An excellent short thread on X amplifying the strategic significance of Pokrovsk for Ukraine:
x.com
For those without an X account (I tried the unroll thing, but it only provides chunks of the posts, so not very useful), here are the briefs:
- Pokrovsk produces most of the coking coal in Ukraine crucial in steel production (separate note, completely unrelated but interesting - the UK shut down one of the big boys today that used coking coal, by the way - a historic event, really);
- currently, the main issue is a severe shortage of electricity expected in the winter and the rates are expected to rise by 20% for the metallurgy sector;
- the metallurgical plants are now operating at 65-75% capacity (the figure remains unchanged from 2023 to 2024);
- when Pokrovsk falls, the plan is to purchase coke from Poland and the US (West Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky - huge and much needed boost to the economy in those states);
- clear consequences are reduced production of steel and increase in manufacturing costs, which is a blow to the Ukrainian economy overall, but their MIC in particular.
Perhaps, this explains the reports of mines still operating in Pokrovsk and kind of late evacuation of the personnel and supporting staff, which is thousand of people?
Quoting myself for continuation and the info in the previous post. Now, four months after I made the post quoted above, Ukraine had finally shut down the coking coal mine near Pokrovsk, in Udachne. According to Deepstate, the Russian troops are now actually in Udachne (the leftmost town on the map; Pokrovsk is in the right top corner):
This is another good short article talking about the significance of the coking plant and provides some numbers and the effect of the closure on the Ukrainian steel production and economy:
The recent halt of operations at the Pokrovsk coking coal mine in Donetsk Oblast marks a critical juncture for Ukraine’s metallurgical industry and economy.
rochanconsulting.substack.com
From the same thread: the article also talks about the Ukrainian troop casualties on the frontline and beyond:
View attachment 51765
A couple of things here. One is, how much “earlier this year” are we talking about? And two, I would think it is safe to assume that the number of permanently departed Russians is likely significantly below 200,000 because the wounded to killed ratio is not at all convincing (almost as if two numbers were taken form two different estimates). But we also discussed that extensively previously with various citations, as well as simple discussion, etc.
A couple of excerpts from a recent Economist article:
View attachment 51804
Again quoting myself here for the purpose of information. Both posts are from September with 9 days difference between them. In the first, the claim is made that there are 2 wounded Russian soldiers for each one that was killed. As discussed previously, not very believable ratio, but the article mentions as “high as”, according to western intel or whatever it was. In the second, this ratio is more reasonable, for every soldier killed, there are 4.3 wounded, which is very close (likely nearly identical in reality) to the Ukrainian numbers, also cited.
The reason I bring it back is this info published about the North Korean troops, citing South Korean government:
Around 300 North Korean soldiers have been killed and 2,700 wounded so far in the fight against Ukraine, the South Korean government in Seoul said on Monday.
Zelenskyy offers prisoner exchange if Kim Jong Un helps with the return of Ukrainian prisoners from Russia.
www.politico.eu
They are suggesting that there are as many as 9 wounded for every one killed. Something is off somewhere, clearly. Or is it some tactics they use that are different from Russians and Ukrainians? Something else? This is especially suspicious due to the following (from the same article):
“The enemy does not surrender. They eliminate themselves according to the same scheme, a grenade near the head, and go. Those who remain on the battlefield are doused with flammable liquid and burned,” Bondar said in a post on Facebook on Sunday.
Someone is clearly off in their estimates.
@John Fedup, I haven’t cited any sources in my previous post (apologies), but this article also suggests that it is the South Korean intel that is questioning these captured fellas:
The two North Korean fighters captured by Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region on Saturday were taken to Kyiv for medical treatment. The soldiers speak neither English nor Russian, so Ukrainian special services are working with the South Korean spy agency to communicate with them.
The article also confirms what the Ukrainian soldier I cited previously said:
Meanwhile, Ukrainian soldiers fighting in Kursk describe North Koreans — previously dubbed “cannon fodder” that will “defect as soon as they get to fight” — as highly skilled, fearless and motivated infantry.
“They have been blowing themselves up when they see capture is in sight,” Lieutenant Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi, a spokesman of the Ukrainian army, told POLITICO on Monday.[…]
Ukrainian soldiers describe the North Korean soldiers as being very far from inexperienced cannon fodder.
“They are young, motivated, physically fit, brave, and good at using small arms. They are also disciplined. They have everything you need for a good infantryman,” Chepurnyi said.
Yuriy Bondar, a Ukrainian soldier with the 80th separate airborne assault brigade, said North Korean soldiers have extremely good physical training and have stable morale.[…]
Bondar also confirmed that the North Koreans possess an extremely high level of mastery of small arms, successfully shooting down “a surprising number” of Ukrainian drones.
“They demonstrate psychological resilience. Imagine, one runs and attracts attention and the other from an ambush shoots down a drone with aimed fire,” Bondar said, claiming that underestimation of the enemy will always lead to a defeat.
“As one commander said, compared to the soldiers of the DPRK, Wagner mercenaries circa 2022 are just children. And I believe him,” Bondar said.
Ukraine keeps transferring specialists from various places to the infantry. The following thread talks about the most recent reports of the engineering and technical personnel from the UAF to be transferred to infantry. 5,000 are (were?) expected to be transferred. A no joke number, surely. In light of public outcry, Zelensky in his address said he ordered UAF commander not to transfer personnel to the infantry. A bunch of sources cited in this thread:
x.com
Russian Baza agency released a transcript from the black boxes of the downed Azeri flight, which were decoded and
returned to Kazakhstan earlier today:
«База» публикует полную расшифровку переговоров пилотов разбившегося самолёта AZAL с диспетчерами. Из неё следует, что все решения не садиться в Грозном, не лететь в Махачкалу, а затем следовать обратно в Баку — и в результате лететь в Актау — экипаж «Азербайджанских авиалиний» принимал самостоятель
baza.io
Whether the transcript is legit or not I do not know. If it is, it is pretty clear that the Russians did not make up the birds theory, as well as the oxygen tanks that may have exploded on board. It is also clear that the pilots were deliberating between Grozny, Minvody, and Makhachkala airports but chose to fly back to Baku and opted for Aktau in the end. It seems, when the missile hit, no one understood what really happened. The pilot reported that they were hit by a bird and that something (“two seats”) exploded. This is at 8:16:05 mark. Later, at 8:52:46 mark, the pilot explained that the oxygen tank exploded, he thinks, and there is not enough oxygen in the fuselage, passengers were passing out, so they needed to decent to a lower altitude (6,000 m should be fine he says), which they were permitted.
The GPS issue was first reported by pilots in the very beginning, on the approach, before the first landing attempt. Time mark is 7:36:57. Their GPS was not working at all. So there was no some extraordinary attempt to “jam the plane into a crash over the sea” or something sinister. Provided the transcript is legit, of course. They talked to Grozny dispatch, Rostov, and Aktau in the transcript provided.
Just a cluster-ef of a situation and someone somewhere “pushed the button”, the act that led to the catastrophic results.
On the subject, today a Russian officer was sentenced to three years in prison for shooting down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter during a supposedly Ukrainian air raid on Crimea on October 18, 2023.
Офицера посадили за вертолет, сбитый вместо дрона над Крымом
www.kommersant.ru
I wonder if anything will happen here with the Azeri flight. I do not believe anyone was charged with anything yet, not that I have seen.
Both of the last two links cited are in Russian, so you will have to use some kind of translate.