After the capture and release of the British hostages what do you think we should do to prevent such an action from occuring again? Did US/UK forces not have an aircraft that could have provided CAS? Did the Cornwall detect the FACS too late to give orders to intercept? I really doubt the Revolutionary Guard would mess with a helo gunship in the area. Even having a Lynx with Sea Skuas would scare me. How far away was the Cornwall that she couldn't begin shelling? This had happened before and I can't understand why it was allowed to happen again.
RN/USN Force Protection
- Thread starter Big-E
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kinggodzilla87
New Member
MOD told them not to fire Thats What heard
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- #3
If this is the case then MoD intentionally gave 15 service members to the whim of the Revolutionary Guard. They must not have had assets in place to deter before the approach of the FACS otherwise they would have used them especially knowing it had happened before. Could they not see the FACS on radar? It's not like the Corwall couldn't fire warning shots when the FACS entered Iraqi waters.
Having adequate reconnaissance and then top cover from a helo now seems to be essential in these waters. Lynx with Sea Skua or a Seahawk armed with something like Hellfire which the RAN is apparently keen on, plus unguided rockets would be a deterrent providing ROE are also clear and enable the helo to engage any fast approaching craft that ignores requests to turn around. It seems from posts in the thread, UK sailors captured at gunpoint, that the helos on both HMS Cornwall and HMAS Toowoomba have only a door mounted MG at present.
Cheers
If that's the case then, IMO, heads should roll in MOD. As it is I suspect that Cornwall's CO will be made the scapegoat for what happened. I hope I'm wrong though.
Cheers
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- #6
The way I see it Cornwall's skipper should have used his assets to provide cover for his men. He has a Lynx and a 117mm naval gun that he could reach out and touch some one with. He didn't have to engage, I imagine his ROE would allow him to fire warning shots at the incoming FACS, especially in Iraqi waters. If I see 117mm shells falling around my boat I will haul tail in the other direction.
Galrahn's Post 41 in UK sailors captured at gunpoint, suggests that a helicopter did escort the RHIBs until it made contact with the ship but that it was given the all clear and then went on to do recon elsewhere. The other point he made was the difficulty of operating a ship like Cornwall in littoral waters. I guess we will have to wait for the inevitable inquiry to find out what decision making shortcomings, if any, were made by Cornwall's captain.
What does seem clear though is that cover must be maintained for sailors embarked in small craft like RHIBs, including top cover whilst a ship is being boarded.
Cheers
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
My understanding is that a Lynx was providing top cover during the approach and boarding. AFAIK, the RHIBs and RN & Marine personnel were captured after they disembarked from the searched vessel because the Lynx had been sent back to patrolling. What this incident suggests is that a sufficiently armed vessel or helicopter needs to accompany any boarding party, the whole time.
As for using the main gun of the HMS Cornwall, I'm not sure that was a viable option. How far away was the RHIB from the Cornwall, and how far away were the FACs from the RHIB when they were detected. From my understanding, there was a concern that using the 4.5" gun could pose a danger to the RN/Marine personnel.
-Cheers
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- #9
It would have to have been used while the FACS were crossing into Iraqi waters as warning shots. That was my suggestion as to it's use. If the Lynx didn't detect the FACS approach they have a serious problem. Totally unacceptable... The reports I read said Cornwall was 12 miles away from the Pacifics, that is an absurd range to be away from your boarding party. Captain Williams has some serious questions to answer the admiralty for his actions.
I'm pretty sure the Brits and all others will have a closer look at their ROEs now and adapt them accordingly.
However, IMO the only option to avoid such incidents is massive deterrence, as direct confrontation between western and iranian forces should be avoided at this point.
BigE's gunship helicopter sounds like a good idea to me. I'm just wondering if there are enough to cover all boarding operations?
In addition a few FACs should be kept ready to immidiately respond to approaching threats and scare the sh*** out of them.
However, IMO the only option to avoid such incidents is massive deterrence, as direct confrontation between western and iranian forces should be avoided at this point.
BigE's gunship helicopter sounds like a good idea to me. I'm just wondering if there are enough to cover all boarding operations?
In addition a few FACs should be kept ready to immidiately respond to approaching threats and scare the sh*** out of them.
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
These sailors should be conducting these sorts of operations from "decent" boats like CB-90's or some such, instead of lightly armed RHIB's. A decent "navalised" vessel to operate from would have forced Iran to play a MUCH deadly game and one that would have forced them to perform an "act of war" to actually seize these sailors, ie: fire upon the vessel".
