RN/USN Force Protection

[Aussie Digger]

I claim virtually no knowledge of this role at ALL, however would the P-3C's not have a considerable role to play in this matter?

Obviously there's little they can do by themselves (Australia won't even arm them with a standoff weapon, let alone anything suitable for this type of work) but their surveillance capacity should be useful...

I think you are right though, a medium vessel with less offensive firepower, but better helo, troop and "fast attack craft" (for want of a better term) capacity would seem to be more useful, with a couple of frigates to back up for any "higher level threat" sceanrio's.

An LCS type craft with a rapid fire "accurised" medium gun (say 57mm), a basic swlfe defence capability (RAM-16 or similar) and multiple "light cannons (25mm or 30mm) plus greater helo capacity and an ability to act as a "mothership" for a "hardened" CB-90H type craft would seem to be exactly what's needed for this "assymetric" role...

 

[Galrahn]

Sorry about being selective in some of your quotes, but I think the issue here is draft of the vessel involved.

I agree that it is one of the factors, it was a point I highlighted early in the other thread about the hostages.

However I am not so certain it would have made a difference. I am almost certain the USCG ships were in the area, but they lack the speed to catch small military spec boats. I have also considered whether the LCS, with its 40+ knot top speed, would have made a difference. Is there really any evidence that the LCS would have conducted the boarding instead of the RHIBs, or that it would have moved from its patrol zone around the oil terminals during that boarding action?

I don't see any evidence in the CONOP discussed thus far regarding the LCS, some hint that it would have deviated from the same activities that the HMS Cornwall was doing. In fact, the CONOP has been implicitly discussed as providing station support while conducting multiple boarding operations by multiple boarding teams. Assuming the same scenario occurred against the US, would the LCS utilized its speed and shallow draught to chase the Iranians into Iranian territory?

I don't know, but I do know the LCS isn't armed very well for the role of penetrating an armed enemy littoral, and with its intended single helicopter and unarmed unmanned systems, the LCS doesn't provide much in force protection outside its main weapon and maybe one day NETFIRES.

At the end of the day, the LCS is still a 3000 ton ship, and as its reach is designed to be off board systems, it is unlikely and actually against stated CONOP to suggest it would be anywhere other than the same area that the HMS Cornwall was. It is something the US Navy, and specifically the LCS planners, should consider.

A Wasp class would have significantly more to offer than a frigate or destroyer to MSO operations though, for one you have 6 armed AH-1s and 3 armed UH-1s in its Marine Corp configuration, but you also have the potential of carrying well over 50 H-60s for Naval operations if you wanted. A Wasp could also independently deploy a large number of smaller, heavier armed shallow draft boats as escorts for RHIBs carrying boarding parties.

However the Wasp is enormous, and it is also a very expensive solution. I would consider the Wasp overkill, not to mention unaffordable to most nations, in regards to a force protection solution for MSO operations.

 

[Todjaeger]

However I am not so certain it would have made a difference. I am almost certain the USCG ships were in the area, but they lack the speed to catch small military spec boats. I have also considered whether the LCS, with its 40+ knot top speed, would have made a difference. Is there really any evidence that the LCS would have conducted the boarding instead of the RHIBs, or that it would have moved from its patrol zone around the oil terminals during that boarding action?

I don't see any evidence in the CONOP discussed thus far regarding the LCS, some hint that it would have deviated from the same activities that the HMS Cornwall was doing. In fact, the CONOP has been implicitly discussed as providing station support while conducting multiple boarding operations by multiple boarding teams. Assuming the same scenario occurred against the US, would the LCS utilized its speed and shallow draught to chase the Iranians into Iranian territory?

I don't know, but I do know the LCS isn't armed very well for the role of penetrating an armed enemy littoral, and with its intended single helicopter and unarmed unmanned systems, the LCS doesn't provide much in force protection outside its main weapon and maybe one day NETFIRES.

At the end of the day, the LCS is still a 3000 ton ship, and as its reach is designed to be off board systems, it is unlikely and actually against stated CONOP to suggest it would be anywhere other than the same area that the HMS Cornwall was. It is something the US Navy, and specifically the LCS planners, should consider.

A Wasp class would have significantly more to offer than a frigate or destroyer to MSO operations though, for one you have 6 armed AH-1s and 3 armed UH-1s in its Marine Corp configuration, but you also have the potential of carrying well over 50 H-60s for Naval operations if you wanted. A Wasp could also independently deploy a large number of smaller, heavier armed shallow draft boats as escorts for RHIBs carrying boarding parties.

