is money which IMO could have been better spent.
The RAN current land attack weapon (other than naval gun fire) is Harpoon. The RAAF maritime strike weapon is also Harpoon. Give the RAN Tomahawk then it gains a range advantage over the RAAF creating vast problems (some of which you helpfully outline). Give the RAAF LRASM and the scenario changes as I said and which you detail (SM-6 partially mitigates). The gap to Block IV for F-35 is a key maritime strike problem for Australia ( and also Japan and US).
It is a contribution to a doctrine of strategic ambiguity. If it is clear they are doing it wrong.
They will be spending a whole lot more than USD$895 mil. on Tomahawk but if it helps get Virginias and AUKUS tech then it is money well spent.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
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Four years ago there was a US DSCA release approving the sale of LRASM to Australia, to be carried by RAAF SHornets, this was in Feb of 2020. In July 2020 there was a media release by the PM & MoD which announced that the aging Harpoon was to be replaced by the AGM-158C LRASM in RAAF service. All integration work for LRASM should be completed by March 2026.
Separately, the US is working on integrating LRASM with the P-8A Poseidon which has a spiral development programme of which the RAAF is also a participant
It might be worth looking into AIR 3023 which mentions the purchase of both LRASM and JSM for RAAF combat aircraft.
Just over two years ago, 5 April 2022, Australia signed an initial contract with Kongsberg to acquire the NSM and have it replace the once again-aging Harpoon, but this time from the RAN's ANZAC-class frigates and Hobart-class destroyers.
There are currently several projects underway to renew/replace Australia's stock of standoff strike and maritime strike ordnance which I suspect will deliver results before Tomahawks enter Australian service, because these programmes have been running longer.
As a side note, that price tag of USD895 mil. for Tomahawks was the DSCA estimate for the costs associated with the missiles. Should more and/or different Tomahawks in the future, then Australia could easily end up spending more.
You can change the scenario I offered to emphasise Stampede’s point, as you like, to illustrate whatever point you wish to make.
Let me finish with this. All of the planned changes to ADF missiles (with tens of billions of program costs including targeting) increase the range at which the ADF can engage targets. Tomahawk is just the ship-attacking-land way of achieving that.
All of that needs to be understood as a response to a threat environment where adversaries seek to hold hostile warships and air bases at risk at great range.
I believe we have ordered only the ship launched version, I dont think we have even ordered the sub version. As far as Im aware, there is not an air launched version. There was a shorter range version designed as an air launched model, but as far as I know, it was not ordered by anyone.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
man_hx77.pdf (defence.gov.au)
That is why at least half the Man Trucks being delivered to the Army are armoured.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
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As of right now, only the ship-launched versions have been approved, no sub-launched Tomahawks. IIRC there was an air-launched version of Tomahawk which was developed back in the 90's but either never entered service or has been withdrawn at this point.
However, even if an air-launched version of Tomahawk was available, why would anyone wish for Australia to purchase and begin fielding them?
Australia has contracts to procure ship-launched NSM which can be used as both an AShM and LACM at ranges of 200+ km, with the missile having been designed with LO features in mind to reduce an adversary's ability to detect inbounds.
Australia also is in the process of acquiring members of the AGM-158 family, which covers iterations of JASSM and LRASM, providing LO standoff ordnance for anti-ship and land/ground strike roles. With the potential entry into ADF service of the AGM-158B-2 (JASSM-XR), one is talking about a modern LO cruise missile with a 1k n mile range. In other words, the ADF will have a few different potential options for strike missions, depending on circumstances.
AND
As I covered above, the NSM that Australia is due to be receiving have a dual role as LACM with a 200+ km range. Given that this missiles are being acquired as replacements for the RGM-84 Harpoon Block II, then I would expect the in-service surface combatants will be able to field them. Going forward this should mean that not only will the Hobart-class DDG's have a LACM capability, but so too will the ANZAC-class FFH's, as well the Hunter-class FFG's as well as HMAS Unicorn and her ten sister ships, if and when they actually get built. This is all without taking into account any RGM-109 Tomahawks or other ship-launched LACM options which are in development. So the RAN already has options just over the horizon...
The one major capability difference that I am aware regarding the RGM-109E Tomahawks covered in the DSCA approval is that the potential over the horizon range is significant, on the order of 1,600 km+, comparable to the AGM-158B-2. Realistically though I suspect that Australia would have trouble with the ISR systems needed to really make effective use of such ranges. To provide some context, warshots taken from in the waters around the Riau Islands of Indonesia should be able to reach the Chinese island of Hainan. It would then become a question of what Australia could effectively target and under what circumstances, never mind under what circumstances would it be worthwhile, keeping in mind that the missile flight time if fired at such long ranges, is going to be two hours from launch to arrival on target.
Would those armoured trucks as shown prevent a drone carrying an explosive that can defeat tanks be of use against a direct hit , I had in mind electronic warfare additions to such vehicles trophy being likely to be considered to expensive