This in turn would have allowed the British or whomever, to "return" the act of war, from their frigate "mothership" meaning that Iran would have to take this level of response into consideration.
As it was, they seized upon prey that had no realistic means to defend itself nor ANY ability to withstand incoming fire and as such, found themselves in a bad tactical situation and only able to do exactly what they did ie: nothing.
FYI HMAS Toowoomba actually has "mini-typhoon" stabilised and EO/IR guided 12.7mm guns, so it's somewhat better off, but 12 miles away IT wouldn't have been able to do anything besides fire 127mm rounds at the Iranians, something sure to upset them and invite a similar response at some point...
Actually the part thats really galling is that Commodore Lambert was in charge of CTF 158 which had 12 or so ships as part of its group in addition to the frigate. USS Howard (DDG 83), USS Chinook (PC 9), USS Whirlwind (PC 11), USCGC Maui (WPB 1307), USCGC Monomoy (WPH 1326), as well as the Australian HMAS Warramunga (FFG 152), were all part of that CTF, of these ships the Cyclone class patrol boats like the USS Chinook and the USCGC ships were DESIGNED for conducting boarding operations or doing maritime intercept operations. These ships would have been able to get in much closer to the freighter than 12 miles because of their shallower draft. On top of all that there were American air assets available apparently according to a couple of newspapers that were commenting on the issue.
My guess is that there was an ROE failure and Commodore Lambert did an ill advised action by not responding.
We have had enough of the politics regarding the incident on this forum, if possible I'd like to stick to the thread topic and focus on the Force Protection aspect, and other military related naval discussions.
In that regard, I got to thinking about operations in those waters. There are only hundreds if not thousands of daily life stories describing MSO operations around ABOT and KAAOT, and personally, I have taken the time to review all the military provided data surrounding those waters.
As was pointed out, there were a number of ships operating the area. The question raised is why the Royal Navy sailors and Marines were exposed. I think there are some pretty simple answers, and I think perhaps this is a good forum to showcase some of the possibilities and discuss them in proper context so that we can expand into the strategical question this thread addresses.
I pull this picture from a Briefing given by the Royal Navy regarding progress around the Iraqi Oil Terminals in March 2006. Notice a few things, namely the borders of Iraq with Iran and Kuwait, but also the water depths in that littoral.
If you look, the red line at the top running north of KAAOT is the Iranian/Iraqi border. Also shown on the bottom right of the map is the patrol zone that extends into International Waters under the UN mandate. That patrol zone is described in the Royal Navy briefing linked above as:
Now compare the above with the picture released by the MoD during the recent Hostage Crisis.
Based on the coordinates of KAAOT, and the coordinates provided by the British during the seizure, and the news report that the HMS Cornwall was in a position somewhere between KAAOT and ABOT, it looks like it was probably just to the south of KAAOT. It is a really good bet the USS Howard (DDG 83) and the HMAS Warramunga (FFG 152) were also very close to the terminals.
Considering the PCs and the USCG ships are instructed to search ships, from a tactical perspective it is probable those 4 ships would extend out into international waters, or patrol the 2 specific ports themselves.
Now we have to also apply our naval knowledge to this scenario.
Between the USS Howard (DDG 83), HMAS Warramunga (FFG 152), and HMS Cornwall (F 99) there are 4 helicopters. Anyone familiar with maintenance of helicopters during continuous operations, that leaves 1 helicopter used for operations, and 0 available for support, and that is assuming efficiency in the maintenance cycles. It is possible on some days you could have a second helicopter up and available, but it could not be counted on as a certainty, and the availability of all 4 is only considered by those with no understanding of how things work.
So basically you are left with 1 destroyer, 2 frigates, 2 US PCs, and 2 USCG ships with 4 helicopters combined patrolling an area that includes around 30-35 large new arrivals per day, 2 critical oil terminals, and hundreds of smaller boats throughout the area, including every Iraqi fishery vessel and a large number of Kuwaiti and Iranian fishery vessels. Even with fixed wing air support, the task is enormous.
Comments welcome. I'll share my thoughts later.
In that regard, I got to thinking about operations in those waters. There are only hundreds if not thousands of daily life stories describing MSO operations around ABOT and KAAOT, and personally, I have taken the time to review all the military provided data surrounding those waters.
As was pointed out, there were a number of ships operating the area. The question raised is why the Royal Navy sailors and Marines were exposed. I think there are some pretty simple answers, and I think perhaps this is a good forum to showcase some of the possibilities and discuss them in proper context so that we can expand into the strategical question this thread addresses.