However the Wasp is enormous, and it is also a very expensive solution. I would consider the Wasp overkill, not to mention unaffordable to most nations, in regards to a force protection solution for MSO operations.

I have a few thoughts regarding the situation in the Persian Gulf, as well as a few questions.

Questions first.
In a 24hr period, how many boardings & vessel searchs are conducted, and how long do the searches take on average? Also, where do most searchs get conducted? Lastly, how many different boarding teams/parties operate and do any operate simultaneously?

From what I understand in discussions on this thread and in another thread, to have a helicopter available 24hr a total of four helicopters need to be operating, to allow for maintenance, repair, etc, but this is only a generalization.

Making a few assumptions, I don't think there is a good way of providing a helicopter for air cover for each boarding party while they are deployed. I'm not sure that there are enough helicopters that would be able to operate in the area, given the requirements for maintenance, down time, etc. I do think helicopters are important, but I'm not sure that exclusivly, they are a viable solution to prevent seizure of future search parties.

I also don't think an LCS (if one was available) would be the solution, particularly if there are a number of boardings/searchs conducted each day. As it's been said, the LCS is a 3,000 ton, 127m vessel, even with a shallow draught compared to a frigate, that is an awfully big vessel to send out to search a transport of fishing vessel, particularly if it gets dispatched five or ten times a day.

Possibly solutions.
The Australian company Austal has designed a trimaran-hulled Multi-Role Corvette, that might be something to escort search parties.
http://www.austal.com/go/product-information/defence-products/multi-role-corvette
Able to support one helicopter, with good speed and presumably shallow draught, they should cost less to operate than the frigates protecting the petroleum terminals, and be able to keep closer to any RHIBs sent out for searches.
OR
Design/purchase a number FACs, something in the 20-40m range, with a 20-40mm gun, a few 0.50 cal. HMG, and perhaps a few missles like Hellfire-M or Penguin AShM. The FACs might be able to do a boarding on it's own, or might send out a RHIB, but would be close by in the event that Iranian FACs get sent out or try to seize a boarding party.

Something else to consider, it to conduct a review of USN equipment and ROE used in Vietnam, when it did boardings and searches of vessels around South Vietnam or in the Mekong Delta. In many instances, the PCFs were armed with a few MG and HMG, and usually a 40mm automatic grenade launcher. For a FAC, I would be looking at something a little larger (to operate in the Gulf itself) and with a little bit more fire power. Basically large & well-armed enough to guarantee the destruction or heavy damage of one or more hostile FACs, before they could be damaged.

I'm interested in what people think about these ideas.

-Cheers

 

[Tasman]

I claim virtually no knowledge of this role at ALL, however would the P-3C's not have a considerable role to play in this matter?

Obviously there's little they can do by themselves (Australia won't even arm them with a standoff weapon, let alone anything suitable for this type of work) but their surveillance capacity should be useful...

I think you are right though, a medium vessel with less offensive firepower, but better helo, troop and "fast attack craft" (for want of a better term) capacity would seem to be more useful, with a couple of frigates to back up for any "higher level threat" sceanrio's.

An LCS type craft with a rapid fire "accurised" medium gun (say 57mm), a basic swlfe defence capability (RAM-16 or similar) and multiple "light cannons (25mm or 30mm) plus greater helo capacity and an ability to act as a "mothership" for a "hardened" CB-90H type craft would seem to be exactly what's needed for this "assymetric" role...

I think the P3C could certainly provide effective surveillance and armed with effective AShMs, for use against small high speed craft, they could also intervene by intercepting an attacking force. However, I would see their main role as co-ordinating and directing helos or friendly high speed craft.

I like your LCS concept AD.

I agree that it is one of the factors, it was a point I highlighted early in the other thread about the hostages.

However I am not so certain it would have made a difference. I am almost certain the USCG ships were in the area, but they lack the speed to catch small military spec boats. I have also considered whether the LCS, with its 40+ knot top speed, would have made a difference. Is there really any evidence that the LCS would have conducted the boarding instead of the RHIBs, or that it would have moved from its patrol zone around the oil terminals during that boarding action?

I don't see any evidence in the CONOP discussed thus far regarding the LCS, some hint that it would have deviated from the same activities that the HMS Cornwall was doing. In fact, the CONOP has been implicitly discussed as providing station support while conducting multiple boarding operations by multiple boarding teams. Assuming the same scenario occurred against the US, would the LCS utilized its speed and shallow draught to chase the Iranians into Iranian territory?

I don't know, but I do know the LCS isn't armed very well for the role of penetrating an armed enemy littoral, and with its intended single helicopter and unarmed unmanned systems, the LCS doesn't provide much in force protection outside its main weapon and maybe one day NETFIRES.

