Post 1/2
Appreciate some time has passed since this discussion started, and we have seen some developments since then (get back to them later).
I was OOA and otherwise engaged. I do however, think this is an discussion that can bare some fruit.
Yoinking across to a more general discussion....
Not only should they, but they always will. Even with the biggest, baddest ABF you can think of plus a full strength and capable Coast Guard, it'll be the RAN which has the ability to operate into the Southern Ocean to rescue sailors or capture fisherman. Or chase a fishing vessel 3/4 of the way to South America. It is inherent to a Navy, the things they need for war (equipment, thinking and processes) means they will always have diplomatic and constabulary tasks. And, while the other two will help, the RAN will always carry more...
Agreed they should and always will.
However, I believe the original operational concept document for SEA 1180 ruled out extensive use of the class much below the 40th parallel. Unsure how this has changed over the years. Or if the current ConOps for the Arafura class allows for this, others may know.
Assuming this stands, beyond our frigates, we don’t have a huge capability to operate that far south. Unsure if using billion-dollar frigates armed with millions of dollars in missiles to rescue sailors and chase fishermen halfway across the world is the best use of resources?
A reality that it does happen and will continue to, but questionable if in a time when our security environment is deteriorating and our fleet numbers are being challenged, we should be using our primary combat vessels for this purpose. We simply don’t have enough.
This might actually strengthen the case for corvettes or a dedicated polar class patrol vessel. Something akin to Jan Mayen class vessels.
Not at all. The Army has spent more time doing non-warlike tasks than warlike - even if at least one of those non-warlike tasks saw my helicopters getting shot at. But in discussing the wider range of tasks the RAN carries, it's not service rivalry or the like.
So, we agree the Army spends more time doing non-warlike tasks than warlike. Yet we are seeing the number of infantry battalions effectively reduced and no new security stabilisation battalion or civil-military coordination capabilities raised, and our reserves getting a new security role in the North. At a time when our traditional security partners are facing the prospect of confrontation on multiple fronts, internal political and social challenges, and economic woes that may hamstring its ability to provide support to all of its allies, everywhere, all the time.
Where will the manpower come from? If and when we face a concurrent set of challenges that require boots on the ground. With this rise of grey zone activities you could expect more insurgencies and the like, not less. Yes, we need a mobilisation plan but we also need enough enlisted personnel (active or reserve) to ensure we can “hold the line” (figuratively speaking) be that in combat or other measures to support that national interest, while the mobilization plan is activated.
The work we do in the region is essential. Our Sect - Coy sized exchanges and the like are a cornerstone of our defence in building regional relations. And they pay back, as anyone who has seen the deployment of forces to Australia post-disaster in the last couple of years.
Exactly….
But, for constabulary tasks, these nations generally have their own forces and we have the AFP, and for diplomatic tasks, it's very low level. For starters, the biggest Army force we regularly send overseas will have, at most, an O4 in charge. Perfectly fine, very little influence. Normally the ranks are lower. A ship will have at least on O5. There is a subtle, but distinct difference - even within our own nation.
A few points to cover here….
I think tying the influence of the deployment or mission to the rank of the officer in charge takes rather a simplistic view of things. The individual in charge might personally have little influence, but the mission, strategic commitment/policy direction, and organisation that he/she represents do. You can bet said deployment is getting consideration at much higher levels than O4, which is strategic influence. You reference this later when you talk about an Armoured Bde “It might not deter, but it'll cause a rethink at least”. This suggests it is influencing at the highest policy level.
As an Army officer you’d know influence over people or things does not happen quickly, it is a persuasive process. It doesn’t happen all at once. It requires a sustained and concerted effort. To effectively influence, you need intimacy with your target audience to understand the culture, motivations, thinking, challenges and goals etc. Then you need to build trust and confidence before applying the effects required to change minds or affect outcomes. Or if you are looking to influence outcomes you need to have solid situational awareness and the ability to apply hard and soft power at the appropriate time and place to alter the course of events. You need to be there.
An Army forward deployment in the country is exactly that “in the country” for extended periods. In the case of “constabulary tasks” overseas, the Army might not be directly involved in the constabulary activity themselves but they are likely involved in training, capacity building, logistics support, ISR and the like—activities which build trust and confidence.
Army personnel sandbagging a river or rescuing stranded civilians during a flood shapes public opinion in a way that a navy ship offshore cannot.
The Navy (with some exceptions) are at sea, and while exchanges do happen navy personnel have much less of an opportunity to interact with local populations/forces over a long period. Of course, during port visits, no doubt they interact quite closely with the bars and local wildlife but much like where you reference that “planes can fly away”, ships can sail away. That is not to say they can’t have a sustained presence and influence on events if we look at the multi-national operation in the Gulf of Aden or various deployments in the Middle East, they are a sustained presence. But would the citizens of say Iraq (for example) even know those ships are there?
Now, I am not anti-navy. I very much agree that we should expand and modernise the fleet, and I am not saying Navy port visits or presence doesn’t have influence, absolutely they do. An aircraft carrier as an example is of 100,000 tonnes of diplomacy and influence. And the Navy does have a heavy load.
I probably overstated when I used the term “token diplomacy”, there is nothing token about port visits. The hugely valuable and far-reaching forms of military diplomacy, however, they alone cannot win the hearts and minds. At home or abroad.
But if we are serious about restructuring the ADF for the future it requires serious investment, gutting one service to prop up another will only lead to problems down the track when circumstances change.
I'm not arguing against a Joint Force. The fact I, as an Army officer, argue for the RAN should indicate it's a very good idea that has inculcated itself within the ADF. But a joint force demands an honest assessment and understanding of roles, including areas one's own service doesn't do well at.
Completely agree that the RAN needs investment. However, if you are always preparing for the conflict you are in. You’ll never be ready for the next one, ships won't do much good inland. Appreciate that developing the RAN is a good idea and priority need, agree 100% but to suggest the army isn't good at influence, engagement, nation building operations, capacity building etc I think is overstatement, I am sure you'd agree the Australian Army did some fine work in Afghanistan/Iraq. Each service has its purpose and needs ongoing improvements to meet the very real and unpredictable threats over the next few decades, to let one service degrade is dangerous.
There is a mix of concepts here, but some are correct and some not.
This is a discussion, and exchange of ideas. Not sure there is a black-and-white right and wrong, it is subjective. Depends on your opinion, and point of view. If the current / trendy view on things of in-service personnel/government of day or consultants was always right, we wouldn’t be facing some of the serious challenges we do. The fact is we a navigating a multi-polar world filled with a multitude of converging traditional and emerging threats enabled by new cutting edge (and potentially game changing) technologies, this somewhat uncharted territory. Flexibility in capability and thinking is required.
One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, as they say.
Generally speaking, in times of peace, Land and Air forces (the latter especially) are not seen by the wider population, much. Their area of influence is much smaller.
The wider population is not at sea. Sailors may interact while they are in port but after a few days they leave. We live in the era of a 24-hour news cycle, a ship visit might make the nightly news but it will soon be forgotten once the next social media fad comes along. Army/Airforce or Navy for that matter that can progressively engage a community over a period of time will have a greater long term impact.