Actually, to be even more specific. It was a tactic devised by Giap. He termed it the tactic of "holding on to the enemy's belt".
With all due respect we were speaking of Rommel and Normandy! I made a slip, but I am aware of Long Tan. I doubt here was the technology to place accurate fire like that in WW2 since I have read of many accounts in different armies where artillery fires were not accurate and where FF from own air forces were not infrequent.
However to be even more specific
Giap didn't devise anything. Everything he knew he learned from his university days where he supposedly was an admirer of Napoleon 1er. The tactic was used even then when skirmishers tried to get so close to the enemy that guns would have to fire on them, and therefore be prevented from firing on the formed troops behind.
The practice of placing close barrages as defensive fires was well known even in WW1, and probably the best exponent in this was Monash, but he was an engineer and a career (militia) artillerymen by training and service and not a political scientist with a revolutionary bent
Even so, as I understand it took Monash considerable effort to get everyone to work to his precise planning so the fires and infantry movements never 'met'. This was not always, if ever possible in small unit actions in South Vietnam. Giap's troops were simply applying what they had been taught either by the French in combat, or by the Chinese/Russian advisers. The Chinese learned this from Russians of course who had plenty of expereience with artillery.
I suspect that in Rommel's case there was another factor to the tactic. The Americans and Canadians in particular were considered green troops, and it was thought that early experience of close combat would force them to rout. Unfortunately much of German troops in Normandy were not exactly Eastern Front veterans themselves, and they were subjected to not insignificant amount of concentrated firepower just like on the Eastern Front. The Americans and Canadians also displayed good fighting spirit even in the early hours of D-Day.
It seems to me that Rommel was made into a 'great commander' by his Commonwealth opponents in the desert where he was able to outperform for a certain time less able Allied commanders with less flexible doctrine, and was used for propaganda to show that the Commonwealth troops overcame the best Hitler had, assuming Hitler would send his best to such an isolated theatre.
In Germany, as my reading suggests, Rommel was seen as a careerist and an opportunist. He was neither the most gifted or respected officer, nor if he had been he would have been sent to the Eastern Front. The British were seen (maybe mistakenly) as a spent force, and the North African campaign as a 'crutch' for Italians since in Berlin no one ever supposed it was possible for Rommel to advance to India! There was a faint hope that if The British were forced to withdraw to Iraq, Turkey may join the Axis, which is why Libya was fought over, but Egypt had to be held.