At the end of the day, the LCS is still a 3000 ton ship, and as its reach is designed to be off board systems, it is unlikely and actually against stated CONOP to suggest it would be anywhere other than the same area that the HMS Cornwall was. It is something the US Navy, and specifically the LCS planners, should consider.

A Wasp class would have significantly more to offer than a frigate or destroyer to MSO operations though, for one you have 6 armed AH-1s and 3 armed UH-1s in its Marine Corp configuration, but you also have the potential of carrying well over 50 H-60s for Naval operations if you wanted. A Wasp could also independently deploy a large number of smaller, heavier armed shallow draft boats as escorts for RHIBs carrying boarding parties.

However the Wasp is enormous, and it is also a very expensive solution. I would consider the Wasp overkill, not to mention unaffordable to most nations, in regards to a force protection solution for MSO operations.

With its shallow draft I think the LCS should be able to accompany boarding craft and stand reasonably close to the vessel being searched. I agree however that the present design seems very lightly armed for a 3000 ton vessel. The 57mm gun, however, would have been sufficient to deter the Iranian high speed craft. A bigger concern is that only one helo is planned. I am surprised that 2 helos have not been required for a vessel of 3000 tons, designed for these sorts of operations. I know that it is also planned to embark UAVs but a second helo would greatly increase their capability IMO.

I agree that a Wasp class appears to be overkill but it could deploy with a reduced aviation and marine complement for this type of mission. It's a pity the USN doesn't have something like the old Iwo Jima class, a much simpler helicopter carrier/amphibious ship. The trouble with building a fleet of large amphibious ships that can 'do everything' like the Wasps is that you end up with overkill situations when you really just need a ship able to carry a dozen helos, a detachment of marines and some decent boarding/patrol craft along the lines of one of the Swedish CB90 variants mentioned by AD. The new LHDs planned for Australia, with their smaller crews (compared with Wasp) but with a docking well, 16 helos. troop carrying and command facilities, would be useful in this type of role. Just a pity they haven't been ordered yet!

http://www.dockstavarvet.se/index2.php?content=products&subpage=combat_boat_cb_90_h

I have a few thoughts regarding the situation in the Persian Gulf, as well as a few questions.

Questions first.
In a 24hr period, how many boardings & vessel searchs are conducted, and how long do the searches take on average? Also, where do most searchs get conducted? Lastly, how many different boarding teams/parties operate and do any operate simultaneously?

From what I understand in discussions on this thread and in another thread, to have a helicopter available 24hr a total of four helicopters need to be operating, to allow for maintenance, repair, etc, but this is only a generalization.

Making a few assumptions, I don't think there is a good way of providing a helicopter for air cover for each boarding party while they are deployed. I'm not sure that there are enough helicopters that would be able to operate in the area, given the requirements for maintenance, down time, etc. I do think helicopters are important, but I'm not sure that exclusivly, they are a viable solution to prevent seizure of future search parties.

I also don't think an LCS (if one was available) would be the solution, particularly if there are a number of boardings/searchs conducted each day. As it's been said, the LCS is a 3,000 ton, 127m vessel, even with a shallow draught compared to a frigate, that is an awfully big vessel to send out to search a transport of fishing vessel, particularly if it gets dispatched five or ten times a day.

Possibly solutions.
The Australian company Austal has designed a trimaran-hulled Multi-Role Corvette, that might be something to escort search parties.
http://www.austal.com/go/product-information/defence-products/multi-role-corvette
Able to support one helicopter, with good speed and presumably shallow draught, they should cost less to operate than the frigates protecting the petroleum terminals, and be able to keep closer to any RHIBs sent out for searches.
OR
Design/purchase a number FACs, something in the 20-40m range, with a 20-40mm gun, a few 0.50 cal. HMG, and perhaps a few missles like Hellfire-M or Penguin AShM. The FACs might be able to do a boarding on it's own, or might send out a RHIB, but would be close by in the event that Iranian FACs get sent out or try to seize a boarding party.

Something else to consider, it to conduct a review of USN equipment and ROE used in Vietnam, when it did boardings and searches of vessels around South Vietnam or in the Mekong Delta. In many instances, the PCFs were armed with a few MG and HMG, and usually a 40mm automatic grenade launcher. For a FAC, I would be looking at something a little larger (to operate in the Gulf itself) and with a little bit more fire power. Basically large & well-armed enough to guarantee the destruction or heavy damage of one or more hostile FACs, before they could be damaged.

I'm interested in what people think about these ideas.