I pull this picture from a Briefing given by the Royal Navy regarding progress around the Iraqi Oil Terminals in March 2006. Notice a few things, namely the borders of Iraq with Iran and Kuwait, but also the water depths in that littoral.
If you look, the red line at the top running north of KAAOT is the Iranian/Iraqi border. Also shown on the bottom right of the map is the patrol zone that extends into International Waters under the UN mandate. That patrol zone is described in the Royal Navy briefing linked above as:
In 2006, the port of Um Qasr averaged 8 ships per day, while the port of Az Zubayr averaged about 20 ships. I have been unable to find the average number of tankers entering each offshore oil terminal per day, but going off what is known about the terminals and output of Iraqi oil, the number would be somewhere around 6+ per day. This excludes large ships in the area with destinations to Kuwait or Iran, and doesn't even begin to count the fishery industry of Iran, Kuwait, or Iraq and the hundreds of boats that would include. Needless to say, when it comes to ships big and small, there is plenty of work for the handful of ships in TF58.
Now compare the above with the picture released by the MoD during the recent Hostage Crisis.
Based on the coordinates of KAAOT, and the coordinates provided by the British during the seizure, and the news report that the HMS Cornwall was in a position somewhere between KAAOT and ABOT, it looks like it was probably just to the south of KAAOT. It is a really good bet the USS Howard (DDG 83) and the HMAS Warramunga (FFG 152) were also very close to the terminals.
Considering the PCs and the USCG ships are instructed to search ships, from a tactical perspective it is probable those 4 ships would extend out into international waters, or patrol the 2 specific ports themselves.
Now we have to also apply our naval knowledge to this scenario.
Between the USS Howard (DDG 83), HMAS Warramunga (FFG 152), and HMS Cornwall (F 99) there are 4 helicopters. Anyone familiar with maintenance of helicopters during continuous operations, that leaves 1 helicopter used for operations, and 0 available for support, and that is assuming efficiency in the maintenance cycles. It is possible on some days you could have a second helicopter up and available, but it could not be counted on as a certainty, and the availability of all 4 is only considered by those with no understanding of how things work.
So basically you are left with 1 destroyer, 2 frigates, 2 US PCs, and 2 USCG ships with 4 helicopters combined patrolling an area that includes around 30-35 large new arrivals per day, 2 critical oil terminals, and hundreds of smaller boats throughout the area, including every Iraqi fishery vessel and a large number of Kuwaiti and Iranian fishery vessels. Even with fixed wing air support, the task is enormous.
Comments welcome. I'll share my thoughts later.
Need for more helicopters
Interesting post Galrahn. Given the info you have supplied about helicopter availability it seems that the 4 helicopters currently available to the task force are grossly inadequate if inspection and boarding operations are to be provided with constant air cover. This demonstrates the value of a frigate or destroyer being able to carry 2 helos. The addition of an amphibious ship such as HMS Ocean or a USN Wasp class vessel tasked with providing helo support would certainly be a handy reinforcement for the task force. Even a smaller unit like the Australian Manoora or Kanimbla, which are able to embark up to 4 naval Seahawk or army Blackhawk helos, would be useful. An amphibious vessel would also be able to assist the frigate and destroyer crews with boarding operations.
Cheers
BTW, HMAS Warramunga has been relieved by its sister ship Toowoomba but the helo capability (1 Seahawk with a door mounted GPMG) is the same.
Interesting post Galrahn. Given the info you have supplied about helicopter availability it seems that the 4 helicopters currently available to the task force are grossly inadequate if inspection and boarding operations are to be provided with constant air cover. This demonstrates the value of a frigate or destroyer being able to carry 2 helos. The addition of an amphibious ship such as HMS Ocean or a USN Wasp class vessel tasked with providing helo support would certainly be a handy reinforcement for the task force. Even a smaller unit like the Australian Manoora or Kanimbla, which are able to embark up to 4 naval Seahawk or army Blackhawk helos, would be useful. An amphibious vessel would also be able to assist the frigate and destroyer crews with boarding operations.
Cheers
BTW, HMAS Warramunga has been relieved by its sister ship Toowoomba but the helo capability (1 Seahawk with a door mounted GPMG) is the same.
I don't know if you recall or not, but wasn't the biggest complaint of the Super Seasprite the number of maintenance hours per flight hour? Something like 30+ hours maintenance for each flight hour if I recall.
So Australia uses its older Seahawks instead, and while I'm not sure of the total, I am pretty sure the number of maintenance hours per flight hour is still pretty high. Well, in reality the same is true for the Royal Navy and US Navy as well.
