Personally, I find this all so confusing.
+ Maritime choke point
+ Flexible maritime deployment (potentially contested)
+ Sustained presence of AShM
+ SHORAD/VSHORAD
Sounds like a job for a frigate.
Regards,
Massive
+ Maritime choke point
+ Flexible maritime deployment (potentially contested)
+ Sustained presence of AShM
+ SHORAD/VSHORAD
Sounds like a job for a frigate.
Regards,
Massive
I used to think that but then a submariner explained it to me.
The counter capability for a frigate is different to what is required for a submarine, and aircraft or deployed land based missiles.
Basically the more different threat profiles we pose the more countermeasures an enemy will require.
By having multiple different ways of hitting them they need to bring greater varieties and numbers of capabilities to the fight.
Maybe they decide to use marine light infantry to clear out the islands, one by one before sending their ships in. Whoops, the infantry company is supported by a troop of Boxers and they get slaughtered. They send in an air strike, oh dear, there's a Hunter near by.
Numbers of certain capabilities have been reduced from what was planned but types and reach of capabilities are increasing.
Oh, I forgot, mines, UUVs USVs UAVs and throw in some suicide Armidales / Capes.
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But the forces are operating in an environment where the adversary has gone to enormous lengths to be able to deny access to frigates (with anti ship ballistic missiles and submarines).
The ADF already was a component of an allied force. The theatre has simply changed. The geopolitics is all about maintaining US engagement in the Western Pacific, That is a constant, but previous Australian governments sought to deliver that by committing Australian troops to Western Asia.
Australia’s capacity to act independently has already been limited by allowing its navy to decline (when assessed against threats). AUKUS followed (a distant second) by the enhanced lethality surface fleet provide a path out.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #3,165
Umm... No.
The ADF has historically been an independent force (post-WWII at least) that has been capable of both independent and coalition operations.
The direction where many of the changes put forth by the DSR seem headed towards re-creating the ADF into a force capable of certain types of A2/AD actions, but are dependent on outside systems for the construction to function. Outside systems which Australia does not seem headed towards acquiring. Then there is also the rather significant matter of getting some of these proposed A2/AD systems into position, protecting them whilst there, and also keeping them and their protecting forces sustained and supplied.
Having formed units to act as A2/AD pointy bits, but then having to ask for help from others to get said units into relevant positions to be useful, and then also get help for targeting data, resupply, etc... That would sharply limit Australia's ability to deploy these capabilities in a useful capacity should some scenario occur where Australia wanted/needed to, to protect it's own national interests.
There is also the very real question of how appropriate or capable such units would be, should Australia need to conduct an expeditionary op somewhere, particularly for something like peace keeping/enforcement.
In some respects it is kind of like asking why is the ADF now getting surface-launched Tomahawk LACM's and what are the thought processes of the decisionmakers. The RAN is sharply limited in the number of both potential launch platforms (currently Hobart-class DDG's only) and total number of potential VLS cells used, with this limitation likely to exist for the next decade or so. When one remembers that the basic airframe design and flight profile dates back to when the missile was being developed in the 1970's and that 20 years ago countries like Iraq were able to demonstrate an ability to intercept at least some of the inbounds, it can make a person wonder.
To be honest, it sounds better to me now than it did initially.
True, we won't have a Hail Mary armoured brigade, leading a motorised division, but we are getting a lot more escorts while maintaining regional overmatch.
I've got a book about the US army WWII independent tank battalions. They fought in Europe but predominated in the Pacific on a scale of one tank btn per infantry division. That's still the scale for light infantry, marines and airborne, 1 to 9.
The period of history where the ADF was capable of independent operation ended some time ago - at some time even before the retirement of fixed wing naval air and the obsolescence of RAAF long ranged land based strike.
Be that as may, the contemporary ADF is not capable of independent operations against the potential adversary it is seeking to deter from aggression. Plausible (in my view) plans to change that are underway but they require many years to implement.
Yes it is very much like that. There are very good domestic political and geopolitical reasons for the Australian government to be vague about its intended use of Tomahawks. The RAN and JMSDF are acquiring the same weapon system at the same time. Both forces are more than capable of evaluating the use and limitations of that system.
I am not sure whether it is true that Iraq intercepted some Tomahawks but it would not be surprising.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #3,169
TBH, and I rather doubt this will be much of surprise to those who have read my posts over the years, it does not sound any better than it did at first. It still strikes me as being less a plan and more the product of overactive imaginations.
Consider for a moment, the changes made in planning for the Hunter-class frigates and the as-yet to be named new class of GP frigate specified in the naval review. Along with such consideration, also through in the implications. The ideas which led to the SEA 5000 project and will ultimately be the Hunter-class frigate had their genesis in the 2009 DWP, and prior to the DSR and subsequent Naval review (and razing pyre of previous plans...) the lead ship was anticipated having an entry into service in 2032, roughly a decade after construction first started.
After the Naval review, it would seem that some with decision-making capacities within the halls of power seem to think that a major construction programme, like building a fleet of 11 GP frigates can go from just being an idea to the lead ship being in service in roughly a third the time that SEA 5000 will take to accomplish the same thing. Yes, I would agree if people were to state that it might be possible to accomplish such an outcome, particularly if significant resources were made available and/or the specs and reqs were flexible. However, there is a significant difference between having a crash development and building programme be potentially viable, and making plans despite there being a number of areas where a single point of failure could delay or end such a programme outright.
Expanding such issues out, what possibilities does this suggest for the DSR and Naval review outcomes? To me, if gov't appears to be planning on a high risk building programme which would require multiple potential issues to go Australia's way, then it would seem reasonable to believe that other aspects of the DSR and Naval review plans would similarly have arears where things would need to go Australia's way.