-Cheers

I can't find the answers to your questions Tod - maybe someone else will! In the meantime I'll keep trying to find out.

A few comments though:

I think it is possible to provide reasonable helo cover by attaching a helicopter carrier as discussed above - Wasp, Ocean, etc. Additional P3Cs to oversee and co-ordinate operations would also help here.

I think the Austal design, the addition of FACs to the force and a study of Riverine warfare in Vietnam are all worth following up. I think the CB90 design provides the basis for vessels with characteristics not unlike some of the high speed craft deployed in Vietnam. It could also be worth looking at a development of one of the INCAT concept designs for 98m and 112m helo carrying vessels and no doubt Austal could also come up with a suitable design.

http://www.incat.com.au/defence.cgi?task=MDC

Cheers

 

[Todjaeger]

I don't know if you recall or not, but wasn't the biggest complaint of the Super Seasprite the number of maintenance hours per flight hour? Something like 30+ hours maintenance for each flight hour if I recall.

So Australia uses its older Seahawks instead, and while I'm not sure of the total, I am pretty sure the number of maintenance hours per flight hour is still pretty high. Well, in reality the same is true for the Royal Navy and US Navy as well.

Lets pretend, and I am very serious about the word pretend, for a moment that all 4 helicopters available to TF 58 only have 3 maintenance hours per flight hour (this is so unrealistic I cringe to make the point). Well, if each helicopter did 6 flight hours per day, the remaining 18 hours in each day would be used for maintenance under that ideal scenario. However, that is the ideal scenario required for 24/7 helicopter coverage operations for TF 58 with its organic helicopter units.

Now you can see why I am almost certain there were no other helicopters available at that time, armed or otherwise, to respond to the crisis in a timely manner. To point out an unspoken truth of the whole crisis, that there was a single helicopter up really says a lot about the quality of the sailors keeping those oil terminals safe.

As I understand it, the acceptance problem with the RAN Seasprites has to do with meeting the requirements for the US FAA FAR Part 29, since there is a two-man crew, a pilot and a weapons/system operator. Currently there isn't a backup digital FCS, therefore no acceptance, etc, etc. There could be a maintenance issue with the SH-2G(A) as well, since they are re-built
SH-2F airframes that are something like three decades old.

The helicopter that comes to mind with that type of maintenance per flight hour schedule is the Canadian Maritime Command CH-124 Sea King, that is reportedly around the ratio of 30:1 maintenance to flight hours.

For the pros out there, what would a reasonable/average maintenance to flight ratio be? 5:1, 10:1, 15:1?

Given the information available, I would assume it would take a boarding part on average, an hour to be sent out, search a vessel, and then return to the mothership. Assuming that the boardings don't all happen simultaneously, and that there is an average of ten hours maintenance per flight hour, I see the numbers working out below. Ten boardings per day, each escorted by a helicopter, would require a minimum of 5 helicopters available to the force. Now if my assumptions are off, either requiring more maintenance per flight, more time per boarding, or more boardings per day, that would effect the numbers. And ultimately the number of required helicopters in the Task Force, would determine whether it's a workable solution or if another course should be pursued.

I'm not sure about the need for a P-3 Orion specifically. Something like the CASA CN-235-300M MPA might be a better option. Basically I would think the desire would be for an airborne asset that can detect, track and relay positions of surface targets. The anti-ship capability of the Orion, nevermind the ASW aspect, I suspect would be better handled by assets closer to the surface, given the apparent amount of traffic in that area. A maritime surveillance UAV might even be considered.

My personal preference though would be for solutions that could then be given/sold to the Iraqi government once they are in a position to take over operations.

-Cheers

 

[B.Smitty]

I'm not sure about the need for a P-3 Orion specifically. Something like the CASA CN-235-300M MPA might be a better option. Basically I would think the desire would be for an airborne asset that can detect, track and relay positions of surface targets. The anti-ship capability of the Orion, nevermind the ASW aspect, I suspect would be better handled by assets closer to the surface, given the apparent amount of traffic in that area. A maritime surveillance UAV might even be considered.

At first glance a Reaper seems near ideal here - up to 14 Hellfires, 260kts max speed, 20+kft AGL, 14 hours in the air.

The problem with UAVs is they have very little deterrence value.

Sure a Reaper could've taken apart the Iranian boats, but you don't want it to go that far. The Iranians would not have even known the Reaper was up there.

OTOH, helo gunships arriving on scene, or a low, high-speed flyby by fighters might've defused the situation without a shot.

 

[Todjaeger]

At first glance a Reaper seems near ideal here - up to 14 Hellfires, 260kts max speed, 20+kft AGL, 14 hours in the air.