Lets pretend, and I am very serious about the word pretend, for a moment that all 4 helicopters available to TF 58 only have 3 maintenance hours per flight hour (this is so unrealistic I cringe to make the point). Well, if each helicopter did 6 flight hours per day, the remaining 18 hours in each day would be used for maintenance under that ideal scenario. However, that is the ideal scenario required for 24/7 helicopter coverage operations for TF 58 with its organic helicopter units.
Now you can see why I am almost certain there were no other helicopters available at that time, armed or otherwise, to respond to the crisis in a timely manner. To point out an unspoken truth of the whole crisis, that there was a single helicopter up really says a lot about the quality of the sailors keeping those oil terminals safe.
Which is what leads me to a discussion I have been having with a number of people I consider naval experts, mostly by email, since the crisis began. Is the frigate, and specifically the Type 22, the best ship for MSO? What about from the USN perspective, we are building 55 LCS for this role, and while the electronics of the LCS are far superior to the older HMS Cornwall and its older Type 968 surface search radar, the question remains, is the LCS really the best platform for MSO? or the ANZAC, What about a Type 23 or DDG-51, particularly given no matter which combatant you choose you are still very limited in helicopter coverage?
I for one, do not think so. Cruisers, Destroyers, and Frigates are ships built to fight wars, but when it comes to peacetime missions, or irregular warfare, including MSO operations, I think conventional ships like Cruisers, Destroyers, and Frigates leave a considerable amount of capability to be desired, and while it was the Royal Navy burned in this instance, despite the noise of American sailors, there really isn't much that wouldn't prevent such an encounter from happening to them, leaving them the choice to shoot or not.
Given some of the other data reported, the British were taken prisoner 1.7 nautical miles within Iraqi territory. If that is true, it would have taken less than 4 minutes to move from the border to that position in a fast attack boat at 26 knots, or considerably less time in faster boats. In other words, if the attack was undetected, it could have taken less than 10 minutes to cross the border, take hostages, and retreat back across the border.
That doesn't leave much time for action for a frigate 8-10 nautical miles away when a threat is first detected and reacted upon, or if a helicopter is not already in the air in that area. When thinking about Force Protection issues, a suitable force protection response package would have to be persistent to be effective, thus raising the question of whether a frigate is persistent enough of a platform to provide force protection to multiple MSO operations happening over an important area like the ABOT and KAAOT oil terminals, without question the most economically important pieces of property Iraq owns.
When it is all said and done, I think Iran exploited a serious flaw in the planning cycle of nations thinking they can maintain MSO operations with conventional warships. Iran isn't unique, modern pirates have been doing this consistently for a long time. I think if true Force Protection is going to be an objective of Navies for MSO operations, if Navies are serious about the irregular warfare mission at sea, then they are going to need to start thinking about best ways (and what equipment is required) to conduct distributed manned operations at sea, something to parallel all the planning modern navies are doing for distributed unmanned operations at sea.
As I look around, I don't see a single Navy actually doing that, instead most if not all have chosen conventional platforms to handle the manned operational role of such distributed operations, and as such I believe vulnerability will continue to exist, and be exploited.
Galrahn, I only mentioned those 6 ships because those were the only notables I was able to find as of January from that particular task group, as of march however it was mentioned that there were at least 12 ships in CTF 158 from the UK, US, Australia and Iraqi Navies. My guess is that there were probably some more patrol craft involved rather than any helo carrying warships. But realistically if you're looking at boarding ops a helo isn't always involved, a cutter or a patrol craft like the Cyclones usually come pretty close to the ship being boarded and provide overwatch. With 12 units covering 8 ships a day that can be done. The helos should be providing extra cover in addition to whatever is providing overwatch.We have had enough of the politics regarding the incident on this forum, if possible I'd like to stick to the thread topic and focus on the Force Protection aspect, and other military related naval discussions.
In that regard, I got to thinking about operations in those waters. There are only hundreds if not thousands of daily life stories describing MSO operations around ABOT and KAAOT, and personally, I have taken the time to review all the military provided data surrounding those waters.
As was pointed out, there were a number of ships operating the area. The question raised is why the Royal Navy sailors and Marines were exposed. I think there are some pretty simple answers, and I think perhaps this is a good forum to showcase some of the possibilities and discuss them in proper context so that we can expand into the strategical question this thread addresses.