From memory some came down, but I am not sure they were confirmed to be downed by enemy fire, more like missile malfunction etc.
in any case, the weapon like all US ones have been substantially updated over time. Current outer mould line tells a very limited part of the story… Tomahawk is up to Block V and it’d development path still has a lot of life, left in it.
The purpose behind Tomahawk is a demonstrable capability. There is nothing else available (from 2026 onwards) that will give us such a potent naval land strike capability. Nothing. Even if a Vertical Launched, naval JASSM-ER were to be developed, it won’t be ready in 2026 and still wouldn’t give us what Tomahawk does with such a huge inventory behind it and that massive range.
And enough with the banal argument about cell count. We aren’t the USN or the PLAN and we aren’t even trying to be. But AWD’s configured for air warfare or land attack will be armed to conduct such. Potentially 32x Tomahawks from a single AWD, plus air self-defence capability with 16x cells remaining is going to represent a substantial land strike capability that dwarfs anything the RAN has been able to do since HMAS Melbourne was retired.
What are we going to do with it, is a better question than “is it enough”…
Enemy locate shore based ASM.
Enemy inserts a 5 man SF team who watch bored infantry for a week or two.
Enemy SF team plan a way to destroy ASM....and depart.
Boxers, infantry and rest of the force feel stupid and useless.
Or Infantry and Boxers compromise SF and destroy them and morale increases.
I was initially opposed to the land based ASM concept as I feared it would result in a further reduction in major combatant numbers. Then there was talk of arming the Arafuras and even the Capes, buying three F-100s from Spain, combined with cancelling the Hunters.
Now we have seen the plans it is clear the missiles are in addition to an increased surface fleet. 11 frigates in addition to 9 tier 1 ships, an increase of 8 over previous plans. 11 proper frigates, not corvettes, not armed OPVs or patrol boats.
In addition there is still the possibility other systems may be acquired to bolster the currently planned long range fires.
Now we have seen the plans it is clear the missiles are in addition to an increased surface fleet. 11 frigates in addition to 9 tier 1 ships, an increase of 8 over previous plans. 11 proper frigates, not corvettes, not armed OPVs or patrol boats.
In addition there is still the possibility other systems may be acquired to bolster the currently planned long range fires.
Personally, I would prefer that the patrol boats have a secondary mission akin to land based ASM. This could mean fitted for, but not with NSM. Island hopping and and brown water operations, hiding among the islands, a bit like WW2 torpedo boats.
So long as it's not instead of the other, more survivable capabilities.
Same is the ability to fit an ATGM to a G Wagen would be good, you don't do it instead of having MBTs.
Absolutely!
We definable need at least 9 frigates as well as the type 26 and Hobart's. I say 9 , because as optimistic as I am that government has chosen the number 11.....there has been zero talk about it since the announcement, and I really don't see anything happening atm except jogging on the spot. Actually, all I am seeing is delays in spending anything.
Army's role has been re defined, and if the current government only does one term, then everything could change.
To be honest, I would rather see more P8s, more MRTTs and even another dozen more F18Fs fill the current gaps, than do SFA until 2030.
Army's role needs to flexible, not focused on island hopping.
We definable need at least 9 frigates as well as the type 26 and Hobart's. I say 9 , because as optimistic as I am that government has chosen the number 11.....there has been zero talk about it since the announcement, and I really don't see anything happening atm except jogging on the spot. Actually, all I am seeing is delays in spending anything.
Army's role has been re defined, and if the current government only does one term, then everything could change.
To be honest, I would rather see more P8s, more MRTTs and even another dozen more F18Fs fill the current gaps, than do SFA until 2030.
Army's role needs to flexible, not focused on island hopping.
OldTex
Well-Known Member
Yes the plan is for 11 new GP frigates to bolster the surface fleet. With their roles being to provide maritime patrol and presence, secure national SLOCs and add bulk to TFs particularly through AAW and ASW.
If even 1 GP frigate was provided to escort each potential LLG (Littoral Lift Group) then 27% of the Tier 2 vessels become unavailable for their intended purpose. Escorting slow moving coastal/littoral vessels should be a task for the PBs and OPVs. Yes they may well need some additional capability upgrades, but the role could be given to a properly established RANR.
USS Anchorage conducts HIMARS shoot during Dawn Blitz 2017
https://youtu.be/mnKjU75cGNI The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) was fired from the flight deck of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport
www.aerotechnews.com
I'm pretty sure they've trialed vehicle mounted SAMs from amphib decks too.
OldTex
Well-Known Member
Last time I looked the San Antonio class amphibs were just a little larger than even the LMV-H is likely to be. Just because it can be done doesn't mean it should be done. Almost like strapping bazookas to the wings of a Piper Cub and calling it a close air support aircraft.USS Anchorage conducts HIMARS shoot during Dawn Blitz 2017
https://youtu.be/mnKjU75cGNI The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) was fired from the flight deck of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport
I'm pretty sure they've trialed vehicle mounted SAMs from amphib decks too.
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More to the point, back in the day Army RBS-70s were fitted to DEs and other ships, Success from memory. The new army systems are much more capable and it would be interesting to see if any work is done on this.
OldTex
Well-Known Member
NASAMS is a much larger system than a RBS-70 firing post. The question would be how the targets would be queued to the AD system, if the organic radar (CEA for NASAMS and Giraffe for RBS-70) is not embarked or not allowed to transmit (EMCON).
The DSR does not mention whether the RBS-70 would be retained (or upgraded) after the IIS of the NASAMS. Common sense would suggest that a VSHORAD capability would be retained with the introduction of a SHORAD capability, thus providing a limited layered AD. But it seems that common sense is a very uncommon commoditiy.