The problem with UAVs is they have very little deterrence value.

Sure a Reaper could've taken apart the Iranian boats, but you don't want it to go that far. The Iranians would not have even known the Reaper was up there.

OTOH, helo gunships arriving on scene, or a low, high-speed flyby by fighters might've defused the situation without a shot.

The main idea for having an MPA or UAV airborne would be for situational awareness. If the TF knows where any potential hostiles are, and if/when the cross into Iraqi waters, it would give the units more time to respond. For a deterence, I think FAC would be the route to go. Something large enough so that Iran would have to send out a naval vessel capable of ship engagements to really threaten it. A vessel of that size would then likely be engaged by one of the TF's patrolling FFG or DDGs. Of course, a few gun and missle armed helicopters wouldn't go amiss either, or would a UAV that can attack, in addition to conducting surveillance.

-Cheers

 

[Big-E]

I'll tell you why I like the LCS concept so lets put them in Cornwall's position of that day. The LCS is 12 miles out with heavier gunned ships backing the FACS taking your boarding party, what do you do? You don't want to physically take the ship into gun range of DDs or heavier frigate guns. You don't want to launch helos that can be taken down by MANPADs or ship based systems covering the FACS. Observation can be taken by the UAV for targeting with no risk of life or limb. The LCS can use the NETFIRES NLOS-LS and take out the whole mess of FACS while still staying out of range of heavier guns. The NLOS-LS might not be great against frigates but they would blow the hell out of a FAC. I don't see how you lose.

 

[swerve]

I'll tell you why I like the LCS concept so lets put them in Cornwall's position of that day. The LCS is 12 miles out with heavier gunned ships backing the FACS taking your boarding party, what do you do? You don't want to physically take the ship into gun range of DDs or heavier frigate guns. You don't want to launch helos that can be taken down by MANPADs or ship based systems covering the FACS. Observation can be taken by the UAV for targeting with no risk of life or limb. The LCS can use the NETFIRES NLOS-LS and take out the whole mess of FACS while still staying out of range of heavier guns. The NLOS-LS might not be great against frigates but they would blow the hell out of a FAC. I don't see how you lose.

Only if it spots them coming, positively IDs them (not that easy - there's a lot of civilian shipping in those waters, including some in fast boats who could be mistaken for Iranian patrol boats - do you want to blow Iraqi smugglers out of the water?) & engages them in the time it takes them to cover the distance from Iranian waters to the boarding party. That's a pretty tall order. Very little time to do it. Earlier, & they're in Iranian waters & it's an unprovoked act of war. Once the first one reaches the boarding party, opening fire condemns 15 of your people to death.

Note that what you propose requires RoEs that allow opening fire without warning, on people who have not (at the point you open fire) done anything overtly aggressive (by the time they do, it's too late), from a country which you are not at war with. Straying across a water boundary could just be carelessness. Navigational errors aren't exactly unknown.

 

[Big-E]

The UAVs are covering your surveillance, they can be outfitted with megaphones issuing the warning. It is standard in the force protection modules they are adding to the unmanned harbor patrols. You just need someone to speak Farsi...

 

[swerve]

The UAVs are covering your surveillance, they can be outfitted with megaphones issuing the warning. It is standard in the force protection modules they are adding to the unmanned harbor patrols. You just need someone to speak Farsi...

And all in two-three minutes. Yep.

BTW, what's the accuracy against fast-moving boats, spread over a mile of sea, which will probably all change direction as soon as you issue your warning? Factor in the time to assess their changes of direction.

 

[Big-E]

And all in two-three minutes. Yep.

BTW, what's the accuracy against fast-moving boats, spread over a mile of sea, which will probably all change direction as soon as you issue your warning? Factor in the time to assess their changes of direction.

There are many forms of surveillance assets at the commanders disposal... it's not like they only have access to their UAVs. NLOS-LS is designed to hit fast moving land vehicles so FACS would be easy.

 

[swerve]

There are many forms of surveillance assets at the commanders disposal... it's not like they only have access to their UAVs. NLOS-LS is designed to hit fast moving land vehicles so FACS would be easy.

OK, not a problem, then - as long as it can hit the requisite number, over the requisite area, in the requisite (very short) time. But I still don't believe the decision cycle will allow it. We're not talking all-out war & effective "free fire" zones. The only reason the boarding parties are out there is to check civilian traffic. Y'know, I can't help remembering an A300, back in the 1980s. We don't want any similar incidents, do we? Or getting the locations slightly wrong & blowing up Iranian patrol boats - which haven't shot at anyone - on their side of the line.