I pull this picture from a Briefing given by the Royal Navy regarding progress around the Iraqi Oil Terminals in March 2006. Notice a few things, namely the borders of Iraq with Iran and Kuwait, but also the water depths in that littoral.
If you look, the red line at the top running north of KAAOT is the Iranian/Iraqi border. Also shown on the bottom right of the map is the patrol zone that extends into International Waters under the UN mandate. That patrol zone is described in the Royal Navy briefing linked above as:
In 2006, the port of Um Qasr averaged 8 ships per day, while the port of Az Zubayr averaged about 20 ships. I have been unable to find the average number of tankers entering each offshore oil terminal per day, but going off what is known about the terminals and output of Iraqi oil, the number would be somewhere around 6+ per day. This excludes large ships in the area with destinations to Kuwait or Iran, and doesn't even begin to count the fishery industry of Iran, Kuwait, or Iraq and the hundreds of boats that would include. Needless to say, when it comes to ships big and small, there is plenty of work for the handful of ships in TF58.
Now compare the above with the picture released by the MoD during the recent Hostage Crisis.
Based on the coordinates of KAAOT, and the coordinates provided by the British during the seizure, and the news report that the HMS Cornwall was in a position somewhere between KAAOT and ABOT, it looks like it was probably just to the south of KAAOT. It is a really good bet the USS Howard (DDG 83) and the HMAS Warramunga (FFG 152) were also very close to the terminals.
Considering the PCs and the USCG ships are instructed to search ships, from a tactical perspective it is probable those 4 ships would extend out into international waters, or patrol the 2 specific ports themselves.
Now we have to also apply our naval knowledge to this scenario.
Between the USS Howard (DDG 83), HMAS Warramunga (FFG 152), and HMS Cornwall (F 99) there are 4 helicopters. Anyone familiar with maintenance of helicopters during continuous operations, that leaves 1 helicopter used for operations, and 0 available for support, and that is assuming efficiency in the maintenance cycles. It is possible on some days you could have a second helicopter up and available, but it could not be counted on as a certainty, and the availability of all 4 is only considered by those with no understanding of how things work.
So basically you are left with 1 destroyer, 2 frigates, 2 US PCs, and 2 USCG ships with 4 helicopters combined patrolling an area that includes around 30-35 large new arrivals per day, 2 critical oil terminals, and hundreds of smaller boats throughout the area, including every Iraqi fishery vessel and a large number of Kuwaiti and Iranian fishery vessels. Even with fixed wing air support, the task is enormous.
Comments welcome. I'll share my thoughts later.
Sorry about being selective in some of your quotes, but I think the issue here is draft of the vessel involved. The Cornwall has a draft when loaded of around 22ft, a Wasp class has a draft around 27ft (it wouldn't have been able to get any closer than Cornwall was and would have been more restricted in that particular area), the Coast Guard cutters on average have a draft somewhere around 7ft and the LCS is figured to have a draft of about 10ft. Those particular numbers make all the difference in the world when operating closer in to the littorals.
Hopefully Francis will respond, he most likely know exactly which ships were there.
But I wouldn't expect much more than what you listed, if they counted the Iraqi's then they are probably counting Ocean 6 as well, which means now your list is missing only 1 ship, which is probably another PC or USCG cutter.
Either way, remember where the Iraqi deep water channels are, and where the incident occurred. The first map provided doesn't even follow the channel north to the ports, so there is considerably more space than what you see there. A lot of area to cover for a dozen ships, particularly when the major warships are usually close to the terminals.
But I wouldn't expect much more than what you listed, if they counted the Iraqi's then they are probably counting Ocean 6 as well, which means now your list is missing only 1 ship, which is probably another PC or USCG cutter.
Either way, remember where the Iraqi deep water channels are, and where the incident occurred. The first map provided doesn't even follow the channel north to the ports, so there is considerably more space than what you see there. A lot of area to cover for a dozen ships, particularly when the major warships are usually close to the terminals.
This is why I feel that an amphibious vessel ought to be added to the task force. Obviously its draught would confine it to deeper waters but it would provide a mobile helicopter base able to deploy helicopter gunships to back up other forces, cross decking them from other ships if necessary. A ship of this type could double as the task force command ship.
I agree with your earlier post about the unsuitability of our frigates and destroyers for littoral operations but I guess we are forced to fight with what we actually have available, not what we would like to have. There is a clear message here for future force planning. A high speed shallow draft ship armed with a medium gun, capacity for 4-6 helos and and embarking a detachment of marines together with boarding craft that are more substantial and better armed than the present RHIBs, might be worth considering.
Cheers
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