With the range given on the Wedgetail at what altitude is that? The lower the target flyes the lower the detection radius is due to the radar horizon. Although the lower the altiutde of launch the lower the missile range too. But if the equasions added up ( like below the radar horizon but within NEZ or range of the missile) then the lauch platform would not be detected. However if the equasion did not add up (below the radar horizon was beyond the range of the missile) then the launch platform could make a high speed and high altitude pass into the lauch reange, fire and bug out. It wouldn't really matter if it was detected. Also this tactic would not be used on its own, it would not inted to use a sneaky shot to down the Wedgetail. Its best use would be just as your fighters are about to angage the enemy. The R172's would probably not down the wedgetail, although they might, but they would force it to shut down, and the RAAF would then loose its AWE&C right as battle commenced. It may be up and running in a few minnets if it got a soft kill on the missiles but if you have a few platforms hurling R172's they would practically negate your AWE&C capability because it would not be observing and directing the battle but dodgeing missiles.
The publicly declared nominal operational altitude is listed as 9,144 - 12,497 m, which I presume would be fairly close to accurate, since Wedgetail is a modified 737-700. I also would assume the declared range is from the operating altitude. Given the tendency to under-report the performance of mil systems, I wouldn't be surprised if the L-band MESA range at altitude was actually greater by 25% or more. The listed range for the IFF system is 555 km or 345 miles, while radar range is listed as 200 n miles/370 km. The point I was making about the effectiveness of the tactic with the R-172 had little to do with what the max R-172 launch range was though. Unless the launch aircraft closed with the Wedgetail (within 100 miles/160km) there would be time for an escorting aircraft to intercept the missile. Or as mentioned, the MESA could conduct an electronic attack upon the missile itself with the T/R modules. As for aircraft entering within 160 km, they would be engaged by the escorting fighters and/or the fighters awaiting direction by the AEW&C. Then there is the question of how effective (and available) the R-172 is. The missile might have the range to reach a distance of 215 n miles, but will it have the guidance and energy to intercept a mobile target. Even if using a radar-homing guidance package, if the MESA makes use of LPI tech, the seeker might not get enough to maintain guidance. Part of the reason the HARM was developed was the prior radar-seeker, Shrike, sometimes didn't hit because the emitter was shut down before the missile could hit, causing the missile to "forget". Modifications were done so that the HARM was faster, hence H for High speed, so that the HARM could strike before the radar could shut down. When factoring in a potentially manuevering airborne target moving at 760+ km/h, with a LPI radar, an R-172 fired at extreme range would have problems...
Thats not what i was arguing at all. Advances in Radar, avionics, missiles and software will no doubt continue in the F35 just as fast as other advances will continue on the Flanker. However the fundimental advantages the F35 has that it will rely on to counter its dissadvantages are being erroded by advances in sensors and networking in the flanker. These errosians can not be recovered by the F35 as they are fundimental to the design. The F35 will continue to increase its radar lead but this will not be decisive because it allready has an advantage in this respect. The crutial argument is systems and technices that will be employed in the Flanker are all intended to counter the LO on the F35 and its the nature of the beast that the F35 ca not just make the aircraft more stealthy like they can install new sensors or avionics.
The point i'm making is the critical advantage that the F35 holds, which is intrenched in its design, is being erroded advances in sensor technology. Without that advantage i dont believe it gives the RAAF the regional air superiority we need.
What I was referring to was the assumptions by some... regarding the potential development paths available for both the Flanker and SH/JSF. The assumptions seemed to be that the sensor development available to the Flanker would allow the Flanker to detect and engage the SH/JSF before the SH/JSF could detect and engage the Flanker. I have problems with assumptions such as these, particularly for the JSF which is a LO design. The SH has LO features (compared to other 4th gen aircraft), and the JSF is LO, though not to the all-aspect degree of the F-22. If LO features were irrelevant, then the preferred air dominance platforms would be Wedgetail variants, armed with hardened, ALRAAM developments of the Phoenix AAM.
On to other things.
Don't short sell JORN or the advantage it can give the ADF. I don't expect I'm writing anything GF doesn't already know and/or have thought about, but JORN, and to a lesser extent SECAR are assets. As I understand it, the systems aren't precise enough to provide an exact location or targeting data, but the early warning that can be provided gives the ADF time to concentrate forces where effective, decide where to engage, and a host of other potential options. Being able to get even a general location on enemy aircraft/vessels up to 3,000+ km away will give options. I don't know if JORN is accurate enough to determine aircraft size, speed, heading or numbers (distinguish between several fighters together in a flight) but if it can at least track heading, SH or JSF should be able to be directed to a position allowing a side-on aspect attack. This would likely negate any sensor developments in the Flanker-series, since the Flanker nose cone housing the sensors would be perpendicular relative to the approaching RAAF aircraft. With a 3,000 km detection range, the advanced notice give the ADF info on "enemy " positioning, before the "enemy" has similar information on the ADF. And ss GF indicated earlier, information is key.
As for the listed scenarios of PLA-AF or IAF vs. RAAF, as presented, I find them of dubious merit at best, even over a 40 year timeframe. At present both sides (PLA-AF/IAF or RAAF) lack the abilities to engage in sustained operations against each other over the distances required. A stand alone attack (cruise missile launch/bombing raid on Perth, Darwin, etc) would be difficult, expensive and ineffective unless done in massive numbers or for delivery of a nuclear device. Either would cause fallout (pun intended) regionally and internationally. Attempts to shorten the distance by forward basing would draw members of the international community into the situation. As for the future, if India or China develop the power projection capabilities to effect Australia and appear threatening then Australia would need to develop as I call it, the "chicken-bone defence". Where Australia, which can't be expected to match either nation in terms of numbers, can retain sufficient striking power to "kill" the attacking nation even as Australia is being defeated. This would most likely consist of nuclear weaponry. Hopefully, this potential situation will just remain an academic discussion.
-Cheers