Some thoughts:
From the pattern of the Israeli attacks emerge some considerations:
a) The first strikes which hit targets of high importance to the status of Hamas and the objectives of Israel in the densly populated areas where carried out almost exclusively by the IAF. This is traditionally the branch of all armed forces which is usually best equipped to deliver precision strikes, and this is also true for the IAF.
b) There were certainly efforts via telephone and flyers to give some inhabitants early warnings of deliberate attacks. We can not know if this procedure was always followed after the first unwarned strikes but surly the efforts (and possibilities to do so) were considerably greater than in other recent MOUT operations.
c) The choice of Hamas to use the urban clutter (structures, civilians) to hide themselves, their weapons and their launch platforms forced Isreal to attack there if they wanted to reduce the rocket attacks.
d) The ground push was clearly supported with a great deal of firepower (artillery, mortars, CAS) with especially the direct firesupport by tanks playing a major role. It seems that the ROE were markedly lower where troops were directly engaged by Hamas. Although tanks are seen as the symbols of unbridled force they can actually deliver often far more accurate fire support than the artillery with dumb rounds, as they are much closer to the target. With the right rounds a precise effect can be achieved. Actually the friendly-fire incidents show the willingness to give very close firesupport very rapidly, sometimes with tragic consequences. But in the end this may keep the overall friendly casualities down. The heavy use of tank fire should also have lowered the numbers of wounded and killed civilians as it replaced sometimes heavy artillery fire.
From the pattern of the Israeli attacks emerge some considerations:
a) The first strikes which hit targets of high importance to the status of Hamas and the objectives of Israel in the densly populated areas where carried out almost exclusively by the IAF. This is traditionally the branch of all armed forces which is usually best equipped to deliver precision strikes, and this is also true for the IAF.
b) There were certainly efforts via telephone and flyers to give some inhabitants early warnings of deliberate attacks. We can not know if this procedure was always followed after the first unwarned strikes but surly the efforts (and possibilities to do so) were considerably greater than in other recent MOUT operations.
c) The choice of Hamas to use the urban clutter (structures, civilians) to hide themselves, their weapons and their launch platforms forced Isreal to attack there if they wanted to reduce the rocket attacks.
d) The ground push was clearly supported with a great deal of firepower (artillery, mortars, CAS) with especially the direct firesupport by tanks playing a major role. It seems that the ROE were markedly lower where troops were directly engaged by Hamas. Although tanks are seen as the symbols of unbridled force they can actually deliver often far more accurate fire support than the artillery with dumb rounds, as they are much closer to the target. With the right rounds a precise effect can be achieved. Actually the friendly-fire incidents show the willingness to give very close firesupport very rapidly, sometimes with tragic consequences. But in the end this may keep the overall friendly casualities down. The heavy use of tank fire should also have lowered the numbers of wounded and killed civilians as it replaced sometimes heavy artillery fire.